Citizens Awareness Foundation, Inc. v. Wantman Group, Inc. , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 7970 ( 2016 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    CITIZENS AWARENESS FOUNDATION, INC.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    WANTMAN GROUP, INC.,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D15-1760
    [May 25, 2016]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
    Beach County; Meenu Sasser, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2014-CA-00577I AI.
    Daniel Desouza of Desouza Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, and Nick Taylor
    of The O’Boyle Law Firm, Deerfield Beach, for appellant.
    Gerald F. Richman and Leora B. Freire of Richman Greer, P.A., West
    Palm Beach, for appellee.
    GROSS, J.
    This case concerns entitlement to attorney’s fees in a public records
    case. The trial court ruled against the party seeking fees. We affirm the
    circuit court’s summary final judgment because there was no unlawful
    refusal to provide the records, which would have justified an award of
    attorney’s fees.
    Wantman Group, Inc. and the South Florida Water Management
    District entered into a contract in which Wantman agreed to provide
    consulting services to the District. Article 8.8 of the contract governs
    public records requests:
    The CONSULTANT shall, at its own expense, allow public
    access to all project documents and materials in accordance
    with the provisions of Chapter 119, Florida Statutes. If at any
    time the DISTRICT requests copies of CONSULTANT’S records
    in response to a public records request, Consultant shall, at
    its own expense, promptly provide copies of all of its records
    in whatever format reasonably requested by the District.
    Should the CONSULTANT assert any exemptions to the
    requirements of Chapter 119 and related Statutes, the burden
    of establishing such exemption, by way of injunctive or other
    relief as provided by law, shall be upon the CONSULTANT.
    The CONSULTANT shall refer any public records requests for
    project documents covered by this provision to the DISTRICT
    and the DISTRICT will handle the request.
    The contract named Robin Petzold as the “consultant” and provided a
    phone number and e-mail address. Significantly, the contract called for
    Wantman to direct “any public records requests” to the District, an agency
    familiar with the area.
    On April 19, 2014, a public records request was submitted by e-mail to
    the contract e-mail address, with the additional language
    “DidTheyReadIt.com” attached at the end of the address. The subject line
    of the e-mail stated: “This is a public records request,” and it indicated it
    was sent from “An Onoma.” The body of the e-mail stated:
    Custodian of Public Records for Wantman Group, Inc.
    Please provide the following records:
    Certificate of Insurance referenced on page 6 of 16 of the
    South Florida Water Management District contract
    4600002690.
    All   responsive      records   should    be    delivered   to
    Vendor.Contract.Publishing@Gmail.com. If for some reason
    Wantman Group, Inc. contends that the requested records are
    exempt from disclosure please explain with particularity the
    rational [sic] for such an assertion. Please provide a written
    estimate of any costs prior to such costs being incurred.
    Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
    VCP-0000-0000-0011.
    After the April 19 request went unanswered, on May 8, 2014, appellant
    Citizens Awareness Foundation, Inc. (“CAFI”) filed a two-count complaint
    against Wantman to enforce Florida’s public records act. CAFI alleged that
    under the terms of the contract between Wantman and the District, the
    District delegated the duty to create and maintain certain records to
    Wantman. Count I was for unlawful withholding of electronic records, and
    -2-
    Count II was for unlawful withholding of public records due to an
    unreasonable delay. CAFI specifically asked the court to enter an order
    declaring Wantman to be in breach of its duty to permit access to public
    records, compelling Wantman to provide access to such records, and
    awarding CAFI attorney’s fees and costs, pursuant to section 119.12,
    Florida Statutes (2014).
    Wantman answered on June 4, 2014, denying that it ever received a
    public records request.      However, Wantman asserted that it had
    “voluntarily provided” the requested records.
    Wantman moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not
    subject to the public records law and, even if it was, it did not wrongfully
    refuse to produce the requested document. The e-mail request appeared
    to be spam; it was not until the filing of the lawsuit that Wantman learned
    that the e-mail was a legitimate records request. Shortly after the lawsuit
    was filed, Wantman voluntarily provided the requested document to CAFI.
    Attached to the motion was David Wantman’s affidavit, swearing that he
    “believed the request was illegitimate and spam.” Wantman also attached
    an affidavit of the District’s Bureau Chief swearing that Wantman is an
    independent contractor without the authority to act on behalf of the
    District. Finally, Wantman attached a copy of the e-mail request and a
    copy of the letter producing the requested document, dated May 29, 2014.
    CAFI opposed Wantman’s summary judgment motion and cross-moved
    for summary judgment. To its motion, CAFI attached its responses to
    Wantman’s statement of uncontested facts, a copy of the contract between
    Wantman and the District, an advisory legal opinion, a copy of the e-mail
    request, and a copy of Wantman’s interrogatory responses.
    After a hearing, the circuit court granted Wantman’s motion and
    entered summary judgment in its favor. In its detailed written order, the
    court concluded that the record was not “sufficiently crystallized” to
    determine whether Wantman was subject to the public records law. The
    court assumed “arguendo” that Wantman was subject to the law and
    continued on to consider whether Wantman unlawfully refused the
    request. The court heavily relied on a first district case, Consumer Rights,
    LLC v. Union Cty., 
    159 So. 3d 882
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), finding it was
    “analogous with the instant case in all material respects.”
    “Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material
    fact and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
    Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 
    760 So. 2d 126
    , 130 (Fla.
    2000).
    -3-
    The public records law provides that “[e]very person who has custody
    of a public record shall permit the record to be inspected and copied by
    any person desiring to do so, at any reasonable time, under reasonable
    conditions, and under supervision by the custodian of the public records.”
    § 119.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014).
    A custodian of public records . . . must acknowledge requests
    to inspect or copy records promptly and respond to such
    requests in good faith. A good faith response includes making
    reasonable efforts to determine from other officers or
    employees within the agency whether such a record exists
    and, if so, the location at which the record can be accessed.
    § 119.07(1)(c), Fla. Stat.
    If a civil action is filed against an agency to enforce the
    provisions of this chapter and if the court determines that
    such agency unlawfully refused to permit a public record to
    be inspected or copied, the court shall assess and award,
    against the agency responsible, the reasonable costs of
    enforcement including reasonable attorneys’ fees.
    § 119.12, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). “The statutory purpose is to
    encourage voluntary compliance with Florida’s public records law, which
    gives effect to the state’s policy ‘that all state, county, and municipal
    records shall be open for personal inspection by any person.’” Office of
    State Attorney for Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. Gonzalez, 
    953 So. 2d 759
    , 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (quoting § 119.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2002)).
    Section 119.12 provides for attorney’s fees if the court determines that
    the failure to provide records in response to a request amounted to an
    unlawful refusal. “By its terms, this section places several conditions on
    the right to an award of fees. The court must determine that the agency
    has ‘refused’ to provide the records and the refusal must be ‘unlawful.’”
    Consumer 
    Rights, 159 So. 3d at 885
    . As the second district explained:
    [A]ttorney’s fees are awardable for unlawful refusal to provide
    public records under two circumstances: first, when a court
    determines that the reason proffered as a basis to deny a
    public records request is improper, and second, when the
    agency unjustifiably fails to respond to a public records
    request by delaying until after the enforcement action has
    been commenced.
    -4-
    
    Gonzalez, 953 So. 2d at 764
    .
    “Unlawful refusal under section 119.12 includes not only affirmative
    refusal to produce records, but also unjustified delay in producing them.”
    Yasir v. Forman, 
    149 So. 3d 107
    , 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Lilker
    v. Suwannee Valley Transit Auth., 
    133 So. 3d 654
    , 655-56 (Fla. 1st DCA
    2014)). “Where delay is at issue, as here, the court must determine
    whether the delay was justified under the facts of the particular case.”
    
    Lilker, 133 So. 3d at 655
    . It is only an “[u]njustified delay in making non-
    exempt public records available [that] violates Florida’s public records
    law.” Promenade D’Iberville, LLC v. Sundy, 
    145 So. 3d 980
    , 983 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 2014).
    We agree with the circuit court that this case is controlled by Consumer
    Rights.
    Consumer Rights, like this case, involved a curious e-mail request for
    records that did not trigger an immediate response. There, the appellant
    made a public records request from the e-mail address
    “ask4records@gmail.com” to the county at “UCBOCC@windstream.net,”
    “an email address posted on the county’s website and not associated with
    a particular county 
    employee.” 159 So. 3d at 883
    . The request was made
    on behalf of an unidentified “Florida company” and was submitted by an
    unnamed agent of the company. 
    Id. Other than
    the e-mail address, “the
    request did not contain any information as to how the county might
    contact the agent or the corporation.” 
    Id. Four months
    after sending the request, and not receiving the requested
    documents, the appellant sued the county, seeking “injunctive relief, a writ
    of mandamus and an award of attorney fees.” 
    Id. at 884.
    The county
    provided all of the records, thus narrowing the issues to injunctive relief
    and attorney’s fees. 
    Id. After an
    evidentiary hearing, the trial court
    “concluded that the delay in providing the records was not tantamount to
    an unlawful refusal and that the plaintiff was not therefore entitled to an
    award of attorney fees.” 
    Id. In explaining
    the trial court’s analysis, the
    First District emphasized the finding by the trial court “that the county
    had not acted in bad faith by failing to provide the records sooner.” 
    Id. The trial
    court reasoned that the records request was “‘intentionally designed
    to appear to be deceptive’ . . . based on the testimony of a county official
    who explained that he did not respond to the records request immediately
    because it appeared to constitute ‘phishing.’” 
    Id. On review,
    citing section 119.07(1)(c), the First District determined that
    “[t]he public records law imposes a duty of good faith on public officers
    -5-
    who are charged with the responsibility of complying with the law.” 
    Id. at 885.
    And “[w]hether a governmental entity acted in ‘good faith’ . . . is
    necessarily a question for the court to decide based on the circumstances
    of a case.” 
    Id. Looking closely
    at the actual e-mail request, the court noted that it “was
    made by an unnamed agent for an undisclosed company and it was sent
    to the county from an e-mail address that did not appear to be the address
    of a person.” 
    Id. at 886.
    As Judge Padovano observed,
    The email from the sender could have contained a virus. It
    might have been a computer-generated message sent out from
    a computer-created email account. The sender might have
    intended to initiate a series of electronic communications that
    would have caused the disclosure of exempt materials or
    created difficulties for the county’s information technology
    officers
    . . . But the delay in this case could have been avoided
    altogether if the plaintiff had just given the county a phone
    number or some other contact information that could be
    associated with a person. In that event, the county could have
    simply contacted the plaintiff to verify that the email was
    authentic.
    
    Id. Finally, the
    court rejected the appellant’s argument that the county
    could have written to him at the e-mail address provided in the request.
    
    Id. The court
    explained that such an argument “plainly reads too much
    into the obligations created by the public records law” because section
    119.07 “is a right that can only be exercised by a ‘person.’” 
    Id. “We know
    of no law that requires a governmental entity to provide public records to
    a generic e-mail address, at least not until such time as it is made clear
    that the address belongs to a person.” 
    Id. Consumer Rights
    concluded by noting that the records were provided to
    the appellant once authenticity was verified. 
    Id. “We have
    no reason to
    believe that the county would not have provided the records much sooner
    had it been able to verify the authenticity of the plaintiff’s email and thus
    we have no reason to question to [sic] trial court’s conclusion that the
    county acted in good faith.” 
    Id. Therefore, “the
    delay in responding to the
    email was not tantamount to a refusal and . . . the trial court correctly
    denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney fees.” 
    Id. at 886-87.
    -6-
    As in Consumer Rights, the delay in providing the records in this case
    was not so “unjustifiable” that it amounted to an “unlawful refusal” to
    provide the record. 
    Id. at 885.
    The request was made in a “suspicious
    email that could not be easily verified,” from an undisclosed sender. There
    was no indication that the e-mail request was made on behalf of a person
    or company. The e-mail did not contain any information about how to
    contact the person or corporation making the request. There was an
    incorrectly spelled word in the e-mail, which is one of the markers of spam.
    This is the type of e-mail that is filtered out as spam by many businesses,
    along with requests for assistance in moving money out of Nigerian banks.
    The e-mail was directed to an independent contractor and not a
    governmental agency familiar with fielding public records requests.
    Appellant waited merely 18 days, without any further inquiry, and then
    filed suit, claiming a right to attorney’s fees. We agree with the analysis of
    Judge Sasser:
    [T]he            email              was              sent
    to robin.petzold@xxxxxxx.com.didtheyreadit.com. Neither the
    underlying contract nor [Wantman’s] website identifies Robin
    Petzold (or anyone else) as a custodian of public records.
    Further, the “didtheyreadit.com” extension rendered the email
    address one not recognized by [Wantman’s] computer
    network. For these reasons the Request itself was one that
    “would lead anyone familiar with the perils of email
    communication to exercise caution, if not to disregard the
    communication entirely.” Consumer Rights, [159 So. 3d at
    886].
    The undisputed evidence in this case also confirms that
    [Wantman] acted in good faith and that its delay in responding
    was attributable to the suspicious nature of the email.
    [Wantman] has presented unrebutted affidavit testimony that
    it believed the Request to be illegitimate and spam and for that
    reason did not respond to it.
    We conclude that there was no “unlawful refusal” to provide public
    records. 1 The public records law should not be applied in a way that
    encourages the manufacture of public records requests designed to obtain
    no response, for the purpose of generating attorney’s fees.
    1Because we affirm the circuit court on these grounds, we do not reach the issue
    of whether Wantman was subject to the public records law.
    -7-
    CAFI relies heavily on Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 
    140 So. 3d 1080
    (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), but that case primarily concerns the issue of
    standing, not whether there was an “unlawful refusal” of a public records
    request that gave rise to an entitlement to attorney’s fees.
    In Chandler, the circuit court denied the petitioner’s petition for writ of
    mandamus to compel production of public records “finding that the
    petition failed to show appellant’s standing to bring the action.” 
    Id. at 1082.
        The records request was an e-mail sent to the City from
    “leo.namesxxx@xxxxx.” 
    Id. This Court
    noted that “[a]lthough the attached
    e-mail did not include a person’s name, the body of the e-mail used the
    pronouns ‘I’ and ‘me.’” 
    Id. The appellant
    had sent three other e-mails to
    city employees requesting documents from the same e-mail address. 
    Id. The city
    clerk responded to the e-mails notifying the sender that they must
    fill out a form on the city’s web page in order to obtain such documents.
    
    Id. When no
    form was filled out, and the same sender e-mailed again
    requesting the same documents, the city clerk again directed the sender
    to the online form. 
    Id. After a
    month of no response, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of
    mandamus, demanding production of the records and also seeking
    attorney’s fees and costs under the public records law. 
    Id. The city
    moved
    to dismiss “arguing that appellant lacked standing to bring the petition
    because it did not allege that appellant was a ‘stakeholder in interest.’” 
    Id. On appeal,
    this Court held that appellant had standing to bring the action.
    
    Id. The portion
    of Chandler on which CAFI urges this Court to focus
    provides:
    We agree with the Attorney General that ‘[a] person requesting
    access to or copies of public records, therefore, may not be
    required to disclose his [or her] name, address, telephone
    number or the like to the custodian, unless the custodian is
    required by law to obtain this information prior to releasing
    the records.’
    
    Id. at 1084
    (alterations in original) (quoting Op. Attorney Gen. Fla. 92-38
    (1992)). We concluded that “the city could not properly condition
    disclosure of the public records, to the then-anonymous requester on
    filling out the city’s form and giving an ‘address or other identifiable source
    for payment of the associated costs.’” 
    Id. at 1085.
    “Requiring appellant to
    provide further identifying information prior to disclosure could have a
    -8-
    chilling effect on access to public records and is not required by the Public
    Records Act.” 
    Id. The focus
    of Chandler was that anonymous requests for public records
    were permissible. The case had nothing to do with whether a violation of
    the Public Records Act had occurred and the propriety of awarding
    attorney’s fees. There is a difference between allowing anonymous public
    records requests and evaluating an agency’s response when such requests
    are justifiably handled with caution.
    We also distinguish the recent case of Board of Trustees v. Lee, 
    2016 WL 1458515
    (Fla. Apr. 14, 2016), where the Florida Supreme Court held
    that a prevailing party is entitled to statutory attorney’s fees when an
    agency unlawfully refused to permit the inspection or copying of a record
    which is a violation of the Public Records Act. In that case, the trial court
    found a violation of section 119.07. 
    Id. at *2.
    The denial of fees in this
    case was based on the conclusion that there was no “unlawful refusal” by
    an agency so there was no violation of the Public Records Act that triggered
    entitlement to statutory attorney’s fees.
    Affirmed.
    STEVENSON and FORST, JJ., concur.
    *         *        *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 4D15-1760

Citation Numbers: 195 So. 3d 396, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 7970, 2016 WL 3002334

Judges: Gross, Stevenson, Forst

Filed Date: 5/25/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024