Alfred E. Hawkins v. State of Florida , 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 7884 ( 2017 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
ALFRED E. HAWKINS, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D16-1120
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed June 1, 2017.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Terry P. Lewis, Judge.
Valarie Linnen, Atlantic Beach, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
BILBREY, J.
Upon the State’s motion for clarification of our original opinion, we grant
the motion, withdraw the original opinion, and substitute the following opinion.
After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder with a
firearm, armed robbery with a firearm, and tampering with physical evidence
following the death of Alex Blas. Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of
his motion for judgment of acquittal as to all three counts, but applying a de novo
standard of review, we find the evidence was legally sufficient. See Durousseau v.
State, 55 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 2010).
Appellant, who was seventeen at the time the crimes were committed, also
challenges his life sentences for the murder and robbery convictions as violations
of the Florida and federal constitutions’ prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. See Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.; Amend. VIII, U.S. Const. The trial court
conducted an individualized sentencing and considered the factors under section
921.1401, Florida Statutes, which was added to address the prohibition set forth in
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), of a mandatory life sentence for any
crime committed by a juvenile. The trial court also ordered a “sentence review
hearing” to occur after 25 years, pursuant to section 921.1402, Florida Statutes,
due to the fact Appellant was convicted of a “capital felony,” referencing the
homicide offense. Appellant’s life sentence for the homicide offense (1st Degree
Murder) is therefore constitutional and in compliance with Florida law.
As to the life sentence for robbery (count II), the trial court’s order for a
sentence review hearing did not clearly specify that the review applied to both the
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capital felony and the nonhomicide felony (armed robbery with firearm). In
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held
that a life sentence for a crime committed by juvenile who did not commit a
homicide offense was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment, unless
there was “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.” For a time after Graham, there was a split of
authority among the district courts of Florida as to whether the prohibition in
Graham of a life sentence for a nonhomicide offense, which would be otherwise
punishable by life, applied when a juvenile also committed a homicide in the same
criminal episode. This court took the position that Graham prohibited a life
sentence without meaningful opportunity for early release for a nonhomicide
offense even when a juvenile committed a homicide in the same criminal episode.
See Jackson v. State, 187 So. 3d 853 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). The Florida Supreme
Court agreed and stated, “Graham’s categorical rule leaves no room for the
homicide-case exception.” Lawton v. State, 181 So. 3d 452, 453 (Fla. 2015). The
Court in Lawton went on to state, “the ban on sentencing juveniles to life without
parole for nonhomicide offenses is, indeed, unqualified.” Id.
However, a life sentence with future judicial review, as provided by section
921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014), validly addresses the constitutional
requirements for cases such as Appellant’s. See Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393
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(Fla. 2015); see also Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5, 10 (Fla. 2016) (agreeing that the
“new sentencing scheme contemplates the possibility of a life sentence for a
juvenile nonhomicide offender.”). Since the sentence for count II imposes a life
sentence without clearly providing a meaningful opportunity for early release, we
must remand for resentencing.
Based on the above, the convictions for counts I, II, and III, and the
sentences for counts I and III are AFFIRMED. However, Appellant’s life sentence
for count II, armed robbery with a firearm, committed when he was seventeen, is
REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing, including the judicial review
provided for by section 921.1402, Florida Statutes, as applicable.
WETHERELL and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.
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