Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed August 2, 2023.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D22-1056
Lower Tribunal No. 18-25764
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Miami-Dade County,
Appellant,
vs.
Keisha Guyton,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto
Diaz, Judge.
Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Leona
N. McFarlane, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Roberts & Basnuevo, P.A., and H. Clay Roberts and Javier A.
Basnuevo; Fornaris Law Firm, and Martha M. Fornaris, for appellee.
Before EMAS, LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ.
EMAS, J.
In September 2006, Keisha Guyton began working for Miami-Dade
County as a part-time bus operator. She was eventually promoted to a full-
time position, but, in 2017, suffered work-related injuries for which she made
valid claims for workers’ compensation benefits. Over a year after her injury,
the County formally dismissed Guyton for long term absenteeism. Upon her
dismissal, Guyton sued the County in a one-count complaint, alleging that
the County violated section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2018), because it
terminated her employment “by reason of” her valid claim for workers’
compensation benefits following her on-the-job injury. 1
The County responded, asserting that it had a legitimate business
reason for terminating Guyton’s employment—her inability to return to work
for over a year following her injury (from March 2017 to June 2018). During
the proceedings below, the trial court denied the County’s motion for
summary judgment and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury ultimately
returned a verdict in favor of Guyton, finding that Miami-Dade discharged
1
Section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2018), provides: “No employer shall
discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by
reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim
compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law.” To establish a claim
under this statute, the employee must prove (1) she engaged in a statutorily
protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) the
adverse employment action and the employee’s protected activity were
causally related. Ortega v. Eng’g Sys. Tech., Inc.,
30 So. 3d 525, 528 (Fla.
3d DCA 2010).
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Guyton by reason of her valid workers’ compensation claim, and awarding
her damages in the total amount of $230,000. Final judgment was entered
for that amount, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, the County challenges the trial court’s ruling on summary
judgment and the trial court’s denial of the County’s motion for directed
verdict (and subsequent motion for judgment in accordance with its earlier
motion for directed verdict), arguing Guyton presented no evidence her
termination was causally related to her claim for workers’ compensation
benefits or that the County’s provided reason was a pretext for retaliation.
Guyton responds that she provided “abundant evidence” her termination was
pretextual, specifically that the County failed to follow its own policies and
procedures following her on-the-job injury and eventual dismissal.
While we apply de novo review to these rulings, in reviewing the trial
court’s denial of the County’s motion for directed verdict (and motion for
judgment in accordance with its earlier motion for directed verdict) “[a]n
appellate court must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, drawing every reasonable inference flowing from the
evidence in the nonmoving party's favor, and “[i]f there is conflicting evidence
or if different reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, then
the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury for resolution.” Miami-
3
Dade Cty. v. Eghbal,
54 So. 3d 525, 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (citations
omitted). A directed verdict should only be granted (or affirmed on appeal)
“where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the
nonmoving party.” Banco Espirito Santo Int'l, Ltd. v. BDO Int'l, B.V.,
979 So.
2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (quoting Owens v. Publix Supermarkets,
Inc.,
802 So. 2d 315, 329 (Fla. 2001)). “A directed verdict is proper only when
the record conclusively shows an absence of facts or inferences from facts
to support a Jury verdict, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Medina v. Peralta,
802 So. 2d 376, 378 (Fla. 3d DCA
2001). Because there were disputed issues of material fact at the summary
judgment stage—particularly whether the County’s discharge of Guyton was
causally related to Guyton’s workers’ compensation claim, see e.g.,
Hornfischer v. Manatee Cty. Sheriff’s Office,
136 So. 3d 703, 710 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2014) (observing: “Generally speaking, an employer does not
announce or state in writing that it is discharging an employee because he
or she has filed a workers' compensation claim” and, consequently,
“employee actions for a retaliatory discharge under section 440.205 are often
ill suited to final disposition on a motion for summary judgment”)—we affirm
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the trial court’s denial of the County’s motion for summary judgment.2 And
because the evidence admitted at trial, viewed in a light most favorable to
Guyton, supported the jury’s verdict, we affirm as well the trial court’s denial
of the County’s motion for directed verdict and motion for judgment in
accordance with its earlier motion for directed verdict.
Affirmed.
2
Guyton contends on appeal that the denial of a pretrial motion for summary
judgment is unreviewable after a full trial and judgment on the merits and
that the scope of this court’s review should be limited to the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at trial to determine if it supports the jury’s verdict. For
this proposition, Guyton cites Lind v. UPS,
254 F.3d 1281, 12846 (11th Cir.
2001) (“Recently, we simply stated that the denial of a motion for summary
judgment is not reviewable after a trial on the merits has occurred” (citing
Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts,
223 F. 3d 1340, 1344 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“[O]nce a trial on the merits has occurred, . . . the denial of [a motion for
summary judgment] is unreviewable on appeal”)). The Eleventh Circuit in
Lind further noted that at least ten circuits have held that the denial of
summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal after a full trial and final
judgment on the merits. See Pahuta v. Massey-–Ferguson, Inc.,
170 F.3d
125, 130 (2d Cir.1999); Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster
Eng’g Corp.,
51 F. 3d 1229, 1234 (4th Cir.1995); Watson v. Amedco Steel,
Inc.,
29 F.3d 274, 277-–78 (7th Cir.1994); Black v. J.I. Case Co.,
22 F.3d
568, 570-–72 (5th Cir.1994); Johnson Int'l Co. v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
19 F.3d 431, 434 (8th Cir.1994); Lama v. Borras,
16 F.3d 473, 476 n.5 (1st
Cir.1994); Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc.,
974 F.2d 1248, 1250-–51 (10th Cir.1992);
Jarrett v. Epperly,
896 F.2d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir.1990); Locricchio v. Legal
Servs. Corp.,
833 F.2d 1352, 1358-–59 (9th Cir.1987); Glaros v. H.H.
Robertson Co.,
797 F.2d 1564, 1573 & n. 14 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Because we
find no error in either the denial of the motion for summary judgment or in
the denial of the motion for directed verdict, we need not reach this issue.
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