PAMELA PARRIS v. STATE OF FLORIDA ( 2023 )


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  •           DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    PAMELA RAPP PARRIS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D21-2682
    [April 12, 2023]
    Appeal from the County Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
    Indian River County; Michael Linn, Judge; L.T. Case No.
    312020MM001119B.
    Philip L. Reizenstein and Bhakti Kadiwar of Reizenstein & Associates,
    PA, Miami, for appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lindsay A. Warner,
    Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    PER CURIAM.
    After the City of Sebastian’s city manager announced a cancellation of
    a properly noticed city council meeting, three councilmembers, including
    the appellant, Pamela Parris, held a meeting anyway, during which they
    voted to terminate the employment of the city manager, the city attorney,
    and the city clerk, and voted to remove the mayor and replace him with
    Parris’s co-defendant, Damien Gilliams. Based on this meeting, Parris and
    Gilliams were charged with violating section 286.011, Florida Statutes
    (2019), commonly referred to as the Sunshine Law. They were also
    charged with perjury based on statements which they made during an
    investigation of the Sunshine Law violations. Parris and Gilliams were
    tried together and found guilty of most counts. Parris appeals her
    convictions for one count of violating the Sunshine Law and two counts of
    perjury. 1
    1   We take up Gilliams’s appeal in a separate opinion in case 4D21-2667.
    Parris raises multiple issues on appeal, most of which pertain to her
    conviction of a Sunshine Law violation. We address the following three
    arguments: (1) her conviction must be reversed where section 286.011
    does not contain definitions for certain phrases; (2) her responses to the
    investigator’s imprecise questions did not amount to perjury; and (3) her
    allegedly false statements were not material. We agree that the state failed
    to prove perjury as alleged in count V, and we reverse on this point, but
    we affirm with respect to the Sunshine Law arguments. Parris’s remaining
    arguments lack merit, and on these arguments, we affirm without further
    discussion.
    The Trial Evidence
    The trial evidence revealed the following. The City of Sebastian operates
    under a charter form of government and its city manager, city attorney,
    and city clerk are charter officers. The charter requires the city council to
    meet once a month, but meetings are usually held twice monthly with
    charter officers being required to attend the meetings. Additionally, the
    city manager requires the attendance of IT personnel to facilitate the
    broadcast of meetings to the public. Meetings typically start at 6:00 p.m.
    and are broadcast live.
    Parris, Gilliams, and Charles Mauti were elected to the council in
    November 2019. According to Mauti, they had a common interest:
    controlling growth. Councilmembers elected Ed Dodd as mayor. Mauti
    voted for Dodd, but in the ensuing months he had second thoughts.
    Gilliams confided in Mauti that he wanted to serve as mayor.
    In the wake of the pandemic’s arrival in the spring of 2020, changes
    were made to how meetings were held. Prior to that, the routine was the
    following. The meeting agenda was typically published to the public no
    later than the Friday before the meeting. City staff customarily set up 125
    chairs in the meeting room, which can accommodate up to 420 people,
    and the doors to the meeting room were unlocked. When councilmembers
    were ready to begin the meeting, the mayor would “hit [a] button” and
    could see that the meeting was being broadcast. Doors to the meeting
    room were kept locked “all the time except for when we have meetings.”
    When no meeting was being held, city officials with a passkey could enter
    the locked meeting room doors, but the doors automatically locked
    thereafter.
    Beginning with a meeting held in March 2020, the city utilized the Zoom
    platform, and it “moved the public outside into the courtyard in order to
    maintain the social distancing.” Speakers were placed outdoors “so that
    2
    people could listen” to the meeting being held indoors. Additionally,
    members of the public who wished to be heard were escorted indoors and
    then back to the courtyard once they finished speaking. As one city
    employee explained, “We were trying to get creative, trying to make sure
    the public had every opportunity to be able to participate in these
    meetings.”
    Also in March 2020, Mayor Dodd signed an emergency declaration
    giving the city manager the authority to cancel meetings. According to
    another councilmember, Jim Hill, the council “made it very clear to the
    city manager that if . . . he wasn’t able to hold a safe meeting” or if there
    were no emergency issues to be addressed, he could cancel an upcoming
    meeting.
    The charges which the state brought against Parris were based on the
    facts surrounding the city council meeting scheduled for April 22, 2020,
    and the events that followed. As the April 22 meeting approached, the city
    received “an extraordinary amount of emails” from residents who felt it
    would be prudent to cancel the meeting for public health reasons even
    though “hot button” topics were on the meeting agenda that had generated
    much interest from the public. Two of the five councilmembers, including
    the mayor, advised the city manager that he should cancel the meeting.
    In the days leading up to the scheduled April 22 meeting,
    councilmembers and charter officers communicated regarding whether the
    April 22 meeting would go forward. On April 19, Gilliams emailed the city
    manager, requesting he not cancel the meeting, and he advised he would
    request an emergency meeting if the meeting was canceled. The next day,
    Gilliams emailed the IT manager, the city manager, and the city attorney,
    requesting an emergency/special meeting. Councilmember Mauti also
    emailed the city manager and councilmembers on April 20, stating that he
    did not agree to cancel the April 22 meeting and he planned to attend.
    Meanwhile, the city’s staff continued to prepare for the April 22
    meeting. The meeting date and time and the agenda had been publicized
    to the city’s residents. The agenda for the meeting contained the typical
    items: invocation, recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, roll call,
    announcements, proclamations, and other routine matters. The agenda
    also included a resolution related to pandemic protocol, a quasi-judicial
    hearing to be conducted by the council in its capacity as the Board of
    Adjustment, a proclamation related to the retirement of the chief of police,
    and Mauti’s request to replace the mayor.
    3
    At 2:36 p.m. on April 22, the city manager notified the councilmembers,
    city attorney, and city clerk by email that he was postponing the meeting:
    Based on the consensus of the City Council and the authority
    granted by the Declaration of Local State of Emergency, I am
    directing that the meeting of April 22, 2020 be postponed and
    all items carried forward to the next regularly scheduled
    meeting.
    The meeting was canceled because it became apparent that contentious
    topics on the agenda were going to draw a large crowd, and the city was
    “expecting more public than we could accommodate and maintain
    Sunshine.” Additionally, the city was still fine-tuning accommodations it
    would provide to comply with pandemic restrictions and the Sunshine
    Law.
    Upon being told by the city manager of the meeting’s cancellation, the
    city clerk notified city residents who were on her email list, department
    heads, the police chief, and the IT staff, as the latter were preparing the
    room and courtyard for the meeting. Staff “started putting equipment
    away,” and a notice of the cancellation was posted on the city’s website,
    its broadcast channel, and on the doors to city hall. The city clerk left city
    hall at 4:30 p.m.
    Gilliams was aware the meeting had been canceled, but a city resident,
    Russell Herrmann, informed him that Gilliams’s “supporters” were
    gathering at city hall and “they want to have a rally.” Gilliams decided to
    go and went to city hall dressed in casual clothing and carrying his
    bullhorn. Herrmann called Parris at about 5:10 p.m. to let her know about
    the rally. She responded that it was “late notice” but she would try to
    attend. Over at city hall, Gilliams informed residents who had turned out
    that the meeting had been canceled but they were going to proceed with
    the meeting once Parris arrived.
    Mauti also went to city hall. He was dressed in a suit and ready for a
    meeting. He was surprised to see a number of people standing outside, as
    “usually people enter the town hall.” He asked Gilliams “what was going
    on,” and Gilliams told him there was a sign posted on the door announcing
    the meeting was “postponed or canceled.” The city hall doors were locked,
    but Gilliams used a passkey to gain access. None of the charter officers
    were there, and the meeting room was dark and not set up for a meeting.
    When Parris showed up, dressed “[i]mpeccably,” Gilliams advised them
    they had a quorum for a meeting and could proceed.
    4
    At about 6:00 p.m., Mayor Dodd went to city hall to see if any residents
    had not received word of the canceled meeting. He saw supporters of
    Gilliams, Parris, and Mauti standing in the courtyard and signs were taped
    to the city hall doors announcing the cancellation of the meeting. Upon
    being told councilmembers were in the chambers, Mayor Dodd knocked
    on the doors, as they were locked. Gilliams let him in, and he saw that
    Mauti was also present. Mayor Dodd warned Gilliams and Mauti he would
    call law enforcement, but Gilliams told him to “go ahead.” When Mayor
    Dodd went back into the courtyard, he saw Parris. Mayor Dodd left, as he
    was concerned he would violate the Sunshine Law if he remained.
    Back in the city hall meeting room, Mauti and Gilliams worked on their
    agenda that was “limited to the reorganization of the city council and the
    firing of certain members.” Some residents entered the meeting room,
    including supporters of Gilliams, Mauti, and Parris. But other residents
    were locked out. Mauti, Gilliams, and Parris proceeded to hold a meeting,
    and they voted on matters that were not on the previously publicized
    agenda. They voted to do the following: terminate the employment of the
    city manager, the city attorney, and the city clerk; modify the emergency
    declaration so that the city manager was not authorized to cancel
    meetings; “rescind the mayor” and seat Gilliams as mayor; and “retain a[n]
    outside attorney for the next meeting” and suspend the city attorney. One
    of the residents watching warned, “Here come the police,” and the meeting
    was hastily adjourned.
    An investigator with the State Attorney’s Office, Ed Arens, was assigned
    to investigate written complaints filed by Parris and Gilliams regarding the
    city manager’s cancellation of the meeting. Arens found it suspicious that
    their complaints matched and, on April 24, Arens met with and
    interviewed Parris. Arens broached the subject of the April 22 meeting
    being canceled, and Parris stated she “had mixed messages that entire
    day” and received “numerous . . . conflicting phone calls and emails from
    the . . . city manager . . . that day.” She also indicated she did not have
    any communications with Gilliams or Mauti that violated the Sunshine
    Law. She claimed that on April 22, she was studying the agenda between
    4:00 and 5:30 p.m. to prepare for that day’s meeting. Arens obtained
    telephone records and confirmed no calls were made from the city manager
    to Parris on April 22. Arens also looked at Parris’s Facebook page. At 4:24
    p.m. on April 22, about two hours after the city manager announced the
    cancellation of the meeting, Parris posted a photo of herself in a car with
    the caption, “cancel me.” During a subsequent interview, Parris explained
    that the noticed meeting was canceled “incorrectly,” as she did not receive
    24 hours’ notice. She denied being aware of the city manager’s email, as
    she was preparing for the meeting.
    5
    City residents testified at trial that they had planned to attend the
    meeting but did not go upon receiving the cancellation email or seeing the
    notice on the city’s website. Other residents did not learn of the
    cancellation until they arrived at city hall.
    Analysis
    Sunshine Law Violation
    Parris was charged with a violation of the Sunshine Law, which
    provides as follows in pertinent part:
    (1) All meetings of any board or commission of any state
    agency or authority or of any agency or authority of any
    county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision . . . at
    which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public
    meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution,
    rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as
    taken or made at such meeting. The board or commission
    must provide reasonable notice of all such meetings.
    ....
    (3)(b) Any person who is a member of a board or commission
    or of any state agency or authority of any county, municipal
    corporation, or political subdivision who knowingly violates
    the provisions of this section by attending a meeting not held
    in accordance with the provisions hereof is guilty of a
    misdemeanor of the second degree . . . .
    § 286.011, Fla. Stat. (2019). Specifically, Parris was alleged to have
    violated the Sunshine Law by holding a meeting that was not open to the
    public and without reasonable notice. She was also charged with perjury
    based on statements to Arens in her April 24 interview.
    Turning to the issues raised on appeal, we must reject as meritless
    Parris’s first argument that the Sunshine Law is unconstitutionally vague.
    Parris contends that because the phrases “reasonable notice” and “open
    to the public at all times” are not defined in section 286.011, Florida
    6
    Statutes (2019), she did not know what conduct was prohibited, and, thus,
    her constitutional right to notice of prohibited conduct was violated. 2
    “[I]n order to withstand a vagueness challenge, a statute must provide
    persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate notice of the
    proscribed conduct. Additionally, the statute must define the offense in a
    manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
    enforcement.” DuFresne v. State, 
    826 So. 2d 272
    , 275 (Fla. 2002) (citations
    omitted). “However, ‘[t]he legislature’s failure to define a statutory term
    does not in and of itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague.
    In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or
    related statutory provisions which define the term . . . .’” 
    Id.
     (alterations
    in original) (quoting State v. Hagan, 
    387 So. 2d 943
    , 945 (Fla. 1980)). “[I]n
    cases where the exact meaning of a term was not defined in a statute itself,
    we have ascertained its meaning by reference to other statutory provisions,
    as well as case law or the plain and ordinary meaning of a word of common
    usage.” 
    Id.
    With respect to “reasonable notice,” “reasonable” is defined, in part, as
    “fair and sensible” and “as much as is appropriate or fair in a particular
    situation.” Oxford Am. Dictionary & Thesaurus, 1079 (2d ed. 2009).
    “Notice” is defined, in part, as “information or warning that something is
    going to happen,” “a sheet or placard put on display to give information,”
    and “a small announcement or advertisement published in a newspaper.”
    Id. at 880.
    This court’s interpretation of the phrase “reasonable notice” is
    consistent with these definitions. In Transparency for Florida v. City of Port
    St. Lucie, 
    240 So. 3d 780
    , 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), we looked to Florida
    Attorney General opinions interpreting what constitutes sufficient notice
    under the statute. These opinions have provided that what satisfies
    “reasonable notice” “is variable and depends on the facts of the situation,”
    2 Parris asserts that the rule of lenity requires reversal. “When a court must
    construe an equivocal criminal statute, or when the statute is open to more than
    one interpretation and the court is otherwise unable to determine which
    interpretation was intended by the Legislature,” as opposed to “arbitrarily
    choosing one of the competing interpretations, the rule [of lenity] provides that a
    court should apply the interpretation that treats the defendant more leniently.”
    Key v. State, 
    296 So. 3d 469
    , 471 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). However, application of
    the rule of lenity to a criminal statute typically involves competing
    interpretations. See, e.g., Wooden v. United States, 
    142 S. Ct. 1063
    , 1069 (2022).
    Parris offers no possible competing interpretations nor any construction analysis,
    and, thus, her argument is more akin to an argument that a statute is
    unconstitutionally vague.
    7
    but “special meetings should have at least 24 hours reasonable notice to
    the public.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 2000-08 (2000)). Further, a
    Florida Attorney General opinion “finds that the type of notice given
    depends on the purpose for the notice, the character of the event about
    which the notice is given, and the nature of the rights to be affected.” 
    Id.
    at 787 (citing Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 73-170 (1973)). We also noted that the
    Attorney General addressed the term “reasonable notice” in its
    Government-In-The-Sunshine Manual, which provides as follows:
    3. Except in the case of emergency or special meetings, notice
    should be provided at least 7 days prior to the meeting.
    Emergency sessions should be afforded the most appropriate
    and effective notice under the circumstances.
    4. Special meetings should have no less than 24 and
    preferably at least 72 hours reasonable notice to the public.
    
    Id.
     (quoting 39 Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual, § (D)(4)(a)3., 4.
    (2017)). This court concluded that “[w]here there is no specific legislative
    directive as to what constitutes reasonable notice as a matter of law, we
    agree with the Attorney General that it is a fact specific inquiry.” Id.
    (reversing and holding summary judgment was improper where there was
    a disputed issue of fact as to whether 21.5 hours’ notice was reasonable
    under the circumstances).
    Few appellate cases have addressed the issue of what constitutes
    reasonable notice, but the First District Court of Appeal has held that
    notice of a special meeting was reasonable where the special meeting was
    announced at the previous meeting and on a local radio station three days
    prior, the city posted the meeting agenda outside of city hall and delivered
    copies to the local media two days prior, and the media published an
    article regarding the meeting the day before. Yarbrough v. Young, 
    462 So. 2d 515
    , 516-17 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The First District has also held that
    a complaint made a prima facie showing of violation of the Sunshine Law
    by alleging that a public meeting regarding the appointment of a committee
    to study the operation of a regional utility authority was held without
    reasonable notice to the public where the meeting was held after
    approximately 1.5 hours’ notice to the media. Rhea v. City of Gainesville,
    
    574 So. 2d 221
    , 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Fla. Citizens All., Inc. v.
    Sch. Bd. of Collier Cnty., 
    328 So. 3d 22
    , 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (applying
    the analysis of Transparency for Fla. and holding that “burying a notice
    inside a committee application and calendar on the instructional materials
    page of the District’s website is an unreasonable way to give public notice
    of a meeting”).
    8
    Next, with respect to the phrase “open to the public,” the word “open”
    is defined, in part, as “exposed to view or attack; not covered or protected,”
    “admitting customers or visitors; available for business,” “accessible or
    available,” “frank and communicative,” and “not disguised or hidden.”
    Oxford Am. Dictionary & Thesaurus at 901. “Public” is defined, in part, as
    “relating to or available to the people as a whole.” Id. at 1043.
    Case law also provides guidance as to the meaning of “open to the
    public.” In Rhea v. School Board of Alachua County, 
    636 So. 2d 1383
     (Fla.
    1st DCA 1994), the court entertained whether a workshop held in Orlando
    by the Alachua County School Board while attending a convention violated
    the Sunshine Law’s requirement that official action occur in a meeting
    open to the public. 
    Id. at 1384
    . Although the board advertised the meeting
    in a Gainesville newspaper and stated that all persons were invited, it was
    more than 100 miles away from the board’s headquarters. 
    Id.
    The First District recognized that the statute does not define “public,”
    but that “[i]n construing a statute, words that are undefined by the statute
    should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” 
    Id. at 1385
    . The court
    looked to the dictionary definition of “public” as “of, relating to, or affecting
    the people as an organized community; a place accessible or visible to all
    members of the community; an organized body of people: community,
    nation; a group of people distinguished by common interests or
    characteristics.” 
    Id.
     (citing Webster’s 3d New Int’l Dictionary 1836 (1981)).
    Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the word to the case before it,
    the court held that “the relevant ‘public,’ the community that would be
    affected by the Board’s official actions, is Alachua County.” 
    Id.
     The court
    recited factors to be considered in determining whether the public was
    provided a reasonable opportunity to attend a meeting that is subject to
    the Sunshine Law: the interests of the public in having a reasonable
    opportunity to attend the meeting, the board’s need to conduct a meeting
    at a site beyond the county boundaries, the extent of the distance from the
    usual meeting place, and any good faith action by the board to minimize
    the expense and inconvenience of the public in attending the out-of-county
    meeting. 
    Id.
     Applying the test to the case before it, the court held the
    meeting held in an Orlando hotel room violated the Sunshine Law, as it
    did not afford the citizens of Alachua County a reasonable opportunity to
    attend. 
    Id. at 1386
    ; see also Bigelow v. Howze, 
    291 So. 2d 645
    , 646-48
    (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (holding that trial court properly declared public
    contract void where committee members who were members of the public
    body violated Sunshine Law by deliberating on a committee’s
    recommendations while in Tennessee and then conducting a related
    meeting in a public room at a Florida hotel, since the “requisite advance
    9
    notice and the reasonable opportunity [for the public] to attend did not
    exist”).
    More recently, in Herrin v. City of Deltona, 
    121 So. 3d 1094
     (Fla. 5th
    DCA 2013), the court wrote that “[t]he phrase ‘open to the public’ most
    reasonably means that meetings must be properly noticed and reasonably
    accessible to the public, not that the public has the right to be heard at
    such meetings.” 
    Id. at 1097
    . 3
    Here, the lack of definitions for “reasonable notice” and “open to the
    public” in the statute do not render it unconstitutionally vague. To the
    extent the language requires any interpretation, the well-established case
    law and the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms provide ample
    guidance. Applying these definitions to the evidence here, sufficient
    evidence showed that Parris knowingly participated in a meeting that was
    not “open to the public” and for which “reasonable notice” was not given.
    Perjury Charge
    We also reject Parris’s second argument that the state did not prove the
    perjury charge against her in count VI where the investigator’s questioning
    was imprecise.
    The crime of perjury is codified in section 837.012, Florida Statutes
    (2019), which provides that “[w]hoever makes a false statement, which he
    or she does not believe to be true, under oath, not in an official proceeding,
    in regard to any material matter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the
    first degree.” “The statement alleged to be perjury must be one of fact, and
    not of opinion or belief.” Vargas v. State, 
    795 So. 2d 270
    , 272 (Fla. 3d DCA
    2001). “The questions posed to elicit perjured testimony must be asked
    with the appropriate specificity necessary to result in an equally specific
    statement of fact.” Cohen v. State, 
    985 So. 2d 1207
    , 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA
    2008). “Precise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of
    3 Parris argues these cases are inapplicable as they do not involve a criminal
    violation of the Sunshine Law. Although our courts’ discussion of the meaning
    of “reasonable notice” and “open to the public” is contained in civil cases, the
    discussion extends to the meaning of the phrase in the criminal law context. See
    Wolfson v. State, 
    344 So. 2d 611
    , 614 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (acknowledging that
    the definition of “official act” it relied on was “employed in a civil context,” but
    observing that “we can think of no reasoning process which would compel the
    conclusion that it necessarily assumes a fatal vagueness when considered in a
    criminal context”).
    10
    perjury.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Bronston v. United States, 
    409 U.S. 352
    , 362 (1973)).
    A statement regarding a person’s recollection is not an assertion of
    empirical fact that can support a perjury conviction. McAlpin v. Crim. Just.
    Stds. & Training Comm’n, 
    155 So. 3d 416
    , 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). “[A]n
    initially false statement . . . can be further explained so that the statement
    taken as a whole is not perjury.” 
    Id.
     “The typical manner of proving
    perjury is to have two conflicting sworn statements by the same person.”
    
    Id.
    Here, the perjury charge against Parris alleged in count VI of the
    information was based on her statements in the first half of the April 24
    interview by Arens, and it alleged that Parris “falsely told a law
    enforcement officer that on April 22, 2020, she had several telephone
    conversations with City Manager Paul Carlisle concerning whether the
    April 22, 2020 Sebastian Council meeting was postponed or canceled.”
    During this interview, Arens communicated his understanding that the
    April 22 meeting had been canceled, and Parris volunteered that she had
    “mixed messages that entire day” and “received numerous phone calls,
    conflicting phone calls and emails from the . . . city manager . . . that day.”
    She “wish[ed]” he had sent her “all email,” but “[h]e chose to call me on my
    phone a few times.” She was “under the impression that there were two
    meetings scheduled by 5:00,” so she “got dressed and went to city hall . .
    . and I went into my meeting.” Arens stated that he thought the city
    manager sent an email “to all of you” at 2:30 p.m. canceling the meeting,
    and Parris responded, “There were several phone calls after that.”
    We hold sufficient evidence showed that Parris made a false statement
    when she asserted that she had received numerous phone calls and emails
    from the city manager on April 22. At trial, the state’s evidence included
    phone records showing that the city manager never called Parris on April
    22. Arens’s statements and questions, and Parris’s responses, read in
    context, indicate Parris was asserting that the city manager called her
    several times on April 22 and gave her conflicting information as to
    whether the meeting was canceled. Based on these “mixed messages,” she
    thought the April 22 meeting was still on, and she went to city hall. As
    the prosecutor showed the jury, Parris’s statements conflicted with what
    the phone records actually showed.
    Third, Parris argues that the state did not prove the perjury charge
    alleged against her in count V of the information. There, the state alleged
    that Parris “falsely told a law enforcement officer that she had no phone
    conversations with any other council members on April 22, 2020.” We
    agree with Parris that the state’s evidence fell short.
    11
    As evidenced at trial, during the interview, Arens and Parris took a
    break due to Arens’s recorder’s batteries running out of power. During the
    second half of the interview, the parties began discussing Arens’s role at
    the State Attorney’s Office. Parris then reminded Arens that he had been
    asking about the April 22 meeting being videotaped or held on the Zoom
    platform, and she volunteered that she had consulted with her doctor
    about whether she should attend public meetings, and she felt it was
    important to attend meetings in person. She also spoke about her
    conversations with the city manager and the city clerk regarding how to
    allow for public input during the pandemic.
    After briefly changing topics, Arens asked the question that led to the
    statements related to count V: “[Y]ou’ve had a lot of phone calls you said
    from people that were trying to, or from people about the meeting
    happening. You said you received phone calls or texts or messages?”
    Parris responded, “No, it was the city manager.” Arens sought to clarify:
    “Did you receive any phone calls or texts from Mr. Gilliam[s] or Mr. Mauti
    or anybody –”. Parris interjected:
    I’m not . . . going to do that, no. That’s the Sunshine Law.
    . . . That was pounded into my head from day one. . . . Not
    to talk to them. And I think it’s odd because it makes it really
    hard to come to good solutions when you can’t communicate.
    But I’ve asked even a gentleman from Rick Scott’s office. He
    sat down and he was kind enough, when I came to office to
    greet me and . . . explain everything and it is what it is because
    (indiscernible) I go out of my way to make sure I don’t violate
    that.
    This evidence does not reflect that Parris clearly indicated she “had no
    phone conversations with any other council members on April 22, 2020.”
    The statements forming the basis of count V were made during the second
    half of the interview, a significant amount of time after the April 22 meeting
    was referenced. Additionally, Arens asked Parris a broad question
    regarding whether she had conversations with members of the public
    pertaining to the April 22 meeting. Nothing in this broad question
    indicated that Arens was limiting Parris to phone calls and
    communications received on April 22 by other councilmembers. Parris’s
    response to the unclear question was to state that she was referencing the
    city manager. Arens attempted to clarify that he was talking about the
    other councilpersons, but again, he failed to make it clear he was
    referencing April 22. Further, even if it could be said that Parris’s response
    related to April 22, she did not make it clear that she had not spoken to
    the other councilmembers at all. Read in context, Parris seemed to be
    12
    denying that she had any communications with them that violated the
    Sunshine Law.
    Finally, we reject Parris’s contention that her statements were not
    material. ‘“[M]ateriality’ is not an element of the crime of perjury in Florida
    but is a threshold issue that a court must determine as a matter of law
    prior to trial.” Vargas, 
    795 So. 2d at 272
    . ‘“Material matter’ means any
    subject, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which
    could affect the course or outcome of the proceeding. Whether a matter is
    material in a given factual situation is a question of law.” § 837.011(3),
    Fla. Stat. (2019). “To be material, statements must be germane to the
    inquiry, and have a bearing on a determination in the underlying case.”
    Vargas, 
    795 So. 2d at 272
    . However, “[i]t is not essential that the false
    testimony bear directly on the main issue. It is sufficient if the false
    testimony is collaterally or corroboratively material to the ultimate
    material fact to be established.” Gordon v. State, 
    104 So. 2d 524
    , 531 (Fla.
    1958). Here, Parris’s statements are material because the statements
    showed her intent to participate in a meeting that was not reasonably
    noticed and not open to the public at all times.
    Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing, we reverse Parris’s perjury conviction on count
    V and we remand for the county court to vacate the count V conviction
    and sentence. We affirm with respect to all other issues.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
    KLINGENSMITH, C.J., and WARNER, J., concur.
    CIKLIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
    CIKLIN, J., concurring specially.
    The majority opinion solidly stands for the “clinical” legal reasoning and
    academic analysis behind our decision to both affirm and reverse certain
    of the convictions that occurred before a jury below.
    I think it is important, however, to issue a clarion call to the hundreds
    of Florida public officials who are subject to the Florida Sunshine Law.
    Indeed, as more and more individuals become Floridians and engage in
    civic involvement, our new citizens need to be fully aware of Florida’s
    13
    Sunshine Law. 4 The appellate briefs filed in this case suggesting that the
    Sunshine Law is vague and unclear or that the law is weak and unprovable
    have given me pause and a commensurate urge to raise a warning flag. It
    has been many years since a comprehensive opinion has been issued by a
    Florida intermediate appellate court on the subject and, thus, perhaps this
    admonition is particularly timely.
    It seems unlikely, in this unfortunate series of events, that former
    Sebastian City Councilmembers Pamela Parris and Damien Gilliams
    would have ever thought it imaginable that they would now be appealing
    criminal convictions for which they have been sentenced to serve jail time
    of two months and six months, respectively. My guess is, that in
    retrospect, they would have run away and resisted any temptation to get
    caught up in the excitement of the moment . . . as, unfortunately, they
    ultimately did.     These recent Indian River County Sunshine Law
    prosecutions and convictions illustrate actual examples of popularly
    elected local governing body officials being ordered to do real jail time in a
    real Florida county jail for the commission of a real Florida crime. Of
    course, whether elected or appointed is of no consequence. The Florida
    Sunshine Law applies equally to all.
    After now engaging in significant research on the law itself, plus sitting
    for oral argument on the topic in January, I have developed a concern that
    some government officials subject to the Sunshine Law may not fully
    appreciate the Law’s meaning and/or the possible criminal penalties that
    lie in wait for those who carelessly fail to fully comprehend the Sunshine
    Law and abide by it. And this baffling complacency is not for want of
    official publications—including the current 360-page Government-In-The-
    Sunshine manual prepared by the Florida Attorney General.                   44
    Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual (2022 ed.). To be sure, the briefings
    in these consolidated cases, and our majority opinion are considerably
    lengthy because the issues are complex and yet, paradoxically, not all that
    difficult to understand.
    The scenario in this case is alarming. Three duly elected members of
    the Sebastian City Council who were not allowed to privately discuss
    foreseeable government issues did so anyway. They decided amongst
    themselves—as their personal protest to the mayor and city manager’s
    decision to cancel a regularly scheduled city council meeting because of
    4The Sunshine Law applies to “any board or commission of any state agency or
    authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or
    political subdivision.” § 286.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2019).
    14
    Covid—to enter the city council chambers and conduct the cancelled
    meeting anyway. Armed with a government-issued pass key, and in unlit
    city council chambers, these three city councilmembers took to the dais
    and purported to take official action at what in essence became a
    spontaneous, non-announced meeting of the three of them that lasted
    until the police showed up. That imprudent action was itself a flagrant
    violation of the Sunshine Law and a reading of the statute makes this
    conclusion abundantly clear.
    Whether two or more officials privately discuss, in any manner
    whatsoever, a foreseeable issue of any magnitude, inside the other’s office
    or at a coffee shop or in the spectator audience of a child’s soccer match
    or at a statewide education conference or by quick text or whether they do
    so through surrogates (such as aides, friends, relatives, other government
    officials) or whether, as in this case, they decide to spontaneously convene
    an unannounced rally or meeting, so long as two or more are involved,
    these are all distinctions without a difference. And every individual
    unauthorized private discussion between two or more officials along the
    way constitutes an individual statutory crime against each person with
    each separate charge carrying a possible penalty of 60 days in the county
    jail. Plus a $500 fine. Plus substantial court costs. Plus six months of
    probation. Per act. And notably, in the State of Florida, no statutory
    sentencing guidelines exist for these types of crimes and consecutive jail
    sentences and consecutive probationary periods are permitted and within
    the unfettered discretion of the trial judge.
    Even though ample publications, and just as many available seminars,
    meetings, discussions, and groups, are specifically charged with fully
    educating officials subject to the Sunshine Law (which, ironically all three
    charged city councilmembers attended), here are my very easy takeaways
    from the current state of the Florida Sunshine Law.
    1. Meetings of two or more fellow government officials who
    are subject to the Sunshine Law are not allowed if any words
    of any type pertaining to any possible foreseeable issue will be
    communicated in any way unless they are open to the public
    to whom reasonable notice has been provided.
    2. There is rarely any purpose for a private meeting or
    communication between two or more government officials who
    are both are subject to the Sunshine Law. Those who engage
    in such activity widely open themselves to allegations that
    some aspect of the governmental decisional process has
    unlawfully occurred behind closed doors. Any aspect of the
    15
    decisional process—ranging from whether to conduct a
    meeting in the first instance to the concept of terminating
    administrative staff to the seemingly inane decision as to
    which government officials will even make a motion to begin
    open public discussion—is part of the official decisional
    process and must be wide-open and advertised in advance to
    the public.
    3. Under Florida law, there is no such thing as an “informal”
    conference or “unofficial” caucus or pass-you-in-the-hallway
    information gathering (or sharing) by two or more government
    officials subject to the Sunshine Law which would thereby
    remove such communication from the Sunshine Law’s ambit.
    Indeed, such “innocuous” meetings have been held to be
    illegal and nothing short of the unlawful crystallization of
    secret decisions to a point just short of public discussion and
    ceremonial acceptance. And whether done personally or
    through surrogates (such as aide-to-aide), such meetings are
    illegal under Florida’s Sunshine Law.
    4. Any attempt to distinguish between a “formal,” “informal,”
    “ministerial,” “informational gathering-only,” or “just a
    listening” meeting between two or more government officials—
    for purposes of determining whether the Sunshine Law
    applies—is by itself alien to the law’s design, exposing it to the
    very evasions which it was designed to prevent.
    5. Because a violation of Florida’s Sunshine Law can be
    investigated and charged as a crime, all of those law
    enforcement and prosecutorial techniques, such as the
    issuance of subpoenas for cell phone records is but a
    signature away. In these cases, prosecutors easily gathered
    data and produced it for the jury showing numerous texts,
    emails, telephone conversations and voicemails over a wide-
    ranging period between all three city councilmembers. The
    flow chart prepared by the prosecution and shown to the jury
    highlighted the dates of the calls, to whom they were made,
    the duration of the calls and the overall sequence of
    communications.
    6. When in any doubt, as to whether a meeting or
    communication, either directly or indirectly between two or
    more government officials may be illegal under the Sunshine
    Law, the easy answer is: “LEAVE.” See City of Miami v. Berns,
    16
    
    245 So. 2d 38
    , 41 (Fla. 1971) (“The evil of closed door
    operation of government without permitting public scrutiny
    and participation is what the law seeks to prohibit. If a public
    official is unable to know whether by any convening of two or
    more officials he is violating the law, he should leave the
    meeting forthwith.”).
    7. Lying, under oath, about any matter that is material to an
    alleged Sunshine Law violation is considered as an additional
    crime of perjury and every individual lie constitutes an
    individual statutory crime against each person with each
    separate charge carrying a possible penalty of 1 year in the
    county jail. Plus a $1000 fine. Plus substantial court costs.
    Plus 12 months of probation. Per lie. And just as is the case
    with the underlying Sunshine Law crime, no statutory
    sentencing guidelines exist for this type of crime in Florida
    and thus consecutive jail sentences and consecutive
    probationary periods are permitted and within the trial judge’s
    unfettered discretion.
    *         *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    17