GONZALEZ v. COCONUT KEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOC., INC. , 246 So. 3d 428 ( 2018 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    COCONUT KEY HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    GONZALEZ,
    Appellee.
    Nos. 4D17-739 & 17-1749
    [May 9, 2018]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Michael L. Gates, Judge; L.T. Case No. 09-061407(12).
    Joseph D. Garrity of Garrity Traina, PLLC, Coconut Creek, for
    appellant.
    Alexis Fields of Kopelowitz Ostrow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
    KLINGENSMITH, J.
    Coconut Key Homeowner’s Association, Inc. (“the Association”), as the
    appellant/cross-appellee, seeks review of an order imposing a mandatory
    injunction against it. Gonzalez, as appellee/cross-appellant, appeals the
    denial of her request for attorney’s fees and costs. Accordingly, there are
    two issues presented in this appeal and cross-appeal. First, whether the
    trial court erred in issuing the injunction against the Association. Second,
    whether Gonzalez prevailed in the underlying action for purposes of an
    award of attorney’s fees when the jury found that the Association breached
    a contract, but awarded no damages to Gonzalez. We affirm as to the entry
    of the injunction, and also find that Gonzalez was the prevailing party for
    purposes of awarding both attorney’s fees and costs.
    Gonzalez filed a complaint against the Association. Under count one,
    “Breach of Governing Documents,” Gonzalez alleged that the Association
    had “breached, and continue[d] to breach the Governing Documents by
    failing to properly manage the surface water management system,” which
    caused her property to consistently flood when it rained, and led to
    significant damage to her home. 1 She sought monetary damages for the
    breach.     Under count two, “Injunction,” Gonzalez alleged that the
    Association failed to address the issue of the existence of several
    unauthorized wood decks and other alterations on other properties, and
    failed to rectify the chronic flooding problems arising in her own backyard
    area; consequently, she sought enforcement of the various applicable
    covenants and restrictions in the Association’s governing documents. 2
    In their joint pretrial stipulation, both parties agreed on the underlying
    issue in the case:
    This case involves [the Association]’s alleged violation of its
    [governing documents].       Defendant is a duly formed
    homeowners association, of which [Gonzalez] is a resident
    member. In this action, it is alleged by [Gonzalez] that the
    [Association] has failed to comply with the [A]ssociation’s
    governing documents by failing to properly maintain the
    surface water management system behind her residence
    which has resulted in a flooding problem. [Gonzalez] seeks
    an injunction requiring the Association to cure the alleged
    surface water management violations and stop the
    flooding problem.
    (Emphasis added).
    After a trial on these issues, the jury found that the Association
    breached its governing documents by failing to maintain and operate the
    surface water management system on Gonzalez’s property, but that the
    breach was not a legal cause of damage to Gonzalez. As a result, Gonzalez
    was awarded no monetary damages on count one.
    The trial court conducted a post-trial hearing on whether to issue an
    injunction against the Association pursuant to count two. After the
    hearing, it granted Gonzalez’s motion for entry of a mandatory injunction.
    The court’s decision was in accord with the jury’s finding that the
    Association violated clear legal rights in its governing documents, which
    caused Gonzalez irreparable harm without an adequate remedy under the
    law.
    1  The governing documents referenced are the Association’s Declaration of
    Restrictions, Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, and Rules and Regulations.
    2 In counts three and four, Gonzalez alleged that because of the flooding she had
    a claim for “Nuisance” and “Trespass.” She dismissed these counts before trial,
    as well as all other defendants except the Association.
    2
    Gonzalez then filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to
    section 720.305(1), Florida Statutes (2008). Following a hearing, the trial
    court denied Gonzalez’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Gonzalez
    timely appealed the denial of fees and costs, and the Association timely
    appealed the entry of the injunction.
    1. Issuance of the injunction
    “‘[A]n order imposing a permanent injunction lies within the sound
    discretion of the trial court and will be affirmed absent a showing of abuse
    of discretion.’” Smith v. Coal. to Reduce Class Size, 
    827 So. 2d 959
    , 961
    (Fla. 2002) (quoting Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 
    626 So. 2d 664
    , 670 (Fla. 1993)). Gonzalez sought a mandatory injunction to
    command specific conduct, specifically compliance with governing
    documents. “In order to establish entitlement to a mandatory injunction
    there must be a clear legal right which has been violated, irreparable harm
    must be threatened, and there must be a lack of an adequate remedy at
    law.” Amelio v. Marilyn Pines Unit II Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 
    173 So. 3d 1037
    ,
    1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
    Section 718.303(1), Florida Statutes (2008), authorizes the
    extraordinary civil remedy of a mandatory injunction in cases involving
    condominium associations and their members. This section provides in
    pertinent part:
    (1) Each unit owner, each tenant and other invitee, and each
    association shall be governed by, and shall comply with
    the provisions of, this chapter, the declaration, the
    documents creating the association, and the association
    bylaws and the provisions thereof shall be deemed
    expressly incorporated into any lease of a unit. Actions
    for damages or for injunctive relief, or both, for failure
    to comply with these provisions may be brought by the
    association or by a unit owner against:
    (a) The association.
    (b) A unit owner.
    § 718.303(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, section 720.305(1) authorizes
    courts to impose equitable remedies in disputes between homeowners and
    their associations:
    3
    (1) Each member and the member’s tenants, guests, and
    invitees, and each association, are governed by, and must
    comply with, this chapter, the governing documents of the
    community, and the rules of the association. Actions at
    law or in equity, or both, to redress alleged failure or
    refusal to comply with these provisions may be
    brought by the association or by any member against:
    (a) The association.
    (b) A member[.]
    (Emphasis added); see also Fox v. Madsen, 
    12 So. 3d 1261
    , 1263 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2009) (“[A] mandatory injunction is the proper method of enforcing
    restrictive agreements on property.”); Abbey Park Homeowners Ass’n v.
    Bowen, 
    508 So. 2d 554
    , 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (“Injunctive relief is an
    appropriate remedy for the enforcement of regulations contained in a
    declaration of condominium.”).
    After careful review of the record in this case, which included three full
    days of conflicting testimony and evidence before a jury, we find no error
    in the trial court’s issuance of an injunction against the Association. Here,
    the record shows that Gonzalez satisfied each of the three elements needed
    to obtain an injunction.
    First, Gonzalez demonstrated that a clear legal right was violated when
    the jury found the Association violated its governing documents for failing
    to properly maintain the surface water management system at Gonzalez’s
    property. See Billian v. Mobil Corp., 
    710 So. 2d 984
    , 992 (Fla. 4th DCA
    1998) (“Where the fact issues decided by a jury in an action at law are
    sufficiently similar to the fact issues on a related equitable claim, the trial
    court is bound by the jury’s findings of fact in making its ruling on the
    equitable claim.”).
    Second, Gonzalez proved irreparable harm since multiple witnesses
    testified that the flooding problem could only be resolved if the Association
    fixed the swales and drainage system near Gonzalez’s property.
    Third, Gonzalez did not have an adequate remedy at law. Any potential
    award of compensatory damages would only address repairs to whatever
    structural damage was caused by previous flooding. While damages for
    the diminished value of her property caused by future flooding could
    conceivably be recovered, only an injunction requiring the Association to
    comply with its governing documents would prevent future harm.
    4
    Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order issuing a mandatory
    injunction against the Association.
    2. Attorney fees and costs
    In general, we review a trial court’s determination of the prevailing party
    for an abuse of discretion. See T & W Developers, Inc. v. Salmonsen, 
    31 So. 3d 298
    , 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). However, when the trial court’s
    determination of which party prevails depends on the interpretation of a
    statute or a contract, we apply a de novo standard of review. Id.; accord
    Shirley’s Pers. Care Servs. of Okeechobee, Inc. v. Boswell, 
    165 So. 3d 824
    ,
    827-28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Here, the trial court’s determination of the
    prevailing party does not depend on the interpretation of either a statute
    or the parties’ agreement. Thus, we review the trial court’s determination
    of whether Gonzalez was the prevailing party for abuse of discretion.
    The exercise of the trial court’s discretion is “subject to the test of
    reasonableness, i.e., [it] must be supported by logic and justification for
    the result and founded on substantial, competent evidence.” In re
    Guardianship of Sapp, 
    868 So. 2d 687
    , 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
    In addition to the excerpt cited above, section 720.305(1) provides, “The
    prevailing party in any such litigation is entitled to recover reasonable
    attorney fees and costs.” This section specifically covers disputes that
    occur between homeowners and homeowner’s associations. Additionally,
    Gonzalez referenced multiple sections of Chapter 720, Florida Statutes, in
    support of her claim as stated in her complaint. Therefore, this section
    applies to this action.
    When there is a prevailing party statute or contract, reasonable
    attorney fees must be awarded. See Sorrentino v. River Run Condo. Ass’n,
    
    925 So. 2d 1060
    , 1066 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). “For the purpose of attorney’s
    fees, the prevailing party is the party that won on the significant issues in
    litigation.” M.A. Hajianpour, M.D., P.A. v. Khosrow Maleki, P.A., 
    975 So. 2d 1288
    , 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). In this case, the trial court found that
    Gonzalez was not the prevailing party by focusing primarily on the amount
    of the judgment she received—or more specifically, the lack of any
    monetary award to her—rather than on the substance of what occurred in
    the litigation. This was error.
    In an analogous case from this court, Khodam v. Escondido
    Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 
    87 So. 3d 65
    , 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), a
    homeowner sued her homeowner’s association for breaching its
    5
    declaration of covenants. Like this case, the jury found that the
    homeowner’s association breached the covenants, but awarded the
    homeowner no damages. 
    Id.
     Despite the zero-damage award, we held that
    the homeowner was the prevailing party for purposes of recovering
    attorney’s fees and costs, and reversed the trial court order denying the
    claim:
    The party who prevails “on the significant issues in the
    litigation is the . . . prevailing party for attorney’s fees.” Moritz
    v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 
    604 So. 2d 807
    , 810 (Fla. 1992). Absent
    compelling circumstances, “we have maintained that ‘[i]n a
    breach of contract action, one party must prevail.’” Animal
    Wrappers & Doggie Wrappers, Inc. v. Courtyard Distrib. Ctr.,
    Inc., 
    73 So. 3d 354
    , 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citation omitted).
    In the present case, only appellant’s breach of contract claim
    was submitted to the jury. The jury found that appellee
    breached its declaration of covenants with appellant, though
    it awarded appellant “$0.” Despite the absence of damages,
    the finding that appellee breached the contract made
    appellant the prevailing party on the litigation’s
    significant issues. Green Cos., Inc. v. Kendall Racquetball
    Inv., Ltd., 
    658 So. 2d 1119
    , 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    We recognize that in other jurisdictions, it is the amount of the
    judgment, not merely the verdict, that trial courts consider in determining
    whether to award attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v.
    KB Home Lone Star L.P., 
    295 S.W.3d 650
    , 656 (Texas 2009) (holding that
    “law nor logic favors a rule that bestows ‘prevailing party’ status upon a
    plaintiff who . . . pockets nothing except a jury finding of non-injurious
    breach[,]” and to prevail where a party seeks only actual damages “there
    must be a showing that the plaintiff was actually harmed, not merely
    wronged.”).
    When looking for the meaning of common and ordinary legal terms,
    courts routinely refer to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “prevailing
    party” as “[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of
    the amount of damages awarded.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (8th ed.
    2004) (emphasis added). Ignoring the second, emphasized phrase by
    making even a “no money judgment” dispositive would seem to be a
    departure from the ordinary meaning of “prevailing party.” Normally, the
    “touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration
    of the legal relationship of the parties.” Texas State Teachers Ass’n v.
    6
    Garland Indep. School Dist., 
    109 S.Ct. 1486
    , 1494 (1989) (stating that a
    technical victory may be so insignificant as to be insufficient to support
    prevailing party status). Such a “material alteration” typically occurs when
    a plaintiff secures an “enforceable judgment[ ] on the merits.” Buckhannon
    Board & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
    121 S.Ct. 1835
    , 1840 (2001). The Supreme Court has also reasoned that the
    amount of a judgment is critical to the prevailing party determination by
    holding that a “prevailing party” is one who has been awarded some relief
    by the court, even if it is nominal damages. See Farrar v. Hobby, 
    113 S.Ct. 566
    , 574-75 (1992). Stated succinctly, “no money judgment, no fees.”
    In the ordinary sense, a moral victory or satisfaction would not suffice
    to make someone a prevailing party in litigation. Viewing the results
    obtained here, a non-interested observer could reasonably conclude that,
    while perhaps Gonzalez was a “nominal winner” in convincing the jury that
    she was “wronged” by the Association’s breach, she was a “prevailing
    party” on that claim only in a pyrrhic sense. 3
    Florida case law does not allow for the consideration of proportionality
    to decide a litigant’s prevailing party status in these cases. Consequently,
    we are bound by our prior holding in Khodam on the effect of the jury’s
    verdict, thus making Gonzalez a prevailing party on the breach claim
    despite the “no damages” award. See also Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v.
    Ziplocal, LP, 
    2014 WL 5517027
    , at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2014) (“Florida
    courts have held that the party against whom a contract has been
    breached may be the prevailing party even though the jury awarded ‘$0’
    damages.”).
    While the prevailing party determination does not depend solely on the
    magnitude of relief Gonzalez obtained, she was required, at the least, to
    secure some relief on the merits of her claim to achieve such status.
    3 We should note that this case was not one brought to advance a public benefit.
    Private tort or contract suits benefiting only the individual plaintiff whose rights
    were violated are different from actions to vindicate public rights. Unlike most
    private litigants, for example, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important
    civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms.
    Thus, legitimate reasons exist for treating public litigation cases differently from
    private actions when considering who is, or is not, a prevailing party. Because
    damages awards in civil rights cases, for example, do not reflect fully the public
    benefit advanced by such litigation, fees awarded in those cases, unlike most
    private law cases, need not depend on obtaining substantial monetary relief.
    Therefore, reasonable attorney’s fees awarded under provisions such as 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     are not conditioned upon, and need not be proportionate to, the award of
    money damages.
    7
    “‘[P]laintiffs may be considered a ‘prevailing party’ for attorney’s fees
    purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which
    achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.’” Hensley
    v. Eckerhart, 
    103 S.Ct. 1933
    , 1939 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe,
    
    581 F.2d 275
    , 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). Although there is ongoing debate
    in the courts on whether a plaintiff who recovers no money damages can
    be a prevailing party, a party who receives affirmative judicial or equitable
    relief is clearly considered a prevailing party under the law. Gonzalez was
    indisputably a prevailing party on her injunctive claim in equity,
    regardless of her marginal victory on the breach count. Thus, prevailing
    party attorney fees should be awarded to Gonzalez in this dispute. See
    Khodam, 
    87 So. 3d at 66
    .
    Court costs under section 57.041, Florida Statutes (2008), are also
    “‘governed by the ‘prevailing party’ standard . . . .’” Wyatt v. Milner
    Document Prods., Inc., 
    932 So. 2d 487
    , 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting
    Spring Lake Imp. Distrib. v. Tyrrell, 
    868 So. 2d 656
    , 658-59 (Fla. 2d DCA
    2004)), abrogated on other grounds by Westgate Miami Beach, Ltd. v.
    Newport Operating Corp., 
    55 So. 3d 567
     (Fla. 2010). A trial court has no
    discretion to deny costs under this statute—the prevailing party must be
    awarded their costs. See Oriental Imps., Inc. v. Alilin, 
    559 So. 2d 442
    , 443
    (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that under section 57.041, a judge does not
    have discretion to deny recovery of costs to a prevailing party). As such,
    appellant is the prevailing party for purposes of an award of costs as well.
    See Sunshine Bottling Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 
    757 So. 2d 1231
    , 1233
    (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
    We reverse the trial court’s order denying Gonzalez’s motion for fees
    and costs, and remand for the trial court to award those reasonable
    amounts applicable to her breach and injunction claims.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
    GERBER, C.J., and DAMOORGIAN, J., concur.
    *        *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-1749

Citation Numbers: 246 So. 3d 428

Filed Date: 5/9/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/9/2018

Authorities (20)

Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School ... , 109 S. Ct. 1486 ( 1989 )

Smith v. Coalition to Reduce Class Size , 827 So. 2d 959 ( 2002 )

Shirley's Personal Care Services of Okeechobee, Inc. v. ... , 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 8470 ( 2015 )

Spring Lake Imp. Dist. v. Tyrrell , 868 So. 2d 656 ( 2004 )

Moritz v. Hoyt Enterprises, Inc. , 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 465 ( 1992 )

In Re Guardianship of Sapp , 868 So. 2d 687 ( 2004 )

Khodam v. Escondido Homeowner's Ass'n , 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 6034 ( 2012 )

Larry Nadeau v. Raymond A. Helgemoe, Warden, New Hampshire ... , 581 F.2d 275 ( 1978 )

Green v. Kendall Racquetball Investment , 658 So. 2d 1119 ( 1995 )

Wyatt v. Milner Document Products, Inc. , 932 So. 2d 487 ( 2006 )

Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center , 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 559 ( 1993 )

Intercontinental Group Partnership v. KB Home Lone Star L.P. , 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1204 ( 2009 )

Sorrentino v. River Run Condominium Ass'n , 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 2992 ( 2006 )

Abbey Park Homeowners Association v. Bowen , 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1500 ( 1987 )

Billian v. Mobil Corp. , 710 So. 2d 984 ( 1998 )

Oriental Imports, Inc. v. Alilin , 559 So. 2d 442 ( 1990 )

Fox v. Madsen , 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 8767 ( 2009 )

T & W DEVELOPERS, INC. v. Salmonsen , 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 4291 ( 2010 )

Animal Wrappers & Doggie Wrappers, Inc. v. Courtyard ... , 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 17383 ( 2011 )

Westgate Miami Beach, Ltd. v. Newport Operating Corp. , 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 735 ( 2010 )

View All Authorities »