Thomas v. State ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 17, 2021
S21A0438. THOMAS v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Justice.
Drexton Thomas appeals his convictions for malice murder and
other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Jeffrey
Douglas, Sr., and the aggravated assault of Jeffrey Douglas, Jr.
(hereinafter, “Junior”). 1 He argues that: (1) the evidence was
1 The crimes occurred on June 28, 2013. In September 2013, a Fulton
County grand jury indicted Thomas for malice murder (Count 1), three counts
of felony murder (Counts 2-4), two counts of armed robbery (one against
Douglas (Count 5) and one against Junior (Count 10)), aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon against Douglas (Count 6), one count of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7), two counts of aggravated assault
against Junior (Counts 8 (pointing a gun at Junior) and 9 (hitting Junior with
the gun)), and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony (Count 11 for felonies committed against Douglas and Count 12 for
felonies against Douglas’s son). After an October 2015 trial, a jury found
Thomas guilty on Counts 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12, and not guilty on Counts 2,
5, and 10. Counts 4 and 7 were initially bifurcated but dismissed following the
trial. In an order entered on November 6, 2015, the trial court sentenced
Thomas to serve life in prison on Count 1, two concurrent twenty-year terms
on Counts 8 and 9, and two five-year suspended terms for Counts 11 and 12 to
run concurrently with each other but consecutively with the remaining counts.
insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of federal due
process, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for a new trial as the “thirteenth juror,” (3) the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Thomas’s motion for a mistrial
based on a courtroom outburst, (4) his inculpatory custodial
statement was obtained in violation of his Miranda 2 rights, (5) his
trial counsel was ineffective, and (6) he is entitled to a new trial on
the basis of cumulative prejudice. The evidence was sufficient to
support Thomas’s convictions and thus his due process and
thirteenth-juror claims fail, the trial court properly handled the
courtroom outburst, Thomas was given Miranda warnings before
beginning his interview and the State was not obligated to give them
again after a two-hour break, Thomas has shown no prejudice from
any alleged ineffectiveness, and there are not multiple errors from
Count 3 was vacated by operation of law. The trial court initially entered a
sentence on Count 6, but later issued a corrected sentence merging Count 6
with Count 1. Thomas filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later
amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Thomas’s motion on
January 30, 2019. Thomas timely appealed; his case was docketed to this
Court’s term beginning in December 2020 and submitted for a decision on the
briefs.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
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which to accumulate prejudice. We affirm.
The trial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdicts showed the following. Thomas and Douglas had known each
other for years before June 2013. On June 27, 2013, the day before
the shooting, Thomas and Douglas had an argument because
Douglas believed that Thomas had been sending Douglas’s drug
customers to other dealers. The next day, Douglas, his girlfriend
Geraldine Thompson, and others were at Douglas’s house.
Thompson’s daughter and Junior were outside when Thomas
suddenly came walking up the driveway, pointed the gun at Junior,
pistol-whipped him, took his money, and at one point fired a shot.
Thomas instructed Junior to “go get your daddy” because “that’s who
I want anyway.” Thomas backed away from Junior after a woman
called out to Thomas, pleading for Thomas not to kill Junior.
Douglas came to the door and ushered Thompson’s daughter
and Junior inside the house. Douglas tried to shut the door on
Thomas, who was approaching, but Thomas stopped the door from
closing with his foot. Thomas shot Douglas as Douglas was
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attempting to run into the kitchen. Douglas fell to the ground, and
Thomas rolled him over and took money out of Douglas’s pockets.
Thomas left the scene while threatening those present that he would
be back if anyone reported what he did.
By the time the paramedics arrived, Douglas was dead.
Douglas had been shot in the back and was not seen with any
weapons prior to the shooting. Thompson had been inside the house
during the incident, heard the commotion outside, witnessed
Thomas shoot Douglas, and told the police that Thomas was the
shooter.
Thomas was later arrested and, after being informed of his
Miranda rights, confessed to two detectives that he shot Douglas.
Although Thomas initially said to one detective that he shot Douglas
because Douglas and Junior pulled a pistol on him and threatened
him, he told another detective that he did not see Douglas with a
weapon but assumed Douglas had one because Douglas and Junior
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had pulled a weapon on him earlier that day. 3 Thomas told the
second detective that he shot Douglas because he was “pissed” and
wanted payback for having a gun pulled on him. Video recordings of
the interviews were played for the jury. Thomas told the detectives
that he threw the gun used to shoot Douglas in a sewer drain, but
the police could not find it there.
1. Thomas argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction. His claim fails.
When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, we must
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In
making that determination, “we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, and we put aside any questions about
conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the
evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of
3A defense witness testified that there was a separate argument on the
morning of the shooting and claimed that Douglas had pulled a gun on him and
Thomas that morning.
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the [jury].” Wilkerson v. State, 307 Ga. 574, 574 (837 SE2d 300)
(2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “As long as there is some
competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support each fact
necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be
upheld.” Scott v. State, 309 Ga. 764, 766 (1) (848 SE2d 448) (2020)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, Junior testified that Thomas pointed a gun at him. See
Rich v. State, 307 Ga. 757, 759 (1) (a) (838 SE2d 255) (2020) (“[T]he
testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a
fact[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Thomas admitted
hitting Junior with the weapon. Multiple eyewitnesses said that
Thomas shot Douglas. And Thomas admitted that he shot Douglas
in anger. Douglas was shot in the back and had no weapons on him.
After assessing the credibility of the eyewitnesses and reviewing a
video recording of Thomas’s interviews, the jury was authorized to
reject any claims that Thomas shot Douglas in self-defense or with
an irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation, and to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas was guilty of the crimes
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of which he was convicted. See Corley v. State, 308 Ga. 321, 322 (1)
(a) (840 SE2d 391) (2020) (“[Q]uestions about the existence of
justification are for a jury to decide[.]”); Anderson v. State, 248 Ga.
682, 683 (3) (285 SE2d 533) (1982) (“Whether or not a provocation,
if any, is such a serious provocation as would be sufficient to excite
a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person,
reducing the offense from murder to manslaughter, is generally a
question for the jury.”).
2. Thomas next argues that the trial court failed to fulfill its
role as the “thirteenth juror” by failing to grant his motion for a new
trial. To the extent Thomas argues that the trial court failed to
exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror,” the record shows
otherwise. In denying Thomas’s motion for new trial, the trial court
cited the correct legal standards, weighed the evidence, and found
that the evidence overwhelmingly supported Thomas’s guilt. See
Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 714-715 (4) (b) (739 SE2d 332)
(2013) (trial court’s language that evidence was not “sufficiently
close” to warrant new trial shows that court exercised its
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discretionary authority to not grant a new trial).
To the extent Thomas argues that the trial court exercised its
discretion improperly, his argument presents nothing for us to
review. Only trial courts have discretion to sit as the thirteenth
juror. See Wilson v. State, 302 Ga. 106, 109 (II) (d) (805 SE2d 98)
(2017). When asked to review the refusal to grant a new trial on such
grounds, our review is limited to the Jackson v. Virginia standard,
and we have already explained that the evidence was sufficient
under that standard.
3. During the trial, one of Douglas’s other sons, seated in the
courtroom gallery, screamed at Thomas, “You killed my daddy, man.
You killed my motherf***ing daddy, man.” Thomas argues that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on this
courtroom outburst, because multiple members of the jury indicated
that the outburst caused them concern. We disagree.
A trial court generally has broad discretion in deciding whether
to grant a mistrial, and great deference is afforded to a court’s
determination that a mistrial was not necessary. See Blake v. State,
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304 Ga. 747, 750 (2) (822 SE2d 207) (2018). The measures a trial
court takes in response to a courtroom outburst are within the
court’s discretion unless a fair trial is not possible without a new
trial. See Thompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 154 (10) (816 SE2d 646)
(2018); Green v. State, 300 Ga. 707, 710 (2) (797 SE2d 863) (2017).
Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it takes
“prompt, thorough, and curative action.” Thompson, 304 Ga. at 154
(10) (citation and punctuation omitted). When juries are given
curative instructions following such outbursts, they “are presumed
to follow [them] in the absence of proof to the contrary.” Jones v.
State, 305 Ga. 750, 755 (3) (827 SE2d 879) (2019).
Here, in response to the outburst, the trial court removed the
relatives of the victim from the courtroom, checked with the jurors
as to how they felt, and received reassurance from all of them that
the outburst would not impair their ability to be fair and impartial.
Even the jurors who specifically said they were concerned by the
outburst expressed a desire to continue serving. After denying
Thomas’s motion for a mistrial, the trial court told the jury that the
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man who had made the outburst was excluded from the courthouse
and instructed the jury to disregard the outburst. Under these
circumstances, Thomas has failed to show that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying a mistrial. See Thompson, 304 Ga. at 154-
155 (10) (holding the trial court’s curative instruction sufficient
where the court gave a lengthy curative instruction after a witness
under cross-examination said repeatedly, “Y’all done killed
somebody,” and “Y’all going to hell”); see also Messer v. State, 247
Ga. 316, 323-325 (6) (276 SE2d 15) (1981) (concluding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial
and instead giving a curative instruction after the father of the
victim lunged at the defendant and screamed, “You’ll pay,” “You’re
liable,” and “You’re going to get it”).
4. Thomas claims that the trial court erred in admitting his
custodial statements from the second custodial interview because he
was not re-advised of his Miranda rights and the detective who
conducted that interview deployed “extremely coercive, combative
and threatening conduct” in the interview. We disagree.
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The record shows that Thomas had been advised of his
Miranda rights prior to his first interview with one detective, and
there was a break of about two hours between that interview and
the second interview. There is no dispute that the second interview
was merely a continuation of the first. Without more, the two-hour
break between the two interviews did not require Thomas to be re-
advised of his Miranda rights. See Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676,
678-679 (3) (681 SE2d 130) (2009) (“[T]he lack of a Miranda warning
after [a two-hour] break is of no consequence, as [appellant] was
advised of and waived his Miranda rights before the first interview
and the second interview was part of a continuous series of
interviews.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Williams v. State,
244 Ga. 485, 488 (4) (b) (260 SE2d 879) (1979) (“[T]he state was
under no duty to repeat the Miranda warnings given the day before
where, as here, the interviews were part of a continuing
interrogation.”).
Turning to the coercion argument, the video recording of the
interview plainly contradicts Thomas’s assertions. Thomas points to
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no portion of the video recording to show that the second detective
was coercive. The detective spoke calmly and never raised his voice
or threatened Thomas in any way during the interview. Nothing in
the video recording suggests “excessively lengthy interrogation,
physical deprivation, brutality, or other such hallmarks of coercive
police activity” that could render Thomas’s statements involuntary.
Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 291 (3) (766 SE2d 447) (2014) (citation
and punctuation omitted).
5. Thomas also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
not renewing the motion for mistrial based on the courtroom
outburst and thereby not preserving the issue for appeal. We
disagree.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Thomas must show both that his trial counsel’s performance was
deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his defense.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80
LE2d 674) (1984). “To establish deficient performance, an appellant
must overcome the strong presumption that his or her counsel’s
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conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional
conduct and show that his counsel performed in an objectively
unreasonable way considering all circumstances and in the light of
prevailing professional norms.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2)
(770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To
establish prejudice, an appellant must show that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694. Thomas must prove both prongs of
the Strickland test, and if he fails to prove one prong, “it is not
incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith, 296
Ga. at 733 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a
ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we defer to the
trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we
apply the law to the facts de novo.” State v. Spratlin, 305 Ga. 585,
591 (2) (826 SE2d 36) (2019).
Here, the trial court considered the merits of Thomas’s motion
for mistrial, denied the motion, told Thomas’s counsel that she could
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renew the motion “if something else happens,” and then gave the
jury a curative instruction. Thomas does not allege on appeal that
something else happened at the trial that required trial counsel to
again move for a mistrial based on the courtroom outburst, but
argues that trial counsel potentially failed to preserve the issue by
failing to renew the motion. See Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga. 883, 886
(2) (757 SE2d 90) (2014) (concluding that the defendant waived
challenge to denial of motion for a mistrial where he failed to renew
his motion following the trial court’s admonishment of prosecutor
and curative instruction). But even assuming that trial counsel’s
failure to renew the motion was deficient performance, Thomas fails
to establish prejudice. Because we have concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a
mistrial, electing instead to take adequate curative measures,
Thomas does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different if trial counsel had renewed the
motion for a mistrial. See Hartsfield, 294 Ga. at 887 (3) (a) (because
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial
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where curative instruction was adequate, there was no prejudice
from trial counsel’s failure to renew motion).
6. Lastly, Thomas argues that he is entitled to a new trial on
the basis of cumulative prejudice. We disagree.
We recently recognized a new cumulative error rule in State v.
Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020), whereby courts are “to
consider collectively the prejudicial effect of trial court errors and
any deficient performance by counsel — at least where those errors
by the court and counsel involve evidentiary issues.” Id. at 14 (1).
But this cumulative prejudice analysis does not apply when, as here,
there are not multiple errors to consider cumulatively. See Beck v.
State, 310 Ga. 491, 499 (3) n.5 (852 SE2d 535) (2020).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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