DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
WISBEN SANON,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D22-713
[April 12, 2023]
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; Lawrence M. Mirman, Judge; L.T. Case No.
562017CF001914.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anesha Worthy,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
FORST, J.
Appellant Wisben Sanon appeals his conviction for several sexual
assault crimes, raising two arguments on appeal. First, Sanon argues his
conviction by a six-person jury violated his rights under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. We have recently
addressed this issue and affirm without discussion. See Guzman v. State,
350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).
Second, Sanon contends the State made improper rebuttal closing
argument when it showed the jury a placard with the reasonable doubt
instruction juxtaposed with the phrase “motive plus opportunity is not
reasonable doubt.” The State explained this was a reference to Sanon’s
defense that he had been framed for the charged crimes and the jury
should find reasonable doubt attributable to the accusers’ motive and
opportunity to plant damaging evidence.
We review a trial court’s control of prosecutorial closing comments for
abuse of discretion. Narcisse v. State,
166 So. 3d 954, 956 (Fla. 4th DCA
2015). In exercising that discretion, trial courts will properly permit the
parties “wide latitude in closing argument to a jury.” Stephens v. State,
975 So. 2d 405, 421 (Fla. 2007).
As a response to Sanon’s primary defense, the State’s rebuttal closing
argument was well within that latitude. See State v. Compo,
651 So. 2d
127, 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (“Fundamental notions of fairness require[]
that the state be allowed to comment on . . . issues raised by the
defendant.”). Moreover, the State informed the jury that the objected-to
statement “is obviously not part of the instruction [on reasonable doubt].”
Upon further defense objection, the trial court clarified that the
prosecution was merely emphasizing what was and what was not in the
agreed-upon reasonable doubt jury instruction, with the court informing
the jury “what is and what isn’t reasonable doubt, ladies and gentlemen,
will ultimately be for you to decide.” The trial court’s comments, on top of
the State’s explanation, “remov[ed] any question of an improper taint on
the jury’s understanding of the burden of proof.” Thomas v. State,
726 So.
2d 369, 372 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We accordingly find no error.
Affirmed.
GROSS and CONNER, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
