State v. Walden ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 3, 2021
S21A0210. THE STATE v. WALDEN.
PETERSON, Justice.
Carly Walden is charged with malice murder and other crimes
for the April 28, 2019, shooting death of her mother, Andrea Walker,
at Walker’s home. On that date, Walden called police and reported
a shooting; she claimed an unidentified man was responsible.
Walden was transported to the county sheriff’s office, where she
made statements to an investigator before being provided warnings
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d
694) (1966). On Walden’s motion, the trial court suppressed those
statements, while declining to suppress others that she had made
earlier in the day. The State has appealed the trial court’s ruling in
advance of trial. When — as here — a trial court makes no explicit
findings in ruling on a motion that does not require such findings to
be made, we presume that the trial court implicitly made all the
findings in support of its ruling that the record would allow. But the
record in this case does not allow the findings that would be
necessary to conclude that Walden was in custody when she made
the statements at issue, and so we reverse the trial court’s
suppression of Walden’s statements.
“Miranda warnings must be administered to an accused who is
in custody and subject to interrogation or its functional equivalent.”
State v. Troutman, 300 Ga. 616, 617 (1) (797 SE2d 72) (2017). This
requirement arises “when a person is (1) formally arrested or (2)
restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id.Whether the circumstances in a particular case amount to custody
is assessed objectively. “Thus, the proper inquiry is how a reasonable
person in [Walden]’s shoes would have perceived [her] situation.” Id.“In determining whether a suspect is in custody, we must consider
the totality of the circumstances without regard for the subjective
views of the suspect or the interrogating officer.” Licata v. State, 305
Ga. 498, 501 (1) (826 SE2d 94) (2019). Although there is no one
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dispositive factor, important considerations include “the location of
the questioning, its duration, statements made during the
interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the
questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the
questioning.” Id. (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (132
SCt 1181, 182 LE2d 17) (2012)).
Whether a defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda
is a mixed question of fact and law. See Troutman, 300 Ga. at 617.
We apply de novo the relevant legal principles to the facts, and we
accept the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility of
witnesses unless clearly erroneous, and construe the evidence most
favorably to uphold the findings and judgment of the trial court. See
Davis v. State, 307 Ga. 625, 627 (2) n.4 (837 SE2d 817) (2020);
Troutman, 300 Ga. at 617. Where, as here, the trial court was not
required to make explicit factual findings or credibility
determinations on the record, and in fact did not do so, we assume
that the trial court implicitly resolved all disputes of fact and
credibility in favor of its ruling, and we generally accept such
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implicit factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See Cain v. State,
306 Ga. 434, 438 (2) (831 SE2d 788) (2019) (assuming that trial court
credited testimony of officers over defendant where trial court ruled
that defendant’s statement was voluntary without making explicit
factual findings). But “when, as here, the controlling facts are not in
dispute, because they are discernable from a video, our review is de
novo.” Licata, 305 Ga. at 500 (1) n.2.
Here, the interactions between Walden and law enforcement
officers were documented by a series of video recordings, which
showed the following. Deputy Davon Sydnor arrived at the victim’s
home at about 7:26 a.m. on the morning of the shooting, following
other officers, in response to a 7:10 a.m. 911 call. A few minutes after
Deputy Sydnor’s arrival, Walden followed him toward his vehicle,
carrying a cell phone. She sat in the back seat of the vehicle as she
talked to Deputy Sydnor, while he stood by the open door of the car.
Highly agitated, she claimed that some men she had brought home
from a party that night had tried to rape her and her mother. Deputy
Sydnor asked her a number of questions about the men, their
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descriptions, their vehicle, and which way they may have escaped,
although his interest on that point faded somewhat when she
mentioned that female companions of the men had danced on top of
the ceiling fan.
Shortly thereafter, Deputy Sydnor received instructions over
his radio to “detain” Walden, stop talking to her, and bring her in to
the sheriff’s office. It does not appear from the video recording that
Walden noticed the instruction that she be “detained,” however,
because she was talking in a focused and intense manner when that
message came across the radio and continued her intense talking
even after the message had been transmitted. In contrast, a short
time later another radio message came through that mentioned
taking Walden to an interview room at the sheriff’s office so she
could compose herself (but made no mention of detaining her).
During this message, Walden leaned forward to listen. Deputy
Sydnor eventually motioned for Walden to stop talking, visually
checked her for weapons, and asked her to fasten her seat belt. He
also told her that she was “not in any type of trouble” “right now.”
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Deputy Sydnor advised Walden, “We’re going to take a ride to the
sheriff’s office, OK?” Walden nodded and said, “OK.” Deputy Sydnor
got into the driver’s seat before stating, again, “You and I are going
to take a ride to the sheriff’s office, OK?” Walden responded, “Yes.”
They headed to the sheriff’s office at around 7:40 a.m.; the drive took
less than 12 minutes. Walden was not handcuffed as they proceeded
to the sheriff’s office, and she retained the cell phone that she had
been carrying. Deputy Sydnor asked her no questions about what
happened as he drove, although he told her to put her seat belt back
on when she removed it and to stop moving around.
Upon arrival at the sheriff’s office, Deputy Sydnor helped
Walden look for the cell phone, which had briefly gone missing, at
times turning his back to her as she stood in the parking lot. At one
point, he told her not to touch him and to stop moving around.
Walden remained unhandcuffed as she and Deputy Sydnor moved
around the sheriff’s complex, seeking access to an interview room.
She retained the cell phone for some time as they sat in an interview
room waiting for an investigator, although Deputy Sydnor told her
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to slide the phone across the table after she insisted that it was not
hers. As they waited, with the door open, Deputy Sydnor did not
question Walden about the circumstances surrounding her mother’s
death. When Walden volunteered information or asked questions,
Deputy Sydnor largely did not respond or told her to wait for
investigators. Walden did not physically attempt to leave the room
while waiting for the investigator, she cannot be heard on the video
recordings asking if she could leave, and Deputy Sydnor cannot be
heard telling her that she could not leave.
After Walden and Deputy Sydnor waited for about 40 minutes
in the interview room, Investigator Clinton French entered the
room. Investigator French asked Walden whether the phone on the
table was hers, and stepped out to secure it when she claimed that
it did not belong to her. Investigator French returned and asked
Deputy Sydnor to step out before beginning the interview at around
8:45 a.m. At no time prior to beginning the interview can
Investigator French be heard on the video recording of their
interaction telling Walden that she could not leave. Investigator
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French asked some preliminary questions, but did not provide
Miranda warnings, before asking Walden to tell him what
happened. She then spoke for less than six minutes, during which
time she said that she had accidentally shot her mother.
Investigator French stopped the interview and stepped out of the
room. Walden never asked or attempted to leave the interview room
during the time she was speaking with Investigator French.
Deputy Sydnor returned to the interview room a few minutes
later to sit with Walden; he did not ask her questions about the
shooting and left the door open. During this time, Walden attempted
to get up from her chair at several points, and Deputy Sydnor told
her not to get up. Left alone for a while, she opened the door and
attempted to walk out; Deputy Sydnor asked her what she was doing
and she said she was “getting away from you.” Deputy Sydnor
directed her back in the room and told her to sit down and stay in
the room.
Investigator French returned to the interview room more than
three hours later. After some preliminary questions apparently
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designed to evaluate Walden’s lucidity, Investigator French read
Miranda warnings to her before attempting to interview her a
second time. Walden promptly asked for an attorney, and
Investigator French ended the interview. About two hours later, at
around 3:00 p.m., Walden was placed in handcuffs and escorted out
of the interview room.
After being indicted, Walden filed a motion to suppress the
statements that she made to officers on the date of her arrest. At the
hearing on her motion, Walden’s counsel narrowed the suppression
motion to the statements Walden gave in the interview room (all of
which preceded the Miranda warnings), and agreed that the only
issue was whether she was in custody during that interview. Walden
withdrew all of the other issues raised by the motion to suppress her
statements, including the voluntariness of her statements. Walden
testified at the hearing that she had not wanted to sit in the
backseat of Deputy Sydnor’s vehicle or walk to the interview room
with him, but she believed that she was in custody and had no
choice. She claimed that she asked to leave when she got to the
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interview room, and tried to leave prior to her interview with
Investigator French, but was told repeatedly that she could not go:
Q BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When you got to the
CID room prior to your interview with Investigator
French did you ask to leave, did you try to leave?
A Yes, I tried to leave and I was told repeatedly by
Deputy Sydnor that I could not leave, that I could not go
and so.
But she contradicted that testimony on cross-examination:
Q BY [THE PROSECUTOR]: You didn’t ask to leave
during the time that you were waiting for Investigator
French to arrive the first time, did you?
A No, I did not because I was trying to help with the
investigation that was going on at my home. So I was
there trying to help them, the officers with anything that
was going on at the home.
Q You wanted to help, you wanted to tell them what
you knew?
A Yes.
The trial court made no oral findings at the hearing and asked
the parties to submit letter briefs. The trial court later entered an
order granting Walden’s motion to the extent it sought suppression
of any statements she made in the interview room. The trial court’s
order did not contain any findings or explanation for this ruling. The
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State appeals this ruling.
The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred by
suppressing the statements that Walden made in the interview
room. The State contends that Walden was not in custody at the
time she gave the statement to Investigator French in which she
admitted shooting her mother (claiming that it was accidental), and
that Miranda warnings were not required. We agree with the State
that the record does not support a conclusion that Warden was in
custody at the time in question.
Walden emphasizes that she was never told that she was free
to leave, a factor that may support a determination that a defendant
was in custody for purposes of Miranda. See, e.g., Troutman, 300
Ga. at 617-618 (1) (where record supported trial court’s findings that
defendant was kept at the police station in a non-public area for
nearly nine hours, was interviewed three times, was never advised
that he was free to leave, and was explicitly told he was not allowed
to leave, this Court could not say that trial court erred in
determining that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would
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have believed that he was in custody); State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105,
108 (1) (686 SE2d 239) (2009) (trial court did not err in concluding
that a reasonable person would believe he was in custody where the
record supported the trial court’s findings that defendant was never
told he was free to leave, was kept either under surveillance or in a
closed interrogation room for six hours, was explicitly told that the
evidence pointed at him, and was essentially required to come to the
police station by officers who waited at his home and ensured that
he arrived at the police station by following him), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Abbott, 303 Ga. 297, 303-304 (3) (812 SE2d 225)
(2018). But this factor alone is not dispositive. See, e.g., Teasley v.
State, 293 Ga. 758, 762-763 (3) (a) (749 SE2d 710) (2013) (trial court
did not err in concluding that appellant was not in custody where
detective testified that appellant was never told that he could not
leave and never asked to leave; no mention of whether appellant was
affirmatively told that he was free to leave); Henley v. State, 277 Ga.
818, 820 (2) (596 SE2d 578) (2004) (concluding that the trial court
did not err in admitting appellant’s pre-Miranda statement where
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appellant voluntarily agreed to ride with the officers to the police
station to answer questions, while noting that whether appellant
was a suspect is not dispositive, without discussing whether
appellant was told that he was free to leave), overruled on other
grounds by Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 178 (1) (657 SE2d 863)
(2008). Moreover, a video recording of Walden’s encounter with
Deputy Sydnor shows that, as he prepared to transport her to the
sheriff’s office, Deputy Sydnor told Walden that she was “not in any
type of trouble.” Such a statement may indicate to a defendant that
he or she is not in custody for purposes of Miranda. See McAllister
v. State, 270 Ga. 224, 226-228 (1) (507 SE2d 448) (1998) (trial court
authorized to find that defendant was not in custody where
investigator assured defendant “that he was not under arrest or
being detained” and that he was free to leave at any time).
Walden also emphasizes that the trial court made its ruling
after hearing live testimony and having the opportunity to evaluate
the credibility of the relevant witnesses. But she also acknowledges
that, as noted above, a law enforcement officer’s subjective views
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about whether a person being interrogated is in custody are
irrelevant to a trial court’s evaluation of whether the person is
actually in custody for purposes of Miranda. And the actual mindset
of the person being questioned is irrelevant to whether that person
is in custody, as well. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261,
271 (131 SCt 2394, 180 LE2d 310) (2011). Thus, we are concerned
with not what was in the mind of Walden or the law enforcement
officers whom she encountered, but with what they said and did, all
of which was captured on video. Walden did testify that she tried to
leave the interview room and was told that she could not. But the
video evidence contradicts her testimony, clearly showing that
Walden never physically attempted to walk out of the interview
room before she gave the statements in question to Investigator
French. At no time prior to the statements at issue can Deputy
Sydnor or Investigator French be heard on the recordings telling
Walden that she was not free to leave. It generally is difficult to hear
some of Walden’s words on the recordings, and Deputy Sydnor
occasionally ignored some of what Walden said or responded by
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telling her that she needed to wait for an investigator. But we have
found no point on the recordings of Walden’s time with Deputy
Sydnor or Investigator French before she gave the statements in
question in which she spoke words that reasonably could be
interpreted as a request to leave, and she identifies no such point.
To the extent that the trial court’s ruling was based on an implicit
finding that Walden was told that she could not leave the interview
room prior to making the statements at issue, that finding was
clearly erroneous.
Walden’s entire encounter with law enforcement, up to and
including her interaction with Investigator French, is documented
on video recordings that include audio, allowing this Court to review
that evidence de novo. That evidence is insufficient to support the
trial court’s ruling. Walden agreed to ride to the police station to
answer questions, a factor that weighs in favor of finding that she
was not in custody. See Henley, 277 Ga. at 820 (2). Walden was not
handcuffed or otherwise restrained, and she waited less than an
hour to speak to the investigator. Walden claims that Deputy Sydnor
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impeded her exit because he was in uniform, armed, and seated next
to the door, and the exit was not obviously accessible. But the door
to the interview room clearly remained open while they waited, and
Deputy Sydnor did not sit in front of the doorway. And although
Walden emphasizes that she was interviewed in an interrogation
room, by an investigator, without any family members present,
these factors by themselves would not support a finding that she was
in custody. See, e.g., Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 280-282 (1) (A)
(1) (695 SE2d 604) (2010) (defendant who was handcuffed and taken
to sheriff’s office in patrol car, whereupon handcuffs were removed
and he was told he was not under arrest and questioned in an
unlocked interview room for two hours, was not in custody),
disapproved on other grounds by Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 328
(2) (c) (830 SE2d 195) (2019).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that
the evidence did not authorize the trial court’s implicit
determination that a reasonable person in Walden’s situation would
believe that she was in custody when she was subjected to
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questioning by Investigator French prior to being given Miranda
warnings. We thus conclude that the trial court erred in concluding
that Walden’s pre-Miranda statements to Investigator French were
due to be suppressed. We affirm the order to the extent that the trial
court declined to suppress any other statements that she made.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the
Justices concur.
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