Tyler v. State ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 1, 2021
S21A0553. TYLER v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
A Richmond County jury found Charles Tyler guilty of felony
murder, armed robbery, and other crimes in connection with the
shooting death of David Fulkrod and theft of copper from a recycling
facility. On appeal, Tyler challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
as to all of his convictions. Because the evidence was sufficient to
support each conviction, we affirm. 1
1The crimes occurred on June 4, 2008. In September 2008, a Richmond
County grand jury indicted Tyler for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), armed robbery (Count 3), burglary
(Count 4), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 5),
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6). At a jury trial held
from August 31 to September 3, 2009, Tyler was found not guilty on Count 1
and guilty on Counts 2 through 5. The State elected not to pursue Count 6, for
which the trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi. The trial court
sentenced Tyler to consecutive sentences of life in prison on Counts 2 and 3, a
consecutive term of 20 years in prison on Count 4, and a consecutive term of 5
years in prison on Count 5. On September 10, 2009, Tyler filed a motion for
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed the following. In the weeks
preceding the murder, CMC Recycling Augusta in Richmond County
terminated Tyler’s employment with the company. During the
afternoon of June 3, 2008, Tyler rented a U-Haul box truck and a
storage unit.
In the early morning hours of June 4, Fulkrod was working as
a security guard at CMC Recycling. He was stationed at a guard
shack at the facility’s entrance where he would maintain a log
recording the names of people arriving, their times of arrival, and
other activity. He spoke to his supervisor at 3:00 a.m. and
documented that he “made rounds” between 3:30 and 3:45 a.m.
new trial, which he subsequently amended. The trial court denied the motion
for new trial, as amended, on December 16, 2015, and Tyler filed a timely notice
of appeal on December 30, 2015. The case was docketed in this Court on April
27, 2017, as case number S17A1524, but was remanded to the trial court on
June 30, 2017, so that the complete record of the proceedings could be
transmitted to this Court. On January 28, 2019, the trial court entered an
order certifying that the record was complete and ordering the clerk of court to
transmit the complete record to this Court upon the filing of a new notice of
appeal by Tyler. On February 15, 2019, Tyler filed a notice of appeal. This case
was docketed in this Court to the April 2021 term and submitted for a decision
on the briefs.
2
Fulkrod left a voicemail with his supervisor that all was clear at
around 4:00 a.m. Fulkrod began an entry with a time notation of
4:40 a.m., but there was no description of what happened at that
time.
At around 5:30 a.m., another employee arriving for work found
the gate open but did not see anyone in the guard shack to grant him
entrance. The employee exited his vehicle, looked through the guard
shack window, and observed Fulkrod lying in a pool of blood.
Fulkrod had been shot in the head and died from his wounds. A 9mm
cartridge casing was found next to Fulkrod’s body.
Investigators discovered that a copper bale was missing from
the “lower” warehouse. A forklift, normally stored in the “upper”
warehouse, was also out of place, and a welding torch appeared to
have been used to cut the upper warehouse lock. Investigators also
located forklift tire tracks leading to the lower warehouse and tire
tracks from a vehicle with four rear tires leading from the company’s
front entrance to a lane between the upper and lower warehouses
and back out. They also located work boot impressions in the dirt at
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the crime scene, a pair of bolt-cutters, and a destroyed lock by the
front entry gate.
The police provided information about the incident to the
public and requested reports of anyone seen in possession of large
amounts of copper. On June 5, the police received a call from a man
reporting that on the preceding day at approximately 5:45 a.m., he
was driving behind a U-Haul truck and observed “a big cube of
metal” that “looked like copper” in the back of the truck.
At around 7:00 a.m. on June 5, investigators discovered a large
copper cube in a delivery area of a grocery store. About seven miles
away from the grocery store, the police found Tyler lying beside a U-
Haul truck in the parking lot of a gas station. Tyler initially gave
the police a false name, and after being given Miranda warnings, 2
Tyler told investigators that he was using the U-Haul truck to move
himself and his wife from his mother’s house into a new apartment.
Tyler was then transferred to a hospital to be treated for
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)
(1966).
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dehydration.
That same day, Tyler’s wife told investigators that she had
been living with her mother and was not moving into a new
apartment with Tyler. She also stated that she brought Tyler a
broom at his request to clean out the U-Haul. Tyler’s mother told
investigators that she had not seen her son in five years. When
investigators returned to the hospital later that day and told Tyler
what they had learned from his wife and mother, Tyler could not
provide an explanation, and “his eyes watered up with tears.”
Investigators also found copper scraps, a pallet, and some cardboard
boxes on the floor of the U-Haul. When told of this discovery by
investigators, Tyler denied that those items had been in the U-Haul
when he rented it, but stated that he was the only one who had
driven or had access to the truck. Investigators also found that the
tires on the U-Haul had the same characteristics as the impressions
left at the crime scene.
Investigators executed a search warrant at Tyler’s storage unit
and discovered approximately 2,700 pounds of copper in piles inside
5
and copper bits scattered around outside the unit. The amount of
copper discovered in the storage unit and behind the grocery store
was consistent with the amount of copper stolen from CMC
Recycling. Investigators then returned a third time to speak to Tyler
and again gave Miranda warnings to Tyler before questioning him.
Tyler initially denied renting a storage unit, but when investigators
revealed proof that he had done so, Tyler admitted that he rented
the unit. Tyler admitted that the storage unit’s key was on a lanyard
that officers had taken from him and stated that no one else had the
key. However, he denied that there was any copper in the unit and
disputed the account of a maintenance man who reported having
backed the U-Haul into the unit at Tyler’s request on the evening of
June 4.
The police searched Tyler’s apartment and found work boots
that matched the impressions documented at the crime scene.
Investigators also recovered documents in the apartment related to
renting a forklift, and notes detailing U-Haul truck rental costs and
weight limits, as well as documents listing various CMC Recycling
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locations throughout the Southeast. Additionally, investigators
found Tyler’s resume, which listed that he was previously a
construction welder and that his skills included forklift operation.
2. In two separate enumerations of error, Tyler challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Tyler first argues that
the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the
State did not establish each element of the offenses and because the
evidence was circumstantial, did not establish that he actively
engaged in any of the crimes, and did not preclude the possibility
that someone else committed the crimes. Tyler also argues that the
evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his convictions for armed
robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony because it was equally possible that the copper was taken
before Fulkrod’s shooting, and thus a jury could not find that the
robbery was accomplished by use of force. For the reasons explained
below, each of these contentions fails.
When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of
federal due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
7
States Constitution, the proper standard of review is whether a
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III)
(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). This Court views the evidence
in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the
jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506
(739 SE2d 313) (2013). The jury’s resolution of these issues
“adversely to the defendant does not render the evidence
insufficient.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Graham v. State,
301 Ga. 675, 677 (1) (804 SE2d 113) (2017).
Further, as a matter of Georgia statutory law, “[t]o warrant a
conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only
be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every
other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”
See former OCGA § 24-4-6.3 Whether an alternative hypothesis is
3 This case was tried prior to the current Evidence Code becoming
effective in 2013. However, this provision “was carried forward into the new
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reasonable or whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every
reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt is generally a question left
to the jury, and this Court “will not disturb that finding unless it is
insupportable as a matter of law.” Johnson v. State, 307 Ga. 44, 48
(2) (834 SE2d 83) (2019). “[I]t was for the jury to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or
inconsistencies in the evidence. Likewise, it was for the jury to
decide whether the defense theory . . . was reasonable and not
excluded by other evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Bamberg v. State, 308 Ga. 340, 343 (1) (a) (839 SE2d 640) (2020).
We first consider the sufficiency of the evidence presented as
to the offense of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault.
OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) provides that “[a] person commits the offense of
murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the
death of another human being irrespective of malice.” Tyler’s felony
murder conviction was predicated on his aggravated assault of
Evidence Code, and it now can be found at OCGA § 24-14-6.” Gibson v. State,
300 Ga. 494, 495 (1) n.4 (796 SE2d 712) (2017).
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Fulkrod. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]
person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she
assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon[.]” A person commits an assault
when he or she “[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person
of another [or c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable
apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” OCGA § 16-
5-20 (a).
Here, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support
Tyler’s conviction for felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault. The jury could conclude from the evidence presented at trial
and summarized above that Tyler shot Fulkrod so that he could steal
copper from CMC Recycling.
Likewise, the evidence was sufficient to support Tyler’s
conviction for burglary. Under the statute in effect at the time of the
crimes, OCGA § 16-7-1 (a) provided that “[a] person commits the
offense of burglary when, without authority and with the intent to
commit a felony or theft therein, he . . . enters or remains within any
other building . . . or any room or any part thereof.” Here, the
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evidence presented at trial authorized the jury to determine that
Tyler entered the CMC Recycling upper and lower warehouses
without authority and for the purpose of stealing copper. See
Blackshear v. State, 309 Ga. 479, 484 (1) (847 SE2d 317) (2020). The
evidence was therefore sufficient to support his conviction for
burglary.
Tyler was also convicted of armed robbery and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony predicated on armed
robbery or murder. OCGA § 16-8-41 (a) provides that “[a] person
commits the offense of armed robbery when, with intent to commit
theft, he or she takes property of another from the person or the
immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, or any
replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon.” A
person commits the offense of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony when he has within arm’s reach or on his
person a firearm during the commission of “[a]ny crime against or
involving the person of another . . . and which crime is a felony[.]”
OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (1).
11
The indictment alleged that Tyler committed armed robbery in
violation of OCGA § 16-8-41 “with the intent to commit theft, [by]
tak[ing] copper, the property of CMC [Recycling, Inc.], from the
immediate presence of David Fulkrod, by use of a certain firearm[.]” 4
“The State therefore was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that [Tyler]’s use of the [firearm] occurred ‘prior to or
contemporaneously with the taking’” of the copper in order to
sustain his conviction for armed robbery and unlawful possession of
a firearm during that offense. (Citation omitted.) Harrington v.
State, 300 Ga. 574, 577 (2) (a) (797 SE2d 107) (2017). A defendant
may be convicted of committing a robbery if he kills the victim first
and then takes property in his possession. See Hester v. State, 282
Ga. 239, 240 (2) (647 SE2d 60) (2007). The evidence was sufficient
for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the State
4 It is immaterial that the copper belonged to CMC Recycling, not
Fulkrod. See Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100, 104 (5) (485 SE2d 192) (1997)
(“Robbery is a crime against possession, and is not affected by concepts of
ownership. . . . [T]he gravamen of the offense of armed robbery is the taking of
items from the possession of another by use of an offensive weapon, and not
the ownership status of the item taken.” (footnotes omitted)).
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made such a showing here. The evidence showed that Fulkrod
regularly recorded the name and time of people arriving at the gate,
and there was an incomplete entry at 4:40 a.m. The jury could
conclude that Tyler arrived in the rented U-Haul at the main gate
and then shot Fulkrod before entering the property to complete the
theft. Investigators located tire marks matching the rented U-Haul
entering the main gate between the two warehouses, greatly
diminishing the theory that Tyler gained entry to the facility
through some other means. Further, from the evidence presented at
trial, the jury could infer that he needed time to cut the upper
warehouse lock with a welding torch and to drive the forklift from
that warehouse to the lower warehouse to load copper onto the
truck. And there was no evidence that Fulkrod was restrained in
any way to keep him from calling the police while the theft was
completed. Accordingly, as a whole, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdicts, this evidence was sufficient for the jury to
conclude that Tyler shot Fulkrod before stealing the copper. See
Lumpkin v. State, 310 Ga. 139, 146 (1) (a) (849 SE2d 175, 182) (2020)
13
(evidence sufficient to prove defendant’s use of an offensive weapon
occurred prior to or contemporaneously with the taking); Johnson v.
State, 307 Ga. 44, 49-50 (2) (b) (834 SE2d 83) (2019) (same). The
evidence was therefore sufficient to sustain his convictions for
armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony as a matter of due process.
Finally, we consider Tyler’s argument that the evidence was
insufficient under former OCGA § 24-4-6. Tyler denied any
involvement in the crimes and now argues that the State’s evidence
was circumstantial and did not exclude the possibility that someone
else committed the crimes. However, significant physical evidence
found by the police tied Tyler to the crimes, including a large volume
of copper and copper scraps found in and around the storage unit
and U-Haul that he had rented, work boots found in Tyler’s
possession the soles of which matched impressions found at the
crime scene, and documentation detailing information on forklift
and U-Haul rentals, U-Haul weight limits, and CMC Recycling
locations, as well as a resume detailing Tyler’s skills as a welder and
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forklift operator. The jury was authorized to accept the State’s
theory of the crimes and was not required to conclude that the
hypothesis proposed by Tyler that someone else committed the
crimes was reasonable. See Blackshear, 309 Ga. at 483 (1).
Based on the foregoing, the jury was authorized to find that the
evidence, even if considered entirely circumstantial, was sufficient
to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of Tyler’s
guilt as to each offense for which he was convicted. See former
OCGA § 24-4-6; Blackshear, 309 Ga. at 484 (1). Moreover, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts and deferring
to the jury’s assessment of the evidence’s weight and credibility, we
conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient as a
matter of constitutional due process to authorize a rational trier of
fact to find Tyler guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of
felony murder, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony. See Jackson, 442 U. S. at 319 (III)
(B); see also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“It
was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to
15
resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (citation
omitted)).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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