Universal Insurance Company of North America v. Sunset 102 Office Park Condominium Association, Inc. ( 2023 )

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed December 13, 2023.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D22-0248
Lower Tribunal No. 18-42359
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Universal Insurance Company of North America,
Appellant,
vs.
Sunset 102 Office Park Condominium Association, Inc.,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Gina
Beovides, Judge.
Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, PLC, and David T. Burr
and Jaime K. Quezon (Tampa), for appellant.
Yelena Shneyderman, P.A., and Yelena Shneyderman (Hollywood),
for appellee.
Before EMAS, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.
EMAS, J.
INTRODUCTION
Universal Insurance Company of North America (“Universal”), the
defendant below, appeals a final judgment entered by the trial court following
a jury trial that culminated in a verdict in favor of its insured, Sunset 102
Office Park Condominium Association (“Sunset”). Universal also appeals
the trial court’s order denying its motion for new trial.
The action below was filed by Sunset after filing an insurance claim
with Universal for losses suffered as a result of Hurricane Irma. Universal
determined the amount of the claim did not exceed Sunset’s deductible
under the policy, and Sunset thereafter filed suit for breach of contract. The
case proceeded to trial, with the jury returning a verdict in favor of Sunset,
and the trial court (following a denial of Universal’s motion for a new trial)
entered final judgment in favor of Sunset for $884,371.90.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Universal urges five grounds for reversal: (1) denial of a motion for
leave to amend affirmative defenses; (2) erroneous jury instructions and
verdict form; (3) denial of a motion for relief based on spoliation of evidence
by Sunset; (4) exclusion of certain evidence at trial; and (5) denial of a motion
for mistrial following inflammatory remarks by counsel for Sunset.
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1. Denial of Motion for Leave to Amend Affirmative Defenses
Universal asserts the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave
to amend its affirmative defenses to add a defense based on the policy’s “wet
rot” exclusion. See Florida East Coast Ry. v. Shulman, 481 So. 2d 965 (Fla.
3d DCA 1986) (reviewing such a claim for abuse of discretion). It is an abuse
of discretion to deny leave to amend “‘unless it clearly appears that allowing
the amendment would prejudice the opposing party, the privilege to amend
has been abused, or amendment would be futile.’” Kay’s Custom Drapes,
Inc. v. Garrote, 920 So. 2d 1168, 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fleet Fin. Corp., 724 So. 2d 1218, 1219 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1998) (additional citation omitted).
Trial was scheduled to begin on Monday, June 14, 2021. Two business
days before trial, Universal moved ore tenus to amend its answer and
affirmative defenses to add an affirmative defense based on the “Fungi, Wet
Rot, Dry Rot or Bacteria” exclusion in its policy.
The trial court held a lengthy hearing on the request. Sunset argued it
was clearly prejudiced because it could not adequately prepare to meet this
newly asserted defense on the eve of trial. Sunset argued this proposed
“wet rot” defense represented a new policy exclusion that had not previously
been raised by Universal. It was also established that Universal had been
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aware, for over a month, of the underlying basis for such a requested
amendment, but raised the issue with the court only two days before trial.
Although Universal contended there would be no prejudice or surprise to
Sunset if the amendment were permitted, the trial court determined
otherwise. The trial court found that this affirmative defense would “inject a
new theory of defense” without allowing Sunset adequate time to consult with
an expert and prepare for trial. The court concluded “this is the definition of
undue prejudice based on the procedural posture of this case.”
As this court observed in Building B1, LLC v. Component Repair Servs,
Inc., 224 So. 3d 785, 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017):
While public policy generally favors application of rule 1.190 to
permit amendment of pleadings, the rule's “liberal amendment
policy diminishes as a case progresses to trial.” Morgan v. Bank
of N.Y. Mellon, 200 So. 3d 792, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
Ultimately, the decision is vested in the broad discretion of the
trial court, and the touchstone consideration of this analysis is
prejudice to the opposing party.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Universal’s
request for leave to amend its affirmative defenses, given the eleventh-hour
nature of the request, Sunset’s objection and the resulting prejudice to
Sunset in its ability to prepare for or defend against this new theory of
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defense. See also Designers Tile Int'l Corp. v. Capitol C Corp., 499 So. 2d
4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Santi v. Zack Co., 287 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).1
2. Spoliation
Prior to trial, Universal filed a motion for relief based on alleged
spoliation of evidence, asserting Sunset had intentionally destroyed
evidence when it undertook repairs on two of the four insured buildings,
preventing Universal from properly assessing the loss. Universal requested,
as a sanction for this spoliation, an “adverse inference” jury instruction. The
court held a hearing on the spoliation motion and thereafter denied it, finding
Universal inspected the property four times, and denied coverage without
1
We likewise find no error in the jury instructions and verdict form provided
to the jury. Universal contends that the concurrent cause doctrine was
inapplicable in this case, and that it was error for the court to give the
standard jury instruction on the concurrent cause doctrine, rather than an
instruction on efficient proximate cause. However, the concurrent cause
doctrine was applicable here. See Sec. First Ins. Co. v. Czelusniak, 305 So.
3d 717, 718-19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“Generally, ‘when independent perils
converge and no single cause can be considered the sole or proximate
cause, it is appropriate to apply the concurring cause doctrine.’ However,
when the insurer explicitly avoids the application of the concurring-cause
doctrine with an anti-concurrent cause provision, the plain language of the
policy precludes recovery”) (additional citations omitted). There was no
applicable anti-concurrent cause provision, and thus no error was committed
in giving the standard jury instruction on concurrent cause and including
same on the verdict form. See Jones v. Federated Nat’l Ins. Co., 235 So. 3d
936, 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) ("If the insurer fails to establish either a sole
or efficient proximate cause, and there are no applicable anti-concurrent
cause provisions, then the concurrent cause doctrine must be utilized.")
5
ever requesting to reinspect, and thus, had not shown that Sunset violated
any duties under the contract.
“We review the decision to grant or deny an adverse inference jury
instruction under an abuse of discretion.” Pena v. Bi-Lo Holdings, LLC, 304
So. 3d 1254, 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). In Pena, this court reiterated the
“three-part threshold inquiry” for a trial court to engage in when considering
a motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence: “‘(1) whether the evidence
existed at one time, (2) whether the spoliator had a duty to preserve the
evidence, and (3) whether the evidence was critical to an opposing party
being able to prove its prima facie case or a defense.’” Id. (internal citation
omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court found Universal failed to establish
that Sunset violated its duty, under the terms of the insurance policy, to
preserve the evidence. The policy provides that the insured must allow
inspection of the property “as often as may be reasonably required.”
However, the evidence supports the court’s determination, because
Universal was allowed to inspect the property four times and did not request
to conduct further examination of the two reroofed buildings—despite notice
of Sunset’s intention to replace the roofs—until after installation of the new
roofs was complete.
6
On appeal, Universal seeks to rely on Sunset’s expert, who testified he
would not have allowed destructive testing (which Universal claims was
necessary), but despite its knowledge in advance, Universal never requested
testing prior to replacement of the roofs and did not file a motion to preserve
the evidence. As for the later replacement of the remaining two buildings,
Universal’s expert was present for that work, did not attempt to inspect the
underlayment, and later testified that, regardless, his opinions remained the
same.
Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in denying
an adverse inference jury instruction. See id. at 1258 (rejecting “the
contention that the judicial action in denying an adverse inference was
‘arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable [or that] . . . no reasonable man [or
woman] would take the view adopted by the trial court.’” (quoting Canakaris
v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980))).
3. Improper Comments and Questioning
Finally, Universal contends that the trial court should have granted its
motion for mistrial because counsel for Sunset made fraud allegations
against Universal in front of the jury, prejudicing Universal and resulting in
an unfair trial. We do not agree.
7
The alleged error occurred during Sunset’s questioning of Universal’s
corporate representative. Curiously, Universal’s brief does not set forth the
actual portions of the trial transcript at issue; nor does Universal’s brief even
provide selected quotes of the statements that it claims resulted in a denial
of a fair trial. Instead, Universal’s brief merely references the three page
numbers of the trial transcript, and then characterizes the questioning
contained in those three pages as “repeated, baseless accusations of fraud,”
asserting that through these questions Sunset implied that Universal “had
conspired with its vendors and contractors to falsify estimates so they fell
below policy deductibles to avoid paying claims.” Here are the pertinent
excerpts of questions posed by Sunset’s counsel to Universal’s witness:
Q. Now, when you all, Universal, insured these roofs in 2017,
you knew you were insuring 15-year-old roofs, correct?
A. I don’t know exactly what the underwriting department may
have known at the time it was insuring the roofs. It relied – it
seems likely it relied upon at least the information supplied in the
policy application. Beyond that, I have no specific information
about the underwriting of the policy for Sunset 102.
Q. But it would have been a combination of whatever that
underwriting you’re referencing is?
Counsel for Universal: Objection.
The Court: Sustained. Can I see the parties at sidebar?
8
At sidebar, the court reminded counsel for Sunset that he could
only ask if the claims adjuster knew when the roofs were built.
Questioning continued:
Q. So this was, by definition, a covered loss? That’s not an issue
here, right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And once it became a covered loss, then what Universal does
it, it goes about adjusting or valuing those losses, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And Universal should not adjust those losses so as to
artificially remain under the deductibles for any of these
buildings, correct?
Counsel for Universal: Objection, predicate.
The Court: Sustained. Rephrase.
...
Q. Universal has an obligation to fairly and accurately value
these losses?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. The – the valuation of these losses cannot be
manipulated so as to keep the numbers below the deductibles,
correct?
Counsel for Universal: Objection, predicate.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. It has to be a fair and honest evaluation?
Counsel for Universal: Objection, predicate.
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Q. It has to be an accurate evaluation under the policy?
Counsel for Universal: Objection, predicate.
The Court: Overruled.
While these questions may have intruded into an area prohibited by a
pretrial motion in limine (precluding Sunset from asking questions regarding
general claims-handling or underwriting practices), they are a far cry from
the characterization in Universal’s brief that they constitute “repeated,
baseless accusations of fraud,” and that the questions imply that Universal
“had conspired with its vendors and contractors to falsify estimates so they
fell below policy deductibles to avoid paying claims.”
Indeed, if, as Universal contends, Sunset’s questioning constituted
“repeated, baseless accusation of fraud,” it begs the question why
Universal’s four objections consisted merely of the word “predicate.”
Universal did not object based upon an alleged violation of a pretrial order in
limine, or raise the specter of improper character attacks, but merely a claim
that some requisite evidentiary foundation was absent. 2
2
Universal asserts it used “predicate” as the objection because the trial court
prohibited speaking objections during trial. We reject Universal’s purported
use of “predicate” as a catchall substitute for a precise objection to the
question posed or the answer given. The purpose of an objection is to place
the trial court and opposing counsel on notice of the precise underlying
evidentiary basis for the assertion that the question is improper or the answer
inadmissible. This provides a trial court an opportunity to prevent or cure a
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Nevertheless, assuming this objection was adequate to preserve the
issue (in light of the existing order in limine) and even if we were to find the
motion for mistrial was contemporaneous (though raised fifteen transcript
pages later),3 we nevertheless agree with the trial court’s assessment that
the comments were not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial, especially
in light of the fact that the trial court sustained several of Universal’s
objections and gave a curative instruction to the jury. See Talley v. State,
260 So. 3d 562, 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“The granting of a motion for
possible error, and the questioning party an opportunity to rephrase the
question to overcome the objection. Objecting on the basis of “predicate”
does not preserve the claim, asserted here, that the questions constituted
improper accusations of fraud by Universal. Instead, the evidence code
“requires precision in objections.” See e.g., Jackson v. State, 738 So. 2d 382,
386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (the “objection ‘lack of foundation,’ like its first
cousin ‘improper predicate,’ is not a ‘specific ground of objection’ within the
meaning of section 90.104(1)(a).”); Filan v. State, 768 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2000); § 90.104(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2022), (providing that a court
“may predicate error, set aside or reverse a judgment, or grant a new trial on
the basis of admitted or excluded evidence when a substantial right of the
party is adversely affected and . . . [w]hen the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears on the record, stating
the specific ground of objection if the specific ground was not apparent from
the context”).
3
See Ed Ricke and Sons, Inc. v. Green By and Through Swan, 468 So. 2d
908, 910-11 (Fla. 1985) (“Unless the improper argument constitutes a
fundamental error, a motion for a mistrial must be made ‘at the time the
improper comment was made”, but also noting “we do not impose a strict
rule requiring that a motion for mistrial be made in the next breath following
the objection to the remark.”)
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mistrial is not based on whether an error is merely prejudicial but rather
whether ‘an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial’”) (quoting
Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 372 (Fla. 2008)). See also Olsen v. Phillip
Morris USA, Inc., 343 So. 3d 172, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“If the issue of
an opponent's improper argument has been properly preserved by objection
and motion for mistrial, the trial court should grant a new trial if the argument
was ‘so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the opposing party
its right to a fair trial’” (quoting R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Calloway, 201
So. 3d 753, 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)) (additional citations omitted)).
CONCLUSION
Because Universal has failed to demonstrate reversible error in this
case 4, we affirm the final judgment and the trial court’s order denying
Universal’s motion for new trial.
Affirmed.
4
We have considered the remaining points raised by Universal on appeal,
conclude they are not meritorious, and affirm without further discussion of
those claims.
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