DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
MICHAEL STEVEN KNEZEVICH,
Appellant,
v.
SERVICE FINANCE COMPANY, LLC,
Appellee.
No. 2D23-810
December 13, 2023
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Declan P. Mansfield,
Judge.
Michael Steven Knezevich, pro se.
Nicholas S. Agnello of Burr & Forman LLP, Fort Lauderdale; and David A.
Elliott of Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, Alabama, for Appellee.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
Michael Knezevich appeals from an order entered pursuant to
Florida's Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2022).
Knezevich argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter this
order because it did so after he had already voluntarily dismissed his
action against Service Finance Company, LLC (SFC). Because SFC filed
its motion seeking relief under that statute before Knezevich dismissed
his action, however, the court retained jurisdiction to rule on the motion.
Knezevich sued SFC pro se, alleging that SFC had falsely reported
information to credit bureaus of an outstanding debt between Knezevich
and a third party. Over the course of the litigation, Knezevich sent
numerous communications to the trial court and to opposing counsel
that included derogatory and disparaging remarks, eventually leading
SFC to file a motion seeking various forms of relief under section 68.093.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion at which both parties
presented evidence. The very next day, and before the court entered its
ruling on the motion, Knezevich voluntarily dismissed his action.
Nonetheless, the court subsequently rendered its order, which enjoins
Knezevich—a prolific pro se litigant—from commencing any further pro
se actions in the Sixth Judicial Circuit without first obtaining leave of the
circuit's administrative judge. See § 68.093(4). The order also bars
Knezevich from claiming indigent status and prohibits him from
communicating with the court, its judicial assistant, or SFC's counsel in
any manner.1
"Whether a trial court retains jurisdiction over a party after it
voluntarily withdraws its litigated claim is a question of law reviewed de
novo." Voyles v. Glavin,
335 So. 3d 200, 203 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing
Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Venzen v. Ashby,
294 So. 3d 445, 446 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2020)). A plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of his or her suit generally
serves to terminate the litigation and divest the trial court of jurisdiction.
See Residents for a Better Cmty. v. WCI Cmtys., Inc.,
291 So. 3d 632, 633
(Fla. 2d DCA 2020). A court retains jurisdiction, however, to resolve a
defendant's motion seeking to sanction a plaintiff if the defendant has
filed that motion before the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the case.2 Cf.
1 We do not address the grounds for the order other than to observe
that they are ample.
2 Moreover, even apart from section 68.093, it is within courts'
inherent authority to sanction abusive litigants who drain limited judicial
resources. See Sibley v. Fla. Jud. Qualifications Comm'n,
973 So. 2d 425,
2
Pino v. Bank of N.Y.,
121 So. 3d 23, 42–43 (Fla. 2013) (holding that trial
courts "will have continuing jurisdiction to resolve" a pending sanctions
motion under section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2009), where the
motion was filed after the twenty-one-day safe harbor period but before
the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of the action); Residents for a Better
Cmty., 291 So. 3d at 633 ("[F]or this exception to apply, the motion for
sanctions must have been filed before the case was voluntarily
dismissed").
Here, SFC's motion preceded Knezevich's voluntary dismissal of the
action. Accordingly, the trial court retained jurisdiction to grant that
motion notwithstanding the dismissal. We therefore affirm the court's
order.
Affirmed.
KELLY and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
426 (Fla. 2006) (noting that courts have the "inherent judicial authority
to sanction an abusive litigant"); Clark v. Baney, 355 So. 3d 976, 978
(Fla. 1st DCA 2023) ("Under this inherent authority, a court may bar a
litigant from appearing pro se when the litigant's 'frivolous or excessive
filings interfere with timely administration of justice.' " (quoting Ardis v.
Pensacola State Coll., 128 So. 3d 260, 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013))); Golden
v. Buss,
60 So. 3d 461, 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ("It is well-settled that
courts have the inherent authority and duty to limit abuses of the
judicial process by pro se litigants.").
3
