UNIFIRST CORPORATION v. STRONGER COLLISION CENTER, LLC ( 2022 )


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  •       Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed April 20, 2022.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D21-0281
    Lower Tribunal Nos. 20-245 AP, 20-615 CC
    ________________
    UniFirst Corporation,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Stronger Collision Center, LLC,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Stephanie
    Silver, Judge.
    The Gardner Law Firm, and John W. Gardner and Sara K. Grover
    (Brandon), for appellant.
    Law Office of Keith Chasin, and Keith Chasin, for appellee.
    Before HENDON, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.
    BOKOR, J.
    UniFirst Corporation appeals the trial court’s grant of Stronger
    Collision’s motion to dismiss UniFirst’s claim seeking enforcement of an
    arbitral award. 1 The issue turns on whether the applicable law and the terms
    of the parties’ contract permitted UniFirst to proceed with an ex parte
    arbitration after Stronger Collision elected not to participate or whether
    UniFirst should have first sought a court order to compel arbitration before
    proceeding. 2 As explained below, under the contract’s choice of New York
    law, we conclude that UniFirst appropriately proceeded to arbitration.
    UniFirst and Stronger Collision entered into a contract with an
    arbitration provision and a selection of New York law. 3        Subsequently,
    1
    As the order on appeal not only grants a motion to dismiss but also denies
    the substantive relief sought by UniFirst, the plaintiff below, we have
    jurisdiction as an appeal of a final order. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A); see
    also Hoffman v. Hall, 
    817 So. 2d 1057
    , 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“The
    traditional test for finality is whether the decree disposes of the cause on its
    merits leaving no questions open for judicial determination except for
    execution and enforcement of the decree if necessary.”).
    2
    We review issues of law and issues of contract interpretation de novo. All
    Seasons Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Patrician Hotel, LLC, 
    274 So. 3d 438
    , 445
    (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“[T]he interpretation of a contract involves a pure
    question of law that is subject to a de novo standard of review.”).
    3
    The arbitration provision at issue reads as follows:
    All disputes of whatever kind between Customer and UniFirst
    based upon past, present or future acts, whether known or
    unknown, and arising out of or relating to the negotiation or
    performance of this Agreement shall be resolved exclusively by
    final and binding arbitration. The arbitration shall be conducted
    in the capital city of the state where Customer has its principal
    2
    UniFirst demanded arbitration, which Stronger Collision refused. UniFirst did
    not seek to compel arbitration. Instead, UniFirst proceeded to arbitration in
    Tallahassee, Florida, under the expedited procedures of the commercial
    arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), in
    accordance with the contract. Stronger Collision timely received notice of
    this proceeding, but did not participate.
    After an ex parte arbitration under the expedited AAA procedures, the
    arbitrator issued an award in UniFirst’s favor. UniFirst sought enforcement
    of that award in a court of competent jurisdiction in Miami-Dade County.
    place of business (or some other location mutually agreed to by
    Customer and Unifirst) pursuant to the Expedited Procedures of
    the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
    Association and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.
    Customer acknowledges that, with respect to all such disputes,
    it has voluntarily and knowingly waived any right it may have to
    a jury trial or to participate in a class action or class litigation as
    a representative of any other persons or as a member of any
    class of persons, or to consolidate its claims with those of any
    other persons or class of persons. If this prohibition against class
    litigation is ruled to be unenforceable for any reason in any
    proceeding, then prohibition against class litigation shall be void
    and of no force and effect in that proceeding. This paragraph is
    governed by New York Law (exclusive of choice of law). The
    arbitrators shall award to the substantially prevailing party, if any,
    as determined by the arbitrators, all of its costs and fees. “Costs
    and fees” are defined as all reasonable pre-award expenses of
    the arbitration, including the arbitrators’ fees, administrative
    costs, travel expenses, out-of-pocket expenses, such as copying
    and telephone expenses, court costs, witness fees and attorney
    fees.
    3
    Stronger Collision contested the award, arguing, among other grounds, that
    UniFirst’s ex parte award cannot be enforced because of the failure to first
    seek an order compelling arbitration. The trial court agreed, applying Florida
    law to conclude that the arbitration provision required UniFirst to first seek a
    court order compelling arbitration prior to arbitrating its dispute, ex parte,
    under the agreed-to arbitration rules.
    This was error, as UniFirst complied with the applicable New York law
    and the expedited procedures under the commercial arbitration rules of the
    AAA as elected in the parties’ contract. The parties do not dispute that the
    arbitration provision is “governed by New York Law” as the exclusive choice
    of law. Choice-of-law provisions in Florida are presumptively valid and must
    be enforced unless strong public policy considerations warrant invalidating a
    contracting party’s choice to be bound by the laws of another state. See,
    e.g., Se. Floating Docks, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
    82 So. 3d 73
    , 80 (Fla.
    2012). Further, “[w]here the language of the contract clearly indicates that
    AAA rules govern, they are expressly incorporated into the contract.”
    Younessi v. Recovery Racing, LLC, 
    88 So. 3d 364
    , 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
    4
    Thus, we apply New York law and the AAA rules to determine UniFirst’s
    entitlement to ex parte arbitration under the contract. 4
    The relevant AAA rule permits ex parte arbitration if the respondent
    does not reply to arbitration notices, as was the case here. 5 New York law
    also provides that “[a] party aggrieved by the failure of another to arbitrate
    may apply for an order compelling arbitration.”        N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7503(a)
    (emphasis added). “May” is a permissive term. Nothing in the use of the
    language “may apply for an order compelling arbitration” mandates that a
    party must apply for such an order before seeking arbitration under the
    4
    Although we apply New York law, Stronger Collision also argues that
    binding caselaw from this court prohibits the enforcement of such an award
    obtained after ex parte arbitration. See Chicago Ins. Co. v. Tarr, 
    638 So. 2d 106
    , 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (“Ex parte arbitration awards will not be
    enforced unless the insurance policy provides for ex parte arbitration.”).
    Stronger Collision’s reliance on Tarr is misplaced. First, the defendant in
    Tarr was not a party to the arbitration sought. 
    Id.
     (“Chicago was not made a
    party to the arbitration.”). Second, unlike the insurance policy in Tarr, which
    did not provide for ex parte arbitration, the agreement in this case clearly
    states that arbitration shall be governed by the commercial arbitration rules
    of the AAA, which do provide for ex parte arbitration. Here, Stronger
    Collision was both a party to the arbitration agreement which provided for ex
    parte arbitration, and UniFirst specifically demanded arbitration with Stronger
    Collision. UniFirst sought ex parte arbitration, as permitted under the rules,
    only after Stronger Collision refused the demand to arbitrate.
    5
    See American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and
    Mediation          Procedures,         R-31        (Oct.        1,       2013),
    https://adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf (“Unless the law
    provides to the contrary, the arbitration may proceed in the absence of any
    party or representative who, after due notice, fails to be present or fails to
    obtain a postponement.”).
    5
    procedures agreed to by the parties. See, e.g., In re Cnty. of Suffolk v.
    Suffolk Chapter, Civ. Serv. Emps. Ass'n, Inc., Loc. No. 852, 
    86 A.D.2d 892
    ,
    892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (reversing the trial court’s vacation of an arbitration
    award and explaining that “filing of the notice of intent, while advisable, is not
    mandatory in light of the use of the permissive ‘may’”).
    Here, Stronger Collision elected not to participate in the arbitration after
    receiving UniFirst’s demand. UniFirst was, therefore, within its rights under
    New York law to file a demand for arbitration with the AAA without first
    exercising its permissive option to seek a court order compelling arbitration.
    The rules agreed to by the parties do not require a court order to compel
    arbitration and explicitly permit ex parte arbitration where not prohibited by
    law. Accordingly, UniFirst complied with New York law and the contractual
    language (incorporating AAA expedited procedures) before seeking and
    obtaining an arbitral award. The trial court erred in dismissing the petition to
    enforce the arbitral award on that basis.
    Reversed and remanded.
    6