Vincent Sansone v. Frank Crum/Frank Winston Crum Insurance, Inc. , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 16230 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                                        IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
    VINCENT SANSONE,                       NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    Appellant,                       DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    v.                                     CASE NO. 1D15-5116
    FRANK CRUM/FRANK
    WINSTON CRUM
    INSURANCE, INC.,
    Appellees.
    _____________________________/
    Opinion filed November 2, 2016.
    An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.
    Mary A. D’Ambrosio, Judge.
    Date of Accident: January 14, 2015.
    Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
    William H. Rogner and Paul L. Luger, Winter Park, for Appellees.
    WINSOR, J.
    This appeal is about attorney’s fees. Under section 440.34(3)(b), Florida
    Statutes (2014), successful claimants can recover attorney’s fees from a carrier or
    employer in certain circumstances. But the statute includes a grace period, providing
    that “attorney’s fees shall not attach” until thirty days after the carrier or employer
    receives the petition for benefits. The question we address is what happens if the
    carrier or employer accepts responsibility for medical expenses within thirty days
    but does not actually pay the medical bills until after thirty days. We hold that so
    long as the carrier or employer accepts responsibility for medical expenses within
    the thirty-day grace period, it is not liable under section 440.34(3)(b) for fees
    associated with those benefits. We therefore affirm the order denying fees.
    Facts and Procedural History
    Vincent Sansone suffered a workplace injury when he fell from a scaffold.
    After the employer/carrier initially denied compensability, Sansone retained counsel
    and filed a petition seeking disability payments, payment of an outstanding hospital
    bill, and attorney’s fees. Within thirty days of receiving the petition, the
    employer/carrier rescinded its denial, paid the disability benefits, and accepted
    responsibility for paying the hospital bill. A few weeks later, the employer paid the
    hospital bill.
    Sansone’s attorney then filed a separate petition for attorney’s fees, asserting
    that “[a]s a result of our efforts, we obtained for [Sansone] the payment of the
    hospital bill.” The employer/carrier objected, arguing that the statutory grace period
    precluded fees because the employer/carrier accepted responsibility within thirty
    days of receiving the petition for benefits. The judge of compensation claims denied
    2
    the fee petition, and Sansone appeals. Because this appeal turns on pure issues of
    law, our review is de novo. See Airey v. Wal-Mart/Sedgwick, 
    24 So. 3d 1264
    , 1265
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
    Analysis
    Attorney’s fees under section 440.34(3)(b) require the “successful prosecution
    of the petition,” but fees cannot attach until thirty days after the employer receives
    the petition. § 440.34, Fla. Stat.; see also Neville v. JC Penney Corp., 
    130 So. 3d 235
    , 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Franco v. SCI at Palmer Club at Prestancia, 
    989 So. 2d
    709, 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Therefore, an award under section 440.34(3)(b)
    requires some part of the “successful prosecution” to occur after thirty days. In other
    words, if the petition fully succeeds before the thirty days run, fees do not attach. Cf.
    Franco, 
    989 So. 2d
    at 710 (“Because more than 30 days elapsed from the date the
    e/sa received the petition and claimant successfully achieved acceptance and
    payment of the claim, all of the statutory requirements of section 440.34(3), Florida
    Statutes (2006), have been met.”). The question here, then, is whether Sansone’s
    petition finally succeeded when the employer accepted responsibility for the hospital
    bill (which was before the thirty days ran) or when the employer actually paid the
    hospital bill (which was after).
    3
    Sansone relies on this court’s decisions holding that “successful prosecution”
    under section 440.34(3) is not achieved until there has been acceptance and payment.
    See, e.g., Franco, 
    989 So. 2d
    at 710; McDonald’s Rest. #7160 v. Montes, 
    736 So. 2d 768
    , 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). And to be sure, we have said that “timeliness of
    payment of benefits is determined not by the date on which the E/C notifies a
    claimant’s attorney that the claim is accepted and benefits will be paid, but by ‘the
    date checks of payment are placed in the mail.’” Williams v. State Dep’t of Corr./Div.
    of Risk Mgmt., 
    97 So. 3d 923
    , 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (quoting Amerimark, Inc. v.
    Hutchinson, 
    882 So. 2d 1114
    , 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)). But those cases addressed
    claims for benefits payable directly to claimants. The payment at issue here was to
    the hospital—not to Sansone himself. 1
    The actual benefit Sansone received was not the employer/carrier’s payment
    to the hospital; it was his being relieved of any obligation to pay the hospital himself.
    Sansone became “insulated from financial responsibility” for the hospital bill after
    the employer/carrier accepted responsibility. See Bergstein v. Palm Beach Cty. Sch.
    Bd., 
    97 So. 3d 878
    , 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); see also § 440.13(3)(g), (13)(a), Fla.
    Stat. (2014). At that point, when or whether the employer/carrier actually paid the
    1
    Sansone also sought indemnity benefits, which the employer/carrier actually
    paid before the thirty days ran. Those benefits are not at issue here.
    4
    bill became immaterial to Sansone; it was then only a matter between the hospital
    and the employer/carrier.2
    Conclusion
    When it comes to medical benefits, a claimant’s successful prosecution ends
    when the carrier or employer accepts responsibility, regardless of when the carrier
    or employer actually pays the medical providers. In this case, that happened within
    thirty days after the employer/carrier received the petition for benefits, so Sansone’s
    attorney’s fee petition was properly denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    B.L. THOMAS and WETHERELL, JJ., CONCUR.
    2
    Although not necessary for resolution of this appeal, we note Sansone’s
    position—that the date of payment controls—would mean in some instances fee
    entitlement could turn on medical providers’ billing practices. In this case, the
    employer/carrier had the bill in time to pay it within the thirty days. But in another
    case, a carrier or employer might not even receive the bill until after the thirty days
    has run.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1D15-5116

Citation Numbers: 201 So. 3d 1289, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 16230

Judges: Winsor, Thomas, Wetherell

Filed Date: 11/2/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024