S AND A PROPERTY INVESTMENT SERVICES, LLC v. PEDRO J. GARCIA, etc. ( 2023 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed March 15, 2023.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D22-835
    Lower Tribunal No. 21-18225
    ________________
    S and A Property Investment Services, LLC,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Pedro J. Garcia, etc., et al.,
    Appellees.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Pedro P.
    Echarte, Jr., Judge.
    Law Office of Stanley H. Beck, and Stanley H. Beck (Hallandale
    Beach), for appellant.
    Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Daija
    Page Lifshitz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellees Pedro J. Garcia and
    Peter Cam.
    Before SCALES, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.
    SCALES, J.
    Appellant, plaintiff below, S and A Property Investment Services, LLC
    (“Taxpayer”), appeals an April 26, 2022 final summary judgment entered in
    favor of appellees, defendants below, Pedro J. Garcia, the Miami-Dade
    County Property Appraiser (“Property Appraiser”) and Jim Zingale, executive
    director of the Florida Department of Revenue. 1 The trial court’s summary
    judgment confirmed a determination by both the Property Appraiser and the
    Miami-Dade County Value Adjustment Board (“VAB”) that, under the facts
    presented, the conveyance of the subject non-homestead residential
    property from Taxpayer’s owners to Taxpayer constituted a “change of
    ownership or control” of the property. As such, the trial court found, pursuant
    to section 193.1554(3) of the Florida Statutes, that the Taxpayer lost its
    annual assessment cap (the “10% Assessment Limitation”).
    We affirm because the Taxpayer’s assertion that the conveyance to
    Taxpayer was merely a transfer between legal and equitable title, rather than
    a change of ownership, is belied by (i) the plain language of section
    193.1554, (ii) the subject quitclaim deed, and (iii) Florida’s limited liability
    company (LLC) law.
    I. Relevant Factual Background
    1
    The Florida Department of Revenue filed a notice of joinder below, adopting
    the Property Appraiser’s pleadings at the summary judgment stage. The
    Department did not file an answer brief with this Court.
    2
    In 2000, Sylvester and Angela Anderson (the “Andersons”) purchased,
    as tenants by the entireties, a non-homestead property in Miami (the
    “Subject Property”). In 2015, the Andersons established Taxpayer, a for-
    profit Florida limited liability company, with the Florida Department of State’s
    Division of Corporations. Angela Anderson owns fifty-one percent of
    Taxpayer; Sylvester Anderson owns the remaining forty-nine percent.
    In June 2019, the Andersons executed a quitclaim deed transferring to
    Taxpayer fee simple interest in the Subject Property. The Andersons
    received no consideration for the transfer, and, according to the testimony of
    Angela Anderson, the Andersons transferred the Subject Property to
    Taxpayer so that the Andersons would not face any personal tort liability
    arising from their ownership of the Subject Property.
    While the Andersons owned the Subject Property as tenants by the
    entireties, they enjoyed the 10% Assessment Limitation for non-homestead
    residential property on the Subject Property. In January 2020, though, after
    the 2019 transfer of the Subject Property from the Andersons to Taxpayer,
    the Property Appraiser re-assessed the Subject Property at its just value,
    thereby removing the 10% Assessment Limitation. Without the benefit of the
    10% Assessment Limitation that the Andersons had enjoyed, the Property
    3
    Appraiser’s assessed value of the Subject Property rose from $104,023 in
    2019, to $273,409 in 2020, resulting in an increased property tax liability.
    II. Procedural History
    Taxpayer appealed its 2020 tax assessment to VAB, challenging the
    Property Appraiser’s decision to remove the 10% Assessment Limitation
    from the Subject Property. The VAB magistrate ruled in favor of the Property
    Appraiser and denied Taxpayer’s VAB appeal.
    Taxpayer then, pursuant to sections 194.036(2) and 194.171 of the
    Florida Statutes, 2 filed a two-count complaint in circuit court. Count II of
    Taxpayer’s complaint challenged the Property Appraiser’s removal of the
    Andersons’ 10% Assessment Limitation. 3
    The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Taxpayer’s
    summary judgment evidence consisted of an affidavit by Angela Anderson
    stating the legal conclusion that the Andersons retained equitable ownership
    of the Subject Property after quitclaiming the Subject Property to Taxpayer.
    Thus, according to Angela Anderson’s affidavit, the transfer was “between
    2
    These related statutes provide a taxpayer with the right to file an action in
    circuit court to contest a tax assessment.
    3
    Count I of the complaint, which eventually was dismissed, challenged the
    market value assigned to the Subject Property, and is not a part of this
    appeal.
    4
    legal and equitable title,” and therefore, did not constitute a “change of
    ownership” under section 193.1554(5). After an April 18, 2022 hearing on
    the parties’ competing summary judgment motions, the trial court entered
    the challenged April 26, 2022 final summary judgment in favor of the
    Property Appraiser, rejecting Taxpayer’s assertion that the Andersons had
    retained equitable title after transferring the Subject Property to Taxpayer.
    The trial court found that nothing in the quitclaim deed or in Taxpayer’s LLC
    operating agreement indicated that the Andersons retained equitable title in
    the Subject Property. Taxpayer timely appealed the judgment.
    III. Analysis4
    A. Section 193.1554
    As mentioned above, section 193.1554(3) provides that any change
    resulting from the annual assessment of a non-homestead residential
    property is capped at ten percent of the assessed value of the property for
    the prior year. § 193.1554(3), Fla. Stat. (2020). The property retains this 10%
    Assessment Limitation so long as the property does not undergo “a change
    of ownership or control.” § 193.1554(5), Fla. Stat. (2020). If, however, there
    4
    This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s summary judgment. Ibarra v. Ross
    Dress for Less, Inc., 
    350 So. 3d 465
    , 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). A trial court’s
    interpretation of a statute is reviewed de novo as well. Rahimi v. Global
    Discoveries Ltd., LLC, 
    252 So. 3d 804
    , 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).
    5
    is “a change of ownership or control,” the property “shall be assessed at just
    value as of January 1 of the year following such change in ownership or
    control.” 
    Id.
    Section 193.1554(5) defines “a change of ownership or control” as
    “any sale, foreclosure, transfer of legal title or beneficial title in equity to any
    person, or the cumulative transfer of control or of more than 50 percent of
    the ownership of the legal entity that owned the property when it was most
    recently assessed at just value.” 
    Id.
    The statute contains four express exemptions to this definition. The
    exemption at issue in the instant case reads as follows: “There is no change
    of ownership if: . . . [t]he transfer is between legal and equitable title.” §
    193.1554(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2020).
    B. Crescent City Miami and Kuro cases
    Taxpayer asserts on appeal, as it did below, that the Property
    Appraiser wrongfully characterized the Andersons’ 2019 conveyance of the
    Subject Property to Taxpayer as a change of ownership of the property.
    Taxpayer asserts that when real property is transferred from two married
    individuals to an LLC that is owned solely by the two married individuals, as
    occurred here, only a transfer between legal and equitable title has occurred,
    and ownership has not changed for the purposes of section 193.1554(5)(b).
    6
    In support of its argument, Taxpayer relies on two cases construing a
    different statute from the one involved here – section 201.02(1) of the Florida
    Statutes, the documentary tax statute. 5 These cases are Crescent Miami
    Center, LLC v. Florida Department of Revenue, 
    903 So. 2d 913
     (Fla. 2005)
    and Kuro, Inc. v. State Department of Revenue, 
    713 So. 2d 1021
     (Fla. 2d
    DCA 1998). The Crescent Miami Center Court held that “the transfer of
    property between a grantor and its wholly owned grantee, absent any
    exchange of value, is without consideration or a purchaser and thus not
    subject to the documentary stamp tax in section 201.02(1).” Crescent, 
    903 So. 2d at 919
    ; see Kuro, Inc., 
    713 So. 2d at 1022
     (“[w]e conclude that Kuro
    was not a purchaser within the meaning of section 201.02(1) and, thus, no
    additional taxes were due. Section 201.02(1) applies to transfers of real
    estate for consideration to a ‘purchaser.’”)
    Taxpayer asserts that the transfer from the Andersons to Taxpayer is
    identical to the transfers in Crescent Miami Center and Kuro, Inc. where in
    each of those cases the courts concluded that the challenging taxpayer was
    not a “purchaser” under section 201.02(1). Crescent Miami Center, 
    903 So. 5
     In relevant part, this statute provides that when a deed for real property is
    conveyed, the purchaser shall pay a documentary stamp tax of $.70 per
    every $100 of consideration paid for that real property. § 201.02(1), Fla. Stat.
    (2020).
    7
    2d at 919; Kuro, Inc., 
    713 So. 2d at 1022
     (holding that the “beneficial
    ownership of the land remained unchanged.”). Taxpayer urges us to come
    to a similar conclusion when analyzing the transactions under section
    193.1554(5).
    The inquiry in both Crescent Miami Center and Kuro, Inc. was whether,
    under section 201.02(1), there had been a sale, supported by consideration,
    to a “purchaser.” As the Crescent Miami Center and Kuro, Inc. Courts held,
    documentary tax liability under section 201.02(1)’s plain language is
    triggered only when there is a “purchaser” and, relatedly, when there is
    “consideration.” Crescent Miami Center, 
    903 So. 2d at 918
    ; Kuro, Inc., 
    713 So. 2d at 1022
    . While our inquiry under section 193.1554(5) might seem
    similar to the inquiry undertaken by the Crescent Miami Center and Kuro,
    Inc. courts, our focus is not whether there was a purchaser and consideration
    for the transaction. Rather, our focus, based on section 193.1554(5)’s plain
    language, is whether there was a “change of ownership.” Clearly, the transfer
    of the property from the Andersons – who held the property in the entireties
    – to Taxpayer, a Florida LLC, constituted a change of ownership.
    Taxpayer is an entity separate and distinct from its owners, the
    Andersons. § 605.0108(1), Fla. Stat. (2020); Palma v. S. Fla. Pulmonary &
    Critical Care, LLC, 
    307 So. 3d 860
    , 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020 (“[A]n LLC is an
    8
    autonomous legal entity, separate and distinct from its members”). 6 Indeed,
    the purpose of the 2019 transfer of the Subject Property to an LLC was to
    separate the Andersons from their ownership of the property so that tort
    liability for occurrences on the property would not touch them. Nothing in the
    summary judgment record indicates that this purpose was not effectuated by
    the transfer.
    Plainly, there was a “change of ownership” – as that term is defined in
    section 193.1554(5) – in the Subject Property. The transfer to LLC ownership
    was not a mere “book transaction,” as Taxpayer suggests. We find
    Taxpayer’s reliance on Crescent Miami Center and Kuro, Inc. unpersuasive.
    C. Transfer between Legal and Equitable Title – the Statutory
    Exception
    Finally, Taxpayer asserts that, because the Andersons control
    Taxpayer, the 2019 transfer was merely “between legal and equitable title,”
    6
    While not critical to our analysis, we note that, contrary to Taxpayer’s
    assertion, this transfer was not a mere “book transaction” whereby they
    “received no interest in the property that they did not already have before the
    transfer.” Crescent Miami Center, 
    903 So. 2d at 916
    . Before the transfer,
    each Anderson spouse, as a tenant in the entirety, owned a one hundred
    percent undivided interest by the property with a right of survivorship. See
    Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 
    780 So. 2d 45
    , 52 (Fla. 2001). After
    the transfer, Angela Anderson owned a fifty-one percent interest and
    Sylvester Anderson owned a forty-nine percent interest in Taxpayer.
    Additionally, the summary judgment record does not indicate that the
    Andersons’ ownership interest in Taxpayer was subject to a right of
    survivorship.
    9
    and therefore, pursuant to the statutory exception found in section
    193.1554(5)(b), no change of ownership occurred. Put another way,
    Taxpayer argues that only legal title to the Subject Property was transferred
    by the quitclaim deed, and that the Andersons retained equitable title to the
    Subject Property because they are the owners of Taxpayer. They claim the
    authority to “revest” ownership of the Subject Property.
    In our view, Taxpayer’s argument misapprehends the effect of a
    quitclaim deed, Florida LLC law, and equitable ownership. First, it is black-
    letter Florida real property law that when a grantor delivers a quitclaim deed,
    the grantor is divested of any interest in the deeded property, and any
    interest of the grantor vests in the grantee. See June Sand Co. v. Devon
    Corp., 
    23 So. 2d 621
    , 623 (Fla. 1945). “When the language of a deed is clear
    and certain in meaning and the grantor's intention is reflected by the
    language employed, there is no room for judicial construction of the language
    nor interpretation of the words used.” Rogers v. United States, 
    184 So. 3d 1087
    , 1095 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Saltzman v. Ahern, 
    306 So. 2d 537
    , 539
    (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)). The quitclaim deed in this case unambiguously
    transferred fee simple ownership of the Subject Property to Taxpayer.
    Neither the deed, nor any other document in the summary judgment record,
    10
    purports to reserve to the Andersons any interest, equitable or otherwise, in
    the Subject Property.
    Also, of import here, the grantee Taxpayer is a Florida limited liability
    company. Section 605.0110 of the Florida Statutes unequivocally specifies
    that “[a]ll property originally contributed to the limited liability company or
    subsequently acquired by a limited liability company by purchase or other
    method is limited liability company property.” § 605.0110(1), Fla. Stat.
    (2019). “It is basic hornbook law that ‘corporate property is vested in the
    corporation itself, and not in the individual stockholders, who have neither
    legal nor equitable title in the corporate property.’” Brevard Cnty. v. Ramsey,
    
    658 So. 2d 1190
    , 1196 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (quoting In re Miner, 
    177 B.R. 104
    , 106 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994) (emphasis added)). Consequently, an LLC
    member has “no interest in any specific limited liability company property.” §
    605.0110(4), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added).
    Taxpayer has cited no authority for the proposition that owners or
    members of an LLC who convey, via quitclaim deed, real property to an LLC
    retain, as a matter of law, the equitable title to the conveyed property
    because those owners or members control the LLC. We therefore agree with
    the Property Appraiser, VAB, and the trial court that, for the purposes of
    11
    section 193.1554(5)(b), the Andersons did not retain equitable ownership of
    the Subject Property when they conveyed the Subject Property to Taxpayer.
    IV. Conclusion
    The transfer from the Andersons to the Taxpayer constituted a “change
    of ownership” of the Subject Property. While we are not unsympathetic to
    Taxpayer’s argument that the 10% Assessment Limitation should be
    retained under the circumstances presented here, we are simply not free, by
    judicial fiat, to craft what would amount to a fifth exception to section
    193.1554(5) to exempt from the definition of “change of ownership” any real
    property transfer from individuals to a Florida limited liability company wholly
    owned by such individuals. We therefore affirm the trial court’s final summary
    judgment for appellees.
    Affirmed.
    12