Thomas v. State ( 2021 )


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  • In the Supreme Court of Georgia
    Decided: May 17, 2021
    S21A0438. THOMAS v. THE STATE.
    PETERSON, Justice.
    Drexton Thomas appeals his convictions for malice murder and
    other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Jeffrey
    Douglas, Sr., and the aggravated assault of Jeffrey Douglas, Jr.
    (hereinafter, “Junior”). 1 He argues that: (1) the evidence was
    1  The crimes occurred on June 28, 2013. In September 2013, a Fulton
    County grand jury indicted Thomas for malice murder (Count 1), three counts
    of felony murder (Counts 2-4), two counts of armed robbery (one against
    Douglas (Count 5) and one against Junior (Count 10)), aggravated assault with
    a deadly weapon against Douglas (Count 6), one count of possession of a
    firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7), two counts of aggravated assault
    against Junior (Counts 8 (pointing a gun at Junior) and 9 (hitting Junior with
    the gun)), and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of
    a felony (Count 11 for felonies committed against Douglas and Count 12 for
    felonies against Douglas’s son). After an October 2015 trial, a jury found
    Thomas guilty on Counts 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12, and not guilty on Counts 2,
    5, and 10. Counts 4 and 7 were initially bifurcated but dismissed following the
    trial. In an order entered on November 6, 2015, the trial court sentenced
    Thomas to serve life in prison on Count 1, two concurrent twenty-year terms
    on Counts 8 and 9, and two five-year suspended terms for Counts 11 and 12 to
    run concurrently with each other but consecutively with the remaining counts.
    insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of federal due
    process, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
    motion for a new trial as the “thirteenth juror,” (3) the trial court
    abused its discretion in denying Thomas’s motion for a mistrial
    based on a courtroom outburst, (4) his inculpatory custodial
    statement was obtained in violation of his Miranda 2 rights, (5) his
    trial counsel was ineffective, and (6) he is entitled to a new trial on
    the basis of cumulative prejudice. The evidence was sufficient to
    support Thomas’s convictions and thus his due process and
    thirteenth-juror claims fail, the trial court properly handled the
    courtroom outburst, Thomas was given Miranda warnings before
    beginning his interview and the State was not obligated to give them
    again after a two-hour break, Thomas has shown no prejudice from
    any alleged ineffectiveness, and there are not multiple errors from
    Count 3 was vacated by operation of law. The trial court initially entered a
    sentence on Count 6, but later issued a corrected sentence merging Count 6
    with Count 1. Thomas filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later
    amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Thomas’s motion on
    January 30, 2019. Thomas timely appealed; his case was docketed to this
    Court’s term beginning in December 2020 and submitted for a decision on the
    briefs.
    2 Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
    2
    which to accumulate prejudice. We affirm.
    The trial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
    verdicts showed the following. Thomas and Douglas had known each
    other for years before June 2013. On June 27, 2013, the day before
    the shooting, Thomas and Douglas had an argument because
    Douglas believed that Thomas had been sending Douglas’s drug
    customers to other dealers. The next day, Douglas, his girlfriend
    Geraldine Thompson, and others were at Douglas’s house.
    Thompson’s daughter and Junior were outside when Thomas
    suddenly came walking up the driveway, pointed the gun at Junior,
    pistol-whipped him, took his money, and at one point fired a shot.
    Thomas instructed Junior to “go get your daddy” because “that’s who
    I want anyway.” Thomas backed away from Junior after a woman
    called out to Thomas, pleading for Thomas not to kill Junior.
    Douglas came to the door and ushered Thompson’s daughter
    and Junior inside the house. Douglas tried to shut the door on
    Thomas, who was approaching, but Thomas stopped the door from
    closing with his foot. Thomas shot Douglas as Douglas was
    3
    attempting to run into the kitchen. Douglas fell to the ground, and
    Thomas rolled him over and took money out of Douglas’s pockets.
    Thomas left the scene while threatening those present that he would
    be back if anyone reported what he did.
    By the time the paramedics arrived, Douglas was dead.
    Douglas had been shot in the back and was not seen with any
    weapons prior to the shooting. Thompson had been inside the house
    during the incident, heard the commotion outside, witnessed
    Thomas shoot Douglas, and told the police that Thomas was the
    shooter.
    Thomas was later arrested and, after being informed of his
    Miranda rights, confessed to two detectives that he shot Douglas.
    Although Thomas initially said to one detective that he shot Douglas
    because Douglas and Junior pulled a pistol on him and threatened
    him, he told another detective that he did not see Douglas with a
    weapon but assumed Douglas had one because Douglas and Junior
    4
    had pulled a weapon on him earlier that day. 3 Thomas told the
    second detective that he shot Douglas because he was “pissed” and
    wanted payback for having a gun pulled on him. Video recordings of
    the interviews were played for the jury. Thomas told the detectives
    that he threw the gun used to shoot Douglas in a sewer drain, but
    the police could not find it there.
    1. Thomas argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
    his conviction. His claim fails.
    When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, we must
    determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
    Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In
    making that determination, “we view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the verdict, and we put aside any questions about
    conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the
    evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of
    3A defense witness testified that there was a separate argument on the
    morning of the shooting and claimed that Douglas had pulled a gun on him and
    Thomas that morning.
    5
    the [jury].” Wilkerson v. State, 
    307 Ga. 574
    , 574 (837 SE2d 300)
    (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “As long as there is some
    competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support each fact
    necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be
    upheld.” Scott v. State, 
    309 Ga. 764
    , 766 (1) (848 SE2d 448) (2020)
    (citation and punctuation omitted).
    Here, Junior testified that Thomas pointed a gun at him. See
    Rich v. State, 
    307 Ga. 757
    , 759 (1) (a) (838 SE2d 255) (2020) (“[T]he
    testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a
    fact[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Thomas admitted
    hitting Junior with the weapon. Multiple eyewitnesses said that
    Thomas shot Douglas. And Thomas admitted that he shot Douglas
    in anger. Douglas was shot in the back and had no weapons on him.
    After assessing the credibility of the eyewitnesses and reviewing a
    video recording of Thomas’s interviews, the jury was authorized to
    reject any claims that Thomas shot Douglas in self-defense or with
    an irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation, and to
    find beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas was guilty of the crimes
    6
    of which he was convicted. See Corley v. State, 
    308 Ga. 321
    , 322 (1)
    (a) (840 SE2d 391) (2020) (“[Q]uestions about the existence of
    justification are for a jury to decide[.]”); Anderson v. State, 
    248 Ga. 682
    , 683 (3) (285 SE2d 533) (1982) (“Whether or not a provocation,
    if any, is such a serious provocation as would be sufficient to excite
    a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person,
    reducing the offense from murder to manslaughter, is generally a
    question for the jury.”).
    2. Thomas next argues that the trial court failed to fulfill its
    role as the “thirteenth juror” by failing to grant his motion for a new
    trial. To the extent Thomas argues that the trial court failed to
    exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror,” the record shows
    otherwise. In denying Thomas’s motion for new trial, the trial court
    cited the correct legal standards, weighed the evidence, and found
    that the evidence overwhelmingly supported Thomas’s guilt. See
    Brockman v. State, 
    292 Ga. 707
    , 714-715 (4) (b) (739 SE2d 332)
    (2013) (trial court’s language that evidence was not “sufficiently
    close” to warrant new trial shows that court exercised its
    7
    discretionary authority to not grant a new trial).
    To the extent Thomas argues that the trial court exercised its
    discretion improperly, his argument presents nothing for us to
    review. Only trial courts have discretion to sit as the thirteenth
    juror. See Wilson v. State, 
    302 Ga. 106
    , 109 (II) (d) (805 SE2d 98)
    (2017). When asked to review the refusal to grant a new trial on such
    grounds, our review is limited to the Jackson v. Virginia standard,
    and we have already explained that the evidence was sufficient
    under that standard.
    3. During the trial, one of Douglas’s other sons, seated in the
    courtroom gallery, screamed at Thomas, “You killed my daddy, man.
    You killed my motherf***ing daddy, man.” Thomas argues that the
    trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on this
    courtroom outburst, because multiple members of the jury indicated
    that the outburst caused them concern. We disagree.
    A trial court generally has broad discretion in deciding whether
    to grant a mistrial, and great deference is afforded to a court’s
    determination that a mistrial was not necessary. See Blake v. State,
    8
    
    304 Ga. 747
    , 750 (2) (822 SE2d 207) (2018). The measures a trial
    court takes in response to a courtroom outburst are within the
    court’s discretion unless a fair trial is not possible without a new
    trial. See Thompson v. State, 
    304 Ga. 146
    , 154 (10) (816 SE2d 646)
    (2018); Green v. State, 
    300 Ga. 707
    , 710 (2) (797 SE2d 863) (2017).
    Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it takes
    “prompt, thorough, and curative action.” Thompson, 304 Ga. at 154
    (10) (citation and punctuation omitted). When juries are given
    curative instructions following such outbursts, they “are presumed
    to follow [them] in the absence of proof to the contrary.” Jones v.
    State, 
    305 Ga. 750
    , 755 (3) (827 SE2d 879) (2019).
    Here, in response to the outburst, the trial court removed the
    relatives of the victim from the courtroom, checked with the jurors
    as to how they felt, and received reassurance from all of them that
    the outburst would not impair their ability to be fair and impartial.
    Even the jurors who specifically said they were concerned by the
    outburst expressed a desire to continue serving.       After denying
    Thomas’s motion for a mistrial, the trial court told the jury that the
    9
    man who had made the outburst was excluded from the courthouse
    and instructed the jury to disregard the outburst. Under these
    circumstances, Thomas has failed to show that the trial court abused
    its discretion in denying a mistrial. See Thompson, 304 Ga. at 154-
    155 (10) (holding the trial court’s curative instruction sufficient
    where the court gave a lengthy curative instruction after a witness
    under cross-examination said repeatedly, “Y’all done killed
    somebody,” and “Y’all going to hell”); see also Messer v. State, 
    247 Ga. 316
    , 323-325 (6) (276 SE2d 15) (1981) (concluding that the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial
    and instead giving a curative instruction after the father of the
    victim lunged at the defendant and screamed, “You’ll pay,” “You’re
    liable,” and “You’re going to get it”).
    4. Thomas claims that the trial court erred in admitting his
    custodial statements from the second custodial interview because he
    was not re-advised of his Miranda rights and the detective who
    conducted that interview deployed “extremely coercive, combative
    and threatening conduct” in the interview. We disagree.
    10
    The record shows that Thomas had been advised of his
    Miranda rights prior to his first interview with one detective, and
    there was a break of about two hours between that interview and
    the second interview. There is no dispute that the second interview
    was merely a continuation of the first. Without more, the two-hour
    break between the two interviews did not require Thomas to be re-
    advised of his Miranda rights. See Mangrum v. State, 
    285 Ga. 676
    ,
    678-679 (3) (681 SE2d 130) (2009) (“[T]he lack of a Miranda warning
    after [a two-hour] break is of no consequence, as [appellant] was
    advised of and waived his Miranda rights before the first interview
    and the second interview was part of a continuous series of
    interviews.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Williams v. State,
    
    244 Ga. 485
    , 488 (4) (b) (260 SE2d 879) (1979) (“[T]he state was
    under no duty to repeat the Miranda warnings given the day before
    where, as here, the interviews were part of a continuing
    interrogation.”).
    Turning to the coercion argument, the video recording of the
    interview plainly contradicts Thomas’s assertions. Thomas points to
    11
    no portion of the video recording to show that the second detective
    was coercive. The detective spoke calmly and never raised his voice
    or threatened Thomas in any way during the interview. Nothing in
    the video recording suggests “excessively lengthy interrogation,
    physical deprivation, brutality, or other such hallmarks of coercive
    police activity” that could render Thomas’s statements involuntary.
    Drake v. State, 
    296 Ga. 286
    , 291 (3) (766 SE2d 447) (2014) (citation
    and punctuation omitted).
    5. Thomas also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
    not renewing the motion for mistrial based on the courtroom
    outburst and thereby not preserving the issue for appeal. We
    disagree.
    To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
    Thomas must show both that his trial counsel’s performance was
    deficient   and   that   this   deficiency   prejudiced   his   defense.
    See Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80
    LE2d 674) (1984). “To establish deficient performance, an appellant
    must overcome the strong presumption that his or her counsel’s
    12
    conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional
    conduct and show that his counsel performed in an objectively
    unreasonable way considering all circumstances and in the light of
    prevailing professional norms.” Smith v. State, 
    296 Ga. 731
    , 733 (2)
    (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To
    establish prejudice, an appellant must show that “there is a
    reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
    the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,
    
    466 U.S. at 694
    .   Thomas     must    prove   both    prongs    of
    the Strickland test, and if he fails to prove one prong, “it is not
    incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith, 296
    Ga. at 733 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a
    ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we defer to the
    trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we
    apply the law to the facts de novo.” State v. Spratlin, 
    305 Ga. 585
    ,
    591 (2) (826 SE2d 36) (2019).
    Here, the trial court considered the merits of Thomas’s motion
    for mistrial, denied the motion, told Thomas’s counsel that she could
    13
    renew the motion “if something else happens,” and then gave the
    jury a curative instruction. Thomas does not allege on appeal that
    something else happened at the trial that required trial counsel to
    again move for a mistrial based on the courtroom outburst, but
    argues that trial counsel potentially failed to preserve the issue by
    failing to renew the motion. See Hartsfield v. State, 
    294 Ga. 883
    , 886
    (2) (757 SE2d 90) (2014) (concluding that the defendant waived
    challenge to denial of motion for a mistrial where he failed to renew
    his motion following the trial court’s admonishment of prosecutor
    and curative instruction). But even assuming that trial counsel’s
    failure to renew the motion was deficient performance, Thomas fails
    to establish prejudice. Because we have concluded that the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a
    mistrial, electing instead to take adequate curative measures,
    Thomas does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
    outcome would have been different if trial counsel had renewed the
    motion for a mistrial. See Hartsfield, 294 Ga. at 887 (3) (a) (because
    trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial
    14
    where curative instruction was adequate, there was no prejudice
    from trial counsel’s failure to renew motion).
    6. Lastly, Thomas argues that he is entitled to a new trial on
    the basis of cumulative prejudice. We disagree.
    We recently recognized a new cumulative error rule in State v.
    Lane, 
    308 Ga. 10
     (838 SE2d 808) (2020), whereby courts are “to
    consider collectively the prejudicial effect of trial court errors and
    any deficient performance by counsel — at least where those errors
    by the court and counsel involve evidentiary issues.” Id. at 14 (1).
    But this cumulative prejudice analysis does not apply when, as here,
    there are not multiple errors to consider cumulatively. See Beck v.
    State, 
    310 Ga. 491
    , 499 (3) n.5 (852 SE2d 535) (2020).
    Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
    15