VERONICA SAUNDERS v. FLORIDA PENINSULA INSURANCE COMPANY ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed December 23, 2020.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D19-1049
    Lower Tribunal No. 16-16302
    ________________
    Veronica Saunders,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Florida Peninsula Insurance Company, et al.,
    Appellees.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Pedro P. Echarte,
    Jr., Judge.
    Cernitz Shanbron, LLC., and Justin Cernitz; Alvarez, Feltman, Da Silva &
    Costa, PL, and Paul B. Feltman, for appellant.
    Kelley Kronenberg, P.A., and Kimberly J. Fernandes (Tallahassee), for
    appellees.
    Before EMAS, C.J., and GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Veronica Saunders (the “insured”) appeals from the trial court’s entry of
    summary judgment in favor of Florida Peninsula Insurance Company (the
    “insurer”). Finding that the insured’s all-risk insurance policy’s faulty workmanship
    exclusion prohibits coverage for the alleged loss, we affirm.
    The insured hired a contractor to install a new addition to her property. During
    the installation process, the contractor removed a portion of the roof of the main
    house and left the opening exposed (covered only with tarps) for a few weeks, and
    the insured’s home sustained damage when it rained.             Following a denial of
    coverage, the insured filed a petition for declaratory relief seeking a determination
    of coverage under her policy.
    The insurer moved for summary judgment on the basis that the conduct of the
    contractor was not a covered peril under the subject policy because it expressly
    excludes loss to property caused by “[f]aulty, inadequate[,] or defective . . . [d]esign,
    specifications, workmanship, repair, construction, renovation, remodeling, grading,
    [and] compaction.” The insured opposed summary judgment arguing that the
    policy’s faulty workmanship provision was ambiguous, as it could refer to either
    “the faulty quality of a finished product” or “a faulty process,”1 and thus, should be
    construed in her favor not to exclude the contractor’s conduct during the installation
    1
    Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1359 (1984) defines “workmanship”
    as: “1. something effected, made, or produced: WORK” and “2. the art or skill of a
    workman: CRAFTMANSHIP.”
    2
    process. The trial court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment and
    subsequently entered final judgment in favor of the insurer.
    We review a trial court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. Gidwani v.
    Roberts, 
    248 So. 3d 203
    , 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). Insurance policy construction,
    which is a question of law, is also subject to de novo review. Arguelles v. Citizens
    Prop. Ins. Corp., 
    278 So. 3d 108
    , 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).
    We note at the outset that a policy’s faulty workmanship exclusion is not
    ambiguous merely because standing alone, the word workmanship is susceptible to
    two meanings.      Rather, a policy’s faulty workmanship exclusion should be
    interpreted in context of the insurance policy at hand. See Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc.
    v. Se. Fid. Ins. Corp., 
    636 So. 2d 700
    , 704 (Fla. 1993) (“Our duty is to determine
    whether the [particular] word . . . is ambiguous in the context of the specific
    insurance policy at issue.”). More particularly, because an insurance policy must be
    interpreted as a whole, the meaning of a term within the policy should be ascertained
    by reading the term in conjunction with the entire policy, including the terms with
    which it is associated. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 
    756 So. 2d 29
    , 34
    (Fla. 2000); Arguelles, 278 So. 3d at 111 (“[I]n construing insurance policies, courts
    should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full
    meaning and operative effect.”) (quoting Anderson, 
    756 So. 2d at 34
    ); see also State
    Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez, 
    70 So. 3d 566
    , 570 (Fla. 2011) (“Both the
    3
    broader context of the policy’s defined terms and the immediate context of the policy
    exclusion provision point unambiguously to the conclusion that the . . . exclusion [at
    issue] is applicable here.”).
    Here, the faulty workmanship exclusion is listed in a subsection of the policy
    that excludes from coverage damage caused by both a faulty product and a faulty
    process. Further, the word workmanship is listed between the words “[d]esign [and]
    specifications” and “repair, construction, renovation, remodeling, grading, [and]
    compaction.” This signals that, contrary to the insured’s contention, the subject
    policy intended the term faulty workmanship to mean more than just the flawed
    finished product and include the faulty process interpretation of the term as well.
    Thus, when read in context, we find that the subject policy’s faulty workmanship
    exclusion is unambiguous and should not be construed to mean only a flawed
    finished product. Accordingly, we conclude that the policy’s faulty workmanship
    exclusion excludes coverage for the insured’s loss and affirm.
    Affirmed.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-1049

Filed Date: 12/23/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/23/2020