ANTHONY JONES v. DIONISIOS THEODORE VASILIAS ( 2023 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    ANTHONY JONES,
    Appellant,
    v.
    DIONISIOS THEODORE VASILIAS, NORTH AMERICAN AUTOMOTIVE
    SERVICES, INC., DAVID MARSHALL, and STEVE IGNOWSKI, et al.,
    Appellees.
    No. 4D21-3476
    [March 15, 2023]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
    Beach County; John S. Kastrenakes, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2020-CA-
    001204-XXXX-MB.
    Andrew A. Harris and Grace Mackey Streicher of Harris Appeals, P.A.,
    Palm Beach Gardens, and Neil P. Anthony of Steinger, Greene & Feiner,
    West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Jack R. Reiter and Jonathan L. Gaines of GrayRobinson, P.A., Miami,
    for appellees, North American Automotive Services, Inc., David Marshall,
    and Steve Ignowski.
    CONNER, J.
    This appeal addresses the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
    a cause of action where supervising employees of a corporation were sued
    individually for an automobile accident caused by a subordinate employee
    of the corporation.
    The underlying action arose from a crash suffered by the appellant (“the
    plaintiff”) while riding his bicycle along the busy street in front of an
    automobile dealership as an employee was leaving in a dealership van for
    a delivery. Responding to the operative complaint, the dealership admitted
    ownership of the van and that the driver was driving the van with
    permission while in the course of his employment when the crash
    occurred.
    In addition to a claim for negligent driving against the driver and the
    dealership, the operative complaint asserted direct negligence claims
    against the general manager and the service manager (collectively “the
    supervisors”). The service manager was the one who sent the driver to
    make the delivery. Below and on appeal, the plaintiff collectively refers to
    the direct liability claims against the supervisors and the general
    manager’s employer, North American Automotive Services, Inc. (“North
    American”), as “negligent employment” claims, and we will do the same in
    this opinion. Specific claims of liability will be noted more fully below.
    We determine the trial court erred in dismissing the direct negligence
    claims against the supervisors because it erroneously applied caselaw.
    Because the direct negligence claim against the general manager was
    improperly dismissed, it was also an error to dismiss the vicarious liability
    claim against North American. We reverse for further proceedings. As
    explained more fully below, we emphasize that our opinion is based on the
    pleading-stage procedural posture of this case.
    Background
    In addition to a claim of negligent driving against the driver and the
    dealership, the operative complaint asserted causes of action against the
    supervisors for negligent training, retention, supervision, and
    entrustment. As to the service manager, the complaint also alleged
    negligent hiring. As to North American, the complaint asserted vicarious
    liability for the acts of its employee, the general manager.
    The supervisors and North American each moved to dismiss the
    respective claims against them for failure to state a cause of action. Citing
    Clooney v. Geeting, 
    352 So. 2d 1216
     (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), the supervisors
    argued that the plaintiff could not allege an independent cause of action
    against them where the dealership had already admitted it employed the
    driver and the driver was driving its vehicle with its permission at the time
    the accident occurred. The supervisors also argued that a necessary
    element for the cause of action against them was that the supervisors
    committed a tort outside of their employment (which was not alleged in
    the complaint). North American’s motion to dismiss argued that if the
    claim against the general manager were dismissed, the vicarious liability
    claim against North American would fail as well.
    The plaintiff responded that the negligent employment claims present
    distinct theories of liability from the claims against the driver and the
    dealership, and that the supervisors’ scope of employment argument was
    not applicable to actions against them.
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    The trial court granted all three motions to dismiss, observing that the
    dealership had admitted the driver was driving its vehicle with permission
    while in the scope of employment at the time of the crash. The dismissal
    order stated that the Clooney court “disallowed and [struck] causes of
    action for negligent supervision and retention when the employer admits
    the employee was acting in the course and scope of his duties,” and noted
    caselaw holding that negligent hiring and retention actions require acts
    outside the scope of employment. The dismissal order concluded:
    Here, there are only concurrent theories of liability. The only
    torts alleged by defendants [the general manager] and [the
    service manager] relate to their hiring and retention of [the
    driver] as a driver for [the dealership]. There is no allegation
    that the vehicle they gave him had bad brakes or other faulty
    equipment (the example in Clooney, supra) or that there is a
    separate theory of liability such as a punitive damage claim
    against [the dealership].
    After final orders were entered dismissing the negligent employment
    claims with prejudice, the plaintiff gave notice of appeal.
    Appellate Analysis
    The plaintiff contends on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing
    his claims against the supervisors and North American by ruling that,
    pursuant to Clooney, negligent employment claims against an individual
    supervisor must allege that the subordinate employee’s negligent acts were
    outside the scope of employment.
    A ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is
    an issue of law reviewed de novo. Regis Ins. Co. v. Miami Mgmt., Inc., 
    902 So. 2d 966
    , 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). “When determining the merits of a
    motion to dismiss, a court may not go beyond the four corners of the
    complaint and must accept the facts alleged therein and exhibits attached
    as true, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the pleader.” 
    Id.
    The trial court concluded that the negligent employment claims alleged
    concurrent theories of liability against the dealership involving the
    supervisors and North American. The trial court justified that conclusion
    by relying on Clooney; Acts Retirement-Life Communities, Inc. v. Estate of
    Zimmer, 
    206 So. 3d 112
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); City of Boynton Beach v.
    Weiss, 
    120 So. 3d 606
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); and Belizaire v. City of Miami,
    
    944 F. Supp. 2d 1204
     (S.D. Fla. 2013). The trial court interpreted those
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    cases to stand for the proposition that negligent employment claims must
    allege that the acts of the employee causing an accident were acts outside
    the scope of employment.
    In Clooney, the Second District noted that Florida generally recognizes
    negligent employment claims against employers. 
    352 So. 2d 1220
    .
    However, the Second District held that, in the context of an automobile
    injury case, the trial court properly struck negligent employment claims
    against the employer because those claims imposed no additional liability
    for acts within the scope of employment beyond the negligent driving of
    the employee. 
    Id.
     The Second District reasoned:
    The reason for this is a very practical one: Under [negligent
    employment] theories the past driving record of the driver will
    of necessity be before the jury, so the culpability of the
    entrusting party can be determined. As was said in Dade
    County v. Carucci, 
    349 So. 2d 734
    , 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977),
    “Ordinarily, the evidence of a defendant’s past driving record
    should not be made a part of the jury’s considerations.”
    
    Id.
     Thus, the trial court in the instant case interpreted Clooney and its
    progeny to prohibit negligent employment claims in all instances where
    the employer admits the acts causing injury were committed within the
    scope of employment.
    The trial court’s reliance on Clooney was misplaced. In Clooney, the
    plaintiff did not allege direct negligence against the employer. 
    352 So. 2d at 1219-20
    . Instead, the two counts which the trial court struck alleged
    concurrent theories of recovery based on vicarious liability for the driver.
    
    Id.
     In short, the counts were redundant. Additionally, the negligent
    employment claims in Clooney were brought against the employer, and not
    individually against a supervisor. In the instant case, the plaintiff did not
    plead any negligent employment claims against the employer of the driver
    causing the accident. Instead, the negligent employment claims were
    against the supervisors individually, and vicariously against an employer
    of one of the supervisors (who was not the driver’s employer).
    “It is well-settled . . . that individual officers and agents of a corporation
    may be held personally liable for their tortious acts, even if such acts were
    committed within the scope of their employment or as corporate officers.”
    First Fin. USA, Inc. v. Steinger, 
    760 So. 2d 996
    , 997-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    (emphasis added); see also Greenberg v. Post, 
    19 So. 2d 714
    , 717 (Fla.
    1944) (“It is well settled that an employee may be held personally liable at
    the suit of a third person for positive negligent acts committed by him even
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    though his employer may likewise be liable for the servant’s negligent
    conduct when exercised within the scope of the employment.”).
    Additionally, Florida courts have emphasized that the officer cannot be
    personally liable “for [his] torts merely by reason of his official character[,]”
    but he is liable for torts where he “commits or participates in the
    commission of a tort.” Orlovsky v. Solid Surf, Inc., 
    405 So. 2d 1363
    , 1364
    (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (citation omitted); see also Costa Invs., LLC v. Liberty
    Grande, LLC, 
    353 So. 3d 627
    , 633-34 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022); McElveen v.
    Peeler, 
    544 So. 2d 270
    , 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). “A contrary rule would
    enable a director or officer of a corporation to perpetrate flagrant injuries
    and escape liability behind the shield of his representative character.”
    Orlovsky, 
    405 So. 2d at 1364
     (citation omitted). “A corporate officer or
    agent must be alleged to have acted tortiously in his individual capacity in
    order to be individually liable.”         White-Wilson Med. Ctr. v. Dayta
    Consultants, Inc., 
    486 So. 2d 659
    , 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
    In the instant case, the trial court erred to the extent it concluded that
    a negligent employment claim against a supervisor individually requires
    that the subordinate employee’s actions be outside the scope of
    employment. A claim of negligent hiring, training, retention, supervision,
    or entrustment against a supervisor individually, as opposed to the
    corporate employer, does not depend on whether the subordinate
    employee’s actions were outside the scope of employment. See Steinger,
    
    760 So. 2d at 997-98
    ; Orlovsky, 
    405 So. 2d at 1364
     (determining a
    corporate officer who participates in a tort is liable to third persons injured
    thereby “and it does not matter what liability attaches to the corporation
    for the tort” (citation omitted)). However, such negligent employment
    claims must include more than just general or vague assertions of the
    supervisor’s responsibilities: they must include facts showing the
    supervisor’s “personal involvement” in a tort that led to the plaintiff’s
    injuries, or “at least knowledge amounting to acquiescence in the wrongful
    act.” Costa Invs., LLC, 353 So. 3d at 634 (emphasis added) (quoting
    Speiser et al., 1A Am. Law of Torts § 4:24 (2022))); see also Home Loan
    Corp. v. Aza, 
    930 So. 2d 814
    , 815-16 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (reversing
    dismissal of a complaint for negligent misrepresentation where the
    complaint alleged the corporate officer prepared and signed the document
    containing the misrepresentation).
    The complaint here alleged sufficient facts to avoid dismissal of the
    negligent employment claims. The complaint alleged facts to show that
    although the collision with the plaintiff occurred just off corporate property
    and the supervisors were not in or around the van at that time, the
    supervisors at least “[had] knowledge amounting to acquiescence in the
    wrongful act” of allowing the driver to drive the van under circumstances
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    demonstrating he was unfit to do so. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s
    dismissal of the complaint against the supervisors. Having determined
    that the trial court improperly dismissed the claim against the general
    manager, we also reverse the dismissal as to his employer, North
    American. See Luebbert v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 
    311 So. 3d 334
    , 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (“The theory of vicarious liability holds
    employers liable for the negligence of their employees committed within
    the scope of employment.”).
    We again emphasize that our opinion is based on the pleading-stage
    procedural posture of this case. We also point out that our conclusions
    as to the sufficiency of the pleadings do not determine how the elements
    of the cause of action will play out as discovery reveals more details of the
    facts of this case.
    Conclusion
    Having determined the trial court erred in dismissing the individual
    employment liability claims against the supervisors and the vicarious
    liability claim against North American, we reverse the dismissal order and
    remand for further proceedings.
    Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
    MAY and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
    *        *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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