Hood v. State ( 2021 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 21, 2021
S21A0267. HOOD v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Jamie Donnell Hood appeals his 2015 convictions on
a total of 36 counts charging him with murder, aggravated assault,
kidnapping, carjacking, and other offenses. The charges arose from
the December 2010 shooting death of Kenneth Omari Wray and a
series of crimes in March 2011 that resulted in the death of Athens-
Clarke County Police Officer Elmer Christian. With regard to his
convictions for the Wray murder, Appellant contends that (1) the
State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10
LE2d 215) (1963), by failing to disclose material impeachment
evidence with regard to a key State’s witness; (2) the trial court
erred by failing to give a jury instruction on the necessity of
corroborating a confession; and (3) the cumulative harm of these two
errors requires reversal. With regard to his convictions for the
murder of Officer Christian, Appellant contends that the trial court
erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on the defense of delusional
compulsion and (2) admitting testimony from a responding officer
about images of Officer Christian’s family he saw on the on-board
laptop computer in Officer Christian’s patrol car. We discern no
reversible error, so we affirm. 1
1 Appellant was indicted by a Clarke County grand jury in June 2011,
and was subsequently re-indicted in March 2014, on a total of 70 counts, which
included malice murder (2 counts); felony murder (4 counts); attempted
murder (1 count); aggravated assault upon a peace officer (3 counts);
aggravated assault (15 counts); armed robbery (2 counts); kidnapping with
bodily injury (1 count); kidnapping (11 counts); false imprisonment (10 counts);
hijacking a motor vehicle (2 counts); burglary (1 count); possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon (2 counts); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
during the commission of a crime (15 counts); and possession of a knife during
the commission of a crime (1 count). The State filed a notice of intent to seek
the death penalty for the murders of Wray and Christian.
Approximately 15 months before trial, Appellant sought leave to
represent himself. Following a hearing in accordance with Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (95 SCt 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975), the trial court
granted Appellant’s motion, and Appellant represented himself at trial, with
attorneys from the Capital Defender’s Office acting as standby counsel.
Appellant’s jury trial commenced in June 2015. After nearly a month, at the
conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase, the jury found Appellant guilty on 36
of the 70 counts, including all counts associated with the shootings of Wray
and Christian. These counts included, as to Wray, malice murder, two counts
of felony murder, one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, one
count of firearm possession by a convicted felon, and one count of firearm
possession during the commission of a crime; as to Christian, the counts
2
The evidence at trial 2 showed that Appellant was involved in
the drug trade and had been supplying an associate, Kenyatta
Campbell, with marijuana from a third party in Atlanta. At some
included malice murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated
assault upon a peace officer with a deadly weapon, one count of firearm
possession by a convicted felon, and one count of firearm possession during the
commission of a crime. In the penalty phase, the jury declined to impose a
death sentence and recommended sentences of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for the murder of Christian and life with parole for the
murder of Wray. On July 24, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant in
accordance with the jury’s recommendations and, with regard to the remaining
offenses, Appellant was sentenced to three additional consecutive terms of life
without parole plus 300 consecutive years in prison.
On August 12, 2015, after the appointment of appellate counsel,
Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended in September
2019 and January 2020. A hearing on the motion was held on January 29,
2020. Shortly thereafter, Appellant filed a Motion to Reopen the evidence,
seeking to supplement the record with new evidence in support of his Brady
claim. On April 29, 2020, the trial court entered an order granting in part the
Motion to Reopen the evidence, permitting the admission of certain documents
into the record, and denying the motion for new trial. On May 22, 2020,
Appellant filed a notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the term of this
Court beginning in December 2020. Appellant initially requested oral
argument but later withdrew that request, and the appeal was thereafter
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2 Because Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions, and because this case involves an assessment of the
harm of alleged trial court error, we present the evidence as jurors reasonably
would have viewed it, rather than in the light most favorable to the verdicts.
See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 399 (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (announcing
that this Court will no longer routinely consider sufficiency sua sponte in non-
death penalty cases); Hampton v. State, 308 Ga. 797, 802 (2) (843 SE2d 542)
(2020) (“In determining whether an error was harmless, we review the record
de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have
done so.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)).
3
point before the crimes, Campbell began bypassing Appellant by
purchasing directly from the source, angering Appellant.
On the evening of December 28, 2010, Wray, an associate of
Campbell, was shot outside the Athens home Wray shared with his
mother, Ruby Jordan. Jordan testified that on the night of the
shooting, she was dozing in her bedroom when she heard a knock or
slam on the door and then another loud noise and her son calling for
her. She then heard what sounded like firecrackers. Jordan peeked
out the door and saw someone run from her driveway and, believing
it was Wray, returned to her bedroom. A few minutes later, a friend
of Wray came to the door, looking for Wray, and then saw him lying
in the driveway.
The friend, Billy Howington, testified that he had arranged to
buy marijuana from Wray on the night of December 28. Shortly
before arriving at Wray’s home, he texted Wray that he was
approaching. When Howington arrived, he parked his car in front
of the house and waited for Wray to come out. Wray did not appear
and did not return Howington’s texts or calls. Finally, Howington
4
went to the door, and as he was talking to Jordan he realized Wray
was lying in the driveway.
A neighbor of Jordan, Mike Barnett, came outside after
hearing a loud noise from the direction of Jordan’s home and saw
Wray’s body in the driveway. As he was dialing 911, Barnett was
approached by a police officer patrolling nearby, and emergency
responders were dispatched. Wray had sustained multiple gunshot
wounds, including one through his neck, and died after being
transported to the hospital.
At the scene, investigators recovered six .40-caliber shell
casings. Interviews with Howington and another neighbor indicated
that the shooter was a black male. Appellant was not identified as
a suspect at the time.
Some three months later, on March 22, 2011, Judon Brooks, an
associate of Wray and Campbell, went to Appellant’s home to inspect
some marijuana. Brooks testified that, shortly after he arrived,
Appellant and three masked men with firearms surrounded him,
and one of the men began tying him up with zip ties. Appellant
5
demanded that Brooks tell him Campbell’s whereabouts. When
Brooks replied that he did not know, Appellant brandished a knife
and threatened to kill him. The men put duct tape over Brooks’
mouth, covered his face, and put him in the trunk of Appellant’s car.
Appellant drove away with Brooks in the trunk. After managing to
break his hands free, Brooks opened the trunk latch and escaped
when the car came to a stop. An acquaintance of Brooks who
happened to be driving in the same vicinity saw him in the street
seeking help and summoned him to his car. Brooks called 911, and
a “be on the lookout” notice (BOLO) was issued for Appellant.
In the meantime, Appellant had abandoned his car and called
his brother, Matthew Hood, to pick him up. Athens-Clarke County
Police Officer Tony Howard testified that he was patrolling the area
in response to the BOLO. He recognized Matthew driving and
flagged him down. When Matthew stopped, Officer Howard saw a
man he recognized as Appellant exit Matthew’s car and run towards
the driver’s side of Officer Howard’s patrol car. Officer Howard
grabbed Appellant through his open window, but Appellant broke
6
free, then turned and shot Officer Howard in the face and the back.
The responding EMT testified that when he arrived on the scene,
Officer Howard’s gun was still in the holster on his belt.
Appellant continued running and came upon Officer
Christian’s patrol car. Two witnesses saw Appellant run past the
car and shoot twice through the driver’s side window. Officer
Christian, who at the time was talking on his phone, was struck by
both bullets. By the time emergency responders arrived, Officer
Christian was deceased.
Continuing to run, Appellant approached a stopped car, in
which Deborah Lumpkin was sitting. Lumpkin testified that
Appellant, who was armed with a gun, got in the passenger seat and
told her that he was running from the police and needed her to drive.
She complied. After a short time, Appellant, whom Lumpkin
described as calm and focused, instructed her to stop and get out.
Appellant drove off and later abandoned the car, continuing his
escape on foot.
The manhunt for Appellant proceeded into the following day
7
and night. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on March 24, Appellant went
to the home of Darius Lanier, a longtime acquaintance, who supplied
Appellant with food and clothing. Lanier testified that, during
Appellant’s time at his home, Appellant admitted to shooting the
two police officers. Appellant also told Lanier that he had killed
Wray because Wray would not tell him where he could find
Campbell. Appellant left at around 4:00 a.m. Later that morning,
Lanier reported Appellant’s visit to his probation officer, who
contacted the police.
After leaving Lanier’s home, Appellant found his way to the
Athens subdivision of Creekstone, where he gained entry into the
home of Chayandre Bess and Mandrell Hull, also acquaintances of
Appellant. Bess’s 13-year-old cousin, who was living with Bess and
Hull at the time, testified that, as she prepared to leave for school
on the morning of March 24, Appellant approached her outside the
home, brandished a gun, and ordered her to let him inside. Bess,
Hull, and others in the home testified that Appellant forced them
into a single room, then barricaded them in the home and held them
8
hostage until the following evening, when he surrendered to the
police. 3
During his time in the Creekstone home, Appellant made
several incriminating statements about the murder of Wray,
kidnapping of Brooks, and shootings of Officers Howard and
Christian. These witnesses testified that Appellant said he had shot
Wray when Wray would not tell him where Campbell lived and that
Appellant described specifically how Wray had called for his mother
before being killed. 4 Appellant also told these witnesses that he had
3 Appellant’s conduct in gaining entry to the home and in remaining
there until his surrender was the subject of numerous counts in the indictment
(31 in total) charging Appellant with burglary, kidnapping, false
imprisonment, and aggravated assault. Several of the purported hostages
were acquaintances of Appellant and knew Brooks, Campbell, and Wray.
There was testimony that some of these purported hostages were permitted to
leave the home for specific purposes, under threat of harm to the others if they
went to the police or did not return, and that some of them had arrived at the
home after Appellant. There was also testimony that Appellant slept for some
period of time while in the home and that Appellant snorted cocaine and
smoked marijuana with some of the purported hostages during the episode.
Appellant testified that he was allowed in the home without any coercion and
that he asked the home’s occupants to help him surrender to the police so they
could claim the $50,000 in reward money being offered for his capture.
Appellant was ultimately acquitted on all of the counts related to his conduct
at the Creekstone home.
4 In cross-examining several of the Creekstone witnesses, Appellant
attempted to establish that they were motivated to implicate him in the
9
kidnapped Brooks for the same reason and had intended to kill him
as well. Appellant also said that, while he was sorry for killing
Officer Christian, he was glad he had shot Officer Howard, with
whom he had a history of ill will. In reference to the gun he used to
shoot Officers Howard and Christian, Appellant remarked, “[I]f you
think this one’s pretty, you should have see[n] the one I killed Omari
[Wray] with.” Many of Appellant’s statements about the crimes
were surreptitiously recorded by one of the Creekstone witnesses,
Quintin Riden, and the recordings were played for the jury at trial.5
Also while at the home, Appellant had phone conversations
unsolved Wray murder by the desire to avoid possible prosecution for
harboring a fugitive or to avert suspicions that some of them may have assisted
Appellant in the abduction of Brooks. In his cross-examination of one of these
witnesses, Appellant elicited that the witness had not told the police in her
interview immediately after Appellant’s surrender that he had admitted to the
Wray murder, and he asked whether she felt “any type retaliation that [she]
might be put in jail for harboring a fugitive.” She responded that she had not,
but she admitted that investigators “may have” asked about their participation
in the Brooks kidnapping.
5 In his cross-examination of Riden, Appellant repeatedly asked Riden
whether, after telling investigators about these recordings, he had initially
refused to hand over his cell phone to investigators, to which Riden replied that
he did not remember. Riden also admitted on cross-examination that
investigators asked him whether he had participated in the Brooks
kidnapping.
10
with both Brooks and Campbell. Brooks testified that Appellant told
him, “B**ch, you better be lucky you got away. . . . I was going to kill
your b**ch a** just like I did your boy”; Brooks believed Appellant’s
statement was a reference to Wray’s murder. In Appellant’s
conversation with Campbell, which Riden overheard and testified
about, Appellant told Campbell that the reason he killed Wray was
“because yo’ b**ch a** was hiding out. You got [Wray] killed because
I couldn’t find you.”
Shortly after his surrender on March 25, Appellant was
interviewed by investigators and admitted that he had shot Officers
Howard and Christian. He wrote a letter of apology to Officer
Christian’s family, telling them that “I just seen [Christian] at the
wrong time in the wrong situation.” The video recording of
Appellant’s interview was played for the jury, and the letter was
read aloud at trial.
The State also offered audio recordings of two police interviews
with Lanier, both of which were played for the jury. In the first
interview, conducted on March 24, 2011, Lanier told the detective
11
that Appellant admitted he had shot two police officers and hijacked
a woman’s car and said he wanted to kill Campbell before he turned
himself in. Lanier also told the detective that Appellant said he had
killed Wray. In the second interview, conducted in April 2011,
Lanier again stated that Appellant admitted to killing the officers
and to killing Wray; that Appellant said he had gotten rid of the gun
with which he had killed Wray; and that he had killed Wray because
Wray would not reveal Campbell’s whereabouts.
The State also offered testimony from a GBI firearms examiner
that a .40-caliber shell casing, found in a search of Appellant’s car,
was fired from the same gun as that used to shoot Wray. Additional
testimony established that Wray had been shot seven times, but that
only six shell casings were recovered from the scene. The firearms
examiner also testified that the gun used to kill Wray was not the
same gun used in the police shootings.
Appellant testified in his own defense. He maintained that he
was not involved in Wray’s murder and told the jury that the shell
casing found in his car was the vestige of an armed robbery of which
12
he had been a victim, in which the assailant’s gun had discharged in
his car during their struggle. Appellant also claimed that the Brooks
kidnapping incident was actually initiated by Brooks, when Brooks
showed up at his house with two men, threatening to kill him.
Appellant claimed it was only in response that he and his associates
tied Brooks up and drove away with him. Appellant testified further
that, when he was fleeing after the Brooks kidnapping and
encountered Officers Howard and Christian, he heard the voice of
his deceased brother – who had been killed by a police officer –
telling him, “Don’t let them do you like they done me.” Appellant
testified that he continued running “out of fear. I’m running trying
to get away. I’m running not to kill. I’m running to get away from
them. They fixing to kill me, man.”
1. In his first enumeration of error, Appellant contends that
the State violated his due process rights by failing to disclose
material impeachment evidence relating to Riden, the witness from
the Creekstone home who recorded Appellant’s statements. See
Brady, 373 U. S. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of
13
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment[.]”);
see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 153 (92 SCt 763, 31
LE2d 104) (1972) (impeachment evidence affecting reliability of
witness testimony falls within the Brady rule). Appellant claims
that this violation requires the reversal of his convictions related to
Wray’s murder.
Riden testified at trial about having been summoned to the
Creekstone home on March 24 by his friend, Hull, “to make a drug
transaction.” According to Riden, he and his young son arrived at
the home to find Appellant, whom he knew through his sister and
cousin, holding Hull, Bess, and others hostage; Riden and his son
thus became hostages as well. Riden testified about statements
Appellant made regarding the shootings of the officers, the murder
of Wray, and the kidnapping of Brooks. Specifically, Riden testified
that Appellant said he was sorry he had killed Officer Christian;
that he wished he had killed Officer Howard instead; and that “the
reason he did all this [was] because Judon [Brooks] and Ken
14
Campbell . . . . went behind his back and started dealing with
somebody that he was dealing with on the drug level.” With regard
to Wray’s murder, Riden testified that Appellant said he went to
Wray’s mother’s house and
ran up on Omari [Wray] and tell him, “Tell me where Ken
at.” Omari refused to tell him where Ken was . . . so he
said he shot him. Omari started screaming, making
noises, and he shot him again. He said he seen Omari’s
mama coming out to the door, and he didn’t want to shoot
the old lady, but if she did, he would have shot her, too.
And then he just fled.
Riden also testified about overhearing Appellant’s phone
conversation with Campbell, in which Appellant told Campbell he
was the reason Wray had been killed. Riden then testified about
using his cell phone to secretly record Appellant making admissions
about killing Wray. After authenticating the recordings, Riden
testified as they were played for the jury, providing context and
clarifying portions of the recordings that were difficult to
understand.
At the beginning of Riden’s direct testimony, the prosecutor
elicited that Riden was at the time under indictment on federal
15
charges. Riden testified that he had pled guilty to cocaine
distribution, was awaiting sentencing, and faced a sentence in the
range of 84 to 105 months. The State tendered a certified copy of
Riden’s indictment, filed in May 2014, charging him with two counts
of cocaine distribution, one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine
with the intent to distribute, and one count of possession of a firearm
during a drug trafficking crime. 6 The State also tendered a certified
copy of Riden’s September 2014 plea agreement, in which Riden
agreed to plead guilty to one of the cocaine distribution charges and
to cooperate fully with law enforcement by giving complete and
truthful statements regarding the federal charges and “any and all
criminal violations about which [he] has knowledge or information.”
Under the agreement, the prosecutor would consider such
cooperation, if “completed prior to sentencing,” in determining
whether a downward departure from the advisory sentencing range
would be recommended. Also included among the State’s exhibits
6 Riden also testified that he was “originally arrested,” before going into
federal custody, for cocaine possession, firearm possession by a felon, and a
parole violation; there was no follow-up questioning regarding these charges.
16
were two motions to continue sentencing, from December 2014 and
June 2015, respectively, citing “ongoing matters that need to be
resolved prior to sentencing.” On cross-examination, Riden denied
that his trial testimony was in any way related to his federal
sentencing and testified that he was motivated to testify because
Appellant held him and his family hostage.
In the course of preparing Appellant’s motion for new trial,
appellate counsel learned that, at Riden’s sentencing approximately
one month after the conclusion of Appellant’s trial, Riden was
sentenced to 25 months in prison plus three years of supervised
release. As reflected in the transcript from the federal sentencing
hearing, 7 the prosecutor moved for a downward departure based on
Riden’s “significant” cooperation in Appellant’s case; the trial judge
noted that Riden’s cooperation in Appellant’s case was “far beyond
what [he] normally s[aw]” and told Riden that, for this reason, he
had decided to “substantially reduce[ ] the sentence.”
7This transcript was admitted in the record by the trial court’s partial
grant of Appellant’s Motion to Reopen. See footnote 1, above.
17
In the course of investigating the resolution of Riden’s federal
charges, appellate counsel also discovered that, at the time of trial,
Riden had for more than a year been facing felony charges in
Athens-Clarke County for cocaine possession and other crimes.8
There had been no mention of these state-level charges at trial, and
the State does not dispute that it never made Appellant aware of
these charges. Documents from the record in that proceeding reflect
that, in September 2015, these charges were nolle prossed pursuant
to a motion filed by the State, which cited both Riden’s recent federal
sentencing and his assistance to the State in Appellant’s case.
Appellant contends that the dismissal of Riden’s state-level
charges and the leniency in his federal sentencing, both of which
were explicitly tied to his cooperation in Appellant’s case, are
evidence of express agreements Riden made with the State and with
federal prosecutors, which the State was obligated to have disclosed
8In Appellant’s brief here, his counsel represent that they discovered the
existence of these charges “by chance alone,” while investigating the federal
charges. Documents from the record in Riden’s state prosecution were
admitted in the record here as part of the trial court’s partial grant of the
Motion to Reopen.
18
to Appellant under Brady and Giglio. Appellant contends that these
agreements significantly undercut Riden’s credibility by exposing
strong incentives for him to assist the State in its prosecution of
Appellant and that, because of the significance of Riden’s testimony,
Appellant’s inability to use this evidence to impeach Riden deprived
him of due process under Brady and Giglio.
It is well settled that
“[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. at 87.
This includes the suppression of impeachment evidence
that may be used to challenge the credibility of a witness.
See Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-155 (92 SCt
763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972).
State v. Thomas, Case No. S21A0324, 2021 WL 1724970, at *5-6 (3)
(decided May 3, 2021) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the State is
obligated to reveal any agreement, even an informal one, with a
witness regarding criminal charges pending against the witness.
See id. at *6 (3). To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show
that
19
the State possessed evidence favorable to the defendant;
[the] defendant did not possess the evidence nor could he
obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; the
prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different.
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Accord Schofield v. Palmer,
279 Ga. 848, 852 (2) (621 SE2d 726) (2005). On appeal, a trial court’s
factual findings on a Brady claim are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard, and its application of the law to the facts is
reviewed de novo. See Thomas, 2021 WL 1724970, at *6 (3).
Here, in considering Appellant’s motion for new trial, the trial
court assumed for the sake of argument that the evidence
established that Riden had made deals to testify against Appellant
with both the State and federal prosecutors and that such deals were
suppressed by the State. Even assuming those facts to be true, the
trial court held that Appellant had failed to establish a reasonable
probability that, had this evidence been made available to
Appellant, the outcome of his trial would have been different. In the
trial court’s view, Appellant was unable to establish the
20
“materiality” of the suppressed evidence because of the quantum
and strength of the other evidence against Appellant, independent
of Riden’s testimony. We agree with the trial court.
In order to show materiality, a defendant need not show that
he would have been acquitted had the suppressed evidence been
disclosed; rather, he need only show that the suppression of the
evidence “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”
Schofield, 279 Ga. at 852-853 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).
In determining materiality, the court must examine the suppressed
evidence in the context of the entire record. See Turner v. United
States, __ U. S. __ (II) (A) (137 SCt 1885, 1893, 198 LE2d 443) (2017).
Thus, we have held that the materiality element was established
where the suppressed evidence would have impeached the testimony
of the only witness who testified that the defendant confessed. See
Danforth v. Chapman, 297 Ga. 29, 30-32 (2) (771 SE2d 886) (2015).
Likewise, evidence was material where it would have undercut the
credibility of the only witness who “provided full insight into” the
alleged motive for the crime, and whose testimony “[was] not
21
duplicated elsewhere in the record.” Byrd v. Owen, 272 Ga. 807, 811
(1) (536 SE2d 736) (2000). See also Thomas, 2021 WL 1724970, at
*8-9 (3) (c) (materiality was shown where suppressed evidence
would have impeached a witness whose testimony was highly
corroborative of that of the defendant’s accomplice, whose testimony
was significantly impeached). On the other hand, where there is
strong evidentiary support for the defendant’s conviction apart from
the testimony of the witness whose credibility would have been
affected by the suppressed evidence, materiality may not be
established. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 292-296 (IV) (119
SCt 1936, 144 LE2d 286) (1999).
Here, we note first that the jury was apprised of the fact that
Riden had pled guilty to his federal charges, that his plea agreement
required him to cooperate in other criminal cases about which he
had knowledge, and that the prosecution was obligated to consider
such cooperation in its sentencing recommendations. Thus, while
the full scope of Riden’s possible incentives to cooperate with the
State was not made known to the jury, the jury was nonetheless
22
aware that there was reason to regard his testimony with
skepticism. See Rhodes v. State, 299 Ga. 367, 369-370 (2) (788 SE2d
359) (2016) (materiality lacking where jury did not know about
specific terms of witnesses’ plea deals but was made aware of their
guilty pleas).
Moreover, although Riden’s testimony was undeniably helpful
to the State, it was largely cumulative of other evidence. First, the
jury heard the recordings of Appellant’s own statement in which he
discussed the Wray murder. While it is true that these recordings
were made by Riden, they were made prior to, and shared with
investigators in the immediate aftermath of, Appellant’s surrender
in March 2011, years before Riden was charged in either the federal
or the state case. In addition to Appellant’s own statement, there
was testimony from six of the Creekstone witnesses – not including
Riden – about Appellant’s admissions about Wray’s murder.
Though all six of these witnesses were relatives of Riden, 9 there were
9 Specifically, these witnesses included Riden’s wife, his mother-in-law
and her husband, his sister-in-law and brother-in-law, and his wife’s niece.
23
additional witnesses, not associated with the Creekstone home and
not related to Riden, who also testified that Appellant made
incriminating statements about Wray’s murder. Specifically, Lanier
testified that Appellant confessed to killing Wray, and Brooks
testified that he understood Appellant’s statement about “killing
[his] boy” to be a reference to Wray’s murder. All of the accounts of
Appellant’s incriminating statements were consistent in describing
his motive for the killing, and some included details about the
murder – such as the description of Wray calling for his mother –
that were consistent with Wray’s mother’s testimony. 10 Finally, the
ballistics evidence strongly supported the conclusion that Appellant
was responsible for Wray’s murder, because the .40-caliber cartridge
casing found in Appellant’s car was confirmed to have been fired
from the gun that killed Wray, and, although Wray was shot seven
times, only six cartridge casings were recovered at the scene.
10In addition, at least two witnesses testified that Appellant said he had
gotten rid of the gun he used in Wray’s murder, which was consistent with the
firearm examiner’s testimony that Wray had been killed with a different gun
than that used in the shootings of the officers.
24
In summary, examining the purportedly suppressed evidence
in the context of the entire record, we conclude that there is not a
reasonable probability that the jury would have reached any
different verdict had it been aware of Riden’s state-level charges or
any additional information regarding any formal or informal
agreements between Riden and either the State or federal
prosecutors. The jury was already aware of Riden’s possible motive
to assist the State in order to gain favor with federal prosecutors,
and the alleged additional impeachment material would not have
been likely to make a significant impact on the jury, particularly in
light of the many witnesses who gave testimony similar to Riden’s
and the independent evidence of Appellant’s guilt. Accordingly,
Appellant’s Brady claim is without merit.
2. Appellant next contends that the trial court committed plain
error by failing to instruct the jury on the statutory requirement
that a confession must be corroborated to support a conviction. See
OCGA § 24-8-823 (“A confession alone, uncorroborated by any other
evidence, shall not justify a conviction.”). Appellant contends that,
25
because his confessions were critical to the State’s case with regard
to Wray’s murder, the trial court’s failure to give a confession-
corroboration instruction constitutes plain error. We disagree.
It is undisputed that Appellant neither requested a confession-
corroboration instruction nor objected to the jury instructions as
given at trial and that, thus, appellate review of this claim is limited
to plain error only. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). To establish plain error,
[the appellant] must demonstrate that the instructional
error was not affirmatively waived, was obvious beyond
reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the
proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Satisfying all
four prongs of this standard is difficult, as it should be.
Clarke v. State, 308 Ga. 630, 637 (5) (842 SE2d 863) (2020) (citation
and punctuation omitted). “The Court need not analyze all elements
of the plain-error test when the appellant fails to establish one of
them.” Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 194 (12) (a) (850 SE2d 110) (2020).
Here, Appellant has failed to establish that the omission of the
confession-corroboration instruction likely affected the outcome of
the proceedings. Appellant confessed to Wray’s murder not only to
26
the many Creekstone witnesses but also to Lanier, and he made an
admission to Brooks by referring to killing Brooks’ “boy.” See
Sheffield v. State, 281 Ga. 33, 34 (1) (635 SE2d 776) (2006)
(distinguishing confessions, where entire criminal act is admitted,
from admissions, where less than all the “facts entering into the
criminal act” are admitted). In addition, as noted above, various
facets of Appellant’s confessions were corroborated by other
evidence; there was a clear motive for Appellant to commit the
murder; and the ballistics evidence was highly suggestive of
Appellant’s involvement in Wray’s murder. Because Appellant
made multiple confessions to different witnesses, which
corroborated each other, and there was ample evidence
corroborating the confessions, we conclude that it is unlikely that
the absence of the confession-corroboration instruction affected the
outcome of Appellant’s trial. See Clarke, 308 Ga. at 637 (5) (no plain
error in trial court’s failure to give confession-corroboration
instruction, where there was ample corroborative evidence); English
v. State, 300 Ga. 471, 474-475 (2) (796 SE2d 258) (2017) (same).
27
3. Appellant next contends that the Court should evaluate
cumulative prejudice, in accordance with State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10(838 SE2d 808) (2020), to examine the combined prejudicial effect of
the “errors” alleged in the above two enumerations. See id. at 17 (1)
(holding that appellate courts must “consider collectively the
prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the
prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel” – at least
where those errors and deficiencies involve evidentiary issues).
Specifically, Appellant contends that the cumulative effect of the
State’s suppression of evidence regarding Riden’s state and federal
criminal proceedings and the trial court’s error in failing to give the
confession-corroboration instruction was sufficiently prejudicial to
entitle him to a new trial. We disagree.
While the cumulative prejudice rule as announced in Lane has
so far been applied only to evidentiary error, we have noted the
possibility of extending cumulative prejudice to other types of
defects in trial proceedings. See Lane, 308 Ga. at 17-18 (1)
(suggesting that such a possibility could be considered in a future
28
case). We have also noted the potential difficulty in applying
cumulative prejudice where the various defects are subject to
different standards of appellate review. See Finney v. State, __ Ga.
__ (3) (a) (855 SE2d 578, 589) (2021). Here, the materiality standard
for a Brady violation (reasonable probability of a different outcome
at trial) is similar to the plain error standard of review (error likely
affected the outcome). See Lane, 308 Ga. at 21 (4) n.12 (noting that
standard for plain error review equates to prejudice standard for
ineffective assistance); Harris v. State, 309 Ga. 599, 607 (2) (b) (847
SE2d 563) (2020) (noting that prejudice standard for ineffective
assistance is rooted in Brady’s materiality standard). Even
assuming, however, that a Brady violation and an instructional
error are appropriately assessed as part of a cumulative prejudice
analysis, we see no cumulative prejudice here. Given the quantum
and strength of the evidence, independent of Riden’s testimony and
corroborative of any single confession Appellant made, we conclude
that it is not reasonably probable or likely that the combination of
29
the Brady violation and the omitted jury instruction 11 affected the
verdicts against Appellant as to Wray’s murder. See Allen v. State,
310 Ga. 411, 417-418 (4) (851 SE2d 541) (2020) (no cumulative
prejudice given strong evidence of defendant’s guilt).
4. Appellant contends that the trial court committed plain
error by failing to give a jury instruction on the defense of delusional
compulsion. Claiming that his only plausible defense as to the
shootings of Officers Howard and Christian was a delusional
compulsion insanity defense, Appellant contends that the trial court
was required to instruct the jury on this defense despite the fact that
he did not request such an instruction. We disagree, because there
was not even slight evidence to support such an instruction.
To establish an insanity defense based on delusional
compulsion, a defendant must show that
at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting
the crime, the [defendant], because of mental disease,
injury, or congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of
11While we did not expressly conclude that the State violated its duties
under Brady nor that there was clear error in the trial court’s omission of the
confession-corroboration instruction, we assume the existence of both defects
for purposes of this analysis.
30
a delusional compulsion as to such act which
overmastered his will to resist committing the crime.
OCGA § 16-3-3. In addition, we have held that this defense is
available only if Appellant “was compelled by [his] delusion to act in
a manner that would have been lawful and right if the facts had been
as he imagined them to be.” Choisnet v. State, 295 Ga. 568, 571 (2)
(761 SE2d 322) (2014) (punctuation and citation omitted).
Here, Appellant’s claim of entitlement to a delusional
compulsion instruction stems solely from his testimony that he shot
Officers Howard and Christian in response to hearing the voice of
his deceased brother urging him not to let the officers “do you like
they done me.” But Appellant has failed to offer any evidence – or
any claim, for that matter – that at the time of the crimes he suffered
from any “mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency” as
required by OCGA § 16-3-3. Moreover, Appellant himself
acknowledges that, even if his alleged delusion caused him to believe
he was acting in self-defense, his conduct in shooting the officers
would not have been “lawful and right” because he was at the time
31
fleeing to avoid capture for the kidnapping of Brooks. See OCGA §
16-3-21 (b) (2) (“A person is not justified in using force [in self-
defense] if he . . . [is] fleeing after the commission or attempted
commission of a felony[.]”). Accordingly, Appellant has failed to
establish any error, much less any plain error, in the trial court’s
failure to give a delusional compulsion insanity instruction.
5. Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by
admitting testimony from a GBI agent about images of Officer
Christian’s family that were visible on the screen of the on-board
laptop computer in Officer Christian’s patrol car. During the State’s
case, GBI Special Agent Jeff Roesler testified about responding to
the scene of Officer Christian’s murder and was questioned at length
about the numerous photographs he took during his crime scene
investigation. Among these photographs were those depicting
Officer Christian’s patrol car, some of which showed the monitor of
an on-board laptop computer docked near the car’s center console.
Agent Roesler testified that during his inspection he noticed the
laptop screensaver scrolling through various images, and, when
32
asked specifically whether any of those images showed Officer
Christian’s family, he responded affirmatively. Though Appellant
objected to this testimony on grounds of relevance and prejudice, the
State argued that the photographs showed “what was going on in
[Officer Christian’s] car at the time he was shot” and thus were
relevant to disproving justification by showing that the car was not
in motion at the time of the shooting. The trial court overruled
Appellant’s objections and allowed the testimony. Upon further
questioning, Agent Roesler testified about “a photograph of a child
by himself, and then another child, and . . . a family photograph, and
. . . other photos coming across as well.”
Pretermitting whether this testimony was properly admitted,
any possible error in the admission of this testimony was harmless
in light of the overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt as to the
murder of Officer Christian. Appellant admits that he intentionally
shot Officer Christian and, while expressing remorse, he has offered
neither argument nor evidence that this shooting was justified.
Thus, it is highly probable that any error in admitting the testimony
33
in question “did not contribute to the verdict.” Peoples v. State, 295
Ga. 44, 55 (4) (c) (757 SE2d 646) (2014) (citation omitted) (reciting
standard for nonconstitutional harmless error). See also Puckett v.
State, 303 Ga. 719, 721 (2) (814 SE2d 726) (2018) (any error in
admission of photograph was harmless because evidence of
appellant’s guilt was overwhelming). In addition, similar testimony
about these images of Officer Christian’s family was given by
another law enforcement officer, with no objection by Appellant.
Thus, to the extent Agent Roesler’s testimony was improperly
admitted, it was cumulative of other unobjected-to testimony and
any error in its admission was therefore harmless. See Rutledge v.
State, 298 Ga. 37, 40 (2) (779 SE2d 275) (2015) (because challenged
testimony was cumulative of properly admitted evidence, any error
in admitting it was harmless).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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