Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed February 24, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-557
Lower Tribunal No. 11-22605A
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Joseph Phelps,
Petitioner,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.
GrayRobinson, P.A., and Andrew T. Sarangoulis and Joel Hirschhorn,
for petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Asad Ali, Assistant Attorney
General, for respondent.
Before EMAS, C.J., and GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.
EMAS, C.J.
Joseph Phelps was charged with and convicted of first-degree felony
murder and attempted robbery with a firearm. The crimes were alleged to
have been committed in 1996. At his December 2014 trial, the trial court
failed to deliver the instruction provided in Florida Standard Jury Instruction
(Criminal) 3.7, which provides:
3.7 PLEA OF NOT GUILTY; REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
BURDEN OF PROOF
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. This means you
must presume or believe the defendant is innocent. The
presumption stays with the defendant as to each material
allegation in the [information] [indictment] through each stage of
the trial unless it has been overcome by the evidence to the
exclusion of and beyond a reasonable doubt.
To overcome the defendant's presumption of innocence, the
State has the burden of proving the crime with which the
defendant is charged was committed and the defendant is the
person who committed the crime.
The defendant is not required to present evidence or prove
anything.
Whenever the words “reasonable doubt” are used you must
consider the following:
It is recommended that you use this instruction to
define reasonable doubt during voir dire. State v. Wilson,
686
So.2d 569 (Fla. 1996).[ 1]
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, a speculative,
imaginary or forced doubt. Such a doubt must not influence you
to return a verdict of not guilty if you have an abiding conviction
1
The trial court did not give this instruction to the jury venire during voir dire.
2
of guilt. On the other hand, if, after carefully considering,
comparing and weighing all the evidence, there is not an abiding
conviction of guilt, or, if, having a conviction, it is one which is not
stable but one which wavers and vacillates, then the charge is
not proved beyond every reasonable doubt and you must find
the defendant not guilty because the doubt is reasonable.
It is to the evidence introduced in this trial, and to it alone, that
you are to look for that proof.
A reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant may arise
from the evidence, conflict in the evidence, or the lack of
evidence.
If you have a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant
not guilty. If you have no reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant guilty.
The State, defense and trial court all failed to realize that this standard
jury instruction was neither delivered orally to the jury nor included in the final
set of written instructions provided to the jury for use in deliberations.
Further, in his direct appeal from the judgment and sentence, Phelps’
appellate counsel did not raise this issue, and Phelps’ convictions and
sentence were affirmed in 2017.2 Phelps filed the instant petition for writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that appellate counsel’s failure to raise this error
constituted deficient performance of appellate counsel, and that Phelps was
prejudiced by this failure. We agree, grant the petition, vacate the judgment
and sentence, and remand this cause to the trial court for a new trial.
2
Phelps v. State,
232 So. 3d 1131 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).
3
A petition for writ of habeas corpus is recognized as “the proper vehicle
to advance claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,” Rutherford
v. Moore,
774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000), and the requirements for
establishing such a claim closely parallel the two-pronged test established in
Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) for establishing a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel: “Petitioner must show 1) specific
errors or omissions which show that appellate counsel’s performance
deviated from the norm or fell outside the range of professionally acceptable
performance and 2) the deficiency of that performance compromised the
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the
fairness and correctness of the appellate result.” Wilson v. Wainwright,
474
So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 1985). 3
Appellate counsel’s failure to raise an error on appeal will not constitute
ineffective assistance if that error was not properly preserved below, unless
3
We recognize, of course, that “appellate counsel is not necessarily
ineffective for failing to raise a claim that might have had some possibility of
success; effective appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable
nonfrivolous issue,” State v. Murrary,
262 So. 3d 26, 43 (Fla. 2018) (citations
omitted). Additionally, we note that “the defendant has the burden of alleging
a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel can be based.” Schoenwetter v. State,
46 So. 3d 535,
563 (Fla. 2010) (citation omitted).
4
such error is fundamental. Valle v. Moore,
837 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 2002);
Rutherford,
774 So. 2d at 643.
In the instant case, the failure to give the standard jury instruction was
fundamental error. More significantly for our purposes, this court had already
decided that question well before Phelps’ trial and direct appeal. In a case
virtually indistinguishable in all relevant respects from the instant case,
Cavagnaro v. State,
117 So. 3d 1111, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), this court
held “the failure to give the jury any reasonable doubt instruction at all,
though unpreserved, is fundamental error.” Our decision in Cavagnaro was
released in January 2012, three years before the notice of appeal was filed
in Phelps’ direct appeal, and four years before the initial brief was filed. See
also Smith v. State,
260 So. 3d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (following
Cavagnaro); Usry v. State,
284 So. 3d 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (same);
Curry v. State,
169 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (same); Burnette v.
State,
103 So. 3d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (same).
Given the existence of our 2012 decision in Cavagnaro, holding such
error to be fundamental, appellate counsel’s failure to identify this
fundamental error by the trial court, and the failure to raise it in the direct
appeal, fell outside the range of professionally acceptable performance. See
Skinner v. State,
137 So. 3d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (holding appellate
5
counsel’s failure to raise as fundamental error the trial court’s erroneous (but
unobjected-to) jury instruction on attempted manslaughter constituted
deficient performance and required a new trial); Jenkins v. State,
75 So. 3d
1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding appellate counsel’s failure to identify and
raise on appeal two facially meritorious claims of fundamental error in the
jury instructions constituted deficient performance); Granberry v. State,
919
So. 2d 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (holding appellate counsel’s failure to raise
as fundamental error the trial court’s erroneous (but unobjected-to) jury
instruction constituted deficient performance in light of the existing case law
at the time of the direct appeal, holding such error fundamental); York v.
State,
891 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Phelps has therefore established
the deficient performance prong for ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.
We further conclude that Phelps has met his burden of establishing the
prejudice prong. While it is true, as the State points out, that Cavagnaro was
a direct appeal, while this case involves a collateral attack alleging ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, the different procedural posture does not
lead to a different result. Had appellate counsel raised this claim of
fundamental error in the direct appeal, this Court, relying on Cavagnaro,
would have reversed the judgment and sentence and remanded for a new
6
trial. See Cavagnaro,
117 So. 3d at 1114 (holding the failure to give standard
jury instruction 3.7, or any similar instruction, was fundamental error, and
required reversal of the conviction and remand for a new trial); Smith, 206
So. 3d at 578 (relying on Cavagnaro, finding fundamental error where the
jury charge did not include Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 3.7
or any similar instruction, and reversing and remanding for a new trial); Usry,
284 So. 3d at 1120 (reversing and remanding for a new trial, holding that the
failure to instruct the jury as to the critical concept of reasonable doubt
constitutes fundamental error); Curry,
169 So. 3d 1259 (reversing and
remanding for a new trial because the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury
as to reasonable doubt constituted fundamental error); Burnette,
103 So. 3d
at 1059 (same). See also Molina v. State,
150 So. 3d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2014) (recognizing that, for purposes of analyzing ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claims, “[p]rejudice is shown where ‘there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different’” (quoting Strickland,
466
U.S. at 694)). Appellate counsel’s deficient performance in this case
“compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine
confidence in the fairness and correctness of the appellate result.” Wilson,
474 So. 2d at 1164.
7
We grant the petition, vacate the judgment and sentences, and
remand for a new trial.
8
