Jackson Stallings v. State , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 12587 ( 2016 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
JACKSON STALLINGS,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D16-1448
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed August 19, 2016
3.850 Appeal from the Circuit
Court for Orange County,
Robert J. Egan, Judge.
Jackson Stallings, Jasper, pro se.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.
EDWARDS, J.
Jackson Stallings ("Appellant") appeals the lower court’s order summarily denying
his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850. In light of Atwell v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S244 (Fla. May 26, 2016), which was
decided after the lower court ruled, we reverse and remand for the postconviction court
to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Appellant is entitled to resentencing
pursuant to Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015), and chapter 2014-220, Laws of
Florida.
In 1973, when Appellant was seventeen years old, he pleaded guilty to sexual
battery, robbery, and assault with the intent to commit a felony. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment on the sexual battery charge because sexual battery was a capital offense
at that time. See § 784.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1972). He was sentenced to fifteen years
imprisonment for the robbery charge, followed by a consecutive five-year term for the
assault charge with intent to commit a felony charge. Both sentences were ordered to
run concurrently with Appellant’s life sentence. Appellant was not sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole.
The Florida Supreme Court recently held that a life sentence with the possibility of
parole for a juvenile convicted of homicide violated the Eighth Amendment because
Florida’s statutory parole system does not afford the individualized consideration for
juvenile defendants required by Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Atwell, 41 Fla.
L. Weekly at S248. Under our parole system, a convicted juvenile defendant is given a
hearing by the Commission on Offender Review. Id. at S247. The Commission
determines a presumptive parole date, which is the juvenile's earliest possible release
date from prison. Id. In making its determination, the Commission utilizes objective parole
guidelines that give primary weight to the seriousness of the offender’s present offense
and prior criminal record. Id. These guidelines, however, do not factor in the so-called
diminished culpability of youth. Id. at S247-48. Since the offender’s presumptive parole
date can be scheduled for decades beyond a natural lifespan, a life sentence with the
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possibility of parole may be the practical equivalent of a life sentence without the
possibility of parole. Id. at S247.
In 1999, following a review, the Commission established Appellant's presumptive
parole release date as December 11, 1999; however, that release date was suspended
as a result of an "Extraordinary Review," which discussed a number of infractions accrued
by Appellant during his incarceration. The Commission indicated that another review
would be conducted in July 2004. We cannot determine from the record whether the
Commission conducted a review in July 2004 and a new presumptive release date was
ever calculated, or whether Appellant remains in limbo under the suspended 1999 release
date. With the uncertainty of his release date and no information about any future
reviews, there is a likelihood that the now sixty-one-year-old Appellant will spend the rest
of his life in prison without ever having the “meaningful opportunity for early release.”
Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 680 (Fla. 2015) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
75 (2010)).
Because the Florida Supreme Court has stated that Florida’s parole system is
incompatible with the mandate of Miller, the postconviction court’s reliance on the
Extraordinary Review is no longer sufficient to conclude that Appellant is not eligible for
resentencing. Atwell, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at S244. Accordingly, we reverse the order
summarily denying Appellant’s rule 3.850 motion and remand for the postconviction court
to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine Appellant’s presumptive parole release date
and the Commission's recommendations for his parole release. On remand, the
postconviction court shall also determine whether, in light of Atwell, Appellant must be
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resentenced pursuant to chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, as discussed in Horsley.
See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORPY and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
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