JAMES P. MEJIA v. ROSA B. MEJIA ( 2020 )


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  •           DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    JAMES P. MEJIA,
    Appellant,
    v.
    ROSA B. MEJIA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D19-3847
    [April 29, 2020]
    Appeal of non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
    Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Nickolaus Hunter Davis, Judge; L.T.
    Case No. FMCE18005173.
    James P. Mejia, Santiago, Dominican Republic, pro se.
    H.A. Rodriguez of The Law Office of H.A. Rodriguez, P.A., Fort
    Lauderdale, for appellee.
    MAY, J.
    The husband appeals a temporary support order. He argues the trial
    court erred in finding it had subject matter jurisdiction and in determining
    the amount of the wife’s need and his ability to pay. We agree with him
    on the second issue. We reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct
    further proceedings regarding spousal support.
    The parties married in the Dominican Republic (“DR”) in 1995 and had
    three children. The husband is a pilot and has been based out of Miami
    since 1999. The parties lived in Weston from 2001–2014. They moved to
    the DR and leased their “homesteaded” Weston home.
    In 2017, the husband was arrested in the DR for alleged domestic
    violence. The parties separated and the husband filed for divorce in the
    DR. 1 In April 2018, the wife filed her dissolution petition in Broward
    County. Months later, the DR court issued a custody and timesharing
    order.
    1   Alimony is not awarded in the DR even for long-term marriages.
    The husband moved to dismiss the Broward case for lack of
    jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion in a January 2019 order
    that detailed the parties’ connections to both countries.
    Both parties had Florida drivers’ licenses, were registered to vote in
    Florida, had a joint bank account in Florida, and the husband leased a car
    and received his mail in Florida. While the trial court did not specifically
    find the wife was a Florida resident for the six months prior to filing the
    petition, it made numerous findings and concluded that the husband
    treated Florida as his “chief seat” of his affairs and interests. 2 The trial
    court reiterated that it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
    parties when it subsequently confirmed a DR child custody order. No
    appeal was taken from that order.
    The wife then moved for temporary spousal support. In the motion, the
    wife alleged the husband was refusing to pay her bills, cancelled her health
    insurance, and was dissipating assets. She alleged the husband earned
    around $180,000 annually and had the ability to pay spousal support.
    The wife alleged she had no income or funds. Her financial affidavit
    reflected a monthly deficit of $11,714.02. The husband filed a financial
    affidavit reflecting a monthly net income of $11,163.39 and $900 in DR
    court-ordered child support.
    Following several days of hearings, the trial court determined the
    husband was an intelligent, educated, and accomplished pilot earning over
    $180,000 annually. He imputed a $2,000 monthly income to the wife.
    Based on the evidence, the trial court ordered the husband to pay $7,800
    a month in temporary support. It directed the husband to reinstate the
    wife’s health insurance and ordered both parties not to transfer or
    withdraw funds from the husband’s retirement accounts/pensions. The
    husband now appeals, challenging the trial court’s subject matter
    jurisdiction and the support award.
    Jurisdiction
    The husband argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
    over the case because neither party lived continuously in Florida for six
    months prior to the wife filing the petition for dissolution. The wife
    responds that while subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time,
    2 The husband appealed that order. We treated the appeal as a petition for writ
    of certiorari. When the husband failed to timely file the formal petition as
    ordered, we dismissed the case and subsequently denied a motion to reinstate.
    2
    that issue was decided in a prior trial court order that the husband
    appealed. Even though that appeal was dismissed, she argues the trial
    court did not revisit the jurisdictional issue in the present order.
    Regardless, she argues the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that
    the husband’s “chief seat” of affairs was in Florida.
    Section 61.021, Florida Statutes, requires one of the parties to reside
    in the state for six months before filing a dissolution petition. “Residence”
    as used in section 61.021 means “an actual presence in Florida coupled
    with an intention at that time to make Florida the residence.” Jenkins v.
    Jenkins, 
    556 So. 2d 441
    , 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (quoting Gillman v.
    Gillman, 
    413 So. 2d 412
    , 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)). Courts have
    interpreted “actual presence” as not requiring presence during the entire
    six-month time frame. See Jenkins v. Jenkins, 
    915 So. 2d 1248
    (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2005) (citing Jenkins, 
    556 So. 2d 441
    ).
    Within its January 2019 order, the trial court found neither party was
    credible on this point. It found both parties had a Florida driver’s license,
    were registered to vote in Florida, have a joint bank account here, and their
    Weston home is homesteaded with insurance and utility bills in their
    name. During the jurisdictional hearing, the husband testified to being in
    Florida every week, but denied that it was his home. The wife testified the
    husband prevented her from returning to Florida from the DR where she
    was tending to her sick father.
    This case is akin to our 2005 decision in Jenkins. There, the husband
    spent most of the one-year period preceding the filing of his petition in
    Tennessee caring for his sick brother and only a minimal portion of it in
    Florida. 
    Jenkins, 915 So. 2d at 1249
    . However, the marital home was in
    Florida and homesteaded; the husband’s bank accounts were in Florida,
    he had a Florida driver's license, and was registered to vote here.
    Id. Those facts
    are virtually identical to the facts in this case. Like Jenkins, we affirm
    on the jurisdictional issue.
    Id. at 1250.
    Need and Ability to Pay
    We review temporary support orders for an abuse of discretion.
    Canakaris v. Canakaris, 
    382 So. 2d 1197
    (Fla. 1980); Robbie v. Robbie,
    
    591 So. 2d 1006
    , 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
    If a trial court enters a temporary support order that “exceeds or nearly
    exhausts a party’s income,” it has abused that discretion. Wilder v. Wilder,
    
    42 So. 3d 961
    , 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting Bolton v. Bolton, 
    898 So. 2d
    1084, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). The wife’s amended motion asserted
    3
    the husband earned about $180,00.00 annually and had the ability to pay
    for her support. She alleged he dissipated assets, refused to pay her bills,
    and cancelled her health insurance. She did not request a specific amount
    of support within the motion, but her financial affidavit reflected a monthly
    need of $11,714.00.
    •   The Husband’s Ability to Pay
    The husband argues the trial court erred in using his gross income to
    calculate his ability to pay. Meldrum v. Bergamo-Meldrum, 
    281 So. 3d 504
    ,
    505 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019); Vega v. Vega, 
    877 So. 2d 882
    (Fla. 4th DCA
    2004). As a result, he is now ordered to pay more than 75% of his net
    income to the wife. He points to his net monthly income of $11,163.00,
    which should have been reduced by his monthly child support obligation.
    The wife responds the husband’s paystubs show he received between
    $6,201.94 and $8,333.59 bi-monthly, or $148,000–$200,000 annually.
    She suggests that he unilaterally reduced the parties’ available monthly
    income by $2,400 when he terminated the lease on the Weston marital
    home. But she fails to address the trial court’s use of the husband’s
    “gross” instead of “net” income and its failure to reduce the husband’s
    monthly income by his child support obligation.
    We agree with the husband that the court erred in using his gross
    income and in failing to factor in his child support obligation to determine
    his net income. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to
    recalculate the husband’s ability to pay.
    •   The Wife’s Need
    The husband argues the trial court failed to consider the $2,000 in
    income it imputed to her and an $87,500 inheritance in determining her
    need. As to the inheritance, the testimony shows she has not received
    anything from her father’s estate as of the date of the hearing, therefore
    the court did not err in refusing to consider this. She does not address
    the $2,000 in imputed income and we cannot discern whether the trial
    court considered it when it arrived at the $7,800.00 award.
    On remand, the trial court shall use the husband’s net income in
    calculating his ability to pay and deduct his child support obligation. It
    should also account for the $2,000.00 income that it imputed to the wife.
    We therefore reverse the temporary support order and remand the case to
    the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Meldrum, 
    281 So. 3d 504
    .
    4
    Reversed and Remanded.
    WARNER and GERBER, JJ., concur.
    *        *       *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    5