Joshua T. Oliver v. State of Florida , 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 1051 ( 2015 )


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  •                                        IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
    JOSHUA T. OLIVER,                      NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    Appellant,                       DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    v.                                     CASE NO. 1D13-1281
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellees.
    _____________________________/
    Opinion filed January 29, 2015.
    An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
    Adrian G. Soud, Judge
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Courtenay H. Miller, Assistant Public
    Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Giselle Denise Lylen, Assistant Attorney
    General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellees.
    PER CURIAM.
    Appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 30 years in prison
    for a stabbing that occurred at a nightclub. He contends that the jury instructions on
    his sole defense – justifiable use of deadly force – were fundamentally erroneous for
    the reasons stated in Floyd v. State, 
    2014 WL 4197377
     (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 26,
    2014).    We affirm because, at the charge conference, Appellant’s counsel
    affirmatively requested and specifically agreed to the applicable parts of the
    justifiable use of deadly force instructions that were to be included, thereby waiving
    any claim of fundamental error in the instructions. See Armstrong v. State, 
    579 So. 2d 734
    , 735 (Fla. 1991) (“By affirmatively requesting the instruction he now
    challenges,   [the   defendant]   has    waived    any   claim    of   error   in   the
    instruction.”); Joyner v. State, 
    41 So. 3d 306
    , 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[W]here
    defense counsel agrees to a standard jury instruction and then challenges the
    conviction based upon fundamental error in that instruction, reversal would have the
    unintended consequence of encouraging defense counsel to ‘stand mute and, if
    necessary, agree to an erroneous instruction’ or sacrifice his client’s opportunity for
    a second trial.”) (quoting Calloway v. State, 
    37 So. 3d 891
     (Fla. 1st DCA
    2010)); cf. Williams v. State, 
    145 So. 3d 997
    , 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (explaining
    that waiver of a claim of fundamental error in a jury instruction requires more than
    “unknowing acquiescence” to the instruction); Moore v. State, 
    114 So. 3d 486
    , 493
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (holding that counsel’s mere failure to object to an erroneous
    jury instruction is insufficient by itself to waive a claim of fundamental error based
    upon the instruction). We affirm the other issues raised by Appellant without
    discussion.
    2
    AFFIRMED.
    PADOVANO, WETHERELL, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1D13-1281

Citation Numbers: 162 So. 3d 162, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 1051

Judges: Padovano, Wetherell, Makar

Filed Date: 1/29/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024