Alex Peterson v. State ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •          IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FIFTH DISTRICT
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    ALEX PETERSON,
    Appellant,
    v.                                                       Case No. 5D16-4341
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    ________________________________/
    Opinion filed December 1, 2017
    Appeal from the Circuit Court
    for Brevard County,
    Jeffrey Mahl, Judge.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and
    Robert E. Wildridge, Assistant Public
    Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
    Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller,
    Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
    Beach, for Appellee.
    PER CURIAM.
    The sole contention raised by Appellant in this appeal is that the present prison
    sentences imposed upon him by the trial court after Appellant violated probation in his
    three cases below are unlawful. Appellant argues that when he was initially sentenced,
    he received “true” split sentences, thus limiting the trial court’s sentencing discretion upon
    Appellant’s later probation violation. Having reviewed the transcripts from the original
    sentencing hearings, we conclude that Appellant did not initially receive “true” split
    sentences, and therefore, we affirm his present sentences.
    “A ‘true’ split sentence consists of a total period of confinement with [all or] part of
    that confinement suspended. Generally, the defendant is placed on probation for the
    suspended portion of the confinement.” Moore v. Stephens, 
    804 So. 2d 575
    , 577 (Fla.
    5th DCA 2002) (citing Poore v. State, 
    531 So. 2d 161
    , 164 (Fla. 1988)).
    “[W]hen a sentencing court imposes a true split sentence, the
    judge has effectively sentenced the defendant in advance for
    a probation violation and is not later permitted to change his
    or her mind. Upon revocation of probation, the court may not
    order the defendant incarcerated for a period exceeding the
    suspended portion because to do so would be a violation of
    the double jeopardy clause.”
    Harris v. State, 
    218 So. 3d 457
    , 458 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (quoting Boone v. State, 
    967 So. 2d 999
    , 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)).
    The State disagrees that when first sentenced Appellant received a “true” split
    sentence. Rather, the State argues that Appellant initially received a “probationary” split
    sentence, which involves a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation. See
    
    Moore, 804 So. 2d at 577
    . A defendant violating the probation of a “probationary” split
    sentence is thereafter subject to being sentenced by the trial court to the maximum
    allowable period of incarceration for the crime committed.       Howells v. State, 
    16 So. 3d 852
    , 853 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (citing 
    Poore, 531 So. 2d at 164
    ).
    The written sentencing documents in this case are unclear as to whether Appellant
    first received a “true” split sentence or a “probationary” split sentence. However, our
    review of the transcripts filed of record from these sentencing hearings clearly show that
    2
    Appellant did not receive “true” split sentences when first sentenced because the trial
    court explicitly provided that Appellant would serve a period of incarceration followed by
    a term of probation and did not suspend any portion of Appellant’s incarceration. Under
    these circumstances, “[w]here a conflict exists between the oral pronouncement of
    sentence and [the] written sentencing documents, the oral pronouncement controls.”
    Chrystie v. State, 
    95 So. 3d 1027
    , 1028 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (citing Williams v. State, 
    957 So. 2d 600
    , 603 (Fla. 2007)). Because the trial court’s oral pronouncements of sentences
    conclusively show that Appellant received “probationary” split sentences, his present
    prison sentences imposed after violating probation, which are all within the allowable
    statutory maximums, are lawful.
    AFFIRMED.
    SAWAYA, EVANDER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Case 5D16-4341

Judges: Sawaya, Evander, Lambert

Filed Date: 12/1/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024