Nuila v. Stolp , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 5024 ( 2016 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
VICTOR NUILA,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D15-2686
CRYSTAL STOLP,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed April 1, 2016
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Brevard County,
Kelly J. McKibben, Judge.
Lindsey M. Sharp, Melbourne,
for Appellant.
No Appearance for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Victor Nuila, seeks reversal of the one-year injunction against dating
violence obtained against him by his former girlfriend, Crystal Stolp ("Appellee"),
pursuant to section 784.046(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2015). An injunction against dating
violence would be statutorily authorized in this case if Appellee proved three elements:
(1) a dating relationship within the past six months; (2) at least one occasion of dating
violence; and (3) reasonable cause to believe that petitioner is in imminent danger of
another act of dating violence. Id. We review the judgment for competent substantial
evidence proving those three elements. Toubail v. White, 141 So. 3d 649, 650 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2014) (citing Schutt v. Alfred, 130 So. 3d 772, 772 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)).
As to the first element, both parties testified at the June 25, 2015, hearing that
they had been in a dating relationship within the past six months. As to the second
element, dating violence, Appellee and Appellant gave conflicting testimony about how
Appellant twisted Appellee's arm and gave her a black eye on June 9, 2015, when he
went to Appellee's house seeking the last of his personal effects. Appellee testified that
Appellant punched her, while Appellant testified that he was acting in self-defense. The
trial court found Appellee's testimony more credible. Thus, there was competent
substantial evidence that Appellee was the victim of dating violence. We find there was
sufficient proof of the first two of three statutory elements required for granting an
injunction against dating violence.
Next, we consider what proof was offered as to the third element: reasonable
cause to believe that Appellee was in imminent danger of another act of dating violence.
As to this element, the trial court considered two email messages that Appellant sent
before the act of dating violence. In the emails, Appellant lamented his breakup from
Appellee and indicated that once Appellee allowed him to retrieve the rest of his
belongings, he would disappear from her life forever. Appellee conceded that she did
not consider the messages threatening. In addition to the emails, Appellee testified that
her home's swimming pool and air conditioner were vandalized in May 2015. Although
she suspected Appellant was responsible, she had no proof. The trial court did not
consider the vandalism as support for the third element. There was also no evidence
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admitted at the hearing to establish that Appellant ever threatened Appellee with
physical injury or violence. After the one incident of violence, there was no further
contact, attempted contact, communication, or interaction between Appellant and
Appellee.
When specifically asked what proof she had that she was in imminent danger of
future dating violence, Appellee testified that she was afraid Appellant may try to hurt
her again because he hurt her in the aforementioned incident. To obtain an injunction,
"[i]t is not sufficient to have been the victim of one incident of dating violence in the
past." Alderman v. Thomas, 141 So. 3d 668, 669 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). We find that the
third statutory element, reasonable cause to believe that she was in imminent danger of
another act of dating violence, was not supported by competent substantial evidence.
Therefore, the injunction should not have been entered.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ORFINGER, COHEN and EDWARDS JJ., concur.
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