Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed August 16, 2023.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D23-0503
Lower Tribunal No. 21-1637
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Rogelio Cordero, etc.,
Appellant,
vs.
Rolando A. Cordero,
Appellee.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-
Dade County, Bertila Soto, Judge.
The Billbrough Firm, and G. Bart Billbrough, for appellant.
Rosenthal Law Group, and Alex P. Rosenthal and Amanda Jassem
Jones (Weston), for appellee.
Before LOGUE, C.J., and HENDON, and GORDO, JJ.
HENDON, J.
1
Rogelio Cordero (“Appellant”), pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(E), seeks to reverse a non-final order granting his
brother’s, Rolando Cordero (“Rolando Jr.”), motion to disqualify the
Appellant’s attorney, Gustavo Gutierrez (“Gutierrez”), in the underlying
probate dispute. We affirm.
Facts
The Decedent had two sons – the Appellant and Rolando Jr. The
Appellant was appointed personal representative of his father’s estate. The
Decedent’s 2018 Will left the entire estate to the Appellant, with no
provision made for the Appellant’s brother, Rolando Jr. Rolando Jr. filed an
adversary proceeding in probate seeking to revoke the Decedent’s 2018
Will, alleging lack of capacity and the Appellant’s undue influence.
Rolando Jr. asserted that a 2012 Will that split the estate equally
between the two brothers was the true will of the Decedent. The attorney
who prepared the 2012 Will was Gutierrez. In 2012, Gutierrez assisted the
Decedent by also transferring two real properties from the Decedent to the
Decedent as a life estate with the remainder interests in Appellant and
Rolando Jr., allegedly evidencing the Decedent’s intent to divide the estate
equally between the two siblings. Rolando Jr. asserted that after 2012, the
Decedent’s mental capacity declined so that by 2018, he was of such
2
diminished capacity that he did not understand the nature of his assets.
Further, Gutierrez had been counsel for Rolando Jr. in several business
and personal transactions, and thus had a conflict of interest by
representing the Appellant in this estate dispute. Rolando Jr. invoked Rule
4-1.7 (Conflict of Interest, Current Clients), Rule 4-1.9 (Conflict of Interest,
Former Client), Rule 4-1.10 (Imputation of Conflicts of Interest; General
Rule), and Rule 4-1.13 (Organization as Client), of the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar.
In the Appellant’s response to the motion to disqualify he asserted,
among other issues, the following affirmative defenses: diminution in value
of the Estate; an assertion that the 2018 Will represents the uninfluenced
desires of the Decedent with reference to the disposition of his Estate; his
assertion that the Decedent had reasons to disinherit Rolando Jr.; denial
that the Decedent lacked the testamentary capacity to execute the 2018
Will; and denial that the Decedent was under the undue influence of the
Appellant, who did nothing more than perform the duties of a dutiful son.
The Appellant’s answer also asserted misconduct on the part of Rolando
Jr. following a buyout of the family business from former business partners.
Appellant alleged that Rolando Jr.’s conduct in the business, as well as his
conduct concerning property owned by the Decedent in Costa Rica,
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disenchanted the Decedent regarding Rolando Jr.’s motivations, resulting
in his exclusion from the 2018 Will.
Gutierrez responded that although he had represented the Decedent
and Rolando Jr. in various business matters since 2012, he was not
involved in the preparation of the 2018 Will and had no knowledge of its
contents. Further, Gutierrez asserted that at the time he undertook to
represent the Appellant, he was not representing Rolando Jr. in any matter.
In July 2021, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
Appellant’s motion to disqualify Gutierrez. The parties and Gutierrez
testified, and, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied
Rolando Jr’s. motion to disqualify Gutierrez. In its order, the trial court
stated there was no evidence to support a finding that Gutierrez’s prior
representations would preclude him from currently representing the
Appellant in the will contest litigation.
In November 2021, Rolando Jr. filed an amended complaint, once
again alleging the Decedent’s lack of capacity and the Appellant’s undue
influence, and adding a claim to recover assets allegedly misappropriated
by the Appellant. The Appellant denied the allegations. Over a year later,
Rolando Jr. filed a renewed motion to disqualify Gutierrez, asserting that,
through his prior representations in business and personal transactions for
4
the Decedent, and in mediating disputes between the brothers and their
father, Gutierrez obtained confidential information that was now being used
against him in the probate dispute. Further, he asserted that Gutierrez had
earlier failed to disclose that he would be the Appellant’s fact witness in the
probate dispute.
On February 15, 2023, the trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing
on Rolando Jr.’s renewed motion to disqualify. At that hearing, the
Appellant acknowledged that Gutierrez would be called as a necessary
witness in the litigation and conceded that Gutierrez could not be the
Appellant’s trial counsel. The Appellant’s other attorney, Mr. Barreto,
conceded that under the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Gutierrez could
not be trial counsel, but argued that Gutierrez should not be disqualified
from participating in the litigation as a whole, as he “can prepare and he
can work post. The rules are clear. He can sit at the table, but he can't be
trial counsel.”
After hearing from all the involved parties, the trial court issued its
order granting Rolando Jr.’s motion to disqualify. The trial court found that
the new information presented to the trial court, that the Appellant would
call Gutierrez as a fact witness, precluded Gutierrez’s participation in the
litigation. The trial court found, in pertinent part:
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The Court finds that Mr. Gutierrez is likely to be a necessary
fact witness in this case because he was an integral part of
Decedent’s estate planning and intimately involved in lawsuits
by and against [Corporation] Nema, which are highly relevant
issues in this case. During the hearing, Defendant Rogelio
[Appellant] conceded that Mr. Gutierrez is a necessary fact
witness that [Appellant] intends on calling to testify at trial. The
exceptions to Rule 4-3.7(a) do not apply because (1) the
testimony would relate to highly contested issues, (2) the
testimony will not relate solely to a matter of formality, (3) the
testify [sic] will not relate to services rendered in this case, and
(4) even though disqualifying Mr. Gutierrez may be a hardship
on [Appellant], it is not a substantial hardship because
Defendant Rogelio has already had other counsel involved in
the case who is more than competent to represent Defendant
Rogelio at trial and the trial is being continued for another 6
months. The Court also notes that any hardship to Defendant
Rogelio is outweighed by the prejudice to Plaintiff Rolando if
Mr. Gutierrez were permitted to continue representing
[Appellant].
This appeal ensued. 1
The Court’s standard of review for orders entered on motions to
disqualify counsel is that of an abuse of discretion. FlexFunds Holdings,
LLC v. Rivero,
341 So. 3d 478, 480–81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). “We note,
however, that “disqualification of a party's lawyer in a civil case is a drastic
remedy, [which] must be employed only in limited circumstances.”
Id. at
481 (quoting Gutierrez v. Rubio,
126 So. 3d 320, 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)).
1
A nonfinal order granting or denying a motion to disqualify counsel is
reviewable by appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(E); In re Amends. to
Fla. R. of App. Proc.-2017 Regular-Cycle Report,
256 So. 3d 1218 (Fla.
2018); Akerman LLP v. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC,
338 So. 3d 309
(Fla. 3d DCA 2022).
6
Analysis
“An order disqualifying counsel must be tested against the standards
imposed by the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.” Kemp Invs. N., LLC v.
Englert,
314 So. 3d 734, 736 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). One of the grounds the
trial court cited for disqualifying Gutierrez was that he would be called as a
fact witness. Rule 4-3.7(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Lawyer
as Witness, provides:
(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as
advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness on behalf of the client unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and
there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be
offered in opposition to the testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client.
As none of the listed exceptions apply to Gutierrez, the trial court
appropriately disqualified him from participating at trial. Case law suggests
that the disqualification should be limited to Gutierrez’s participation in the
trial, rather than the entire case. See Graves v. Lapi,
834 So. 2d 359, 360
(Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (concluding that the order disqualifying counsel was
too broad in not limiting the disqualification to trial advocacy, an issue
which petitioners clearly raised below in their reply to the motion). Because
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the rule only prohibits a lawyer from serving as “trial” counsel for a client
where he is likely to be a necessary witness for that client, “it follows that a
lawyer may act as an advocate at pre-trial (before the start of the trial) and
posttrial (after the judgment is rendered) proceedings.” Columbo v. Puig,
745 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (interpreting the rule's key
words “at trial” to mean that counsel should be permitted to represent party
“in any proceedings before trial and after trial”); Goff v. Goff,
276 So. 3d 83,
87–88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). Moreover, “[a] lawyer is not a necessary
witness when there are other witnesses available to testify to the same
information.” Steinberg v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,
121 So. 3d 622, 624
(Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. English,
588 So. 2d 294, 295
(Fla. 2d DCA 1991)); Cerillo v. Highley,
797 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA
2001) (specifically quashing an order disqualifying counsel from
participating in pre-trial proceedings); Fleitman v. McPherson,
691 So. 2d
37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
The Appellant argues that the trial court went too far by disqualifying
Gutierrez from representing Rolando Jr. throughout the entire litigation. We
disagree. This case also involves application of Rule Regulating the Florida
Bar 4-1.9, which prohibits an attorney from representing a new client
against a former client if that attorney will (a) represent another person in
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the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests
are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former
client gives informed consent (which the Appellant did not give); (b) use
information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former
client except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client
or when the information has become generally known; or (c) reveal
information relating to the representation except as these rules would
permit or require with respect to a client. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.9
(emphasis added); see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W.,
575 So.
2d 630, 633 (Fla. 1991) (holding a party “seeking to disqualify opposing
counsel based on a conflict of interest must demonstrate that (1) an
attorney-client relationship existed, thereby giving rise to an irrefutable
presumption that confidences were disclosed during the relationship, and
(2) the matter in which the law firm [or attorney] subsequently represented
the interest adverse to the former client was the same or substantially
related 2 to the matter in which it represented the former client.”) When
these two elements are shown, rule 4–1.9 creates “an irrefutable
presumption that confidences were disclosed” between the client and the
2
“Matters are ‘substantially related’ for purposes of this rule if they involve
the same transaction or legal dispute, or if the current matter would involve
the lawyer attacking work that the lawyer performed for the former client.”
Comment to R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4–1.9.
9
attorney. Young v. Achenbauch,
136 So. 3d 575, 583 (Fla. 2014) (quoting
K.A.W.,
575 So. 2d at 633–34) (holding a party “seeking disqualification
under rule 4–1.9 does not have to demonstrate actual prejudice to the
former client as a result of the subsequent representation because the
existence of an attorney-client relationship ‘giv[es] rise to an irrefutable
presumption that confidences were disclosed.’”); see Gaton v. Health Coal.,
Inc.,
745 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
In this case, there is no dispute that Gutierrez had an attorney-client
relationship with Rolando Jr. and the Decedent for several years,
representing both since 2012 in a variety of personal and business matters.
Gutierrez prepared the Decedent’s 2012 Will and certain trust documents
that involved both of his sons; he can testify to the Decedent’s
conversations and intent regarding his estate planning over these years,
and he mediated the business disputes between the parties involving the
Decedent’s corporation, Nema. All of these issues were raised in the
underlying pleadings and appear to be relevant to the current will dispute
litigation.
Applying Rule 4–1.9(a) to the circumstances present in this case, it is
undisputed that Gutierrez represented Rolando Jr. in the same or a
substantially related matter in which Rolando Jr.’s interests are materially
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adverse to the interests of the Appellant. Further, under subsection (b) of
the rule, through Gutierrez, the Appellant would be able to use information
relating to Rolando Jr.’s and the Decedent’s representation to Rolando Jr.’s
disadvantage. We note that the trial court specifically observed that any
hardship to the Appellant was outweighed by the prejudice to Rolando Jr. if
Gutierrez were permitted to continue representing the Appellant, and
further, that the Appellant had other counsel to represent him. Accordingly,
we affirm.
Affirmed.
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