FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D23-0684
LT Case No. 2010-CF-625
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TREVORISSE THOMAS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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3.800 appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Tatiana Salvador, Judge.
Trevorisse Thomas, Daytona Beach, pro se.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren Shippy, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
December 1, 2023
KILBANE, J.
Trevorisse Thomas (“Thomas”), pro se, timely appeals the trial
court’s summary denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. Because the substance
of the verdict form and written judgement accurately reflect the
charge in the Amended Information, the use of the word
“aggravated” in each of the aforementioned documents does not on
its own make Thomas’s sentence illegal. Therefore, we affirm.
Relevant here, Thomas was tried, and convicted by a jury, of
the second-degree offense of fleeing or attempting to elude a law
enforcement officer in contravention of section 316.1935(3)(a),
Florida Statutes (2009). Although the Amended Information’s
introductory summary of count 2 states, “AGGRAVATED
FLEEING OR ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE A LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER,” the actual charge in count 2,
contained in the body of the Amended Information, does not use
the term “aggravated,” and tracks the pertinent language of
section 316.1935(3)(a), as follows:
COUNT 2
TREVORISSE SHANEOTIS THOMAS on January
15, 2010, in the County of Duval and the State of Florida,
did willfully flee or attempt to elude a law enforcement
officer in an authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle
with agency insignia and other jurisdictional markings
prominently displayed on the vehicle with siren and
lights activated, and during the course of the fleeing
drove at a high speed or in any manner which
demonstrates a wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property, contrary to the provisions of Section
316.1935(3)(a), Florida Statutes.
The erroneous use of the word “aggravated” in the Amended
Information’s introductory summary of count 2 is a mere
scrivener’s error; the content of the actual charge on count 2, as
stated in the body of the Amended Information, controls. See
Danzy v. State,
603 So. 2d 1320, 1322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (where
information contains statements of fact meeting all elements of
offense, erroneous reference to statute is scrivener’s error). Here,
the charge stated in the body of the Amended Information not only
tracks, but also correctly cites, the applicable statutory provision,
section 316.1935(3)(a). There is no mention in the Amended
Information of injury, damage to property, serious bodily injury, or
death, which is required for an “aggravated” charge under section
316.1935(4).
Similarly, the verdict form on count 2 also erroneously used
the word “aggravated”: “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of
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aggr[a]vated fleeing to elude a law enforcement officer, as charged
in the information.” Again, this is a mere scrivener’s error; the
verdict form refers to the charge in the Amended Information,
which, as explained, is not a charge for “aggravated” fleeing or
attempting to elude under section 316.1935(4) but is a “non-
aggravated” charge under section 316.1935(3)(a). See Duvall v.
State,
835 So. 2d 1224, 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (inclusion of word
“attempted” on grand theft verdict form was scrivener’s error, not
fundamental error).
Lastly, the handwritten judgment entry on count 2 also
incorrectly includes the word “aggravated.” That entry, however,
correctly cites section 316.1935(3)(a), which was the offense
charged in the Amended Information and reflected in the verdict
form. Accordingly, the inclusion of the word “aggravated” in the
judgment is also a scrivener’s error; however, it is one requiring
remand for correction, with instructions to delete the word
“aggravated” in order to conform the written judgment to the
charged offense–of which Thomas was convicted–on count 2. See
Rosen v. State,
272 So. 3d 875, 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (remanding
with directions for correction of scrivener’s error in judgment to
reflect underlying offense); see also Rhodes v. State,
168 So. 3d 244,
244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (remanding for correction of judgment to
delete word “aggravated”); Masterson v. State,
133 So. 3d 1085,
1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (same).
Importantly, the fifteen-year sentence imposed by the trial
court is within the sentencing range for a violation of section
316.1935(3)(a)—the offense both charged in the Amended
Information, and reflected in the handwritten judgment—which is
a second-degree felony punishable by a sentence of up to fifteen
years as provided in section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2009).1
1 The thrust of Thomas’s argument is that he should have
been charged only with fleeing or attempting to elude a law
enforcement officer under section 316.1935(1), which does not
contain the language of subsection (3)(a) regarding driving at a
high speed or in a manner which demonstrates a wanton disregard
for the safety of persons or property. The offense of fleeing or
attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, in contravention of
section 316.1935(1), is a third-degree felony that carries only a
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Accordingly, we affirm Thomas’s sentence and remand with
instructions to remove the word “aggravated” as it appears in the
judgment’s handwritten description of count 2.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED to correct written judgment as
instructed.
EDWARDS, C.J., and PRATT, J., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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five-year maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082(3)(d),
Florida Statutes (2009). Aside from the fact that such an
argument is not cognizable under a rule 3.800 motion, Thomas’s
argument is without merit, as the verdict form on count 2 shows
that the jury had the option of convicting Thomas of such as a
lesser included offense but chose not to do so.
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