McClain v. State ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 17, 2021
S21A0252. McCLAIN v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Letisha McClain appeals from the trial court’s denial of her
motion to withdraw her guilty pleas to felony murder and three
counts of aggravated assault. She claims that the trial court erred
in denying her motion because withdrawal of her pleas is necessary
to correct a manifest injustice. McClain shows no obvious abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her
guilty pleas, and we affirm.
The record shows that a Richmond County grand jury indicted
McClain for malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and three
counts of aggravated assault in connection with the death of Walter
Benning and the injury of three others during a house fire in May
2018. During the course of her May 2019 trial, McClain changed her
initial plea of not guilty and entered non-negotiated pleas of guilty
to one count of felony murder and three counts of aggravated
assault. The count of malice murder and one count of felony murder
were nolle prossed. The trial court sentenced McClain to life in
prison without parole for felony murder, and 20 years in prison for
each count of aggravated assault to be served concurrently with the
sentence for felony murder. McClain filed timely motions to
withdraw her guilty pleas in June 2019 through trial counsel and
new counsel.
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw McClain’s guilty
pleas, the trial court heard testimony from McClain and her trial
counsel. McClain’s new counsel represented that the motion was
based on the “very limited premise” that McClain “stopped her trial
and pleaded guilty because . . . she felt that she had a better chance
of a life with parole sentence . . . if she did plead guilty.” The trial
court denied the motion in a written order, and McClain filed a
timely appeal.
After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw her guilty
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plea only to correct a manifest injustice, which exists if
the plea was in fact entered involuntarily or without an
understanding of the nature of the charges. When a
defendant challenges the validity of his guilty plea in this
way, the State bears the burden of showing that the
defendant entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. The State may meet its burden by showing on
the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant
understood the rights being waived and possible
consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic
evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was
voluntary and knowing. In evaluating whether a
defendant’s plea was valid, the trial court should consider
all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the plea.
The court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
will not be disturbed absent an obvious abuse of
discretion.
Johnson v. State, 303 Ga. 704, 706-707 (2) (814 SE2d 688) (2018)
(citations and punctuation omitted). See also Powell v. State, 309
Ga. 523, 524 (1) (847 SE2d 338) (2020) (The test for manifest
injustice varies “from case to case, but it has been said that
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for
instance, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the
guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding
of the nature of the charges.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
McClain contends that withdrawal of her guilty pleas is
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“necessary to correct the manifest injustice arising from denying
[her] the opportunity to obtain the possibility of parole after
prison[.]” She asserts that she entered her guilty pleas after her
attorney advised her that her trial was “not going well” and that her
only chance of avoiding a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole was to plead guilty. McClain argues that she
reached for the “lifeline” thrown her way as a result of “instinct,”
and, therefore, her guilty pleas were not voluntary, knowing, or
rational. She argues that she should be allowed to withdraw her
instinctive guilty pleas “and finish her day in court” because of the
possibility that, if she is found guilty after a trial, “the judge might
be moved enough to offer the possibility of parole.”
McClain and her trial counsel testified at the hearing on the
motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. In pertinent part, trial counsel
testified as follows. After the evidence at trial had “taken a turn”
against McClain, counsel strongly suggested that there was a “good
likelihood” that she would receive a parolable life sentence if she
took responsibility and pleaded guilty. Counsel had assessed that
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McClain would almost certainly receive a sentence of life without
parole if she finished the trial and was convicted. Counsel did not
promise McClain that she would receive a parolable sentence if she
pleaded guilty, but he believed that pleading guilty was in her best
interest.
McClain testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw
that she believed she would receive a sentence of life without parole
if she followed through with the trial and was convicted, and that
she thought she was doing “the right thing” by pleading guilty. She
testified that she thought that by pleading guilty she would receive
a sentence with the possibility of parole, and that she got the idea
from her trial counsel, who told her “that there was a chance that
the Judge would have gave [sic] me a sentence with possibility of
parole.”
The record does not include a transcript of the guilty plea
hearing, but it contains a written plea and acknowledgment of
waiver of rights in which McClain acknowledged, among other
things, that the maximum sentence for the charge of felony murder
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was life without parole and that she had made no plea agreement
that caused her to plead guilty. McClain’s counsel certified, among
other things, that he had reviewed the questions on the form with
her, assured himself that she understood them, and explained to her
all possible consequences of a guilty plea. The trial court also
entered an order signed contemporaneously with the entry of the
plea finding from the questioning of the defendant and defense
counsel, and from the plea and acknowledgment of waiver, that the
court had affirmatively determined, among other things, that
McClain knew and understood the nature of the charges and the
consequences of the plea. See Oliver v. State, 308 Ga. 652, 655 (842
SE2d 847) (2020) (holding that under circumstances in which,
among other things, appellant signed a waiver-of-rights form and
the trial court entered an order contemporaneous with the guilty
plea finding the plea to be freely, understandingly, and voluntarily
made, appellant was advised of his rights and understood that he
was waiving those rights by pleading guilty); Mims v. State, 299 Ga.
578, 581-584 (2) (a) (787 SE2d 237) (2016) (holding that, although
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the transcript of the guilty plea hearing did not show that the
defendant was apprised of his privilege against self-incrimination
and the right to confrontation, documents in the record of the plea,
including a written plea and acknowledgment of waiver of rights,
certification of trial counsel, and a contemporaneous order of the
trial court, refuted appellant’s claim that he was not advised of his
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confrontation),
overruled on other grounds, Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 363, 377 (834
SE2d 769) (2019).
McClain’s testimony at the hearing on the motion to withdraw
her pleas and her waiver-of-rights form showed that she understood
that she faced a maximum sentence of life without parole by
pleading guilty to the charge of felony murder. She pleaded guilty
on advice of counsel, but McClain does not show or contend that her
attorney was deficient in offering that advice. Notwithstanding
McClain’s argument on appeal that she acted “instinctively” in
entering her guilty pleas, the record supports the trial court’s
finding that her pleas were freely and voluntarily made. We
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conclude that there was no obvious abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s denial of McClain’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. See
McGuyton v. State, 298 Ga. 351, 353 (1) (a) (782 SE2d 21) (2017) (“A
decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a matter for the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent
manifest abuse.”) (citation omitted)).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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