Willie K. Clay v. State , 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 12568 ( 2017 )


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  •          IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FIFTH DISTRICT
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    WILLIE KEITH CLAY,
    Appellant,
    v.                                                    Case No. 5D16-2987
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    ________________________________/
    Opinion filed September 1, 2017
    Appeal from the Circuit Court
    for Orange County,
    Mark S. Blechman, Judge.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and
    Thomas J. Lukashow, Assistant Public
    Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
    Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman,
    Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
    Beach, for Appellee.
    COHEN, C.J.
    Willie Keith Clay appeals his conviction and sentence after a jury found him guilty
    of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements. Clay argues that there
    was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. We agree and therefore reverse and
    remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
    To establish its prima facie case, the State was required to demonstrate that Clay
    qualified as a sexual offender, which included establishing that Clay was released from
    incarceration on or after October 1, 1997. See § 943.0435(1)(h)1.a.(I)–(II), Fla. Stat.
    (2015); see also Fla. Std. Jury Inst. (Crim.) 11.14(g) (delineating elements of failure to
    register charge: (1) status as sexual offender; (2) offender’s county of residence; and (3)
    knowing failure to reregister). The State offered no direct evidence to do so, providing
    neither a witness nor documentation from the Department of Corrections to meet its
    burden. Instead, the State relied solely on an inference that, because Clay was given a
    ten-year sentence on October 30, 1995, he must have been released from incarceration
    after October 1, 1997.
    On appeal, the State maintains that Clay’s sentence is prima facie evidence of the
    date of his release. We disagree. The State has the burden to prove each element of the
    offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. That cannot be accomplished based on
    guesswork. A number of factors impact the amount of time an inmate serves on any given
    sentence, and that information is not presented to the jury for determination of an inmate’s
    release date. Moreover, statutory sentencing schemes have changed over time, and the
    amount of time inmates are required to serve has fluctuated significantly. 1
    No evidence was presented on prison release policies from which the jury could
    conclude that Clay was released from incarceration after October 1, 1997. The State did
    not present any other evidence during its case that would have established his precise
    release date from incarceration—an essential element to finding that Clay qualified as a
    sexual offender under the statute. See Munroe v. State, 
    28 So. 3d 973
    , 975 (Fla. 2d DCA
    2010) (“To convict a defendant of failure to register as a sexual offender, the State must
    1 For example, the requirement that inmates serve eighty-five percent of their
    sentences by limiting the accrual of gain time applies only to offenses committed on or
    after October 1, 1995. See § 944.275(4)(f), Fla. Stat. (2015).
    2
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a sexual offender unless the
    defendant stipulates that he or she is a sexual offender.” (quoting In re Std. Jury Instrs. in
    Crim. Cases-Report No. 2007-4, 
    983 So. 2d 531
    , 533 (Fla. 2008))). Therefore, the trial
    court erred in denying Clay’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s
    case.
    Alternatively, the State contends that Clay’s testimony during the defense’s case-
    in-chief was sufficient to establish that his release date was after October 1, 1997. We
    reject this argument. A defendant does not waive the arguments made in a motion for
    judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case by subsequently introducing
    evidence. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.380(b); see also Franklin v. State, 
    718 So. 2d 902
    , 905
    (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (“[A] defendant does not run the risk of supplying a missing link in
    the state’s evidence by presenting evidence after moving for a judgment of acquittal at
    the close of the state’s case.”).
    Because the State failed to meet its burden of proof, we reverse and remand for
    entry of a judgment of acquittal.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    ORFINGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Case 5D16-2987

Citation Numbers: 226 So. 3d 346, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 12568

Judges: Cohen, Orfinger, Wallis

Filed Date: 9/1/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024