DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
CLAY ROBINSON,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D22-535
[March 22, 2023]
Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for
the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Mariya Weekes, Judge;
L.T. Case Nos. 04-20572CF10A, 05-1162CF10A, 05-1163CF10A, and
05-1164CF10A.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Cynthia L. Anderson,
Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Clay Robinson appeals an order denying his rule 3.800(a) motion to
correct illegal sentence. We affirm because Robinson’s claim that the
sentencing court misunderstood its options at sentencing is not cognizable
under rule 3.800(a) and is otherwise meritless.
In 2005, Robinson entered open pleas to offenses charged in four
separate felony prosecutions. The offenses in each case were committed
on separate dates and involved different victims. Some of the offenses
carried mandatory minimum sentences under the “10-20-Life” statute,
section 775.087(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). The parties advised the
sentencing court that it was required to impose the mandatory minimum
sentences in each case consecutively to the mandatory minimum
sentences in the other cases. The sentencing court therefore imposed the
sentences in each case concurrently with each other but consecutively to
the sentences in the other cases. The convictions and sentences were
affirmed on direct appeal and became final in 2013. See Robinson v. State,
278 So. 3d 702, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).
In 2020, Robinson filed a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal
sentence, arguing he was entitled to resentencing because the sentencing
court mistakenly believed it was required to impose the mandatory
minimum sentences in each case consecutively when, in fact, the court
had the discretion to impose the sentences concurrently. The trial court
denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
We affirm for two reasons. First, Robinson’s claim is procedurally
barred and not cognizable under rule 3.800(a). As recognized by
Robinson, the sentences he received were technically not illegal because
they could have been imposed under Florida’s sentencing laws. See
Johnson v. State,
9 So. 3d 640, 640–41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (recognizing
that because the defendant’s sentences were technically not illegal,
“[u]nder settled law, he would be procedurally barred from raising errors
regarding the imposition of the sentence because the law of this case is
that the sentence is valid”); see also Martinez v. State,
211 So. 3d 989, 991
(Fla. 2017) (holding that “to be subject to correction under rule 3.800(a) a
sentence must be ‘one that no judge under the entire body of sentencing
laws could possibly impose’” (citation omitted)).
Second, even if we were to treat this appeal as a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, Robinson is not entitled to relief because the sentencing
court was required to impose the mandatory minimum sentences
consecutively. Section 775.087(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2004), provides
that mandatory minimum sentences imposed under the 10-20-Life statute
must be imposed “consecutively to any other term of imprisonment
imposed for any other felony offense.” Under this provision, mandatory
minimum sentences must be imposed consecutively when the qualifying
offenses were committed during separate criminal episodes and were
prosecuted in separate cases. See Miller v. State,
265 So. 3d 457, 459 (Fla.
2018) (“[S]ection 775.087(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2014), mandates
consecutive sentences for specified crimes committed in separate criminal
episodes and permits consecutive sentences at judicial discretion for
specified crimes committed in a single criminal episode with either
multiple victims or injuries.”); Jean-Michel v. State,
96 So. 3d 1043, 1046
(Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding that consecutive sentences were required
under the 10-20-Life statute for firearm offenses charged in separate
cases).
Affirmed.
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MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
CIKLIN, J., concurs in result only.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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