Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 28, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-1693
Lower Tribunal No. 20-23439
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CRSJ, Inc., et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Miami-Dade County, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Valerie R. Manno Schurr, Judge.
Bercow Radell Fernandez Larkin & Tapanes, Thomas H. Robertson
and Nicholas J. Rodriguez-Caballero, for appellants.
Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and James
Edwin Kirtley, Jr., Abbie Schwaderer Raurell and Monica Rizo Perez,
Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee, Miami-Dade County; Weiss Serota
Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., and Edward G. Guedes, John J. Quick and
Charles M. Garabedian, for appellee, City of Miami Gardens.
Before EMAS, HENDON and GORDO, JJ.
GORDO, J.
Appellants, CRSJ, Inc., DG2, Inc. and Mnar 17800 Ipco Road, LLC,
appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion for a temporary injunction
to halt the processing of an application for annexation that was filed with
Miami-Dade County by the City of Miami Gardens. We have jurisdiction.
See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B). Appellants, owners of commercial
industrial property within the area to be annexed, argue that the City failed
to comply with the mandatory notice and financial impact provisions of the
Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter and Miami-Dade County Code of
Ordinances for annexation. As such, Appellants contend the annexation
application is defective and seek to enjoin any future legislative action to
effectuate the annexation. The trial court denied the injunction concluding it
lacked jurisdiction to intervene in the ongoing legislative process. We
affirm.1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June of 2019, the City of Miami Gardens submitted a boundary
change application to the Miami-Dade County Clerk of the Board for the
annexation of an unincorporated, commercial industrial area of Miami-Dade
County. The Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners referred the
1As our opinion focuses solely on the jurisdictional issue, we do not review
or address the propriety of the annexation application itself.
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application to the County’s Planning Advisory Board (PAB). Pursuant to
Section 20-6 of the Miami-Dade County Code, the PAB reviewed and
considered the boundary change request. After providing the required notice
to property owners, the PAB held an advertised public hearing on January
8, 2020. Following the hearing, the PAB adopted a resolution recommending
the County Commission approve the proposed boundary change. The
matter was set for another public hearing in October pursuant to Section 20-7
of the Code for the County Commission to review and consider the
recommendations of the PAB and allow all interested persons an opportunity
to be heard on the proposed boundary change. Following the public hearing,
the Health Care and County Operations Committee of the County
Commission voted to recommend to the County Commission a resolution
directing the County Attorney to prepare the appropriate annexation items,
including the ordinance and interlocal agreement, to effectuate the
annexation. The resolution was scheduled for consideration at the County
Commission’s November 19, 2020 meeting.
On November 2, 2020, Appellants filed an emergency motion for
preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin the County Commission from
considering the resolution at the upcoming meeting. Appellants argued the
application was defective because no notice was provided to the affected
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owners prior to the filing of the application for annexation and the application
did not include the tax load on the area to be annexed or the financial impact
on the property owners of the proposed annexed area. Appellants
contended that there was no adequate remedy for the alleged due process
violations and that they would suffer an irreparable harm because the effects
of the annexation could not be quantified as damages.
The City and the County responded to the motion for injunctive relief
arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the injunction since the
legislative process concerning the confirmation of the annexation was
ongoing and Appellants did not present sufficient evidence to establish the
elements necessary to obtain a temporary injunction. The City and the
County explained that numerous steps remained before the County
Commission’s final consideration of and decision on the City’s annexation
request. They contended that Appellants could not establish irreparable
harm because the annexation was not finalized and there would be adequate
remedies at law because Appellants could attend future hearings, lobby to
express any concerns throughout the process and challenge the validity of
any ordinance that was passed.
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On November 12, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Appellants’
motion for emergency injunctive relief. The trial court denied the petition
reasoning:
This is a legislative process, and I just have no
business being there telling them what to do,
because they – have complete discretion without
anybody looking over their shoulder. And without the
court looking over their shoulder and saying, You’re
not doing it right, and that your client can lobby the
commissioners to try to see it their way, and that’s
how it works. It’s not coming to court and getting an
injunction to stop the whole process. It’s going and
lobbying and talking to them and trying to see – get
them to see it your way.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court’s order denying the temporary injunction de
novo because the order is based on a legal conclusion. See Lawnwood
Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Desai,
54 So. 3d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Home Rule Amendment to the Florida Constitution, adopted in
1956, and the Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter, adopted by the
electors in 1957, grant the County Commission of Miami-Dade County
exclusive authority over municipal boundary changes. See Art. VIII, § 6 (a),
(e) Fla. Const. (2012); City of Sweetwater v. Dade Cnty.,
343 So. 2d 953,
954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (“The matter of changing boundaries of
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municipalities is one of the areas of autonomy conferred on Dade County by
the Home Rule Amendment, with the result that the method provided therefor
by the Home Rule Charter, pursuant to authorization by the Home Rule
Amendment, is effective and exclusive . . . .” (citations omitted)). Section
6.04 of the Charter, governing changes in municipal boundaries, provides
that proposed boundary changes may be initiated by the governing body of
a municipality. Section 6.04 further provides:
B. The Board of County Commissioners, after
obtaining the approval of the municipal governing
bodies concerned, after hearing the
recommendations of the Planning Advisory Board,
and after a public hearing, may by ordinance effect
boundary changes, with an affirmative vote of the
members of the Board of County Commissioners. In
making such decision, the Board shall consider
whether commercial areas are included in the
boundaries of the proposed area to be annexed for
the mere benefit of increasing the tax base of the
annexing municipality. . . .
C. No municipal boundary shall be altered
except as provided by this Section.
Consistent with the Home Rule Charter, the County Commission
adopted procedures in sections 20-1 through 20-9 of the Miami-Dade County
Code to process and evaluate proposed annexations. The procedures
require proposed boundary changes to be referred to the PAB for review and
require multiple advertised and duly noticed public hearings on any boundary
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change request. In the instant case, the City’s annexation application was
set to be heard at the County Commission meeting. Section 20-7 of the
Code requires that “[a]t such public hearing, the County Commission shall
review and consider the recommendations of the Planning Advisory Board,
and shall afford to all interested persons an opportunity to be heard upon the
merits and propriety of the proposed boundary changes.” § 20-7, Code of
Miami-Dade County. “At the conclusion of such public hearing, the County
Commission . . . may deny the requested boundary change, . . . may direct
the County Attorney to prepare an appropriate ordinance accomplishing the
proposed boundary change, which ordinance shall be placed on the official
agenda of a subsequent regular meeting of the County Commission for
consideration and adoption on first reading, or . . . may defer such requested
boundary change for further consideration at a subsequent meeting . . . .”
§ 20-7(B), Code of Miami-Dade County.
Appellants seek to have the court intervene to enjoin the County
Commission from considering the resolution which would direct the County
Attorney to prepare future annexation items. Importantly, the County
remains in the middle of an ongoing, and exclusively legislative process
concerning the annexation request. Multiple steps remain before the County
Commission makes any final decision to adopt an ordinance effectuating the
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annexation. Even then, the County Commission’s adoption of the ordinance
is subject to the County Mayor’s veto. See Art. 2, § 2.02D, Miami-Dade
County Home Rule Charter. Should the County Commission successfully
adopt an ordinance approving the annexation, its validity may then
appropriately be challenged in the courts.
At this stage, however, there are “no ground[s] for injunctive
interference with the preliminary internal functioning of the county board.”
Hernandez v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Hillsborough Cnty.,
153 So. 790, 791 (Fla.
1934). Rather,
[t]he resolving powers of the board are to be tested
by the resolutions or actions that they actually pass.
These, if invalid or beyond the county board’s
powers, can be tested in appropriate proceedings,
wherein it may become necessary for the court to
determine their enforceability as against any legal
rights set up in conflict therewith. But until that time
arrives the judicial powers of the courts cannot be
invoked to obtain relief against injuries which are
supposed to flow from unauthorized resolutions of
county commissioners that, if adopted, would be
subject to appropriate subsequent attack by
individuals asserting legal rights inconsistent
therewith.
Id. “No court in this state has the power to determine in advance of its
enactment the validity or constitutionality of any act of the Legislature. Any
attempt to do so would be a clear invasion by the judiciary of the legislative
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branch of the government.” Collins v. Horten,
111 So. 2d 746, 751 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1959).
“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the
separation of powers.” Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). “Unlike
legal questions, political questions ‘fall within the exclusive domain of the
legislative and executive branches under the guidelines established by the
Florida Constitution.’” DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. Ass’n,
306 So. 3d 1202, 1214–
15 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (quoting Johnson v. State,
660 So. 2d 637, 646 (Fla.
1995)); see Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. Miami-Dade County has been vested by
the Home Rule Amendment to the Florida Constitution with the exclusive
domain over municipal boundary changes. The Charter and Code provisions
governing boundary changes provide “no role for judicial involvement” to
interfere with the County’s proceedings. See City of Miami v. Vill. of Key
Biscayne,
197 So. 3d 580, 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). Thus, the trial court
appropriately recognized it lacked jurisdiction.
Even if the court had jurisdiction, Appellants failed to establish the
elements for injunctive relief. As discussed, the legislative process is
ongoing, so any perceived harm is, at best, speculative. Further, Appellants
failed to establish the lack of an adequate remedy at law as the boundary
change procedures provide Appellants with the opportunity to be heard at a
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public hearing before the County Commission; Appellants may lobby their
local representatives to deny the annexation request; and ultimately, if the
ordinance is enacted, Appellants may challenge its validity in the courts.
While Appellants’ motion seeking judicial intervention to enjoin the
legislative process for the proposed annexation was not the appropriate
remedy at this juncture, we note that Appellants’ plight is not over. “Speech
is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials
accountable to the people.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558
U.S. 310, 339 (2010). The County’s annexation process is exclusively
carried out by the people and their elected representatives. As constituents
in a representative democracy, Appellants have the power to lobby their
commissioners throughout the annexation process and publicly present their
views in favor or against the resolution. Rather than participate in that
process, Appellants ran to the courthouse steps too quickly. The trial court
correctly recognized that the separation of powers essential to our system of
governance precluded its intervention.
Affirmed.
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