Express Damage Restoration, LLC (A/A/O Annie Santalla) v. Wright National Flood Insurance Company ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT □ SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION . CASE NO. 1:19-ev-24127-JLK EXPRESS DAMAGE RESTORATION, LLC, as assignee of Annie Santalla, □□ Plaintiff, WRIGHT NATIONAL FLOOD . INSURANCE COMPANY, □□ Defendant. . / . □ ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss filed October 14, 2019 (DE 6) (the “Motion”. Plaintiff failed to file a re to the Motion, and the time to do so has expired. The Motion is therefore ripe for decision. . . □□ /-«, BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Express Damage Restoration, LLC, ree this action for breach of contract under a Standard Flood Insurance Policy that Defendant issued to an individual named Annie Santalla, a non-party to this action, See Compl. 9.8, DE 1-1. Plaintiff ee to bring this action as assignee of Ms. Santalla based upon an “assignment of insurance proceeds.” Id. A. As background, □ the Complaint alleges that, on September 10, 2017, Ms. Santalla’s property sustained flood damage due to Hurricane Irma, Id {{ 8-9. The Complaint alleges that Ms. Santalla “retained Plaintiff to -perform necessary mold test services at the Property,” and that ‘“Defendant’s refusal to pay for the services ree by the Plaintiff contrary to the terms of the Policy.” Id. Jf ll, 15. Defendant now moves to pene the Complaint, arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing sue er policy because (a) the policy does not list Plaintiff as an et and (b) the alleged assignment from Ms. . _ Santalla is barred by the policy and federal law. See Mot. 6—-14.! □ Il. LEGALSTANDARD . □ To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead “enough facts to on claim to relief that is nore on its face.” Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A “claim facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows □ the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendanit is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the Court’s review is generally confined to the four corners of the coinplaint, “when the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and. those documents are central to the plaintiff's claim, then the Court may consider the documents . ... for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (ith Cir. 1997). II. DISCUSSION As part of the federal government’s National Flood Insurance Program CNFIP”), Standard Flood Insurance Policies “are interpreted using principles of federal common law,” Newton v. - Capital Assurance Co., 245 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001), and must be “strictly construed and enforced,” De La Cruz v. Bankers Insurance Co., 237 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2002). □ “The elements of a breach of contract claim under federal common law are: (1) a valid contract between the parties, (2).an obligation or duty arising out of the eee (3) a breach of that duty, _ and (4) damages caused by the breach.” Hernandez-Rodriguez v: Al Sun Protection, Inc., No. 09- 23057-CIV, 2010 WL 996529, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant also argues that Plaintif? s state law claims for attorney’s fees and costs are preempted. by federal law and that Plaintiff's claim for prejudgment interest is barred by the “no-interest rule.” . Because the first element requires that there be a valid contract between the parties, courts have recognized that only the named insured is entitled to sue for benefits under a Standard Flood Insurance Policy. Jd. For example, in Hernandez-Rodriguez, a “burst water pipe caused water to □□ enter Plaintiffs’ ee resulting in damage due to mold, mildew, and other effects from water intrusion.” Jd. at *1. ‘The plaintiffs filed suit under a Standard Flood Insurance □□ that listed _ only their condominium association an insured. Td. Applying federal law, the court found that _ ‘the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for-breach of contract, reasoning that the condo ee was “the only party entitled to benefits under the Policy.” See id. at *3. Sinnilarly, here, Plaintiff brings suit under a Standard Flood Insurance Policy that names only Ms. Santalla as an insured. See Mot, Ex.'1. Because Plaintiff is not an insured under the policy, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element breach of contract claim? . oe Moreover, while Plaintiff attempts to bring this action as assignee of Ms. Santalla under an. alleged “assignment of insurance proceeds,” the Court agrees with Defendant’s argument that the assignment is invalid under both Peace terms of the policy and federal law. Asan initial matter, the policy permits assignments only when the insured “transfer[s] title of [the] property to someone else.” 44 CER. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. VII(D). No such transfer of title is alleged in this oT Plaintiff has not pointed to any other provision that would permit an assignment of the-policy or’ any claims under the policy. Indeed, as Defendant points ao the NFIP Claims Manual specifically States ‘hat the “SFIP does allow assignment of a claim.” See Mot. Ex: 3 (quoting NFIP Claims Manual (June 2019)). The Court also agrees with Defendant’s sitgumenit that the ee fails. to comply with the Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727 et seq., which places restrictions 2 Contrary to Defendant’s characterization, Hernandez-Rodriguez did not dismiss the case for lack of Article II standing, a jurisdictional defect. Instead, the court dismissed the action on the merits for failure to state a breach of contract claim. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 2010 WL 996529, at *3. on the assignment of claims against the federal government. See Goldstein Grp. Holdings, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 15-cv-03851, 2017 WL 448372, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2017) (applying the Act to assignment of claim under Standard Flood Insurance eee “which is written by the federal. government”). As relevant here, the Act requires the assignment to “be attested to by 2 witnesses,” and states that “the person making the assignment shall acknowledge it before an official who may □ acknowledge a deed, and the official shall certify the assignment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3727(b). In this however, the assignment from Ms. Santalla to. Plaintiff was not attested to by any witnesses and does not contain the requisite certification, See Compl. Ex. A, DE ie a _In short, because Plaintiff is not named as an insured on the policy, and because the Bere assignment from Ms. Santalla is barred by the policy and the Assignment of Claims Act, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint must be eee for failure to state a claim. IV. CONCLUSION - - Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (DE 6) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; this case is hereby DISMISSED; and the Clerk shall CLOSE this case. . □□ DONE and ORDERED in chambers at the James Lawrence King Federal Justice Erne and United States Courthouse, at Miami, Florida, this 9th day of December, 2019. A pos LAWRENCE KING “ . . ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE ce: All counsel of record Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim must bé dismissed in its entirety, the Court need not address Defendant’s arguments regarding Plaintiffs request for attorney’s fees costs and prejudgment interest. : oe