KENNETH HENDEL v. INTERNET ESCROW SERVICES, INC., etc. ( 2021 )


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  •       Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed February 3, 2021.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D19-2148
    Lower Tribunal No. 17-23056
    ________________
    Kenneth Hendel,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Internet Escrow Services, Inc., etc.,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David C.
    Miller, Judge.
    Stok Kon + Braverman, and Robert A. Stok and Gabriel G. Mandler
    and Yosef Kudan (Fort Lauderdale), for appellant.
    EBI Law, PLLC and B. Elizabeth Interthal (Tampa); and Garbett, Allen
    & Roza, P.A., and David S. Garbett, for appellee.
    Before FERNANDEZ, SCALES, and HENDON, JJ.
    HENDON, J.
    Kenneth Hendel (“Hendel”) appeals from a final judgment dismissing
    his action filed in Miami-Dade Circuit Court, with prejudice, based on an
    internet contractual forum selection clause requiring all disputes be litigated
    exclusively in Orange County, California. We affirm.
    Hendel owns and operates a local art gallery in Aventura, Florida. In
    April 2016, Hendel entered into an online transaction (“Buyer/IES
    Agreement”) to purchase a piece of art for $38,000 from a seller located in
    Switzerland. The transaction took place via a website owned and operated
    by Internet Escrow Services d/b/a Escrow.com (“IES”), which provided the
    escrow services for the transaction. Specifically, after the seller initiated the
    online transaction with IES and indicated that Hendel was the buyer, IES
    sent Hendel three separate emails indicating that Hendel had not yet agreed
    to the transaction and requesting that Hendel: (1) sign in to his IES account;
    (2) click on the transaction number; and (3) then “agree to the terms and the
    escrow instructions.” The emails contained a button to select titled “Review
    and Agree to terms.”
    Hendel clicked on the “Review and Agree to Terms” button which took
    Hendel to the IES “Agree Page.” At the top of the Agree Page were buttons
    to “Agree,” “Modify” and “Cancel Transaction.” On the Agree Page, Hendel
    was able to review the merchandise, the terms of the purchase and sale
    2
    transaction, and the General Escrow Instructions. The General Escrow
    Instructions section allowed Hendel to scroll through the instructions without
    opening a new webpage, and also to print them out. Hendel clicked on the
    “Agree” button and then deposited the $38,000 purchase money with IES.
    When Hendel received the art piece, he discovered that it was a
    forgery. What followed were protracted efforts by Hendel to return the art
    piece and recover his deposit from IES, including going to arbitration and
    participating in an interpleader action in California. 1 When efforts to recover
    his money from IES proved unsuccessful, Hendel filed the instant action
    against IES in the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court. IES moved to dismiss
    Hendel’s initial complaint based on the forum selection clause in the
    Buyer/IES Agreement. After further proceedings, the lower court denied the
    motion based on limited evidence, consisting of, inter alia, Hendel’s affidavit
    1
    On July 8, 2016, in accordance with the General Escrow Instructions, IES
    filed an interpleader action against the Seller and Hendel in the Superior
    Court in Orange County California (“CA Action”). The Seller never responded
    and on March 17, 2017, IES applied for a default judgment against the Seller
    permitting IES to release the Escrowed Funds to Hendel on the condition
    that IES “will do so in return for Mr. Hendel’s release of the artwork to Plaintiff
    counsel’s office to hold in trust and agree to continue to attempt to contact
    Defendant ….” Hendel, however, refused to allow IES or its counsel to hold
    the artwork. As a result, IES voluntarily dismissed Hendel without prejudice
    from the CA Action, and the court entered a default judgment against only
    the Seller.
    3
    denying that he had agreed to the General Escrow Instructions containing
    the forum selection clause. IES voluntarily dismissed its appeal.
    In Hendel’s Second Amended Complaint, the operative complaint, he
    alleged claims against IES for fraud in the inducement, negligent
    misrepresentation, violation of FDUTPA and for a declaratory judgment. As
    for the declaratory judgment claim, Hendel alleged, among other things, that
    he had no actual or constructive notice that the General Escrow Instructions
    and the Terms of Use were part of the transaction. IES again moved to
    dismiss the Second Amended Complaint based on the mandatory forum
    selection clause contained in the General Escrow Instructions. After
    considering argument and evidence, the trial court granted the motion and
    dismissed complaint, with prejudice, based on the forum selection clause.
    Hendel appeals.
    Standard of review
    A Rule 1.140(b)(3) motion to enforce a forum selection clause is
    evidentiary, see Steiner Transocean Ltd. v. Efremova, 
    109 So. 3d 871
     (Fla.
    3d DCA 2013), and the lower court properly considered the evidentiary
    presentations. Interpretation of the forum selection clause presents a
    question of law for de novo review. Antoniazzi v. Wardak, 
    259 So. 3d 206
    ,
    209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). The finding that Hendel assented to the forum
    4
    selection clause is factual, subject to the clearly erroneous standard, and will
    be affirmed on substantial competent evidence. See Citigroup Inc. v. Caputo,
    
    957 So. 2d 98
    , 100 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
    Discussion
    The forum selection clause in the Buyer/IES agreement requires all
    disputes to be litigated exclusively in Orange County, California 2, as follows:
    Governing Law; Venue
    This Agreement will be construed in accordance with and
    governed exclusively by the laws of the State of California
    applicable to agreements made among California residents and
    to be performed wholly within such jurisdiction, regardless of
    such parties’ actual domiciles. All parties submit to personal
    jurisdiction in California, and venue in the County of Orange,
    State of California. The aforementioned choice of venue is
    intended by the parties to be mandatory and not permissive in
    nature. Each party hereby waives any right it may have to assert
    the doctrine of forum non conveniens or similar doctrine or to
    object to jurisdiction or venue with respect to any proceeding
    brought in accordance with these General Escrow Instructions.
    For the purposes of this appeal, Hendel does not contest that the forum
    selection clause is mandatory. See Espresso Disposition Corp. 1 v. Santana
    Sales & Mktg. Grp., Inc., 
    105 So. 3d 592
    , 595 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (such
    clauses are presumptively valid; reversible error to refuse to enforce
    mandatory forum-selection clause). Rather, Hendel argues that IES’s venue
    2
    Further, the funds were deposited in California and are currently held in
    California.
    5
    objections are procedurally barred, either by waiver or as successive
    motions.
    Rule 1.140(b) requires the defendant to plead “specifically and with
    particularity” the defense of improper venue, failing which the point will be
    waived. Three Seas Corp. v. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc., 
    913 So. 2d 72
    , 74
    (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). IES preserved its venue challenge with particularity at
    all stages of litigation. IES specifically objected to venue in Miami-Dade in
    response to Hendel’s first complaint. When IES voluntarily dismissed its
    appeal in that case, and Hendel submitted an amended complaint, IES once
    again objected based on the mandatory forum selection clause. The court’s
    denial of IES’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint did not foreclose a
    subsequent dismissal based on additional evidence and arguments. IES’s
    voluntarily dismissing its appeal, answering the amended complaint and
    raising improper venue based on the forum selection clause, among other
    activity, did not waive IES’s right to seek enforcement of the forum selection
    clause in response to the second amended complaint. 3 The second
    3
    We note that an order denying a change of venue is one of the enumerated
    nonfinal orders that is reviewable on interlocutory appeal. Fla. R. App. P.
    9.130(a)(3)(A); see Vinsand v. Vinsand, 
    179 So. 3d 366
    , 368–69 (Fla. 2d
    DCA 2015) (holding failure to pursue an interlocutory appeal on venue
    does not bar review of the venue issue on appeal after final disposition of
    the case); Ferenc v. Ferenc, 
    553 So. 2d 1329
    , 1330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989);
    Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(h) (stating that the rule permitting appellate review of
    6
    amended complaint superseded the amended complaint, permitting IES to
    conduct motion practice on the new pleading with additional evidence
    obtained following its answer to the amended complaint on a preserved
    venue issue.
    We disagree with Hendel’s argument that his claims for fraud in the
    inducement and for a declaratory judgment preclude dismissal of the instant
    action based on the mandatory forum selection clause contained within the
    General Escrow Instructions. Hendel admits that he is a sophisticated
    businessperson and an experienced user of internet services for business
    purposes. He was able to complete the transaction on the Agree Page
    without having to scroll through the General Escrow Instructions and/or
    selecting a box to acknowledge that he had read them. The General Escrow
    Instructions were prominently displayed on the Agree Page and were
    conspicuous enough to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry notice of
    their existence. This conclusion is supported by the fact that IES sent Hendel
    three emails requesting that Hendel “agree to the terms and escrow
    instructions,” thus, he was on notice of their existence. See MetroPCS
    Commc’ns v. Porter, 
    273 So. 3d 1025
     (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (concluding that
    specified nonfinal orders “shall not preclude initial review of a non-final order
    on appeal from the final order in the cause”).
    7
    providing a hyperlink to the terms and conditions at the end of short text
    messages to the customer was sufficient to put the customer on inquiry
    notice of the terms and conditions).
    The lower court found by substantial competent evidence that the
    forum selection clause was readily available for Hendel’s review, and that
    Hendel agreed to the forum selection clause by engaging IES’s escrow
    services. The forum selection clause is valid and enforceable. We therefore
    affirm the final judgment dismissing Hendel’s action based on improper
    venue in Miami-Dade County pursuant to the mandatory forum selection
    clause contained in the Buyer/IES Agreement. 4
    Affirmed.
    4
    The “with prejudice” clause in the final judgment does not affect bringing
    the action properly in California, but only acts to preclude re-filing the action
    in Miami-Dade.
    8