TOTAL CARE RESTORATION, LLC, A/A/O YOEL BERNAL v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION ( 2023 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed March 15, 2023.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D22-711
    Lower Tribunal No. 21-31745 CC
    ________________
    Total Care Restoration, LLC, a/a/o Yoel Bernal,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Citizens Property Insurance Corporation,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Elijah A.
    Levitt, Judge.
    Law Office of Chad A. Barr, P.A., and Chad A. Barr and Dalton L. Gray
    (Altamonte Springs), for appellant.
    Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, P.A., and Jessica C. Conner
    (Orlando), for appellee.
    Before EMAS, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.
    EMAS, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    Total Care Restoration, LLC (as assignee of Yoel Bernal) appeals the
    trial court’s order dismissing its breach of contract complaint with prejudice.
    The trial court dismissed the complaint based on Total Care’s failure to
    comply with section 627.7152(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2021), 1 which
    provides that an assignment of benefits agreement must “[c]ontain a written,
    itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the services to be performed by the
    assignee.” (Emphasis added). The assignment of benefits agreement in the
    instant case contained a generic list of available services, together with their
    unit cost, which the trial court concluded was insufficient to satisfy the
    statute’s requirement, rendering the assignment agreement statutorily
    invalid and unenforceable. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion and, for
    the reasons that follow, affirm the trial court’s order.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    Yoel Bernal’s home, insured by Citizens, suffered a loss due to water
    damage on June 17, 2021.          Twelve days later, Bernal entered into an
    assignment agreement, by which he assigned his insurance benefits to Total
    Care in exchange for water dry-out services performed on Bernal’s property.
    1
    The statute was later amended in 2022, see Ch. 2022-271, § 21, Laws of
    Florida. Although subsection (2)(a)4. was moved to subsection (2)(a)5., the
    statutory language remained unchanged.
    2
    Attached to the assignment agreement was a document entitled “Itemized
    per-Unit Cost Estimate.” That document contained a list of available
    “emergency” and “non-emergency” services, together with a unit price for
    each service. After performing services on Bernal’s property, Total Care
    submitted its assignment agreement and invoices to Citizens. Citizens
    denied full reimbursement. In response, Total Care filed the underlying
    lawsuit for breach of contract, seeking to recover $16,066.32 in damages.
    Attached to the complaint was the assignment of benefits agreement (with
    the list described above), together with invoices submitted to Citizens for the
    work performed.
    Citizens moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, contending
    that the assignment of benefits agreement, on its face, failed to comply with
    section 627.7152(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2021) (requiring that an
    assignment of benefits agreement “[c]ontain a written, itemized, per-unit cost
    estimate of the services to be performed by the assignee”) rendering the
    assignment agreement invalid and unenforceable.         Id. § 627.7152(2)(d)
    (providing: “An assignment agreement that does not comply with this
    subsection is invalid and unenforceable.”)
    More specifically, Citizens contended the assignment agreement did
    not contain “a written, itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the services to be
    3
    performed by assignee” as required by the statute. In response, Total Care
    contended that the assignment agreement contained an itemized per-unit
    cost estimate in compliance with the statute; Citizens lacked privity to
    challenge the assignment agreement; and non-compliance with the statute
    would render the assignment agreement voidable, not void, and—if
    voidable—Citizens would have no standing to challenge the assignment
    agreement since it was not a party to, or third-party beneficiary of, the
    assignment agreement.
    Following a hearing, the trial court entered its order dismissing the case
    with prejudice, on the basis that the assignment agreement was invalid and
    unenforceable because it does not contain the itemized, per-unit cost
    estimate of the services to be performed as required by section
    627.7152(2)(a)4., but instead simply a list of available services offered by
    Total Care. This appeal followed.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The court reviews the granting of a motion to dismiss de novo.
    People's Tr. Ins. Co. v. Alonzo-Pombo, 
    307 So. 3d 840
    , 842 (Fla. 3d DCA
    2020). In doing so, a reviewing court is generally limited to the four corners
    of the complaint and any attachments. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.130(b) (“Any exhibit
    attached to a pleading must be considered a part thereof for all purposes.”)
    4
    In the event of an inconsistency between the allegations of the complaint
    and the language in the attachment, the attachment controls. K.R. Exch.
    Servs., Inc. v. Fuerst, Humphrey, Ittleman, PL, 
    48 So. 3d 889
    , 894 (Fla. 3d
    DCA 2010) (“It is well settled that the court must consider an exhibit attached
    to the complaint together with the complaint's allegations, and that the exhibit
    controls when its language is inconsistent with the complaint's allegations.”)
    Questions of law, such as construction of a statute, are also subject to de
    novo review. Aramark Unif. and Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 
    894 So. 2d 20
    , 23 (Fla. 2004); Mattino v. City of Marathon, 
    345 So. 3d 939
    , 943 (Fla. 3d
    DCA 2022).
    DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
    Enacted by the legislature in 2019, section 627.7152, Florida Statutes
    (2021), governs assignment of benefits agreements. Subsection (2)(a)
    enumerates several requirements for a valid and enforceable assignment of
    benefits agreement. Relevant to the instant case, the statute requires: “An
    assignment agreement must. . . [c]ontain a written, itemized, per-unit cost
    estimate of the services to be performed by the assignee.” 
    Id.
     §
    627.7152(2)(a)4. In addition, section (2)(d) provides: “An assignment
    agreement that does not comply with this subsection is invalid and
    unenforceable.”
    5
    The provision’s plain language requires an itemized cost estimate of
    services “to be performed” on the property. By contrast, the document
    provided by Total Care is nothing more than a generic menu of available
    services offered by Total Care, listing the cost of each available service.
    Here is the actual document attached to the assignment agreement:
    6
    While Total Care contends this document meets the statute’s
    requirement of “a written, itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the services to
    be performed by the assignee,” we conclude it falls far short. It is not tailored
    to the insured or to the services to be performed on this particular property.
    Instead, it is simply a listing of services offered by Total Care, divided into
    two categories—"Emergency Service Price” and “Non-Emergency Prices.”
    The services listed under the two categories overlap nearly completely
    (the emergency category lists twenty-two services, while the non-emergency
    category lists eighteen identical services), with the difference being the cost
    of an available service performed on an emergency versus non-emergency
    basis. Such a generic menu of services available to any customer manifestly
    fails to comply with the “itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the services to be
    performed” required by section 627.7152(2)(a)4.
    Indeed, this document is not an “estimate” at all, because it fails to set
    forth: the specific services being performed by Total Care on Mr. Bernal’s
    property; whether those services are being performed on an emergency or
    non-emergency basis; and the estimated cost for each of the services being
    performed on the property based on the number of “units” (e.g., number of
    hours/days needed for each service and/or number of square feet involved
    for each specific service being performed on the insured’s property).
    7
    We find persuasive the reasoning and holding of our sibling court in Air
    Quality Experts Corp. v. Fam. Sec. Ins. Co., 
    351 So. 3d 32
     (Fla. 4th DCA
    2022), which is indistinguishable in all material respects from this case. In
    Air Quality, an assignee under a homeowner’s property insurance
    assignment agreement submitted bills to the insurer. When the insurer
    refused to pay, the assignee sued, attaching to the complaint the assignment
    agreement contract and two invoices. The assignment agreement included
    “a standard price list of the types of services offered by the assignee with
    their unit price.” Id. at 37. As the Fourth District explained, “[t]here was
    nothing in the attachment which tied the price list to the insured’s home so
    that it could be considered an estimate.” Id.
    The insurer moved to dismiss with prejudice arguing that the amended
    statement of claim (on its face) failed to meet the requirement that “[a]n
    assignment agreement must . . . [c]ontain a written, itemized, per-unit cost
    estimate of the services to be performed by the assignee,” and the failure to
    comply meant that the assignment was “invalid and unenforceable.” §§
    627.7152(2)(a)4., (2)(d).
    In response, the assignee in Air Quality raised many of the same
    arguments Total Care raises here: the price list attached to the assignment
    agreement was sufficient to meet the statutory requirements; and the insurer
    8
    did not have standing to challenge the assignment’s validity on two bases:
    (a) if the assignment was invalid, it would be voidable, not void; and (b) the
    insurer was not a party to the assignment or in privity of contract with the
    assignee. In affirming the trial court’s order, the Fourth District rejected each
    of these arguments as without merit. We agree fully with our sister court’s
    reasoning.
    For example, as to the assignee’s standing arguments, the court
    maintained its focus on the statute’s plain language, explaining that it is the
    assignee, rather than the insurer, who lacks standing, as it sought to enforce
    a claim to insurance proceeds based upon “an invalid assignment.” Id. at 37-
    38. The Fourth District further held:
    Here the statute expressly declares [that] an assignment
    violative of its requirements is ‘invalid and unenforceable’,
    precluding its enforcement by courts. § 627.7152(2)(d). As the
    assignee’s right to sue the insurance company derives from an
    invalid document, the courts cannot enforce it.
    Id. at 38-39.
    As for Total Care’s contention that, under subsection (2)(d), an “invalid
    and unenforceable” assignment agreement is rendered merely voidable not
    void, we reject (as did Air Quality) this proposed construction of the statutory
    phrase “invalid and unenforceable.” We also reject Total Care’s related
    argument that the statutory phrase “invalid and unenforceable” is at best
    9
    ambiguous, and thus the trial court was premature in dismissing the action.
    To the extent a different conclusion was reached in SFR Services, LLC v.
    Indian Harbor Insurance Co., 
    529 F. Supp. 3d 1285
    , 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2021)
    (“Even if the statutory terms ‘invalid and unenforceable’ could mean ‘void,’
    they could also mean voidable. So the question of whether a noncomplying
    AOB is void or merely voidable cannot be answered merely by referring
    without   further   analysis     to   the    statutory   language   ‘invalid   and
    unenforceable’”), we disagree and instead adopt the reasoning of our sister
    court in Air Quality:
    SFR does not cite to any Florida law when it stated that a statute
    may declare a contract void but instead mean that it is voidable.
    Indeed, we can find no such law. The court also noted that the
    Legislature did not use the word “void” but “invalid.” SFR Servs.,
    529 F. Supp. 3d at 1293-94.
    While the definitions of “void” and “invalid” are distinct, they are
    not substantially different. “Void” means “of no legal effect,” while
    “invalid” means “not legally binding.” Black's Law Dictionary (11th
    ed. 2019). Whether the contract is of no legal effect or is not
    legally binding, it is unenforceable. As we must apply the plain
    meaning of a statute, the Legislature has precluded the
    enforcement of an AOB which does not include the mandatory
    statutory requirements.
    Air Quality, 351 So. 3d at 38.
    The Fifth District has likewise declined to adopt the reasoning of SFR
    Services, see Kidwell Grp., LLC v. ASI Preferred Ins. Corp., 
    351 So. 3d 1176
    (Fla. 5th DCA 2022), and held that the insurer has standing to challenge the
    10
    assignment pursuant to section 627.7152, and that the phrase “invalid and
    unenforceable” as used in this statute, does not mean voidable. We agree,
    and conclude that Total Care’s assignment is precisely what the plain
    language of the statute says it is: “invalid and unenforceable,” and Citizens
    has standing to challenge the assignment as such. Given that the statute is
    unambiguous, and that the assignment agreement, on its face, fails to
    comply with section 627.7152(2)(a)4., the assignment is invalid and
    unenforceable, and the trial court properly dismissed the complaint with
    prejudice.
    CONCLUSION
    We adopt the rationale and holding of the Fourth District in Air Quality
    and the Fifth District in Kidwell. The failure to comply with section
    627.7152(2)(a)4   rendered    the   assignment    agreement    “invalid   and
    unenforceable” under section 627.7152(2)(d), and subject to challenge by
    Citizens, the insurer.   The trial court properly dismissed Total Care’s
    complaint with prejudice as its breach of contract action was premised upon
    a statutorily invalid and unenforceable assignment of benefits agreement.
    Affirmed.
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-0711

Filed Date: 3/15/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/15/2023