Ejak v. State ( 2016 )

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, LAKELAND, FLORIDA
October 19, 2016
AMER ALI EJAK, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D13-5332
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
________________________________ )
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellant's motion for rehearing, written opinion and/or certification is granted to
the extent that we substitute the following opinion for the per curiam affirmance issued
April 29, 2016. The motion is denied in all other respects. No further motions for
rehearing will be entertained.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A
TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER.
MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL, CLERK
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
AMER ALI EJAK, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D13-5332
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
________________________________ )
Opinion filed October 19, 2016.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County; Emmett Lamar
Battles, Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender,
and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Special Assistant
Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford
Taylor, Assistant Attorney General,
Tampa, for Appellee.
KELLY, Judge.
Amer Ali Ejak was seventeen years old when a jury found him guilty of
first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Ejak to life in prison without the
possibility of parole on September 3, 2013. The date is significant because Ejak's
sentence was imposed after the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v.
Alabama 1—which held that it was unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile convicted of
homicide to a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole—but before the
Florida Legislature enacted section 921.1401(2), Florida Statutes (2014), to bring
Florida's sentencing scheme in line with Miller. Faced with sentencing Ejak at a time
when Florida had no valid sentencing statute for juveniles convicted of first-degree
murder, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing designed to comport with the
dictates of Miller and then sentenced Ejak to life without the possibility of parole.
While this appeal was pending, the Florida Supreme Court decided
Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015), which held that chapter 2014-220, Laws of
Florida, applies to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional under
Miller. Id. at 409. Ejak filed a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing error citing
Horsley and arguing that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing in accordance
with the procedures outlined in chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, which are codified in
sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014). The trial court
granted the motion in part. As required by section 775.082(1)(b)(3), it made a written
finding that Ejak was eligible for a sentence review hearing under section
921.1402(2)(a). However, it denied the motion to the extent it requested a new
sentencing hearing under section 921.1401(2). On appeal, Ejak argues the trial court
erred in not conducting a new sentencing hearing. We disagree. 2
1
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2Ejak raises several issues in this appeal, none of which have merit. We
originally issued a per curiam affirmance, but granted his motion for rehearing, written
opinion, and/or certification in part to address his argument that he was entitled to be
resentenced. In all other respects his motion was denied.
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The question in Horsley was what remedy was appropriate for sentences
that were unconstitutional under Miller but which were imposed for crimes committed
before the effective date of the new sentencing scheme. The supreme court stated its
choice of remedy was driven by a desire to fashion a remedy that was consistent with
legislative intent and Miller. See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 405-06. The remedy it chose—
application of the new law—would provide juveniles with individualized consideration
before sentencing and, for most juveniles, subsequent judicial review of their sentences.
See id. at 408. Ejak received both.
Unlike Horsley, Ejak was sentenced after Miller was decided. The trial
court recognized Miller required individualized consideration, and it conducted a
sentencing hearing specifically intended to comport with the requirements of Miller. Its
sentencing order addressed the factors spelled out in Miller, which were later
incorporated into section 921.1401(2). Ejak argues the trial court did not consider all
the statutory factors; however, a review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing and
the trial court's sentencing order show otherwise.
The trial court's order fully and carefully set out its findings, and we
conclude it addressed all the factors described in section 921.1401(2), to the extent
each of those factors was applicable. At sentencing, Ejak—unlike Horsley—received
the individual consideration required by Miller. Thus, his life sentence was not
unconstitutional under Miller, and absent an unconstitutional sentence under Miller, he
was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing under section 921.1401(2). We also note
that to the extent Horsley can be read to say that the Constitution requires that juveniles
sentenced to life must be afforded an opportunity for subsequent judicial review of their
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sentences, the trial court recognized this and, as required by section 775.082(1)(b)(3),
made a written finding that Ejak was eligible for sentence review under section
921.1402(2). Ejak received everything he was constitutionally or statutorily entitled to
and, accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying his rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to
correct sentencing error.
Affirmed.
WALLACE and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
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