Robert Brklacic v. Lori Parrish, in her official capacity as Property Appraiser of Broward County, Florida and Judith Fink, as Revenue Collector , 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 13660 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    July Term 2014
    ROBERT BRKLACIC,
    Appellant,
    v.
    LORI PARRISH, in her official capacity as Property Appraiser of Broward
    County, Florida, and JUDITH FINK, as Revenue Collector,
    Appellees.
    No. 4D12-2597
    [September 3, 2014]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Mily Rodriguez Powell, Judge; L.T. Case No. 11-2973(03)
    CACE.
    Jerome R. Schechter and Danielle Greenberg of Jerome R. Schechter,
    P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Gregory Durden of Gregory Durden, P.A., and Mila K. Schwartzreich,
    Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.
    FORST, J.
    Appellant Robert Brklacic appeals the final summary judgment entered
    against him in favor of Appellees Lori Parrish (Property Appraiser of
    Broward County) and Judith Fink (Revenue Collector for Broward County).
    Appellant challenged Appellees’ assessment of an ad valorem back tax lien,
    penalties, and interest based on Appellees’ determination that Appellant
    was not entitled to a homestead exemption for his residential property in
    Broward County when a homestead exemption was granted for the Palm
    Beach County residential property of Appellant’s wife.          Appellant
    maintains that he and his wife had established “separate family units,”
    entitling each of them to their own homestead tax exemption on their
    respective residences. Appellees and the trial court found otherwise and,
    upon review of the court’s application of the Florida Constitution and
    Florida Administrative Code, we concur and affirm.
    Background
    Appellant purchased a property in Broward County in 1979, and he
    has resided there continuously while securing a homestead tax exemption
    during that time. Appellant married “the love of his life” in 2001 and, as
    of the time of the hearing in this case, he acknowledged that he and his
    wife continue to maintain a predominately congenial marriage.
    Notwithstanding the 2001 marriage, Appellant’s wife has continued to
    maintain her own residence in Palm Beach County. The couple agreed to
    maintain their own separate residences until each retired, for personal and
    professional convenience. Both before and after the 2001 marriage, both
    spouses claimed homestead tax exemptions for their respective properties.
    Appellant testified that he and his wife never lived together on a daily basis,
    but they stayed together on weekends and holidays when they traveled
    together or when Appellant stayed with his wife at her home in Palm Beach
    County. They have no children living in either residence. Appellant also
    maintained that he and his wife kept separate accounts and monies.
    Article VII, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution allows “[e]very person
    who has the legal or equitable title to real estate and maintains thereon
    the permanent residence of the owner” to claim a homestead tax
    exemption. However, subsection (b) provides, “Not more than one
    exemption shall be allowed any individual or family unit or with respect to
    any residential unit.” Art. VII, § 6(b), Fla. Const. (emphasis added).
    The Florida Department of Revenue is charged with the responsibility
    to establish rules and regulations for assessing and collecting taxes. §
    195.027(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). Thus, the Department of Revenue created
    Administrative Code Rule 12D-7.007 to address the homestead tax
    exemption. Subsection (7) provides, in relevant part:
    A married woman and her husband may establish separate
    permanent residences without showing “impelling reasons” or
    “just ground” for doing so. If it is determined by the property
    appraiser that separate permanent residences and separate
    “family units” have been established by the husband and wife,
    and they are otherwise qualified, each may be granted
    homestead exemption from ad valorem taxation under Article
    VII, Section 6, 1968 State Constitution.
    Fla. Admin. Code R. 12D-7.007(7) (emphasis added).
    In 2010, the Property Appraiser sent Appellant a notice of intent to file
    a lien against his Broward County property because Appellant received a
    homestead exemption for that property for the years of 2002 to 2009, but
    2
    the Property Appraiser found that Appellant was not qualified for such an
    exemption.    Appellant then filed a complaint against the Property
    Appraiser and the Revenue Collector, alleging that he is entitled to the
    exemption because he has always maintained the subject property as his
    permanent residence and, even though he is married, the spouses have
    established separate family units. The complaint requested the court to
    cancel the tax lien and reestablish the homestead exemption to the
    Broward County property.
    The trial court granted the Property Appraiser’s motion for summary
    judgment, finding that the undisputed facts and the evidence support the
    conclusion that Appellant and his wife were a single family unit and, as
    such, Appellant has not shown entitlement to a homestead tax exemption
    as his wife received one in Palm Beach County.
    Analysis
    As noted above, the pertinent Constitutional provision states, “Not more
    than one exemption shall be allowed any individual or family unit or with
    respect to any residential unit.” Art. VII, §6(b), Fla. Const. (emphasis
    added). Two individuals (Appellant and his wife) received two homestead
    exemptions with respect to two residential units (their respective Broward
    and Palm Beach County residences). Appellant argues that he and his
    wife are separate “family units” and, as such, entitled to their own separate
    homestead exemptions for their respective separate permanent residences.
    Neither the Property Appraiser nor the trial court challenged Appellant’s
    claim that he and his wife primarily resided in separate permanent
    residences; the sole contested issue is whether the trial court properly
    determined, on summary judgment, that Appellant and his wife
    constituted one family unit and were thus limited to one homestead
    exemption.
    No constitutional or statutory definition for “family unit” exists, and no
    Florida appellate case addressed the issue until Wells v. Haldeos, 
    48 So. 3d
    85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). In Wells, a husband owned and permanently
    resided on a property in Florida and sought a homestead tax exemption.
    
    Id. at 85.
    The husband had been separated from his wife for a few years
    before he purchased the home and sought the exemption. 
    Id. However, the
    exemption was denied under the provision allowing for only one
    exemption per family unit because the wife owned and permanently
    resided on a property in the state of New York where she was already
    receiving a residency-based property tax exemption. 
    Id. 3 The
    trial court in Wells found that the husband was entitled to the
    exemption and the Second District affirmed, holding that the husband and
    wife constituted separate family units. 
    Id. at 85-88.
    Significantly, “[t]he
    trial court found that it would defy logic for two people ‘who have no
    contact with one another, who don’t have any connections of a financial,
    emotional or any other way to call them a family unit.’” 
    Id. at 86
    (emphasis
    added). In arriving at its decision, the Second District relied on Fla. Admin.
    Code R. 12D-7.007(7), as well as our previous decision regarding
    protection of a homestead from liens in Law v. Law, 
    738 So. 2d 522
    (Fla.
    4th DCA 1999), the Florida Supreme Court’s decision regarding another
    constitutional tax exemption in Judd v. Schooley, 
    158 So. 2d 514
    (Fla.
    1963), and advisory opinions from the Florida Attorney General, which all
    agreed that married persons may establish separate homesteads under
    certain circumstances. Wells, 
    48 So. 3d
    at 87-88. The Second District
    concluded that “in the unique circumstances presented in [Wells], where
    the husband and wife have established two separate permanent
    residences in good faith and have no financial connection with and do not
    provide benefits, income, or support to each other, each may be granted a
    homestead exemption if they otherwise qualify.” 
    Id. at 88.
    It appears that
    the Second District, in defining “family unit” for the purposes of the
    exemption, focused on the fact that the husband and wife were estranged.
    In Law, we, albeit faced with a different constitutional provision
    protecting a homestead from liens, focused on whether the husband and
    wife were in an “intact marriage” to determine whether a husband and wife
    could have two homesteads. 
    Law, 738 So. 2d at 525
    . The husband and
    wife in Law were separated and permanently living apart when the
    husband sought to claim one residence as his homestead to be exempt
    from liens while the wife was living in the couple’s former home where they
    claimed a homestead tax exemption. 
    Id. at 523.
    We analyzed the purpose
    of the homestead exemption against creditors as a means of protecting the
    family unit and concluded that there is “nothing inconsistent with our
    policy if we extend a homestead exemption to each of two people who are
    married, but legitimately live apart in separate residences, if they otherwise
    meet the requirements of the exemption.” 
    Id. at 525
    (emphasis added).
    The advisory opinions from the Florida Attorney General offer further
    guidance as to how to define a “family unit” for homestead tax exemption.
    In opinion number 75-146, the Attorney General was asked to advise
    whether a married, yet separated, husband and wife could claim separate
    homestead tax exemptions when they each established a separate
    permanent residence. Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 75-146 (1975). The question
    was answered in the affirmative because the separation (as in,
    estrangement) of the parties made them separate family units. Id.; see
    4
    also Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 2005-60 (2005) (explaining that opinion number
    75-146 found that the married individuals could obtain separate
    homestead exemptions because of the circumstances where the spouses
    were separated). In the same opinion, the Attorney General referenced
    opinion number 64-05, which found that a married couple living
    separately but still residing together for periods of time could not be entitled
    to separate homestead tax exemptions. Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 75-146 (1975)
    (explaining that opinion number 64-05 concluded that a husband and a
    wife could not both be “granted [a] homestead tax exemption on dwelling
    houses maintained by each of them merely because they spend a large
    part of the time in their separate dwelling houses”) (quoting Op. Att’y Gen.
    Fla. 64-05 (1964)).
    Subsequent advisory opinions consistently emphasize that married
    individuals can obtain separate exemptions only when they have
    established separate permanent residences and separate family units.
    See, e.g., Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 2005-60 (2005); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 2008-13
    (2008). This suggests that, with respect to the legal authorities that have
    addressed the definition of “family unit,” the focus is more than just where
    the members of the family live, contrary to Appellant’s contention in the
    instant case. The foregoing law and persuasive authority favor finding that
    a married couple constitutes a single family unit when the marriage is
    intact, as opposed to the couple being separated or estranged. A single
    family unit would thus exist where spouses (even though living in separate
    primary residences or even separate permanent residences) live together
    at different periods of time, support each other in some financial or
    emotional way, and/or present themselves as a married couple (as
    opposed to estranged individuals who are just technically still married).
    See Wells, 
    48 So. 3d
    at 88; 
    Law, 738 So. 2d at 523-24
    .
    Conclusion
    “Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material
    fact and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
    Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 
    760 So. 2d 126
    , 130 (Fla.
    2000); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). The burden is on the moving party to
    conclusively show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Frost v.
    Regions Bank, 
    15 So. 3d 905
    , 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). “If the record
    reflects even the possibility of a material issue of fact, or if different
    inferences can reasonably be drawn from the facts, the doubt must be
    resolved against the moving party.” McCabe v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 
    68 So. 3d 995
    , 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs. v.
    Lindsey, 
    50 So. 3d 1205
    , 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)).
    5
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the Property Appraiser
    satisfied the criteria for a summary judgment decision in this case. There
    are no issues of material fact as to whether Appellant and his wife
    constituted one “family unit” as that term has been construed,1 and, as
    such, they were limited to one homestead exemption. Appellant has
    presented ample evidence that the Broward County residence was his
    primary residence and that there was little intermingling of the couple’s
    finances. However, he and his wife were not “separated” as that term is
    understood in the context of the marital relationship, and the couple
    regularly spent time together in the same residence.
    Because the undisputed facts are sufficient to establish that Appellant
    and his wife maintained an intact marriage during the operative years,
    they are a single “family unit” entitled to one homestead tax exemption,
    which Appellant’s wife claimed during each year of the time period at issue
    (2002-09). As such, Appellant was not entitled to a second homestead tax
    exemption and the final summary judgment order is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    STEVENSON and CONNER, JJ., concur.
    *         *          *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    1 Appellant never asserted that he and his wife were “estranged” or living separate
    lives 24/365. If he had done so, it would have placed the Property Appraiser and
    her staff in the position of determining whether the couple’s marriage was no
    longer intact—“your honor, Exhibit 33 is a photo of the Defendant and his wife
    holding hands.” On the flip side, an argument could be made that a couple with
    a very intact relationship who split their time between two residences may be able
    to claim two homestead exemptions so long as they are not legally married. One
    commenter has referred to this as the “‘unwed’ loophole.” Amanda S. Coffey,
    Pillow Talk and Property Taxes: Florida’s Family Unit Requirement for Homestead
    Exemption and the Modern Marriage, 41 Stetson L. Rev. 401, 416 (2012).
    Although we need not meander down that thorny path in the instant case, the
    ambiguity and perhaps unforeseen consequences associated with the definition
    of the term “family unit” may merit legislative scrutiny in the near future.
    6