Donald Miller and Mary T. Miller v. The Bank of New York Mellon, etc. , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 6431 ( 2016 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    DONALD MILLER and MARY T. MILLER,
    Appellants,
    v.
    THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f/k/a THE BANK OF NEW YORK,
    as TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF CWMBS, INC.,
    CHL MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH TRUST 2006-8, MORTGAGE PASS-
    THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-8, BANK OF AMERICA,
    N.A., successor by merger to COUNTRYWIDE BANK, FSB f/k/a
    COUNTRYWIDE BANK, N.A., OCEAN PEARL II HOMEOWNER’S
    ASSOCIATION, INC., UNKNOWN TENANT #1, and UNKNOWN TENANT
    #2,
    Appellees.
    No. 4D15-36
    [April 27, 2016]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
    Indian River County; Cynthia L. Cox, Judge; L.T. Case No.
    312013CA000481.
    Shirlarian N. Williams, Peter Ticktin and Kendrick Almaguer of The
    Ticktin Law Group, P.A., Deerfield Beach, for appellants.
    J. Kirby McDonough and S. Douglas Knox of Quarles & Brady LLP,
    Tampa, for appellees The Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of New
    York Mellon As Trustee for the certificate holders of CWMBS, Inc., CHL
    Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-8, Mortgage Pass Through
    Certificates, Series 2006-8.
    ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
    DAMOORGIAN, J.
    On consideration of Appellee’s motion for rehearing, the Court denies
    the motion, withdraws the opinion filed March 2, 2016, and substitutes
    the following opinion in its place.
    Appellants, Donald and Mary Miller, appeal a final judgment of
    foreclosure in favor of The Bank of New York Mellon (the “Bank”).
    Appellants argue that the judgment should be reversed because the Bank
    failed to establish that it complied with conditions precedent to filing suit.
    Based on the trial court’s finding to the same, we reverse.
    Following a bench trial in front of a magistrate in a routine mortgage
    foreclosure action, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Bank
    for past due amounts under the subject note. However, the trial court
    declined to award the accelerated amount due under the note based upon
    its finding that the Bank did not send proper notice of acceleration as
    required by paragraph twenty-two of the mortgage. In awarding the past
    due amounts, the court reasoned that “failure to comply with paragraph
    [twenty-two] does not affect entitlement to foreclose on past due
    installments.”
    Our holding in Holt v. Calchas, LLC, 
    155 So. 3d 499
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
    dictates otherwise. In Holt, we explained on rehearing:
    Although in our previous opinion, which is now withdrawn[1],
    we construed paragraph twenty-two as relating to acceleration
    remedies and not past due amounts, upon consideration of
    Holt’s motion for rehearing, we are satisfied that failure to prove
    compliance with paragraph twenty-two at trial requires
    dismissal of the case due to the requirements imposed by
    paragraph twenty of the mortgage, which provides:
    Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence ...
    any judicial action pursuant to this Security
    Instrument or that alleges that the other party has
    breached any provision of, or any duty owed by
    reason of, this Security Instrument, until such
    Borrower or Lender has notified the other party ...
    of such alleged breach and afforded the other party
    hereto a reasonable period after the giving of such
    notice to take corrective action. .... The notice of
    acceleration and opportunity to cure given to
    Borrower pursuant to [paragraph] 22 ... shall be
    deemed to satisfy the notice and opportunity to
    1   The final judgment appealed was rendered before we issued our opinion in
    Holt on rehearing and as such, the trial court relied on the withdrawn version of
    Holt in awarding the Bank past due amounts.
    2
    take corrective action provisions of this [paragraph]
    20.
    
    Id.
     at 507 n.4.
    Paragraph twenty of the mortgage at issue in this case contains
    identical language to that quoted by Holt. Accordingly, Holt compels us to
    conclude that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the
    Bank for past due amounts and foreclosure in light of its finding that the
    Bank failed to comply with the notice requirements in the mortgage. The
    proper remedy in light of such determination was a complete dismissal.
    
    Id.
    Although the Bank challenged the merits of the court’s finding
    regarding the Bank’s failure to comply with the mortgage’s notice
    requirements in its answer brief, the issue is not properly before us as the
    Bank did not file a cross-appeal. On rehearing, the Bank asserts that it
    did not need to file a cross-appeal as it seeks to defend final judgment in
    its favor. However, the Bank overlooks the fact that the court ruled in
    Appellants’ favor on the notice issue, and based on this ruling, refused to
    accelerate the note. If we were to hold that the court erred in determining
    that the Bank did not comply with the notice requirements of the
    mortgage, then the judgment for past due amounts would be legally
    incorrect, and we would be compelled to reverse and remand for entry of
    a new judgment for the entire accelerated amount of the note. We cannot
    take such action in absence of a cross-appeal. See Cespedes v. Yellow
    Transp., Inc. (URC)/Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., 
    130 So. 3d 243
    , 249
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
    Reversed.
    TAYLOR and GERBER, JJ., concur.
    *         *         *
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 4D15-36

Citation Numbers: 189 So. 3d 359, 2016 WL 1699202, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 6431

Judges: Damoorgian, Taylor, Gerber

Filed Date: 4/27/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024