Bedford v. State ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: April 19, 2021
S21A0253. BEDFORD v. THE STATE.
S21A0254. BROOKS v. THE STATE.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
Million Bedford and Yaheed Brooks were tried together and
convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the
shooting death of Johnny Jackson. 1 On appeal, they each contend
1 The crimes were committed on April 8, 2017. On July 31, 2017, an
Emanuel County grand jury indicted Bedford, Brooks, and three co-indictees
on one count of malice murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder,
predicated on aggravated assault and armed robbery, respectively (Counts 3
and 5), one count of armed robbery (Count 7), one count of burglary in the first
degree (Count 9), and five counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10). Bedford and Brooks were
tried together on April 10 and 11, 2018, and found guilty on all counts. Bedford
and Brooks were each sentenced to serve life in prison without the possibility
of parole for malice murder, another concurrent life sentence in prison without
the possibility of parole for armed robbery, 20 years in prison to be served
consecutively for burglary, and a total of 15 years in prison for the three
remaining counts of possession of a firearm, also to be served consecutively.
The felony murder convictions and the two possession of firearm convictions
based on the felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law.
After Bedford was sentenced on May 21, 2018, he timely filed a motion
for new trial, which he amended on October 22, 2019. After a hearing, the trial
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain their convictions and
that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial due to the State’s
improper comment about courtroom spectators during its closing
argument. Separately, Bedford claims that the trial court erred by
denying his motion for directed verdict of acquittal and by admitting
his pretrial statements. Brooks argues that a detective witness
improperly bolstered other witnesses’ testimony and that the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to allow him to supplement his
motion for new trial with new claims and by not setting an
evidentiary hearing on the supplemental motion. We affirm the
convictions in both cases.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed that the appellants’ co-indictees,
Shauntequia Bell, Emily Prescott, and Sanantonio Young, devised a
court denied his amended motion on November 27, 2019. On May 10, 2018,
Brooks filed a motion for new trial, which he amended on June 27, 2019. After
a hearing, the trial court denied his amended motion on February 4, 2020.
Bedford and Brooks filed timely notices of appeal. These cases were docketed
to the term of court beginning in December 2020 and submitted for decision on
the briefs.
2
plan to rob Jackson in order to get money for rent. Prescott had
previously traded sex with Jackson to pay for Bell’s jail bond and
saw cash while in Jackson’s house. Bell and Prescott planned for
Young to rob Jackson while Bell distracted him by pretending that
she would exchange sex for money.
On April 8, 2017, Bell texted Jackson that she would come over
that evening. Jackson’s ex-wife testified that Jackson was
intoxicated that day, and his neighbors testified that he canceled
their plans to have a fish fry because he said that he would be
hosting a female guest. Bell, Prescott, and Young arrived at
Jackson’s house after 7:00 p.m. Bell testified that she went inside
while Young and Prescott remained in Young’s car. Around 7:50
p.m., Jackson and Bell drove Jackson’s truck to a nearby
convenience store. While inside the store, Bell advised Prescott and
Young via text message to begin robbing Jackson’s house, but when
Bell and Jackson returned to Jackson’s house, Young and Prescott
were neither inside the house nor waiting outside.
Instead, Young and Prescott were headed to Statesboro where
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Young said that he had to pick up “his brothers.” At 8:28 p.m.,
security camera footage at an apartment complex showed them
picking up 16-year-old Bedford, who was Young’s cousin, and 24-
year-old Brooks. Prescott, Young, Bedford, and Brooks drove to
another apartment to get gas money and then to get gas. Prescott
testified, and security camera footage from the gas station showed,
that Bedford pumped gas into Young’s car while Brooks paid inside
at 8:48 p.m. Prescott and Bell continued to communicate over text
messages while the four drove to Jackson’s house. Once they arrived,
Prescott testified that Young stayed in his car while Prescott,
Bedford, and Brooks entered the house and began searching for
money.
Bell testified that while she was with Jackson in the bedroom,
Young texted her that the robbery was about to occur and that she
should distract Jackson. After searching for money, Bedford,
Brooks, and Prescott went into the bedroom, where Bedford pulled
out a gun. Surprised, Jackson asked who they were and what they
were doing in his house, and Brooks told Bedford to hit Jackson with
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the gun, which Bedford did. After being struck, Jackson attempted
to get back up. Brooks yelled at Bedford to shoot Jackson, and
Bedford shot him multiple times. Bedford and Brooks then left the
house and reentered Young’s car. Prescott continued to search for
money inside, and Bell wiped down items in the home that she
thought they might have touched.
Jackson’s neighbor testified that she heard loud booms coming
from Jackson’s house between 9:15 and 9:20 p.m., and about five
minutes later, she saw a car that matched the description of Young’s
car speed off from where it had been parked. Bell and Prescott
testified that the five split the money they stole, which was between
four and five hundred dollars. Young, Bedford, and Brooks dropped
off Bell and Prescott at their shared apartment. Jackson’s son
discovered his father’s body the next day with four gunshot wounds
and injuries to his face from blunt force trauma.2
2 Young pleaded guilty, received a life sentence without parole for the
felony murder of Jackson, and testified for the State. Bell and Prescott also
testified for the State and were permitted to plead guilty to voluntary
manslaughter due to their cooperation.
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1. Bedford and Brooks argue that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient for a rational jury to find them guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt on each count of the indictment for which they
were convicted. Bedford also argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. See Smith v.
State, 304 Ga. 752, 754 (822 SE2d 220) (2018) (standard of review
for denial of directed verdict is the same as for determining
sufficiency of the evidence). We conclude that both claims lack merit.
On appeal, a criminal defendant is no longer presumed
innocent, and we review whether the evidence presented at trial,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,
authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979). “Under this review, we must put aside any questions about
conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the
evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of
the trier of fact.” Frazier v. State, 308 Ga. 450, 452-53 (2) (a) (841
6
SE2d 692) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Under OCGA § 16-2-20, criminal liability is imposed on a
defendant as a party to the crimes when a defendant intentionally
causes another person to commit crimes, intentionally aids in the
commission of crimes, or intentionally advises, encourages, hires,
counsels, or procures another to commit crimes. Generally, the
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish a fact, but in
felony cases where the only witnesses are accomplices, the
accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated by other evidence. See
OCGA § 24-14-8; State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 240 (824 SE2d 317)
(2019). “[I]t is well settled that an accomplice’s testimony may be
corroborated by the testimony of another accomplice.” Jordan v.
State, 307 Ga. 450, 455 (3) (836 SE2d 86) (2019).
Prescott testified that she, Young, and Bell devised a plan to
rob Jackson. On the evening of the crimes, she and Young dropped
off Bell at Jackson’s house, picked up Bedford and Brooks, and drove
them to Jackson’s house, where she, Bedford, and Brooks entered to
search for money. After they went into Jackson’s bedroom to ask
7
Jackson where he kept his money, Prescott saw Bedford hit Jackson
with the gun and shoot him. Likewise, Bell testified that she and
Prescott planned to rob Jackson with Young’s help and that at
Jackson’s house, she witnessed Bedford pulling out a gun, Brooks
telling Bedford to hit Jackson with the gun and then to shoot him,
and Bedford complying with those directives. Afterwards, all five
split the stolen money. This accomplice testimony was mutually
corroborating as to the plan to rob Jackson and his beating and
shooting. It was further corroborated by the security videos from the
apartment complex and gas station and the neighbor’s testimony
about hearing loud booms coming from Jackson’s house around the
time of the shooting and seeing Young’s car leave the scene. Thus,
the evidence was more than sufficient as a matter of constitutional
due process and as a matter of Georgia statutory law to convict both
Bedford and Brooks of the crimes for which they were charged, as
well as to deny Bedford’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
See Jordan, 307 Ga. at 455 (3) (testimony of accomplice girlfriends
corroborated by each other and jailhouse admission).
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2. Both appellants contend that they were denied a fair trial
when, during the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor told the
jury that they “had other people here who knew them quite well . . .
who left after they heard [Young]’s statement to make sure.
Remember how I said they were dangerous.” Neither defense
counsel objected at the time, but after the prosecutor finished his
closing argument and the jury left the courtroom, Bedford moved for
a mistrial based on these remarks. Brooks joined in the motion on
the grounds that the prosecutor was referring to unidentified
courtroom spectators, no evidence was presented that they were
observing the trial in order to intimidate Young, and the comment
was made to unduly inflame the jury. In denying the motion for
mistrial, the trial court found that these remarks were not harmful
enough to merit a mistrial.
Although we do not condone the prosecutor’s statements, which
were not based on the evidence presented at trial, it is not necessary
to resolve whether the trial court properly denied the motion for a
mistrial. Because Bedford and Brooks moved for a mistrial after, not
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contemporaneously with, the State’s improper closing argument, the
motion was untimely and the issue was not preserved for appellate
review. See Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 337 (3) (751 SE2d 399)
(2013) (“[The defendant’s] motion for mistrial, made after the
prosecutor’s closing argument ended, [was] not timely, and he
therefore failed to preserve this issue for appeal.”); Andrews v. State,
293 Ga. 701, 704 (4) (749 SE2d 734) (2013) (argument waived on
appeal where defendant did not make contemporaneous objection to
State’s closing argument mentioning defendant’s “dangerousness”);
see also Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 328-29 (4) (781 SE2d 772) (2020)
(explaining that under current Georgia law, plain error review is not
available for improper remarks made during closing argument).
3. Separately, Bedford contends that the trial court erred by
improperly considering his prior juvenile record in determining
whether his pretrial statement in this case, made when he was 16
years old, could be admitted at trial under Riley v. State, 237 Ga.
124, 128 (226 SE2d 922) (1976). However, any error in inquiring
about the juvenile record was harmless because the trial court
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ultimately relied upon and applied the correct factors in admitting
the statement.
About five weeks after the shooting, Bedford’s aunt, a
probation officer, dropped Bedford off at a police station, where he
was interviewed by two GBI agents. The agent went through a
Miranda 3 waiver form with Bedford, asked him about the night of
Jackson’s murder, and informed him of the warrant issued for his
arrest for the murder. The agent testified that Bedford was not in
distress or injured during the interview, which was less than an
hour long, and that he appeared to understand the questions asked.
Bedford did not ask for anyone to be present during the interview
until, at its conclusion, he invoked his right to an attorney.
Bedford filed a motion to suppress his statements from this
interview on the grounds that the statements were not knowingly
and voluntarily made. At the hearing on the motion, Bedford’s
counsel advised the trial court of the nine-factor test under Riley for
evaluating whether a juvenile defendant knowingly and voluntarily
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16LE2d 694) (1966).
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waived his constitutional rights when speaking with law
enforcement officers, and he asserted that given Bedford’s age, the
length of the interview, and that no parent or other adult was
present at the interview, the court should suppress the statement.
In a colloquy with the State, the trial court asked about Bedford’s
experience with the criminal justice system and whether he had any
prior convictions, and the prosecutor responded that Bedford had no
prior convictions and that he might have a juvenile record, “but,
obviously, that’s not pertinent to this particular” case. After the
court noted that being in and out of juvenile court would be pertinent
to Bedford’s level of maturity in dealing with the criminal justice
system, Bedford’s counsel said that Bedford “may never have seen
the inside of a courtroom in juvenile court,” and that the court could
not know based on the testimony presented at the hearing. The trial
court agreed with this statement and then orally denied Bedford’s
motion to suppress, expressly relying on the Riley factors and
without referencing Bedford’s juvenile record.
In evaluating whether a juvenile defendant knowingly and
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voluntarily waived his rights during an interrogation, the State
bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the juvenile understood and waived his rights under “the totality of
the circumstances,” and the court must consider nine factors in
making that determination:
(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3)
knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the
charge and the nature of his rights to consult with an
attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is
held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives,
friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was
interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed;
(6) methods used in interrogation; (7) length of
interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to
voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9)
whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial
statement at a later date.
Lester v. State, 310 Ga. 81, 85 (2) (849 SE2d 425) (2020) (citing Riley,
237 Ga. at 128). Although we independently apply the law to the
facts, the trial court’s determinations and factual findings must be
upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 86 (2).
Even if the trial court improperly probed into Bedford’s
juvenile history, this inquiry was harmless because the trial court
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grounded its denial of Bedford’s motion to suppress on the Riley
factors, without relying on the possibility that Bedford had
experience with juvenile detention, including that despite Bedford’s
youth and low level of education, he was informed of the charges
against him and his Miranda rights, was not held incommunicado
or for a very long time, was not prohibited from consulting with
relatives or an attorney, and was not abused or oppressed during the
questioning. Because these findings were not clearly erroneous and
the trial court properly relied upon the Riley factors, we see no error
in the trial court’s denial of Bedford’s motion to suppress.
4. Separately, Brooks asserts that he was denied a fair trial
when a GBI agent improperly bolstered Young’s credibility by
commenting twice on the truth of Young’s prior statements. But
because Brooks did not object to the detective’s testimony at trial,4
this issue was not preserved for ordinary appellate review and
4 Brooks briefly argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to or moving to strike the GBI agent’s testimony. However, as
discussed in Division 5 (c) below, he did not raise trial counsel’s ineffective
assistance at the earliest practicable moment and has thus waived this claim
on appeal. See Martin v. State, 306 Ga. 538, 546 (6) (832 SE2d 402) (2019).
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therefore can only be reviewed for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103
(d). To establish plain error, Brooks must “identify an error that was
not affirmatively waived, was clear and not open to reasonable
dispute, likely affected the outcome of the proceeding, and seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Thompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 151 (6) (816 SE2d
646) (2018).
Young changed his story multiple times throughout the
investigation and trial, alternatively naming as the shooters
unidentified people, as well as Bedford and Brooks, and also taking
the blame himself. At trial, when defense counsel cross-examined
the GBI agent who interviewed Young, counsel suggested that
Young only told the story implicating Bedford and Brooks and
minimized his own involvement because he hoped to obtain a
favorable plea deal. In response, the GBI agent said:
Um, . . . he was telling more of the truth at that time based
off of the corroboration of the . . . other witnesses. . . . [W]e
never went back and told the young ladies exactly what
he said. We had them to regurgitate what they knew at
that time. And the last interview that we had with him on
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May 24th his story was very consistent with the girls’. We
didn’t tell him what the girls said . . . . [T]hey flowed and
it was corroborated with like, say, for instance, money
being needed to go get the gas, having to have cash, things
of that nature just was consistent with the interview. It
was -- the truth stays very similar.
(emphasis supplied). On appeal, Brooks argues that the GBI agent’s
two references to “the truth” of Young’s prior statements constituted
improper bolstering.
Starting with the second reference to “the truth,” the State
contends, and we agree, that, in context, the testimony did not speak
directly to Young’s truthfulness. Rather, it addressed whether
Young’s statements were consistent with other evidence and
established that from an investigative standpoint, statements
consistent with other evidence are generally considered more
accurate. Thus, that reference did not constitute improper
bolstering, and there was no plain error in admitting that testimony.
See Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 460-61 (2) (b) (807 SE2d 369) (2017)
(statement that “in interviewing suspects, oftentimes ‘it’ll take
several hours to get to the actual ultimate truth’” was not bolstering
16
but an explanation that “in general, when interviewing suspects,
they often make inconsistent statements and it often takes
considerable time to get them to provide the complete story”)
(punctuation omitted); Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 40, 44 (3) (785 SE2d
886) (2016) (no plain error in admitting testimony from investigator
about evidence that she obtained and how it lined up with
information provided by the witness).
In contrast, the State does not contest that the first reference
to “the truth” improperly bolstered the credibility of Young’s prior
statements. However, even assuming that the trial court clearly
erred by permitting the testimony, Brooks must also meet the other
prongs of the plain error test to obtain relief, and that he cannot do.
Young’s pretrial statements that Bedford and Brooks were
responsible for shooting Jackson were cumulative of strong,
independent evidence of their guilt from Prescott and Bell’s
testimony. Under these circumstances, because it was unlikely that
the GBI agent’s comment on the truthfulness of Young’s prior
statements affected the outcome of the trial, we conclude that the
17
trial court did not commit plain error in admitting this testimony.
See McGarity v. State, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 86, at *7 (3) (Case No.
S20A1528, decided Mar. 15, 2021) (admission of bolstering
testimony was harmless because “there was ample evidence
independent of [the] testimony to support the jury’s verdicts on all
the counts involving [the victim’s] murder”); Davis v. State, 307 Ga.
746, 751 (2) (b) (838 SE2d 263) (2020) (admission of bolstered
testimony was harmless where State presented strong independent
evidence of guilt); cf. Mosley v. State, 298 Ga. 849, 852-53 (2) (b) (785
SE2d 297) (2016) (no plain error because the challenged hearsay
testimony was cumulative of properly admitted evidence).
5. Finally, Brooks asserts that the trial court erred in not
permitting him to add claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to
his motion for new trial. Brooks’s trial counsel filed a bare-bones
motion for new trial, which was amended by motion-for-new-trial
counsel. At the hearing on the amended motion, Brooks’s trial
counsel was called to testify, but when the court asked Brooks’s new
counsel whether there were any claims of trial counsel’s ineffective
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assistance, Brooks’s motion-for-new-trial counsel said that there
were not. The trial court denied Brooks’s motion for new trial as
amended on February 4, 2020.
On February 17, motion-for-new-trial counsel emailed the trial
court and requested that the court reconsider its denial of Brooks’s
motion for new trial “and/or” permit her to file, and then
immediately deny, a supplement to the motion for new trial raising
ineffective assistance of trial counsel as an additional ground.
Counsel acknowledged that she had declined to raise the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel at the motion-for-new-trial hearing, but
in her email, she stated, “I myself was ineffective for failing to raise
this issue and would argue it against myself if the law permitted me
to do so.” On February 20, she filed a motion seeking leave to
supplement the motion for new trial to add the ground of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, attaching a supplement explaining why
trial counsel was allegedly ineffective.
On March 3, the trial judge responded to motion-for-new-trial
counsel by email and told her that she needed to file a motion for
19
reconsideration because he did not think he could, “after entering an
order, simply allow an amendment or supplement.” The next day,
motion-for-new-trial counsel filed a notice of appeal but did not move
for reconsideration or otherwise respond to the court’s email. On
March 17, the judge emailed again, acknowledging receipt of the
motion for leave but warning counsel that she needed to file a motion
to vacate or reconsider before the end of the term of court. A month
later, Brooks was appointed new appellate counsel.
(a) First, Brooks argues that the trial court erred by not
ordering an evidentiary hearing in response to Brooks’s motion
seeking leave to supplement his motion for new trial because, until
a notice of appeal was filed, the trial court still had jurisdiction to
allow amendments to the motion for new trial, despite its prior
denial of the motion. Although Brooks is correct that the trial court
retained jurisdiction over the case at that time, see Hood v. State,
295 Ga. 664, 664 (763 SE2d 487) (2014), the trial’s court continuing
jurisdiction does not answer whether Brooks was entitled to
supplement his motion for new trial at that time. We conclude that
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he was not. Under OCGA § 5-5-40 (b), motions for new trial may only
be amended as of right before the trial court rules on the motion. See
Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 397-98 (4) (850 SE2d 41) (2020)
(defendant’s purported second amended motion for new trial was
untimely because it was filed after the trial court denied his motion
for new trial). A motion for new trial may not be amended as of right
after the trial court has ruled on it. Haggard v. State, 273 Ga. App.
295, 296 (614 SE2d 903) (2005). Here, because Brooks attempted to
amend the motion for new trial after the trial court issued an order
denying it, the trial court acted well within its discretion in declining
to vacate the denial order sua sponte and accept the proposed
supplemental motion unless a motion to vacate or motion to
reconsider the denial was first filed and granted.
(b) Brooks further asserts that his motion for leave was in
substance a motion to reconsider or vacate because it “put the court
on notice as to the problem, the remedy sought, and the court’s
obligation to afford appellant a hearing and due process as a result
thereof,” and therefore the trial court erred in not ruling on it. As an
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initial matter, even if the motion for leave could be considered a
motion for reconsideration, the trial court was not permitted to rule
on the motion under these circumstances where Brooks elected to
file a notice of appeal, which divested the trial court of jurisdiction.
See Hood, 295 Ga. at 664. And although Brooks is correct that the
substance and function of a motion controls rather than its
nomenclature, see State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338, 340 (1) (830 SE2d
206) (2019), the motion for leave did not ask the court to vacate or
reconsider the denial of the motion for new trial, so the trial court
reasonably read it to be a motion for leave, rather than a motion for
reconsideration, and advised motion-for-new-trial counsel to file the
proper motion. Because we are not persuaded that the motion to
leave functioned as a motion to vacate or for reconsideration, we
discern no error in the trial court’s failure to permit Brooks to
supplement his claims.
(c) Next, Brooks argues that he did not waive his claims that
his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because his failure
to raise his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was due to the ineffective
22
assistance of his motion-for-new-trial counsel. We are unconvinced.
“Claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness must be raised at the earliest
practicable opportunity.” Terrell v. State, 300 Ga. 81, 86-87 (3) (793
SE2d 411) (2016) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, Brooks
not only had the opportunity to raise claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel in his motion for new trial and even called trial
counsel to testify at the hearing, but his motion-for-new-trial
counsel expressly declined to assert such claims when asked by the
trial court. Thus, Brooks’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel are procedurally barred for failure to assert them at the first
practicable opportunity.
Although Brooks argues that his motion-for-new-trial
counsel’s ineffective assistance precluded him from asserting the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a claim alleging the ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel must not be “merely a
camouflaged claim of ineffectiveness by trial counsel.” Elkins v.
State, 306 Ga. 351, 362 (4) (c) (830 SE2d 217) (2019). Although
Brooks has raised his motion-for-new-trial counsel’s ineffective
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assistance at the earliest opportunity, his claims are entirely
dependent on claims against his trial counsel, and
we do not allow a defendant to resuscitate a specific claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that was not
raised at the motion-for-new-trial stage by recasting the
claim on appeal as one of ineffective assistance of motion-
for-new-trial counsel for failing to raise the specific claim
of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Indulging such
bootstrapping would eviscerate the fundamental rule that
ineffectiveness claims must be raised at the earliest
practicable moment and would promote serial appellate
proceedings. If Appellant wishes to pursue a claim that
his motion-for-new-trial counsel was ineffective in this
regard, he must do so through a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
Id. at 362 (4) (b) (cleaned up).
Therefore, we discern no error by the trial court in not
permitting Brooks to amend his motion for new trial to add claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel after denying the motion for new
trial, even though Brooks asserts that motion-for-new-trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise those claims in a timely fashion. 5
5 For similar reasons, we deny Brooks’s motion to remand for an
evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Terrell,
300 Ga. at 87 (3) (“Only where no opportunity existed for the defendant to raise
an ineffectiveness claim prior to appeal have cases been remanded for a
24
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm both Bedford’s and Brooks’s
convictions.
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.
hearing.”); Wilson v. State, 286 Ga. 141, 144 (4) (686 SE2d 104) (2009) (only
where claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not procedurally barred is
remand justified).
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