London v. Dubrovin , 165 So. 3d 30 ( 2015 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed April 29, 2015.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    _______________
    No. 3D13-2881
    Lower Tribunal No. 11-15620
    ________________
    Ruvim London,
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
    vs.
    Vladimir Dubrovin, et. al.,
    Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Daryl E.
    Trawick, Judge.
    Paul A. McKenna, for appellant/cross-appellee.
    Anna Lenchus (Boca Raton); and Keith D. Silverstein (Bay Harbor Islands);
    Eisinger Brown Lewis Frankel & Chaiet, P.A., and Jed L. Frankel (Hollywood),
    for appellees/cross-appellants.
    Before WELLS, SUAREZ and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
    FERNANDEZ, J.
    Appellant Ruvim London appeals the trial court’s order that granted a new
    trial for cumulative unfair surprise and improper closing argument. We reverse
    because there was no cumulative surprise that resulted in prejudice to appellees
    Vladimir Dubrovin, et al., (“Dubrovin”) and any prejudice could have been cured
    before trial.
    London filed his second amended complaint on April 5, 2012, asserting
    fourteen causes of action against Dubrovin. On August 29, 2012, the trial court set
    trial for April 30, 2013, and issued a uniform order setting the case for jury trial.
    On April 30, 2013, the first day of trial, trial court held a hearing on Dubrovin’s
    motion in limine at which the court considered the following issues and ruled as
    indicated.
    First, London served his exhibit list on April 21, 2013, six business days
    before the start of the trial in violation of the pretrial order. The trial court declined
    to exclude the exhibits and offered Dubrovin a continuance. Dubrovin declined.
    Second, London took a videotaped deposition of a witness the day before
    trial, again in violation of the pretrial order. Additionally, London failed to request
    leave from the trial court for the untimely deposition as required under the pretrial
    order.    Dubrovin participated in this deposition, performing a two hour cross
    examination of the witness. Dubrovin did not claim prejudice or surprise from the
    deposition during the hearing, nor did Dubrovin request a continuance based on
    unfair surprise for the untimely deposition.
    2
    Third, London filed, on the day before trial, a “Motion to Correct
    Scrivener’s Error to Re-Designate Second Amended Complaint as Amended
    Complaint, Correct Typographical Errors in Amended Complaint, and to Redact
    Amended Complaint with Dismissed Parties and Counts” along with a proposed
    amended complaint.      This motion essentially corrected the name of a prior
    amended complaint, and removed several parties and charges from the complaint.
    Dubrovin claims this prejudiced them because it forced them to recalibrate their
    defense strategy.   The trial court offered a continuance, and again Dubrovin
    declined.
    On October 22, 2013, the trial court entered an amended order in which it
    granted a new trial based on cumulative unfair surprise. In its order, the trial court
    identified an additional instance of unfair cumulative surprise. London had filed
    its jury instructions the night before the charge conference. Dubrovin made no
    claim of prejudice or surprise, nor did they request a continuance. London also
    waited until the morning of the charge conference to provide Dubrovin’s counsel
    with the case supporting his position. Durbrovin did not raise a claim of prejudice
    or surprise based on the untimely disclosure of London’s supporting case, nor did
    they request a continuance to conduct additional research.
    Additionally, the trial court found two prejudicial “send a message”
    arguments during London’s closing arguments.         The trial court ultimately held
    3
    that the cumulative effect of the incidents, including the “send a message”
    arguments, denied a fair trial.
    We disagree that a new trial is warranted. The standard of review of an
    order that grants or denies a new trial based upon unfair surprise where a
    continuance has been offered and waived is abuse of discretion. Carib Ocean
    Shipping, Inc. v. Armas, 
    854 So. 2d 234
    , 236-37 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). The
    appropriate cure for a violation that results in surprise during the trial is a
    continuance, and a failure to request one precludes a later claim of prejudice. See
    e.g., Binger v. King Pest Control, 
    401 So. 2d 1310
    , 1314 (Fla. 1981)(holding that a
    court may consider a party’s ability to cure the prejudice when weighing a
    violation’s prejudicial effect); Batista v. Walter & Bernstein, 
    378 So. 2d 1321
    ,
    1323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)(failing to move for a continuance due to surprise from
    change in opponent’s theory precludes claiming prejudice on appeal); Rodriguez v.
    State, 
    919 So. 2d 1252
    , 1280 (Fla. 2005)(failing to move for a continuance from
    surprise in an evidentiary hearing precludes claiming prejudice on appeal). We
    note here that during the hearing on Dubrovin’s motion in limine, the trial court
    offered a continuance which was declined.
    Additionally, where individual claims of error fail, a related cumulative
    error claim must likewise fail. See Merck v. State, 
    124 So. 3d 785
    , 802 (Fla.
    4
    2013); see also State v. Duncan, 
    894 So. 2d 817
    , 831 (Fla. 2004); Grifffin v. State,
    
    866 So. 2d 1
    , 22 (Fla. 2003).
    In conclusion, Dubrovin either declined a court offered continuance, or
    failed to request one, after each of the incidents which the trial court identified
    constituted unfair surprise. Thus, like Rodriguez and Batista, Dubrovin did not
    avail themselves of the appropriate remedy for the violations during trial and are
    thus precluded from claiming prejudice. Rodriguez, 919 So. 2d at 1280; Batista,
    
    378 So. 2d at 1323
    . Additionally, as the Florida Supreme Court explained in
    Griffin, since the claims fail individually, they cannot support a cumulative error
    theory. Grifffin, 866 So. 2d at 22.
    We therefore reverse the order for a new trial because there was no
    cumulative unfair surprise that resulted in prejudice to Dubrovin and any prejudice
    could have been cured before trial. We decline to address the remaining issues
    raised in this appeal concluding that they are without merit.
    Reversed and remanded.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3D13-2881

Citation Numbers: 165 So. 3d 30, 2015 WL 1940786

Judges: Wells, Suarez, Fernandez

Filed Date: 4/29/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024