United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Comprehensive Health Center , 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 11689 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •         Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed August 5, 2015.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D13-2232
    Lower Tribunal Nos. 12-56 AP & 12-224 AP
    ________________
    United Automobile Insurance Company,
    Petitioner,
    vs.
    Comprehensive Health Center, a/a/o Erla Telusnor,
    Respondent.
    A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Appellate
    Division, Jennifer D. Bailey, Lisa S. Walsh, and Marcia B. Caballero, Judges.
    Thomas Hunker, for petitioner.
    Marlene S. Reiss, for respondent.
    Before ROTHENBERG, LAGOA, and SCALES, JJ.
    LAGOA, J.
    The petitioner, United Automobile Insurance Company (“United”), petitions
    for a writ of certiorari seeking to: (1) quash a decision of the appellate division of
    the circuit court remanding for a trial on the issue of the reasonableness of the
    claimant’s, Erla Telusnor (“Telusnor”), failure to attend an Independent Medical
    Examination (“IME”); and (2) quash an order of the appellate division of the
    circuit court denying its motion for appellate attorney’s fees.
    Because the appellate division of the circuit court failed to apply the correct
    law when it failed to apply the law of the case, we grant the petition for writ of
    certiorari and quash the circuit court appellate division’s decision. We also quash
    the appellate division’s order denying United’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees
    under the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2012). If the
    terms of the offer of judgment statute are ultimately satisfied, then United shall be
    entitled to recover its appellate attorney’s fees.
    I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    This is the second time this case has been before this Court on petition for
    writ of certiorari. See Comprehensive Health Ctr., Inc. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 
    56 So. 3d 41
     (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), review denied, 
    67 So. 3d 1049
     (Fla. 2011) (circuit
    court opinion at United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Ctr., Inc., 16 Fla.
    L. Weekly Supp. 1143a (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 2009)) (“Comprehensive I”).
    The    underlying     facts   concerning       Comprehensive   Health   Center’s
    (“Comprehensive”) complaint against United seeking personal injury protection
    (PIP) benefits are set forth in this Court’s opinion in Comprehensive I.            In
    2
    Comprehensive I, the appellate division of the circuit court held that it was
    unreasonable that Telusnor failed to attend the IMEs because her lawyer did not
    tell her about the appointment. Comprehensive then filed a petition for writ of
    certiorari to this Court, seeking to quash the appellate division’s decision. This
    Court denied Comprehensive’s petition, concluding that the circuit court did not
    depart from the essential requirements of the law when it held Telusnor’s failure to
    attend IMEs to be unreasonable. 
    56 So. 3d at 42
    . Comprehensive moved for
    rehearing, arguing that this Court’s opinion conflicted with Custer Medical Center
    v. United Automobile Insurance Co., 
    62 So. 3d 1086
     (Fla. 2010). This Court
    denied the motion.
    Comprehensive then petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida to exercise its
    discretionary jurisdiction on the basis that this Court’s opinion directly conflicted
    with Custer. The Supreme Court denied review. Comprehensive Health Ctr., Inc.
    v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 
    67 So. 3d 1049
     (Fla. 2011).
    On subsequent remand in the trial court, Comprehensive filed a Second
    Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that pursuant to Custer, mere non-
    attendance at a scheduled IME is not a defense to an action for PIP benefits, and
    that United failed to allege and prove an unreasonable refusal to attend the IMEs.
    United filed a Cross-Motion Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that
    3
    pursuant to the mandate of the appellate court, it was entitled to summary
    judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
    The trial court granted Comprehensive’s Second Motion for Summary
    Judgment, stating that pursuant to Custer, “in order for it to constitute a defense to
    payment of subsequently received PIP bills the insurance company must plead and
    prove that the insured ‘unreasonably refused’ to attend the [IME].” The trial court
    entered final judgment in the amount of $4,935.60 in favor of Comprehensive.
    United appealed to the appellate division of the circuit court, arguing that the
    trial court failed to follow the law of the case and mandates established by both the
    appellate division of the circuit court and this Court in Comprehensive I. United
    also filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees Based on Rejected Offer of Judgment
    pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes.
    The appellate division reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of
    Comprehensive, but remanded for a trial on whether Telusnor unreasonably failed
    to attend the IMEs. We note that in Comprehensive I, the appellate division had
    already answered that question, finding Telusnor in fact acted unreasonably. In
    reaching its conclusion on this second round of appeals, the appellate division,
    without discussing its own prior holding, stated that, because this Court denied
    certiorari in Comprehensive I, our opinion was merely “dicta” which did not
    constitute the law of the case. Citing to Custer, the appellate division also noted
    4
    that “United was required to plead and prove unreasonable refusal if it intends to
    prevail on this defense.” United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Ctr., 20
    Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 947a (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013). Asserting that the
    “record remains silent after two appeals as to the reasonableness or
    unreasonableness of Telusnor’s failure to attend the IME,” the appellate division
    held that summary judgment was inappropriate, and remanded for a trial. 
    Id.
    The appellate division also entered an order denying United’s motion for
    appellate attorney’s fees and costs. United then filed the present petition for writ
    of certiorari.
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “[W]hen a district court considers a petition for second-tier certiorari review,
    the ‘inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process
    and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise stated,
    departed from the essential requirements of law.” Custer Med. Ctr. v. United
    Auto. Ins. Co., 
    62 So. 3d 1086
    , 1092 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev.
    v. Heggs, 
    658 So. 2d 523
    , 530 (Fla. 1995)); accord Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    774 So. 2d 679
    , 682 (Fla. 2000) (“[T]he proper inquiry under certiorari review is
    limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether it
    applied the correct law.”).
    5
    A second-tier certiorari proceeding “cannot be used to grant a second appeal
    to correct the existence of mere legal error,” and “a district court should exercise
    its discretion to grant review only when the lower tribunal has violated a clearly
    established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Custer, 
    62 So. 3d at 1092-93
    ; accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 
    843 So. 2d 885
    , 889 (Fla.
    2003); Ivey, 
    774 So. 2d at 682, 683
     (stating that a court’s misapplication of the
    correct law or “erroneous interpretation of [a] law” is not a departure from the
    essential requirements of the law).
    A departure from the essential requirements of law is not
    mere legal error, but instead, involves a “gross
    miscarriage of justice.” Heggs, 
    658 So. 2d at 527
    . Due to
    its discretionary nature, a district court of appeal may
    refuse to grant certiorari relief even if there is legal error
    which could be argued to be a departure from the
    essential requirements of law.
    Sutton v. State, 
    975 So. 2d 1073
    , 1081 (Fla. 2008).
    Relevant here, it has been established that when a lower court fails to follow
    the law of the case, certiorari is warranted “because such failure exceeds the court's
    role in the appellate process.” Dougherty v. City of Miami, 
    89 So. 3d 963
    , 966
    (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); accord Dougherty v. City of Miami, 
    23 So. 3d 156
    , 158 (Fla.
    3d DCA 2009) (Wells, J., specially concurring) (granting petition for certiorari and
    quashing circuit court appellate division’s opinion because it failed to apply the
    6
    law of the case as established by its own prior decision, which became binding
    upon this Court’s denial of certiorari review).
    III.   ANALYSIS
    United asserts that certiorari is appropriate because the circuit court failed to
    follow the law of the case as established in Comprehensive I when it remanded
    for a trial on the issue of the reasonableness of Telusnor’s excuse for her failure to
    attend the IMEs. We agree with United.
    A. The law of the case doctrine
    The law of the case doctrine applies where successive appeals are taken in
    the same case. Delta Prop. Mgmt. v. Profile Invs., Inc., 
    87 So. 3d 765
    , 770 (Fla.
    2012); Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 
    801 So. 2d 101
    , 105 (Fla. 2001). It
    provides that “questions of law decided on appeal to a court of ultimate resort must
    govern the case in the same court and the trial court, through all subsequent stages
    of the proceedings.” McGregor v. Provident Trust Co. of Phila., 
    162 So. 323
    , 327
    (Fla. 1935); see also Juliano, 
    801 So. 2d at 105
     (“The doctrine of the law of the
    case requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case
    in the same court and the trial court, through all subsequent stages of the
    proceedings.”).
    7
    Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, a lower court cannot change the law
    of the case as established by the highest court hearing the case, and a trial court
    must “follow prior rulings of the appellate court as long as the facts on which such
    decision are based continue to be the facts of the case.” Juliano, 
    801 So. 2d at 106
    ;
    see also Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    452 So. 2d 550
     (Fla. 1994).
    And, although an appellate court has the power to change the law of the case
    established in its prior decision where adherence to the rule would result in a
    “manifest injustice,” Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 
    177 So. 2d 1
    , 4 (Fla. 1965), a question
    of law decided on appeal will seldom be reconsidered or reversed, even when it
    appears to have been erroneous. See McGregor, 
    162 So. at 728
    ; Parker Family
    Trust I v. City of Jacksonville, 
    804 So. 2d 493
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
    As a result, absent extraordinary circumstances, the ruling of an appellate
    court in an earlier appeal is binding on the lower court on remand, and on the
    appellate court in a subsequent appeal in the same case. See Henry v. State, 
    649 So. 2d 1361
    , 1364 (Fla. 1994) (“[A]ll points of law which have been previously
    adjudicated by a majority of this Court may be reconsidered only where a
    subsequent hearing or trial develops material changes in the evidence, or where
    exceptional circumstances exist whereby reliance upon the previous decision
    would result in manifest injustice.”); see also Brunner Enters., Inc., 452 So. 2d at
    552-53 (stating that the lower courts cannot change the law of the case as decided
    8
    by the highest court hearing a case, and that the highest court hearing a case and
    should only modify the law of the case when adherence to it would result in
    “manifest injustice”).
    United argues that certiorari is appropriate here because the trial court and
    the appellate division of the circuit court failed to follow the law of the case as
    established in Comprehensive I. We agree. Contrary to the appellate division’s
    statement on review before us here, the record is not silent on the issue of
    “reasonableness.”
    During the trial proceedings giving rise to Comprehensive I, the trial court
    conducted a hearing on cross motions for summary judgment as to the
    reasonableness of Telusnor’s excuse for her failure to attend the IME’s, and it
    concluded that summary judgment should be entered in favor of Comprehensive.
    Specifically, the appellate division found that Telusnor received notice of the
    IME, through her attorney, as the “IME notice was sent certified mail to her
    attorney and by regular mail to her.” Comprehensive Health Ctr., 16 Fla. L.
    Weekly Supp. 1143a. Moreover, the provider, Comprehensive, “admitted at the
    lower court hearing that notice to the attorney constitutes notice to the client.” Id.
    As such, the appellate division concluded that Telusnor’s failure to attend the IME
    was “an ‘unreasonable refusal’ under the statute” as “it is not a valid excuse for
    nonattendance, when the claimant is represented by counsel, and counsel received
    9
    valid notice.” Id. The appellate division, therefore, reversed in Comprehensive I,
    holding that based on the evidence presented, which was admittedly undisputed,
    Telusnor’s excuse, as a matter of law, was not reasonable, and that the trial court
    erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Comprehensive “when the
    claimant unreasonably refused to attend the IME.” 1 Id.
    On petition to this Court, we denied Comprehensive’s petition for certiorari
    review, finding that “the appellate division of the circuit court did not depart from
    the essential requirements of the law when it held it to be unreasonable that
    claimant Erla Telusnor failed to attend Independent Medical Exam appointments
    because her lawyer did not tell her about the appointments.” 
    56 So. 3d at 42
    .
    Contrary to the appellate division’s current statement that our finding in
    Comprehensive I was dicta, the appellate division’s earlier finding about the
    unreasonableness of Telusnor’s failure to attend was the central issue before this
    Court and necessary to our elaborated decision in Comprehensive I denying
    certiorari, and it thus constitutes the law of the case. See Topps v. State, 
    865 So. 2d 1253
    , 1258 (Fla. 2004) (“[U]nelaborated orders denying relief in connection
    with all extraordinary writ petitions issued by Florida courts shall not be deemed to
    be decisions on the merits . . . unless there is a citation to authority or other
    statement that clearly shows that the issue was considered by the court on the
    1 The Appellate division’s decision in Comprehensive I reversed and remanded
    the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
    10
    merits and relief was denied.”); State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles
    v. Trauth, 
    971 So. 2d 906
     (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (stating that the law of the case
    doctrine only applies when certiorari is denied on the merits); cf. Turcotte v. City
    of Coconut Creek, 
    88 So. 3d 296
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (finding that res judicata
    barred appeal where prior order of court denying petition for writ of certiorari
    clearly showed that same issue raised on appeal was considered by the court on the
    merits and denied).
    Specifically, this Court considered and addressed the reasonableness of
    Telusnor’s excuse for her failure to appear in denying Comprehensive’s petition
    for certiorari. In reaching its decision to deny certiorari, this Court noted that
    “[b]oth sides agree that Telusnor did not appear for the medical exam
    appointments because she said that she never received notice of them, and/or her
    attorney did not tell her about them.” 
    56 So. 3d at 43
    . Based on that, this Court
    “conclude[d] that Telusnor's reason for her non-appearance at the medical exam
    appointments constituted an unreasonable basis to excuse her non-appearance.” 
    Id.
    Moreover, in considering “the reasonableness of Telusnor’s excuse for her failure
    to appear,” this Court addressed why reasonableness was at issue. 
    Id.
     This Court
    noted that section 627.736(7), Florida Statutes (2009),
    states that if a person unreasonably refuses to submit to a
    medical exam, the PIP carrier is no longer liable for
    subsequent personal injury protection benefits. By using
    the term “unreasonably refuses to submit” in subsection
    11
    627.736(7)(b), it is logical to deduce there are scenarios
    where the insured “reasonably refuses to submit” to the
    examination. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Cimino, 
    754 So. 2d 697
     (Fla. 2000).        Our recent decision in United
    Automobile Insurance Co. v. Gaitan, 
    41 So. 3d 268
     (Fla.
    3d DCA 2010), presents one of those scenarios.
    In Gaitan, unlike here, there was a reasonable basis
    that excused non-attendance at a medical exam. This
    Court held in Gaitan that the circuit appellate court did
    not misapply the law when it remanded the issue of
    reasonableness of claimant's refusal to attend the medical
    exam on the basis that the claimant had never been
    treated by a chiropractor. 
    Id. at 268
    . Telusnor's basis for
    her non-attendance is entirely different.
    
    Id.
     Indeed, this Court stated that “notice to the attorney constitutes notice to the
    client,” id. at 43, and “[w]hen a claimant is represented by counsel and counsel
    received valid notice via certified mail, it is not a reasonable excuse for non-
    attendance.” Id. at 44.
    Given this, the trial court on remand had no discretion to deny United’s
    Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment which was based on the unreasonableness of
    Telusnor’s failure to attend the IMEs.2 The appellate division was similarly bound
    by this Court’s opinion in Comprehensive I, as well as by its own3 prior
    2 See Torres v. Jones, 
    652 So. 2d 893
    , 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“[I]t was error for
    the trial court to modify the final judgment on remand, and to change the law of the
    case as determined by the highest court hearing the case.”); Wilcox v. Hotelerama
    Assocs., Ltd., 
    619 So. 2d 444
    , 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (“A trial court does not
    have discretionary power to alter or modify the mandate of an appellate court in
    any way, shape, or form.”); Hessen v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 
    569 So. 2d 887
     (Fla. 3d
    DCA 1990) (granting motion to enforce mandate where trial court’s class
    certification on remand altered this Court’s determination regarding the class
    representative in first appeal).
    12
    determination on the issue of “reasonableness.”4 Accordingly, we find that the
    appellate division’s decision before us failed to apply the correct law when it failed
    to follow the law of the case as established in Comprehensive I. See Juliano, 
    801 So. 2d at 105
     (“The doctrine of the law of the case requires that questions of law
    actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court . . . through all
    subsequent stages of the proceedings.”); see also Dougherty, 23 So. 3d at 158
    (holding that circuit court failed to apply the correct law when it failed to enforce
    its prior decision after this Court issued a denial of certiorari review in
    Morningside Civic Ass’n v. Dougherty, 
    944 So. 2d 370
     (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
    (table)).
    Comprehensive, however, asserts that this Court should deny certiorari
    because the circuit court properly recognized that the intervening Supreme Court
    of Florida case of Custer “requires United to prove its affirmative defense [of
    unreasonable refusal] in this case.” While an intervening decision by a higher
    court is indeed one of the rare situations in which the highest court hearing a case
    will consider a request to modify the law of the case in order to prevent a “manifest
    3 It is irrelevant – despite the suggestion of the appellate division panel in
    Comprehensive II – that different appellate division panels of the circuit court
    heard and ruled on Comprehensive I and Comprehensive II.
    4 If the appellate division had wished to change the law of the case established by
    its prior decision – and if this Court had not issued an elaborated opinion in
    Comprehensive I, the appellate division would still have had to follow the high
    standards set by McGregor and Strazzulla as discussed supra.
    13
    injustice,” Comprehensive is incorrect that Custer constituted an intervening
    decision that required the appellate division to disregard the law of the case. See
    Brunner, 452 So. 2d at 553; accord Strazzulla, 
    177 So. 2d at 4
     (“Another clear
    example of a case in which an exception to the general rule should be made results
    from an intervening decision by a higher court contrary to the decision reached on
    the former appeal, the correction of the error making unnecessary an appeal to the
    higher court.”).
    In Custer, United moved for a directed verdict without having presented any
    evidence on its affirmative defense that the claimant’s failure to attend a medical
    examination was unreasonable as a matter of law under section 627.736(7).
    Custer, 
    62 So. 3d at 1090
    . The trial court granted United’s motion, partly on the
    basis that the claimant’s failure to appear for examination without excuse or
    objection to the notices constituted an unreasonable refusal. 
    Id.
     The appellate
    division of the circuit court reversed, holding that “in the absence of evidence
    supporting the affirmative defense, the directed verdict is premature.” 
    Id. at 1091
    .
    This Court subsequently granted United’s petition for certiorari, quashed the circuit
    court’s reversal, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the directed verdict in
    favor of United.
    In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court held that United “was
    required to present evidence to the fact-finder that [the claimant] unreasonably
    14
    failed to attend a medical examination without explanation after having received
    proper notice.” 
    Id. at 1097
     (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court noted that
    the trier of fact was not presented with affirmative evidence that the claimant
    actually received notice of the scheduled medical examinations or that any failure
    was unreasonable. 
    Id.
     The Supreme Court also stated that “United had the burden
    of demonstrating the absence of any material issue of fact,” 
    id. at 1098
    , and that
    the “directed verdict was premature because United had not demonstrated the
    absence of any material issue of fact for the jury” regarding the reasonableness of
    the failure to attend. 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    It is undisputed that United raised the issue of unreasonableness in this case;
    Custer requires that United present affirmative evidence that Telusnor
    unreasonably failed to attend the IMEs without explanation after having received
    notice and not rely on the mere fact of non-attendance. At the initial proceedings
    before the trial court that gave rise to Comprehensive I, it was undisputed that
    Telusnor gave no excuse or explanation for her non-attendance.          United then
    presented undisputed evidence that notices of the IMEs were sent to both Telusnor
    and her attorney, that service was made by certified mail on her attorney, and that
    notice on the attorney constituted proper notice on Telusnor. Perhaps presciently
    anticipating Custer’s future ruling, the appellate division in Comprehensive I
    found that proper notice had in fact been received and that, based on the
    15
    undisputed facts in the record, Telusnor had unreasonably failed as a matter of law
    to attend the IMEs. This finding is consistent with Custer’s subsequent holding
    that the insurer bear the burden of presenting actual evidence to show unreasonable
    non-attendance after receipt of proper notice. Put another way, United satisfied its
    evidentiary burden on its affirmative defense, whether analyzed pre- or post-
    Custer.
    Unlike Custer, in which this Court erroneously affirmed the grant of a
    directed verdict in favor of a defendant where there was a complete absence of
    evidence in support of the defendant’s affirmative defense, in Comprehensive I,
    there was not a complete absence of evidence, but rather, a determination by the
    appellate division (on undisputed facts) that United’s evidentiary presentation
    demonstrated the absence of any material issue of fact concerning the
    “unreasonable refusal” issue.     Additionally, this Court in Comprehensive I
    concluded that this was not a departure from the essential requirements of the law.
    For these reasons, Custer does not modify the law of the case as established in
    Comprehensive I.
    Finally, United also seeks a writ of certiorari to quash a separate order of the
    appellate division denying its motion for appellate attorney’s fees. In its appeal to
    the circuit court below, United filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees Based on a
    Rejected Offer of Judgment. United stated that it served Comprehensive with a
    16
    proposal for settlement which was not accepted within thirty days, and that if it
    prevailed on appeal it was entitled to an award of appellate attorney’s fees pursuant
    to the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79. The circuit court sitting in its
    appellate capacity reversed the final judgment entered in favor of Comprehensive,
    and in a separate order denied United’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees. In
    denying United’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees, the circuit court failed to
    apply the correct law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
    It is well settled that “[t]he plain and mandatory terms of the proposal for
    settlement statute encompass all costs and attorney’s fees incurred leading up to a
    final judgment,” including fees incurred on appeal. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
    Rembrandt Mobile Diagnostics, Inc., 
    93 So. 3d 1161
    , 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012);
    accord Motter Roofing, Inc. v. Leibowitz, 
    833 So. 2d 788
    , 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
    (“This Court, along with all district courts in Florida, has ruled that Section 768.79
    also applies to fees incurred on appeal. . . . Thus, the circuit court, sitting in its
    appellate capacity, departed from the essential requirements of law by denying the
    petitioner's request for appellate attorney's fees.”) (internal citations omitted).
    This Court has previously held that “section 768.79 creates an independent,
    substantive, and statutory basis for the award of attorney’s fees when the
    requirements of the statute have been met.” United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Virga, 
    116 So. 3d 1288
    , 1289-90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting DuPont Builders, Inc. v.
    17
    Baker, 
    987 So. 2d 146
    , 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)).              Moreover, it has been
    established that the failure of the circuit court to grant an award of appellate fees,
    conditioned upon meeting the terms of the offer of judgment statute, in a scenario
    similar to the instant one is a departure from the essential requirements of the law.
    See Rembrandt, 
    93 So. 3d at 1161
    .
    Accordingly, the circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity should have
    conditionally granted United’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees incurred in
    successfully obtaining a reversal of the final judgment entered in favor of
    Comprehensive.      The failure to do so was a departure from the essential
    requirements of the law. We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari, and
    quash the circuit court’s order denying United’s motion for appellate attorney’s
    fees under the offer of judgment statute. If the terms of the offer of judgment
    statute are ultimately satisfied, United will be entitled to recover its appellate
    attorney’s fees.
    IV.   CONCLUSION
    Because the appellate division’s failure to apply the correct law, as
    established in Comprehensive I, constitutes a departure from the essential
    requirements of the law, see Dougherty, 89 So. 3d at 966, we grant United’s
    petition for certiorari and quash the circuit court’s appellate decision remanding for
    a trial on the issue of reasonableness.
    18
    We also quash the circuit court’s order denying United’s motion for
    appellate attorney’s fees under the offer of judgment statute. If the terms of the
    offer of judgment statute are ultimately satisfied, United will be entitled to recover
    its appellate attorney’s fees.
    Petition granted; decision quashed and order quashed.
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3D13-2232

Citation Numbers: 173 So. 3d 1061, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 11689, 2015 WL 4634556

Judges: Rothenberg, Lagoa, Scales

Filed Date: 8/5/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (23)

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Rembrandt Mobile ... , 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 12524 ( 2012 )

Torres v. Jones , 652 So. 2d 893 ( 1995 )

Delta Property Management v. Profile Investment, Inc. , 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 157 ( 2012 )

United Automobile Insurance Co. v. John S. Virga, D.C., P.A. , 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 11627 ( 2013 )

Turcotte v. City of Coconut Creek , 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 6040 ( 2012 )

Custer Medical Center v. United Automobile Insurance Co. , 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 640 ( 2010 )

Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs , 658 So. 2d 523 ( 1995 )

Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 25 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1103 ( 2000 )

Wilcox v. Hotelerama Associates, Ltd. , 619 So. 2d 444 ( 1993 )

US SEC. Ins. Co. v. Cimino , 754 So. 2d 697 ( 2000 )

Motter Roofing, Inc. v. Leibowitz , 833 So. 2d 788 ( 2002 )

DuPont Builders, Inc. v. Baker , 987 So. 2d 146 ( 2008 )

Sutton v. State , 975 So. 2d 1073 ( 2008 )

STATE, DEPT. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY v. Trauth , 971 So. 2d 906 ( 2007 )

Henry v. State , 649 So. 2d 1361 ( 1994 )

Parker Family Trust I v. City of Jacksonville , 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 17753 ( 2001 )

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos , 843 So. 2d 885 ( 2003 )

Florida Dept. of Transp. v. Juliano , 26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 784 ( 2001 )

Comprehensive Health Center, Inc. v. United Automobile ... , 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 19841 ( 2010 )

Topps v. State , 865 So. 2d 1253 ( 2004 )

View All Authorities »