FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D23-2257
LT Case No. 2022-DR-026235
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BRYAN SCOTT,
Petitioner,
v.
DONNA SCOTT,
Respondent.
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Petition for Certiorari Review of Order from the Circuit Court
for Brevard County.
Jennifer Opel Taylor, Judge.
Nancy A. Hass, of Nancy A. Hass, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for
Petitioner.
Elizabeth Siano Harris, of Harris Appellate Law Office, Mims, for
Respondent.
December 1, 2023
JAY, J.
Petitioner (“Husband”) and Respondent (“Wife”) are the
parties in an ongoing divorce case. Wife filed two contempt
motions against Husband, one of which the trial court granted.
Husband now seeks certiorari relief from that contempt order.
However, because he fails to show the irreparable harm needed
for us to have certiorari jurisdiction, we must dismiss his
petition.
I.
Husband and Wife own multiple businesses together,
including Barn Light Electric Company, LLC/Barn Light USA
(“Barn Light”). In her contempt motion, Wife alleged that
Husband “unilaterally” canceled the credit card that Wife “had
access to because of her employment” with Barn Light. At the
hearing on Wife’s motion, Husband’s central argument was that
the court could not consider the credit card issue because the card
belonged to Barn Light, and Barn Light was not a party to the
case.
After the hearing, the trial court granted Wife’s motion. The
court found that Husband and Wife are Barn Light’s “equal co-
owners” and that Husband, “through his own individual actions,”
removed Wife’s access to the credit card that “she used in the
jointly owned business.” The court found that Husband had the
ability to reinstate Wife’s card, and it ordered him to do so.
In his certiorari petition, Husband asks us to quash the trial
court’s order. He claims that the order exceeds the trial court’s
jurisdiction in the divorce case because it ultimately compels
action by Barn Light, a non-party. Regardless of whatever
substantive allure this claim may have, we lack jurisdiction.
II.
“[C]ertiorari is an ‘extraordinary remedy.’” Univ. of Fla. Bd.
of Trs. v. Carmody, 48 Fla. L. Weekly S150, S152 (Fla. July 6,
2023) (quoting Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen O’Connor, PLC,
346 So. 3d 577, 579 n.6 (Fla. 2022)). It allows an appellate court
“to reach down and halt a miscarriage of justice where no other
remedy exists.”
Id. (quoting M.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams.,
189 So. 3d 134, 138 (Fla. 2016)). However, it “is not a substitute
for an appeal and ‘is intended to be available only in very limited
circumstances.’”
Id. (quoting Nader v. Fla. Dep’t of High. Saf. &
Motor Veh.,
87 So. 3d 712, 722 (Fla. 2012)).
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“To obtain relief by certiorari, the order . . . must depart from
the essential requirements of the law and cause harm that
cannot be corrected on post-judgment appeal.” Jordan v. State,
350 So. 3d 103, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). “The correctability is a
jurisdictional question.”
Id. “In other words, before certiorari can
be used to review non-final orders, the appellate court must focus
on the threshold jurisdictional question,” which is whether the
order causes irreparable harm. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San
Perdido Ass’n,
104 So. 3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012). This
“jurisdictional evaluation is meant to discourage piecemeal
review.” Jordan, 350 So. 3d at 105.
Here, Husband’s petition has two fatal flaws on the “critical
preliminary question” of irreparable harm. See id. at 106. First,
the petition focuses almost exclusively on purported harm to
Barn Light, not Husband. It complains that the trial court denied
due process “to the non-party company,” that “the trial court
lacked personal jurisdiction over Barn Light,” and that the
court’s order “cannot stand” because “the rights of the company
cannot be adjudicated in a judicial proceeding to which Barn
Light . . . has not been made a party.”
Even if these claims had merit, none of them pertain to
Husband, who is the petitioner before us. See Palma v. S. Fla.
Pulmonary & Critical Care, LLC,
307 So. 3d 860, 866 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2020) (observing that it is a “principle of law deeply
ingrained in our legal and economic system that an LLC is an
autonomous legal entity, separate and distinct from its
members”). And it is obvious that we cannot grant certiorari
relief based on alleged harm to a party not before the court. See
Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc.,
720 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998) (“[I]t is
settled law that, as a condition precedent to invoking a district
court’s certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioning party must establish
that it has suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied
on direct appeal.” (emphasis added)); Mims v. Broxton,
191 So. 3d
552, 553 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (noting that for an appellate court
to have certiorari jurisdiction, “the petitioner must show” that
“the petitioner will suffer” irreparable harm (emphasis added)).
Beyond this clear defect, the petition also fails to identify
harm that is “real and ascertainable” rather than “speculative.”
3
See Mayport Hous. P’ship, Ltd. v. Albani,
244 So. 3d 1176, 1177
(Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v.
Endicott,
81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)). Husband
suggests the court’s order “has the potential to create post-filing,
non-marital debt for which [he] may be, ultimately, responsible.”
(Emphasis added). Husband worries that “if [Wife] were not to
pay” any debt she incurs with the credit card, then Husband
would be on the hook for that balance. (Emphasis added). These
tepid statements offering speculative concern are legally
insufficient to show a material injury that could not be corrected
on post-judgment appeal. See Emed Urgent & Primary Care, P.A.
v. Rivas,
335 So. 3d 766, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“Petitioners
have failed to establish that they will suffer irreparable harm if
the order under review stands. Petitioners offer only unsupported
speculation of future harm, which is not sufficient to establish
material injury.”).
III.
Given the paramount jurisdictional importance of
irreparable harm, a certiorari petition must “clearly reflect” how
the purported harm to the petitioner “‘is incurable’ by a final
appeal.” Ag. for Health Care Admin. v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist.,
206 So. 3d 826, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (quoting Bared & Co. v.
McGuire,
670 So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). Husband’s
petition fails to do that. Because “[w]e are hard-pressed to see
how” the trial court’s order has caused Husband harm, “let alone
a harm that could not be remedied through a direct appeal,” we
have no jurisdiction. See Erskine v. Erskine,
344 So. 3d 566, 571
(Fla. 1st DCA 2022).
PETITION DISMISSED.
WALLIS and SOUD, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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