WILLIAM SALUS v. ISLAND HOSPITALITY FLORIDA MANAGEMENT, INC. ( 2020 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    WILLIAM SALUS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    ISLAND HOSPITALITY FLORIDA MANAGEMENT, INC.,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D18-3222
    [January 15, 2020]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Sandra Perlman, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE17006971.
    Lawrence J. McGuinness of MG Legal Group, P.A., Coconut Grove, for
    appellant.
    Kristen D. Perkins and Paige S. Newman of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
    Smith LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
    LEVINE, C.J.
    An employee appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of the
    employer on the employee’s claim of retaliatory discharge under section
    440.205, Florida Statutes. In interpreting the statute, the trial court found
    no prima facie case of retaliation because the employer terminated the
    employee before the employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation
    benefits. We disagree with the trial court’s interpretation that the
    employee did not attempt to claim compensation under the statute.
    Because a material issue of fact exists as to the employer’s reason for
    discharge, summary judgment is not proper at this juncture. We therefore
    reverse.
    On March 24, 2017, the employee sustained an injury while performing
    workplace duties. The employee notified the employer of the injury the
    following day and later informed the employer he was having difficulty
    receiving follow-up treatment for his injuries. The employer fired the
    employee less than two weeks after the work-related injury.
    The parties’ depositions set forth conflicting reasons for the discharge.
    The employer submitted depositions from three employees describing an
    incident in which the employee became angry and threatened a coworker,
    stating: “I’ll take you outside and beat you with my bad arm.” The
    employee stepped towards the coworker, but the manager stepped between
    them to defuse the situation. Two managers called the employee on the
    phone the following day. After the employee admitted to making the
    threat, the managers told the employee that he was being terminated
    because he threatened another employee with physical harm. The
    managers explained to the employee that the reason for termination had
    nothing to do with his injury or seeking workers’ compensation benefits.
    During the employee’s deposition, the employee denied threatening his
    coworker and denied admitting on the phone to the managers that he
    threatened the coworker. The employee claimed that the other employees
    were lying about the incident. He further testified that the managers did
    not give him a reason for terminating his employment.
    Following his termination, the employee filed a claim for retaliatory
    discharge under section 440.205. Subsequently, the employee filed a
    petition for workers’ compensation benefits. The employer moved for
    summary judgment, arguing that the employee could not establish a prima
    facie case of retaliation because his termination was not causally related
    to his workers’ compensation claim. The employer pointed out that the
    employee’s termination occurred before he had filed a petition for benefits.
    The employer further argued that they had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
    reason for terminating the employee.
    After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
    the employer, stating:
    The undisputed summary judgment evidence before the Court
    was that [the employee] filed his Petition for Benefits after his
    termination by [the employer]. While [the employee] argues
    that he is nevertheless entitled to a presumption of retaliation
    based on the circumstantial evidence of temporal proximity
    between the filing of the Petition for Benefits and his
    termination, this Court finds he is not as Fla. Stat. § 440.205
    requires a showing of a statutorily protected activity, an
    adverse employment action and a causal connection between
    the statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment
    action. Florida law is clear that solely suffering a workplace
    injury and informing the employer of the injury is not alone
    an attempt to file a claim or seek benefits under Florida’s
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    Workers’ Compensation Act. Accordingly, as [the employee]
    has not asserted a prima facie case of retaliation pursuant to
    Fla. Stat. § 440.205, [the employer] is entitled to final
    summary judgment in its favor on [the employee’s] Complaint.
    We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Frost v.
    Regions Bank, 
    15 So. 3d 905
    , 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). “Summary
    judgment cannot be granted unless the pleadings, depositions, answers to
    interrogatories, and the admissions on file together with affidavits, if any,
    conclusively show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
    and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hurchalla
    v. Homeowners Choice Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2527 (Fla.
    4th DCA Oct. 16, 2019).
    Statutory construction is a question of law subject to de novo review.
    BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 
    863 So. 2d 287
    , 289 (Fla. 2003).
    Section 440.205, states: “No employer shall discharge, threaten to
    discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such
    employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation
    under the Workers’ Compensation Law.” (emphasis added). To make a
    prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove the following three
    elements: “1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity; 2) the plaintiff
    was thereafter subjected by his employer to an adverse employment action;
    and 3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
    employment action.” Koren v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 
    97 So. 3d 215
    ,
    219 (Fla. 2012) (citation omitted). “In order to establish a claim under
    section 440.205, the employee’s pursuit of workers’ compensation need
    not be the only reason for a discharge.” Hornfischer v. Manatee Cty.
    Sheriff’s Office, 
    136 So. 3d 703
    , 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). In the present
    case, the employee had not filed the claim, but had taken steps in seeking
    benefits.
    The trial court found that the employee could not make a prima facie
    case under the statute because he did not in fact petition for benefits until
    after his termination. The trial court did not consider if the employee’s
    actions constituted an “attempt to claim compensation.” The trial court
    merely relied on the fact that the claim was filed after the employee’s
    termination. However, the fact that the employee did not file a formal claim
    for workers’ compensation benefits until after his termination does not
    automatically preclude a claim for retaliatory discharge. See Flores v. Roof
    Tile Admin., Inc., 
    887 So. 2d 360
    , 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (reversing
    summary judgment, even though no benefits claim was made before
    termination of employment, where material issues of fact existed as to the
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    reason for the firing); Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 
    524 So. 2d 642
    (Fla. 1988)
    (remanding a district court case for further proceedings where the
    employee “first filed a workers’ compensation claim one month after he
    was terminated,” see Otis Elevator Co. v. Scott, 
    503 So. 2d 941
    , 942 (Fla.
    4th DCA 1987)). The evidence showed that the employee went to the
    hospital the day of the injury, notified his employer of the injury the
    following day, had a discussion with the employer regarding difficulties in
    receiving follow-up treatment, and obtained everything he needed from the
    employer with respect to workers’ compensation. The employee effectively
    sought benefits under the statute. Thus, the employee’s attempt to claim
    compensation brought his actions under the protection of the retaliation
    statute.
    Under the trial court’s interpretation, an employer could circumvent
    section 440.205 by terminating employment immediately after a workplace
    injury and before the employee even has a chance to file a claim for
    benefits. A statutory provision should not be construed in such a way that
    leads to absurd results. Giamberini v. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 
    162 So. 3d 1133
    ,
    1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). For this reason, other jurisdictions interpreting
    similar statutes have declined to adopt such an interpretation of the
    statute. See Hudson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    412 F.3d 781
    , 786 (7th Cir.
    2005) (finding the fact that employee did not file for workers’ compensation
    benefits before his termination was not fatal to his claim; otherwise, an
    employer could “preemptively terminat[e] employees as soon as it caught
    wind that an injured employee was considering a claim”); White v.
    Goodyear Tire, 
    96 F.3d 1444
    (5th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n employee can recover
    for retaliation for taking steps to collect a workers’ compensation claim
    ‘even when the employee was fired before filing a claim for compensation
    so long as the evidence shows that the employee took steps towards
    instituting a compensation proceeding.’”) (citation omitted); Wright v. Fiber
    Indus., Inc., 
    299 S.E.2d 284
    , 287 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the
    applicable statute was “intended to prevent employers from firing or
    demoting employees in retaliation for pursuing their remedies under the
    Workers’ Compensation Act” and that if the statute “were limited only to
    retaliatory acts which occurred after the employee filed his claim, an
    employer could easily avoid the statute by firing the injured employee
    before he filed”). In the present case, it was clear that the employee took
    “steps” to begin the process of claiming and seeking benefits under the
    statute.
    Where, as here, “a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by proving
    the protected activity and the negative employment action are not
    completely unrelated, the burden then shifts to the employer to proffer a
    legitimate reason for the adverse employment action.” Ortega v. Eng’g Sys.
    4
    Tech., Inc., 
    30 So. 3d 525
    , 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). “A plaintiff withstands
    summary adjudication at this stage either by producing sufficient evidence
    to permit a reasonable finder of fact to conclude the employer’s proffered
    reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct, or that the proffered
    reasons are not worthy of belief.” 
    Id. In moving
    for summary judgment,
    the employer argued that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
    terminating the employee: that the employee threatened a coworker.
    However, the employee disputed this claim in his deposition and denied
    that he threatened a coworker. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact
    exists as to the reason for termination, precluding summary judgment.
    See Twin Rivers Eng’g, Inc. v. Pacer USA, LLC, 
    257 So. 3d 140
    , 142 (Fla.
    4th DCA 2018) (reversing summary judgment where conflicting affidavits
    gave rise to a material issue of fact); Hodges v. Citrus World, Inc., 
    850 So. 2d
    648, 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (reversing summary judgment where
    genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether employee was
    terminated for pursuing workers’ compensation claim or for violating
    employer’s administrative rules).
    For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the summary judgment entered
    in favor of the employer and remand for further proceedings.
    Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
    MAY and FORST, JJ., concur.
    *        *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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