DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
CHIQUITA LASHAE MCGEE,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D22-1022
[May 10, 2023]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Indian River County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; L.T. Case No.
312018CF000330A.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Cynthia L. Anderson,
Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anesha Worthy,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Chiquita McGee appeals the sentences imposed for exploitation of an
elderly or disabled adult of $50,000 or more, and scheme to defraud a
financial institution, and she argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to enter a restitution order after she filed her notice of appeal. The state
correctly concedes error. See Marro v. State,
803 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2002) (“A trial court does not have jurisdiction to hold a restitution
hearing or enter an order of restitution after a notice of appeal has been
filed.”) (quoting K.D. v. State,
779 So. 2d 468, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000))).
The trial court did not announce a specified amount of restitution at
sentencing, but the restitution orders entered after McGee filed her notice
of appeal imposed specified amounts of restitution. If the trial court’s post-
appeal order merely memorialized its oral ruling, the court would have had
jurisdiction to enter the order. See V.U.B. v. State,
189 So. 3d 303, 304
(Fla. 2d DCA 2016). But, as we explain below, that is not what occurred.
McGee argues that the trial court is not permitted to reenter the
restitution order on remand, but we disagree. After holding a restitution
hearing, the trial court announced McGee’s sentence, a prison term
followed by probation with the condition that she pay restitution. The
court announced it would enter a separate order for restitution, and it also
announced that restitution would be paid in equal monthly installments.
Eleven days later, and consistent with its oral pronouncement, the court
entered a written order of probation providing as a condition of probation
that McGee “will make restitution” to the victim named in the forthcoming
restitution order and in the amount specified in that order, in equal
monthly installments, “until the obligation is paid in full.” The court
apparently reserved jurisdiction to enter a more detailed order of
restitution. See Albury v. State,
779 So. 2d 423, 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
(recognizing that “no magic words are required” to reserve jurisdiction to
impose restitution). McGee filed her notice of appeal, and afterward, the
court issued restitution orders specifying the amounts owed to the two
victims.
Under these circumstances, the court is permitted to reenter the
restitution orders on remand. See V.U.B.,
189 So. 3d at 304 (remanding
for trial court to conduct another restitution hearing and to again impose
restitution where a partial restitution hearing had been held but the
hearing was continued, and V.U.B. filed a notice of appeal before the
hearing could be concluded). 1
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
MAY, CIKLIN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
1The trial court does not need to hold another restitution hearing, as a full
hearing was already held.
2
