IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
JC LORENZO BAKER, JR.,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D21-3041
5D21-3042
5D21-3044
5D21-3045
5D21-3046
5D21-3043
LT Case No. 2020-CF-5149-A-X
2020-CF-4891-A-X
2020-CF-4977-A-X
2019-CF-2709-A-X
2020-CF-522-A-X
2021-CF-302-A-X
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed July 22, 2022
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Marion County,
Lisa D. Herndon, Judge.
Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender,
and Darnelle Paige Lawshe,
Assistant Public Defender, Daytona
Beach, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and L. Charlene
Matthews, Assistant Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.
EVANDER, J.
JC Lorenzo Baker, Jr. (“Baker”) appeals his judgment and sentences
on six cases, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
withdraw plea after sentencing without first appointing conflict-free counsel to
argue the motion. We agree and, accordingly, we reverse.
Baker was represented by the public defender’s office throughout the
proceedings below. After rejecting a plea offer from the State, Baker entered
an open plea to the court. The trial court imposed a greater sentence than
that offered by the State. Thereafter, Baker’s defense counsel filed a motion
to withdraw plea on Baker’s behalf. The motion alleged that, according to
Baker, defense counsel had “misadvised him as to what the best pleading
decision was.” The motion further sought to allow the withdrawal of the public
defender’s office and for the appointment of conflict-free counsel.
At the ensuing hearing on the motion to withdraw plea, the assistant
public defender advised the court, inter alia, that he did not detail the alleged
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misadvice in the motion because of the conflict between Baker and the public
defender’s office:
[W]ithout getting into the merits of the motion itself, I think the
basic issue at this point is just that we need a conflict-free
counsel to come in. The conflict-free counsel could then hold a
hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea. He would probably
amend it to go into more detail. As I indicated in the motion itself,
I didn’t want to go into too many details because the nature of
this motion and then conflict-free counsel could set the motion
for a hearing.
The trial court declined to appoint conflict-free counsel, finding that it “was
[not] necessary under the circumstances.” Without hearing from Baker
himself, the trial court denied the motion, reciting that it had engaged in a
lengthy colloquy with Baker and that it saw no grounds to permit him to
withdraw his plea:
I went through a colloquy that was lengthy with Mr. Baker, and I
don’t see any ground to withdraw the plea. I asked him all the
relevant questions. He answered them correctly. It was up to
me to decide. He knew that. He acknowledged that he knew
that.
A defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel at a hearing on a
motion to withdraw plea because it is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.
Stephens v. State,
141 So. 3d 701, 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). “When a
defendant files a facially sufficient motion setting forth an adversarial
relationship with counsel, the court is required to appoint conflict-free
counsel unless the record conclusively refutes the motion’s allegations.”
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Angeles v. State,
279 So. 3d 836, 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); see also
Sheppard v. State,
175 So. 3d 275, 287 (Fla. 2009) (“If it appears to the trial
court that an adversarial relationship between counsel and the defendant
has arisen and the defendant’s allegations are not conclusively refuted by
the record, the court should either permit counsel to withdraw or discharge
counsel and appoint conflict-free counsel to represent the defendant.”).
Here, the motion to withdraw plea was legally sufficient. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. State,
196 So. 3d 572, 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (holding record
did not refute defendant’s claim that attorney misadvised him that if he
entered open plea, he would “likely be sentenced as a youthful offender and
receive a sentence of five years’ incarceration or less”).
Furthermore, the record established an adversarial relationship existed
between Baker and the public defender’s office. Indeed, defense counsel
advised the trial court of his inability to fully and properly argue the motion
because of the existing conflict. See, e.g., Angeles, 279 So. 3d at 836 (“In
fact, it was clear there was an adversarial relationship based on counsel’s
multiple requests for the appointment of conflict-free counsel and assertions
that he could not effectively argue his own ineffectiveness.”)
Finally, we reject the State’s argument that Baker’s allegations are
conclusively refuted by the record. The trial court’s inquiry, during the plea
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colloquy, as to whether Baker had been promised anything to enter the plea
did not conclusively refute Baker’s claim. See, e.g., Leroux v. State,
689 So.
2d 235, 237 (Fla. 1996) (holding defendant’s statement during plea colloquy
that he had not been promised anything to enter plea did not conclusively
refute claim that attorney misadvised him about how long he would actually
serve based on entitlement to gain time).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COHEN and NARDELLA, JJ., concur.
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