Dyck-O'Neal, Inc. v. Rojas ( 2016 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
DYCK-O'NEAL, INC.,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D15-3266
LARRY ROJAS,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed July 15, 2016
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Orange County,
John E. Jordan, Judge.
Susan B. Morrison, of Law Offices of Susan
B. Morrison, Tampa, for Appellant.
N. James Turner, of NJT Law, LLC,
Orlando, for Appellee.
LAMBERT, J.
Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. (“Appellant”) appeals the order dismissing its amended
complaint for a deficiency judgment based on the trial court’s finding that it lacked
personal jurisdiction over Appellee. Concluding that the facts before the trial court
established the necessary minimum contacts for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over Appellee, we reverse.
The material facts in this case are not in dispute. Appellee, a resident of California,
purchased a condominium in Florida to serve as a residence for his daughter while she
attended college. To facilitate the purchase of this real property, Appellee obtained a loan
and executed and delivered a promissory note, which was secured by a mortgage on the
condominium. Appellee later defaulted on the note, and a foreclosure suit was filed
against him in Orange County, Florida. The plaintiff in that case obtained a final judgment
of foreclosure in which the court, among other things, reserved jurisdiction over the parties
to render a deficiency judgment, if permissible.
The mortgaged property sold at a foreclosure sale. The interest in the promissory
note and the judgment, including the right to seek a deficiency, was ultimately assigned
to Appellant. Thereafter, Appellant filed a separate action at law pursuant to section
702.06, Florida Statutes (2013), to obtain a deficiency judgment. See Garcia v. Dyck-
O’Neal, Inc., 178 So. 3d 433, 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (holding that the unambiguous
language of section 702.06 permits the filing of a separate action at law for a deficiency
judgment, notwithstanding the foreclosure court’s reservation of jurisdiction in its final
judgment to consider a deficiency).
In the order on appeal, the trial court reasoned that, because the promissory note
and mortgage merged into the earlier foreclosure judgment, the Appellant, by electing to
bring the separate action at law instead of pursuing the deficiency in the original
foreclosure proceeding, had essentially negated its only basis to acquire personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident Appellee. The court also noted that Appellee had no
connections with Florida and Appellant’s amended complaint did not allege any other
separate connections that Appellee had with this state other than the transaction and
foreclosure litigation previously described. Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion
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to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is de novo. Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d
1252, 1256–57 (Fla. 2002) (citing Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc., v. New Oji Paper Co., 752
So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000)).
In Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989), the Florida
Supreme Court articulated a two-pronged inquiry for determining whether a Florida state
court has long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a particular case. See
Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1257 (citing Execu-Tech. Bus. Sys., 752 So. 2d at 584). First, in
the “statutory prong,” the court must determine whether “the complaint alleges sufficient
jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit” of Florida’s long-arm statute. Id.(quoting Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., 752 So. 2d at 584). Second, in the “constitutional prong,”
the court must determine whether the non-resident defendant maintains “certain minimum
contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice[,]’” as provided in the United States
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the due process clause of the Constitution of the
United States. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., 752 So. 2d
at 584). This federal due process clause “minimum contacts” inquiry “asks whether the
non-resident’s ‘conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’” See Balboa v. Assante, 958 So. 2d
573, 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 287 (1980)).
The provision of the Florida long-arm statute applicable in the present case is
section 48.193(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2013), which provides:
(1)(a) A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the
acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or
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herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal
representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for
any cause of action arising from any of the following acts:
....
3. Owning, using, possessing, or holding a mortgage
or other lien on any real property within this state.
Appellee argued below and argues here that this provision of the long-arm statute
requires continuing ownership, use, or possession of real property by a nonresident
before Florida can acquire personal jurisdiction. We disagree. The language of the
statute merely requires that Appellant’s cause of action arose from a nonresident’s
ownership of real property in Florida. See Nicholas v. Paulucci, 652 So. 2d 389, 392 n.5
(Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“By itself, ownership of property is insufficient to subject a
nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, unless the cause of
action arose out of such ownership.” (citation omitted)); see also Holt v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 32 So. 3d 194, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (explaining that 1993 amendment to section
48.193(1)(a)3., adding the words “holding a mortgage or other lien on,” is more
reasonably read to extend personal long-arm jurisdiction to those holding a mortgage or
lien on real property in Florida, not eliminating the long-standing jurisdictional basis for
those owning real property within Florida).
In Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Huthsing, 181 So. 3d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), our sister
court essentially addressed the same scenario presently before us. There, as in the
present case, the trial court dismissed the appellant’s amended complaint for deficiency
judgment, concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the appellee, a non-resident.
181 So. 3d at 555. In reversing, the First District concisely explained:
Applying the principles discussed by the Florida
Supreme Court in Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.
42d 499 (Fla. 1989), the well-pleaded allegations of the
amended complaint (which went undisputed by appellee's
affidavit attached to her motion to dismiss) were sufficient to
bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm
statute—section 48.193, Florida Statutes. Federal due
process concerns were satisfied by appellee's prior conduct,
the final judgment of foreclosure, and the foreseeable future
consequence of a deficiency judgment; appellee reasonably
could have anticipated “ ‘being haled into court’ ” in this state.
Id. at 500 (quoting World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490(1980)). We hold requisite minimum contacts existed for the
trial court to acquire personal jurisdiction over appellee.
Id.1
We agree with this reasoning. Appellant’s amended complaint sufficiently pleaded
that its cause of action arose from Appellee’s ownership of real property in Florida.
Moreover, Appellee should have reasonably anticipated being “haled” back to Florida to
address a claim for deficiency, as the foreclosure final judgment expressly reserved
jurisdiction over the parties to enter a deficiency judgment. Finally, we attribute no
significance to Appellant pursuing the deficiency judgment in a separate action, as
opposed to reopening the original foreclosure proceeding because, under the facts of the
case, the plain language of section 702.06 permitted it to do so.
Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the amended complaint and remand
this case for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
TORPY and COHEN, JJ., concur.
1In defense of the trial judge below, he did not have the benefit of the First District’s
opinion when he issued the order on appeal.
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