GERARD MCELROY v. FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ( 2022 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    GERARD MCELROY,
    Appellant,
    v.
    FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D22-1344
    [November 23, 2022]
    Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth
    Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Richard Oftedal, Judge; L.T. Case
    No. 50-2022-CA-003578-XXXX-MB.
    Gerard McElroy, Royal Palm Beach, pro se.
    Joseph Ianno, Jr. of the Florida Power & Light Company, Juno Beach,
    for appellee.
    PER CURIAM.
    Appellant, Gerard McElroy, appeals a nonfinal order granting the
    Florida Power & Light Company (“FPL”) temporary injunctive relief to
    enforce its rights arising out of an easement on real property. We affirm
    and write only to address Appellant’s argument that FPL’s petition was
    improper because it sought no relief beyond the temporary injunction.
    Appellant’s property is encumbered by two utility easements which FPL
    owns. The easements grant FPL the right to construct, operate, and
    maintain its electric facilities and to “reconstruct, improve, add to change
    the size of or remove such facilities or any of them.” After Appellant
    refused FPL access to the easements to perform work, FPL filed and served
    Appellant with a verified petition for an emergency injunction. Therein,
    FPL asserted the easements unquestionably granted it the right to access
    the property. Notably, in addition to seeking a temporary injunction, the
    petition also requested Appellant “be permanently enjoined from denying,
    interfering or otherwise prohibiting in any manner [FPL], including any of
    its agents, employees, and contractors access to the Easements.”
    Appellant moved to dismiss the petition, arguing, among other things,
    that the petition improperly sought a temporary injunction as a standalone
    cause of action. Appellant later argued to the trial court that FPL should
    have filed a declaratory judgment action. Following an evidentiary
    hearing, the trial court granted FPL’s petition and entered an order
    temporarily enjoining Appellant from denying, interfering or otherwise
    prohibiting in any manner FPL’s access to the easements “during the
    pendency of this action.” The order set forth detailed findings to support
    each prong of the four-part temporary injunction test and required FPL to
    post a bond. This appeal follows.
    Generally, “a party must first file a complaint or allege a cause of action
    in a pleading for a temporary injunction before injunctive relief can be
    granted.” Shake v. Yes We Are Mad Grp., Inc., 
    315 So. 3d 1223
    , 1226
    (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (quoting Cadillac Plastic Grp., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of
    Martin Cnty., N.A., 
    590 So. 2d 1063
    , 1063 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)). This is
    because “the purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status
    quo until full relief can be granted,” and “[a]llowing a preliminary
    injunction to issue in the absence of a pending request for ultimate relief
    would be contrary to the purpose behind temporary injunctions.” Int’l Vill.
    Ass’n v. Schaaffee, 
    786 So. 2d 656
    , 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
    Here, FPL’s petition sought both temporary and permanent injunctive
    relief. The request for a permanent injunction satisfied the requirement of
    an underlying cause of action. See 
    id.
     at 658–59 (reversing an order
    granting temporary relief because the petition did not request permanent
    relief, and noting “[t]here is little authority on the question of whether a
    plaintiff can seek a temporary injunction without asking for any other form
    of relief or any permanent resolution of the situation”); Skyway Trap &
    Skeet Club, Inc. v. Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 
    854 So. 2d 676
    , 681 (Fla. 2d
    DCA 2003) (noting that a trial court lacks the “authority to issue a
    temporary injunction granting relief which is not predicated on a
    complaint seeking permanent relief”). Moreover, it would have been
    entirely unnecessary for FPL to file a declaratory judgment action as FPL
    was not in doubt of its rights under the easements. If anything,
    it was Appellant who was in doubt of his rights.
    Affirmed.
    GROSS, MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
    *         *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    2