DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
INNA PYRINOVA,
Appellant,
v.
MARK E. DOYLE and OLGA PYRINOVA,
Appellees.
No. 4D22-3307
[June 21, 2023]
Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Natasha DePrimo, Judge; L.T. Case No.
FMCE 20-004497 (36).
Eric M. Levine of Atlas | Solomon, PLLC, Stuart, for appellant.
No appearance for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Inna Pyrinova (“Appellant”), a non-party to the litigation below, appeals
a temporary injunction that requires half of the proceeds from the sale of
property titled solely in her name to be held in an escrow account pending
further court order. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the
temporary injunction.
The parties to the litigation below are Mark E. Doyle (“the father”) and
Olga Pyrinova (“the mother”). Briefly, in 2020, the trial court issued a final
judgment of paternity incorporating the parties’ settlement agreement and
parenting plan in connection with their minor child. The following year
the trial court approved a final order that modified the parenting plan.
Contempt proceedings followed with the father alleging the mother
violated multiple court orders in connection with his timesharing and
shared parental responsibility. The trial court found the mother in indirect
civil contempt for violating portions of the parenting plan and determined
that the father was entitled to attorney’s fees. The trial court has not yet
issued an order determining the fee amount.
Pertinent to this appeal, the father moved for injunctive relief alleging
that while the contempt issue was pending, the mother took title to real
property with Appellant as joint tenants but subsequently conveyed her
interest in the property to Appellant. The father therefore moved to
“preserve” his fee award and to “void” the mother’s transfer of property to
Appellant as a fraudulent conveyance.
Although not a party or intervenor to the action at that time, Appellant
and her attorney attended a hearing during which the father argued that
the deed conveying the mother’s interest in the property to Appellant was
both fraudulent and defective. During the hearing, both the mother’s
attorney and Appellant’s attorney questioned the trial court’s authority to
enjoin non-party Appellant’s funds, noting this was not a divorce case
wherein a party transferred marital property subject to equitable
distribution. The trial court declined to consider Appellant’s arguments
because she had not intervened in the proceedings.
Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the
father’s motion for temporary injunction and requiring half of the proceeds
from any sale of the property be held in an escrow account pending further
court order. The trial court did not rule on the validity of the deed
conveying the mother’s interest in the property to Appellant. Notably, the
order failed to detail the reasons for entry of a temporary injunction and
failed to set a bond.
Appellant thereafter moved to intervene in the action and to dissolve
the temporary injunction. The trial court granted Appellant’s motion to
intervene but deferred ruling on the motion to dissolve injunction “pending
an evidentiary hearing in which all necessary parties may take part.”
On appeal, Appellant correctly argues that the temporary injunction
fails to comply with Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.605 for two
reasons. 1 First, the trial court did not require the father to post a bond.
See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.605(b) (“No temporary injunction may be entered
unless a bond is given by the movant in an amount the court deems
proper, conditioned for the payment of costs and damages sustained by
the adverse party if the adverse party is wrongfully enjoined.”); see also
1 We note that this appeal predates changes to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
1.530 and Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.530, providing that to
preserve for appeal the “failure of the trial court to make required findings of fact”
a party must raise that issue in a motion for rehearing. In re: Amends. to Fla.
Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.530 & Fla. Fam. L. Rule of Proc. 12.530, 48 Fla. L. Weekly S69
(Fla. Apr. 27, 2023).
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Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b). Second, the order failed to set forth the reasons
for entry of the temporary injunction. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.605(c)
(“Every injunction must specify the reasons for entry . . . .”); see also
Lanigan v. Lanigan,
353 So. 3d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (reversing
temporary injunction precluding the sale of real property owned by a non-
party because the order failed to set forth a factual basis for its entry).
Appellant also argues the trial court lacked subject matter, case, and
personal jurisdiction over her to enter the temporary injunction. Because
Appellant has been granted intervenor status, on remand, the trial court
shall consider any appropriate arguments which she raises to challenge
the injunction. See Leighton v. First Universal Lending, LLC,
925 So. 2d
462, 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (reversing temporary injunction entered
against a non-party who was not given opportunity to be heard, and
holding that while a trial court can enjoin a non-party, “those parties must
receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard”); see also Let Miami
Beach Decide v. City of Miami Beach,
120 So. 3d 1282, 1288 (Fla. 3d DCA
2013) (outlining the scope of intervention and distinction based on
whether intervenor is an indispensable party to the action).
Reversed and remanded with directions.
KLINGENSMITH, C.J., GROSS and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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