Daniels v. State ( 2022 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 8, 2022
S21A1268. DANIELS v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
A Muscogee County jury found Kevonta Daniels guilty of felony
murder in connection with the shooting death of Kenneth Moore; the
aggravated assaults of Jai Williams, Jamal Williams, and James
Williams; the theft of vehicles belonging to Jamal Williams, Marcus
Jones, and Alvin Walker; and other offenses. Following the denial of
his motion for new trial, Daniels argues on appeal that the trial
court erred by admitting statements he made to the police into
evidence at trial. Daniels, who was 14 years old at the time of the
crimes and when he was interviewed by the police, specifically
argues that the State failed to prove that he knowingly and
voluntarily waived his constitutional rights before speaking with the
police and that his statements should also have been excluded
because the police failed to comply with provisions of the Juvenile
Code relating to custody of juvenile arrestees. We affirm. 1
1 The crimes occurred between December 17 and December 25, 2017. On
July 10, 2018, a Muscogee County grand jury returned a 15-count indictment
against Daniels, Ladarius Render, Marquez Clayton, and Devin Burden. The
indictment charged Daniels, Clayton, and Render with the malice murder of
Moore (Count 1); the felony murder of Moore (Count 2); burglary in the first
degree of Moore’s dwelling (Count 3); armed robbery of Moore (Count 4); the
aggravated assaults of Moore, Jai Williams, Jamal Williams, and James
Williams (Counts 5, 8, 9, and 10); and theft by taking a vehicle belonging to
Jamal Williams (Count 12). Daniels and Render were charged jointly with theft
by taking a vehicle belonging to Marcus Jones (Count 6). Daniels was charged
individually with possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Count 13) and theft by taking a vehicle belonging to Alvin Walker (Count 14).
Burden was charged individually with theft by receiving Jones’s stolen vehicle
(Count 7) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count
11). Render was charged individually with theft by receiving Walker’s stolen
vehicle (Count 15).
Burden’s case was severed from those of the other co-defendants, and he
testified as a witness for the State. It appears that he later entered guilty pleas
as to Counts 7 through 12. His case is not part of this appeal.
Daniels, Clayton, and Render were tried before a jury from June 17 to
June 27, 2019. As to Daniels, Clayton, and Render, the trial court entered a
directed verdict of not guilty as to Count 4. The jury found Daniels not guilty
of Count 1 and guilty of Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 14. Clayton was
tried only as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 and found not guilty of each count. The
jury found Render not guilty of Counts 1 and 6 but guilty of Counts 2, 3, 5, 8,
9, 10, 12, and 15. Clayton and Render’s cases are not part of this appeal.
On August 26, 2019, the trial court sentenced Daniels to life in prison on
Count 2; 20 years in prison on Count 8, to be served consecutively to Count 2;
ten years in prison on Count 6, to be served concurrently with Count 8; 20 years
in prison on Count 9, to be served concurrently with Count 8; 20 years in prison
on Count 10, to be served concurrently with Count 9; ten years in prison on
Count 12, to be served concurrently with Count 8; five years in prison on Count
13, to be served consecutively to Count 2; and ten years in prison on Count 14,
to be served concurrently with Count 10. The trial court merged Counts 3 and
2
1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following. During
the early morning of December 17, 2017, Daniels stole a red Toyota
Tacoma truck from Marcus Jones’s residence in Columbus. The next
day, Daniels and Ladarius Render drove the truck to Kenneth
Moore’s home on Curry Street. Daniels then kicked in the back door
of Moore’s house, and Daniels and Render went inside. They took
Christmas presents, Moore’s cell phone, and a key ring with spare
keys to three cars owned by the Moore family.
Moore returned home while Daniels and Render were still
inside, and he was shot twice, once in the abdomen and once in the
shoulder. Daniels later told Devin Burden that both he and Render
fired shots at Moore. Around 10:30 a.m., police officers responded to
a 911 call. They found Moore inside his house injured from gunshot
5 into Count 2 for sentencing. The State has not challenged this purported
merger, and we decline to address it sua sponte. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga.
691, 696-698 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017).
Daniels filed a motion for new trial on June 29, 2019, which he amended
through new counsel on November 12, 2020. Following a hearing on December
16, 2020, the trial court denied Daniels’s motion for new trial, as amended, on
February 19, 2021. Daniels filed a notice of appeal on March 3, 2021. His case
was docketed to this Court’s August 2021 term and submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
3
wounds, but conscious. Moore was taken to the hospital.
Moore spent 13 days in the hospital, underwent two surgeries,
and eventually died on January 1, 2018. The medical examiner
determined that Moore’s death was caused by a series of blood clots
in his lower extremities resulting from his two gunshot wounds and
that the manner of death was homicide.
At some point, Daniels gave Jones’s truck to Burden, who knew
that it had been stolen. On December 21, 2017, the truck was found
by the police.
On December 24, Alvin Walker went outside to start his 2004
Acura MDX at his home on Muriel Street. After starting the car,
Walker went inside for about three minutes, leaving his car
unlocked and unattended. While Walker was inside, Daniels got into
the running Acura and drove it away. When Walker came back
outside, the Acura was gone. Later that night, Walker saw someone
drive the Acura by his house.
The next day, December 25, Jamal Williams drove to his
parents’ house on Dirk Way. After he arrived, Jamal left his Buick
4
Lucerne running while he went inside the house. Render, Daniels,
and Burden drove by in the stolen Acura and noticed the
unaccompanied Buick running in the driveway. Daniels got out of
the Acura and into the running Buick and drove away. Still in the
Acura, Render and Burden followed Daniels in the Buick.
Inside the house, Jamal’s father, James Williams, grabbed his
gun and James, Jamal, and Jamal’s brother, Jai Williams, went
after the Buick in James’s car. They followed the Buick to Belvedere
Park.
When they saw the Williamses approaching, Render and
Burden drove away in the stolen Acura to retrieve weapons. Daniels
fired a shot which shattered the glass of James’s car and hit Jamal.
James and Jai fired multiple shots back at Daniels. Jai recovered
the Buick after the shootout and drove it back to James’s house.
The Columbus police recovered Walker’s Acura a few days
later. Inside the Acura, officers recovered a Charter Arms .38-caliber
revolver. There was also a shell casing on the floorboard. Although
the Williamses stated that no shots had been fired at them from the
5
Acura, Burden later told the police that the revolver had been used
in the shooting at Belvedere Park.
Daniels was arrested at his home around 9:45 a.m. on January
11, 2018, and was taken to a Columbus police station. Through the
use of an advice-of-rights form designed specifically for juveniles,
Daniels was given Miranda warnings 2 by Detective Jason Carden at
11:40 a.m.3 Detective Carden then interviewed Daniels regarding
some vehicle break-ins unrelated to this case.4 When Detective
Carden concluded his questioning, Investigator Ray Harralson
asked Daniels about the thefts of a Toyota Tacoma and an Acura
and some other thefts unrelated to this case. Investigator Harralson
testified at trial that Daniels confessed to being involved in the
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)
(1966).
3 Detective Carden testified that the form he read to Daniels included
“layman’s terms for a juvenile” further explaining each of the Miranda
warnings. As he was talking through the form with Daniels, Detective Carden
referred to the reading of the rights form as a “formality” that they needed to
complete before Daniels could talk to the officers.
4 It appears that Daniels did not challenge the admission of testimony
regarding unrelated crimes by witnesses for the State under OCGA § 24-4-404
(b), and he has not challenged any evidence presented at trial on that basis in
this appeal.
6
thefts of the Tacoma and Acura. Investigator Joseph Austin entered
the room and assisted Investigator Harralson with his questioning
for about 15 minutes. Investigator Austin then began questioning
Daniels about a different set of vehicle thefts after Investigator
Harralson concluded his questions. Investigator Austin testified
that during their discussion Daniels admitted that he stole a Buick
and that he had been a part of the shooting at Belvedere Park. 5
Investigator Austin testified that he did not provide Daniels with
food but was told Daniels was given two slices of pizza and
something to drink at the police station.
At some point that afternoon, Daniels was moved to a different
5 Daniels’s interviews with Detective Carden and Investigators
Harralson and Austin were audio and video recorded on a single recording,
which was admitted as State’s Exhibit 20 in conjunction with Detective
Carden’s testimony. It appears from the record that only the portion of the
recording showing Detective Carden advising Daniels of his rights was played
for the jury. During the portion of that interview where Investigators
Harralson and Austin questioned Daniels, the audio was garbled and largely
unintelligible. The video shows both officers in the room speaking with Daniels,
and the date and time are displayed on the video. Both Investigators Harralson
and Austin testified at trial regarding their interviews of Daniels, but the
portion of the recording of their discussions with him was not played for the
jury.
7
interview room. 6 At 3:25 p.m., Daniels again received Miranda
warnings through the use of a juvenile advice-of-rights form from
Detective Delante Odom. Detective Odom then told Daniels that he
wanted to talk to him about the Curry Street burglary. Around 3:35
p.m., Daniels told Detective Odom that he kicked in the door to
Moore’s house, searched for money and jewelry, and then ran out of
the house after hearing a gunshot. Detective Odom’s interview with
Daniels concluded just after 4:00 p.m. 7
6 The recording shows that Investigators Harralson and Austin
continued questioning Daniels until around 1:20 p.m. and then left Daniels
alone in the interview room. The recording continued running until 1:41 p.m.,
at which time Daniels could still be seen sitting in the interview room alone. It
is not clear from the record where Daniels was or what transpired between
1:41 p.m. and the beginning of his interview with Detective Odom.
7 Daniels’s interview with Detective Odom was audio and video recorded.
Portions of the interview were redacted pursuant to a stipulation between the
State, Daniels, Clayton, and Render, and the redacted version was admitted at
trial as State’s Exhibit 1A. The recording shows that after Detective Odom left
the room, Daniels sat quietly and began to cry, saying “I just want to hug my
momma” and that he was “sorry.” Approximately 15 minutes later,
Investigator Harralson entered the room and spoke with Daniels about some
other uncharged property crimes before exiting the room. A few minutes later,
Detective Odom returned to the room and asked Daniels whether he knew a
person depicted in a photograph. Detective Carden and Investigators
Harralson and Austin came in and out of the room over the next few minutes
questioning Daniels again. Although unclear from the recording, it appears
that they were questioning him in regard to whether others had been involved
in some of the crimes about which he had already been questioned. The video
8
2. In related enumerations of error, Daniels argues that his
statements to the police should have been excluded at trial. For the
reasons set forth below, we disagree with these contentions.
(a) Daniels first argues that his statements to the police should
have been excluded because the officers who arrested and
interviewed him did not comply with OCGA § 15-11-502 (a) (3). That
section of the Juvenile Code provides, in relevant part:
A person taking an alleged delinquent child into custody,
with all reasonable speed and without first taking such
child elsewhere, shall . . . [b]ring such child immediately
before the juvenile court or promptly contact a juvenile
court intake officer.
OCGA § 15-11-502 (b) provides an exception to this
requirement. Subsection (b) provides that, notwithstanding the
general rule of subsection (a),
a law enforcement officer may detain an alleged
delinquent child for a reasonable period of time sufficient
recording ended at 4:58 p.m. while Investigator Harralson was questioning
Daniels. The record is unclear as to when this interview concluded. However,
we note that Daniels’s trial counsel stated repeatedly in his closing argument
that the interviews on January 11 lasted “five and a half hours,” and that
Daniels’s briefs before this Court indicate that the interviews lasted “roughly”
six hours. Those characterizations, at least as to the starting and ending times,
are generally consistent with the timeline established by the audio and video
recordings of the interviews.
9
to conduct interrogations and perform routine law
enforcement procedures including but not limited to
fingerprinting, photographing, and the preparation of any
necessary records.
Daniels argues that his detention for questioning violated these
provisions of the Juvenile Code because he was not brought before a
juvenile court until the next day.
Daniels did not object to the admission of his incriminating
statements on this basis at trial. He did so for the first time in his
amended motion for new trial. Thus, his claim is subject to review
on appeal only for “plain error[] affecting substantial rights.” OCGA
§ 24-1-103 (d). To show plain error regarding the admission of
evidence, the appellant must satisfy a four-part test:
First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
deviation from a legal rule — that has not been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e.,
affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
case means he must demonstrate that it affected the
outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally,
if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court
has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which
ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the
10
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 327
(3) (781 SE2d 772) (2016).
Although the application of the exception set forth in OCGA §
15-11-502 (b) appears to be a matter of first impression for this
Court, 8 subsection (b) plainly authorized the police to detain and
interrogate Daniels for a reasonable period of time after his arrest.
And we cannot say that a period of roughly five and a half to six
hours was an obviously unreasonable time for interrogation in this
case, particularly given the range and number of incidents about
which Daniels was questioned by the police.
Daniels also asserted in his amended motion for new trial and
in his brief before this Court that he was first brought before the
juvenile court at 1:30 p.m. on January 12, the day after his
8 OCGA § 15-11-502 (a) (3) was carried forward from Georgia’s former
Juvenile Code. See former OCGA § 15-11-47 (a) (3). However, subsection (b)
first appeared in the Juvenile Code in 2014 as part of House Bill 242, the
General Assembly’s wholesale revision and reorganization of the Juvenile
Code. See Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, 417, § 1-1 (effective Jan. 1, 2014).
11
interviews with the police. However, Daniels points to nothing in the
record to support that assertion, nor does he even assert what
happened during the intervening hours, such as whether a juvenile
court intake officer was contacted. Thus, he has not shown that any
such delay was obviously unreasonable, such that it was an obvious
error under OCGA § 15-11 502 (b).
For these reasons, Daniels cannot show that the trial court
made a clear and obvious error by not excluding his statements at
trial due to a violation of the Juvenile Code. Accordingly, this
enumeration of error fails.
(b) (i) Daniels also argues that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his constitutional rights before making the
incriminating statements and that they should have been excluded
by the trial court under the test set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga.
124 (226 SE2d 922) (1976). We see no error in the trial court’s
admission of these statements on that basis.
In evaluating whether a juvenile defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waived his rights during an interrogation,
the State bears the burden of showing by a preponderance
12
of the evidence that the juvenile understood and waived
his rights under the totality of the circumstances[.]
(Punctuation omitted.) Bedford v. State, 311 Ga. 329, 334 (3) (857
SE2d 708) (2021). We have said that courts are to consider nine
factors in making that determination:
(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3)
knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the
charge and the nature of his rights to consult with an
attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is
held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives,
friends[,] or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was
interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed;
(6) methods used in interrogation; (7) length of
interrogations; (8) whether [or not] the accused refused to
voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9)
whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial
statement at a later date.
Lester v. State, 310 Ga. 81, 85 (2) (849 SE2d 425) (2020) (citing Riley,
237 Ga. at 128). 9
9 We noted in Lester that even though Riley was decided in the limited
context of whether a juvenile defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights,
this Court has also relied on the Riley factors in evaluating whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, a juvenile’s confession was given voluntarily as a
matter of due process, which is a separate inquiry. See Lester, 310 Ga. at 85
n.7 (2) (citing Oubre v. Woldemichael, 301 Ga. 299, 305 (800 SE2d 518) (2017);
Murray v. State, 276 Ga. 396, 397-398 (2) (578 SE2d 853) (2003); Jackson v.
State, 272 Ga. 191, 195 (2) (528 SE2d 232) (2000)).
13
“Although we independently apply the law to the facts, the trial
court’s determinations and factual findings must be upheld on
appeal unless clearly erroneous.” Bedford, 311 Ga. at 334 (3).
However, where, as here, recordings of the custodial interviews are
part of the appellate record, this Court “may also consider facts that
definitely can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence
that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility, such
as facts indisputably discernible from audio- or video-recordings.”
(Citation omitted.) Dawson v. State, 308 Ga. 613, 619 (3) (842 SE2d
875) (2020). Moreover, the trial court is not required to make explicit
findings on the record as to each of the Riley factors so long as it is
clear from the record that the trial court applied the factors in
reaching its determination. See Green v. State, 282 Ga. 672, 674 (2)
(653 SE2d 23) (2007).
(ii) On Daniels’s motion, the trial court held two Jackson-
Denno hearings 10 regarding the admissibility of Daniels’s
statements to the police. According to the evidence presented in the
10 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
14
first of those hearings, which was conducted just before jury
selection, Daniels was arrested at his home around 9:45 a.m. on
January 11. His mother was present in the home when Daniels was
arrested, and she testified that “probably like ten” officers came to
her house with guns drawn to arrest Daniels. According to Daniels’s
mother, one of the officers, whom she could not later identify, told
her that as long as Daniels “cooperated,” he would “come home,” but
that there would be “consequences” if he did not. According to his
mother, Daniels was standing two or three feet away when the
officer said this to her. Daniels was then taken to a police station.
He called his mother about an hour or two later. When they spoke,
according to his mother, Daniels was crying and was “hysterical.”
That call was the only time Daniels spoke with his mother that day.
Daniels’s mother never asked to come to the police station to be with
Daniels.
Following his arrest, Daniels gave a series of interviews with
several detectives that day. At the hearing, Detective Odom testified
that he assisted another detective with the investigation of the home
15
invasion and shooting at Moore’s house on Curry Street and, as part
of that investigation, interviewed Daniels beginning at 3:25 p.m. A
video recording of Odom’s interview of Daniels was played for the
trial court. Detective Odom began by discussing a juvenile advice-
of-rights form with Daniels, a copy of which was admitted at the
hearing. 11 After Daniels was advised of his rights, he stated that he
understood them. Detective Odom testified that Daniels did not
appear to be confused or disoriented. Detective Odom had learned
that Daniels was 14 years old, and Daniels told Odom that he was
in the ninth grade in school. After their discussion, Daniels signed
next to the portion of the form indicating that he had read his rights,
that he understood them, that he was willing to waive his rights and
answer questions without an attorney present, that he understood
what he was doing, that no promises or threats had been made, and
11 The juvenile advice-of-rights form used by Detective Odom was the
same form used by Detective Carden, as described in footnote 3 above.
Detective Odom testified that the advice-of-rights form for juveniles is different
from the form used for adults. Detective Odom testified that the juvenile form
contains a series of parentheticals that “interpret” statements regarding the
suspect’s rights into simpler language.
16
that no pressure had been used against him.
Detective Odom testified that he was trying to build a “rapport”
with Daniels and that he made no threats, promises, or offers of
rewards and gave no hope of benefit or inducements to get Daniels
to speak with him. In the interview, Daniels first told Detective
Odom that he had nothing to do with the burglary at Curry Street
and then suggested that some other people had been involved.
Detective Odom said that he did not believe Daniels and explained
that he had evidence that Daniels and Render were involved in the
Curry Street burglary. Detective Odom then told Daniels that he
should “think about” his mother and whether, if someone
burglarized her house, he would want that person to tell the truth
about what happened. After that exchange, Daniels admitted that
he was involved in the burglary but accused Render of shooting
Moore. Detective Odom then told Daniels that Moore had died.
Daniels said that the burglary was a “random lick.” He and
Detective Odom then discussed what Daniels and Render did with
the proceeds of the robbery.
17
Daniels’s mother was not present for the interview, and
Detective Odom testified that he did not contact her. According to
Detective Odom, Daniels never asked to speak with his mother or a
lawyer and never asked for food or a break. Detective Odom testified
that once he concluded his interview of Daniels, he “turned [Daniels]
back over” to the other detectives. Detective Odom did not know if
Daniels had been given any breaks during the day, but he testified
that persons being interviewed are offered food and drinks and given
bathroom breaks upon request.
At the conclusion of the first Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial
court ruled from the bench that, considering the totality of the
circumstances, Daniels’s statements to Detective Odom were made
after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights,
noting specifically that it had considered “the mode, method,
duration, manner, and conditions of interrogation, the defendant’s
educational level, and the evidentiary record that Mr. Daniels has
chosen to provide.” Based on that determination, the court ruled
that, subject to other objections, Daniels’s incriminating statements
18
could be admitted at trial. 12
The next day, following the presentation of the State’s first two
witnesses, the trial court held a second Jackson-Denno hearing. In
that hearing, Detective Carden was called to testify, and a video
recording of Detective Carden advising Daniels of his constitutional
rights and completing an advice-of-rights form was played for the
trial court. The advice-of-rights form was admitted into evidence at
the hearing. Detective Carden began interviewing Daniels around
11:40 a.m. on January 11, 2018, and he spoke with Daniels for about
20 minutes. Detective Carden testified that Daniels did not appear
to be under the influence of any substances at the time and did not
appear to be confused about what was happening when Detective
Carden advised him of his rights. Detective Carden testified that he
did not threaten, coerce, or force Daniels to make any statements
and that he did not make any offers of rewards or inducements to
him. Detective Carden testified that he never told Daniels he would
12The only testimony received by the trial court at this hearing was from
Detective Odom and Daniels’s mother.
19
get to go home and that Daniels appeared to understand what was
going on, appeared to understand his rights, and that he waived his
rights.
When Detective Carden began interviewing Daniels, two other
detectives were in the room, but one of them left following the giving
of the Miranda warnings. 13 Detective Carden informed Daniels that
each of the detectives had charges against him that they wanted to
discuss and showed him folders containing several arrest warrants.
Daniels indicated that he was 14 years old and was in the ninth
grade at the time of the interview. Detective Carden asked Daniels
if he had problems reading or writing, and Daniels said he did not.
After the advisement of rights, Detective Carden explained to
Daniels that he could help himself by being truthful and then
explained to Daniels that although he had “a lot of charges” he could
be “exceptionally cleared.” Detective Carden explained to Daniels
that “exceptionally cleared” is when the police find a person who is
13Detective Carden admitted on cross-examination that having more
than two officers present for an interrogation violated Columbus Police
Department procedures.
20
responsible for a case but choose not to charge them with it.
Detective Carden explained that this was common in cases where a
person has committed multiple “property” crimes. He gave an
example of someone who had broken into 100 cars. Detective Carden
explained that if a suspect is dishonest he might be charged with all
of the crimes but that if the suspect is honest “he might catch five or
six of them instead of a hundred.”
Daniels interrupted Detective Carden’s explanation and said,
“So what you’re saying is, ‘If I help you, you help me.’” Detective
Carden replied, “Yes, that’s what I’m saying.” Detective Carden then
explained that “near every detective up here” had cases on Daniels.
Detective Carden next asked Daniels about a number of vehicle
break-ins that were unrelated to this case. As Detective Carden was
wrapping up his questioning, he said, “That pretty much clears up
my entering autos.” Daniels then said, “Like we said, if I help you,
you help me.” Detective Carden replied,
Yes, sir, we will. You’re not going to get charged with
breaking into any cars at these other two apartment
complexes. The stuff I’ve got charged on you now, that’s
21
there. We’ll help you out with that in court. We’ll make
our recommendation to the district attorney, and all that
stuff. OK. That’s gonna be my case. Between me and her
we’ll talk about it, and we’ll figure out something for you.
But any of this stuff you’ve been telling us about this stuff
you’ve been doing, I have no qualms — I’m not gonna
charge you with it.
Detective Carden then asked Daniels about some other thefts
unrelated to this case. Detective Harralson was present during that
questioning and, as Detective Carden was leaving the room, began
questioning Daniels about the theft of a Toyota Tacoma and an
Acura and other thefts unrelated to this case.
At the Jackson-Denno hearing, Detective Carden testified that
“[e]xceptionally cleared is when we just choose to not prosecute on
certain cases due to the number of property crimes.” Detective
Carden further testified that the police sometimes “have people
confess to 30 or 40 [crimes]. And we exceptionally clear some of them
and move forward with the rest of them.” Detective Carden later
stated that this discussion with Daniels was a way of asking Daniels
22
to give truthful statements.14
Detective Carden further testified as follows. When Daniels
was arrested, “pretty much the entire burglary and theft unit,” or
“roughly nine detectives,” came to Daniels’s house because they were
looking for several people at the time in connection with a series of
property crimes. Detective Carden approached the house in a “ready
position,” meaning that his weapon was drawn but not necessarily
pointed at anyone. Daniels was called out of one of the back
bedrooms of the house, was eventually handcuffed, and was then
transported to a police station. Detective Carden testified that
officers are required to feed suspects and give them bathroom breaks
when they are being held for questioning.
At the close of the second Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial
14 At trial, Detective Carden also testified as follows:
Exceptionally cleared is when we have somebody say they’re
charged with breaking into, say a hundred cars. We don’t charge
them with all of them. We just charge them with the most serious
ones, the entering autos. And basically if they confess to it and they
cooperate, we don’t charge them with all of them. We just charge
them with a few of them.
Detective Carden testified that his investigation involved break-ins that are
not part of this case.
23
court again ruled from the bench, finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that Daniels’s statements to the police were “freely and
knowingly given without hope or expectation of benefits or threat of
harm or coercion.”
Daniels again challenged the admissibility of his statements in
his amended motion for new trial, which he filed through new
counsel. There, Daniels argued that additional evidence about the
interrogations that came out at trial, including the fact that Daniels
was interrogated by as many as six investigators or detectives
throughout the day on January 11, showed that Daniels’s waiver of
his rights was not knowing and voluntary. 15
15 Daniels included, as an exhibit to his amended motion, a psychological
evaluation that had been prepared by an examiner from the Georgia
Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities in
conjunction with the transfer of Daniels’s case from juvenile court to superior
court. The motion highlighted portions of the report showing that Daniels was
likely “functioning within the Low Average-Borderline range of intelligence,”
that his IQ is between 73 and 85 and that his “overall pattern of performance
reflected lower than average ability” to verbalize his thoughts, elaborate on
responses, and “identify concrete and abstract relationships between words
and concepts.” The report also noted that individuals with profiles similar to
Daniels present with “significant anxiety and tension” and an inability to meet
minimal expectations without feeling overwhelmed. The report noted that
Daniels had a history of behavioral issues that began in elementary school and
24
In his motion, Daniels also argued that the trial court had not
correctly applied the Riley factors, as its verbal rulings after the
Jackson-Denno hearings referenced the court’s findings that
Daniels’s statements were made “freely and voluntarily” rather than
that they should be admitted under the nine factors set forth in
Riley. The trial court rejected this argument and denied Daniels’s
motion for new trial.
(iii) On appeal, Daniels again argues that the trial court erred
by not outlining specific findings as to the Riley factors in its verbal
rulings and in its order denying Daniels’s motion for new trial.
However,
we generally do not require trial courts to make specific,
on-the-record findings about each aspect of the totality of
continued into middle school. The report indicated that Daniels was last
enrolled in ninth grade but had transferred to an alternative school at the
beginning of the most recent school year. His school attendance was also
inconsistent. The report concluded that there was “no evidence of serious
cognitive deficits such that [Daniels] would be committable as a mentally
impaired individual” and that Daniels’s “history of academic difficulties
appears related to his history of disruptive behavior and low motivation
towards academic pursuits.” This evaluation, however, was not admitted into
evidence at either Jackson-Denno hearing, at trial, or at the hearing on
Daniels’s motion for new trial, and Daniels has raised no claim that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present the evidence of the
evaluation.
25
the circumstances they evaluate or to make explicit
factual findings or credibility determinations on the
record. Indeed, unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s
credibility determinations and factual findings relating to
the admissibility of a confession, whether explicit or
implicit, must be upheld on appeal, although we
independently apply the law to the facts.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lester, 310 Ga. at 86 (2). So long
as the record is “sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that [the]
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel
and that his statements were properly admitted at trial under the
Riley test,” the trial court need not detail its application of the Riley
factors. (Citation omitted.) Id.
Here, despite Daniels’s contention to the contrary, it is clear
from the record of the Jackson-Denno hearings, the hearing on
Daniels’s motion for new trial, and the trial court’s order denying
that motion that the trial court was aware of and considered the
Riley factors in making its determination. See Bedford, 311 Ga. at
334-335 (3). Daniels’s Jackson-Denno motion cited Riley, and
Daniels’s trial counsel and the prosecutor outlined the State’s
burden of proof and the nine Riley factors for the trial court during
26
arguments at both Jackson-Denno hearings. Defense counsel also
noted Daniels’s age and education level, the circumstances of his
arrest, the length and method of his interrogation, the fact that his
mother was not present, and evidence regarding breaks and food
Daniels received to argue that his statements to the police should
have been excluded under Riley. In response, the State argued that
the Riley test had been satisfied. Thus, there is no question that the
trial court was aware of and applied the Riley factors in reaching its
determination.
(iv) Daniels also argues at length that the trial court
misapplied the Riley factors in reaching its conclusion that his
statements were admissible. We disagree.
Reviewing the nine Riley factors in order, we first note that the
record shows that Daniels was 14 years old when he was interviewed
by the police (the interviews took place the day before Daniels’s
fifteenth birthday). 16 During his interviews, Daniels told the police
16Daniels’s birthday, as listed on the advice-of-rights forms he read and
signed with Detectives Carden and Odom, is January 12, 2003.
27
that he was in the ninth grade in school and that he could read and
write. See Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 838 (2) (848 SE2d 882) (2020). 17
Daniels was given the Miranda warnings twice on January 11
through the use, both times, of an advice-of-rights form designed
specifically for juveniles. Both times, he waived his rights by signing
the form and answered questions from the officers. Daniels was also
advised by Detective Carden at the outset of the interview that he
was being questioned in regard to a series of vehicle thefts and
break-ins and eventually admitted to Investigators Harralson and
Austin that he had been involved in the thefts of a Toyota Tacoma,
an Acura, and a Buick, as well as a shootout in Belvedere Park.
Similarly, when Detective Odom began questioning Daniels, he
advised him that he wanted to know about the break-in at Moore’s
house that culminated in Moore’s shooting.
Daniels notes that his mother was not present for his
17 As noted above, Daniels provided the trial court with the report of a
psychological evaluation of him as an exhibit to his amended motion for new
trial. However, the report was not admitted into evidence at either Jackson-
Denno hearing or the hearing on Daniels’s motion for new trial.
28
interviews, that he was not advised that she could be present, and
that she was never notified that she could be present. However, the
record indicates that his mother was present when he was arrested.
And according to her testimony at the first Jackson-Denno hearing,
she also spoke with him on the phone “an hour or two” after he was
arrested.18 Neither Daniels nor his mother ever asked that she be
present while he was being interviewed. We have previously noted
that “[a] parent’s presence, although not required, is a significant
factor in support of a finding of waiver.” Norris v. State, 282 Ga. 430,
431 (2) (651 SE2d 40) (2007). However, this factor is not
determinative as to this Riley factor or the analysis as a whole. See
Lester, 310 Ga. at 88 (2); Love, 309 Ga. at 838 (2). We also note that
the record supports the trial court’s finding that Daniels never asked
to speak with an attorney or anyone else during the interviews.
Thus, there is no evidence that Daniels was held incommunicado.
18 There appears to be no other evidence that this call took place. Because
this call is not seen on the first video-recorded interview, if it happened in the
timeframe described by Daniels’s mother, it must have occurred, if at all, before
the interviews started about two hours after Daniels’s arrest.
29
Riley also requires the court to consider the timing of the
charges against Daniels, specifically whether Daniels was
interrogated before or after formal charges were filed. The record
makes clear that Daniels was interviewed before he was indicted.
The interviews took place on January 11, 2018, and he was not
indicted until July 10, 2018. However, Daniels was advised at the
outset of his interview with Detective Carden that he had several
warrants pending relating to various “property” crimes. Later,
Detective Odom advised Daniels that he wanted to speak to him
about the burglary at Curry Street before asking Daniels any
questions.
Daniels also asserts that the environment of his questioning
was intimidating and threatening. The record shows that Daniels
was arrested at his home by a team of officers (at least one of whom
had his gun drawn), but the interviews began one to two hours later
at the police station and were conducted by officers who were not
displaying weapons while questioning him. As noted above, Daniels
was questioned by multiple officers in a series of interviews the
30
same day, during which he made multiple inculpatory statements
regarding the thefts of several vehicles and the burglary that
culminated in Moore’s shooting.
The record shows that Detective Carden and Investigators
Harralson and Austin interviewed Daniels from 11:40 a.m. until
about 1:20 p.m. At some point that afternoon, he was moved to a
different interview room at the police station and was interviewed
by Detective Odom from 3:25 to 4:00 p.m. The record shows that he
then spoke with Detective Carden and Investigators Harralson and
Austin in the interview room. Daniels was speaking with
Investigator Harralson just before 5:00 p.m. when the recording
ended. Although our cases do not suggest that there is a limit on the
amount of time for which a juvenile can be questioned, we have
noted that an interview was “relatively lengthy” where the juvenile
suspect was questioned for two-and-a-half hours and held in an
interrogation room for more than four hours. Oubre v.
Woldemichael, 301 Ga. 299, 305 (2) (a) (800 SE2d 518) (2017).
According to Daniels’s mother, he called her “an hour or two”
31
after his arrest and was “hysterical.” The video recording of the
interview with Detective Odom also showed Daniels crying after he
admitted being involved in the Curry Street burglary and after
Detective Odom left the interview room. That he was upset during
his call with his mother and was seen crying after his interview with
Detective Odom does not show that the interrogation was abusive.
The detectives testified that it was standard practice to provide
snacks and bathroom breaks upon request. Investigator Austin also
testified that he was informed that Daniels was given pizza and
something to drink at the police station, and nothing in the record
suggests that Daniels asked for other food or drink and was denied
access to them. Likewise, nothing in the record suggests that
Daniels asked for breaks or was denied them. Moreover, nothing
suggests that the presence of more than one officer during portions
of his interview was unduly coercive or intimidating. See Norris, 282
Ga. at 432 (2) (noting that even though the juvenile suspect became
upset and began to cry when confronted with accusations, there was
no evidence that the interrogation was abusive); Chapman v. State,
32
273 Ga. 865, 869 (4) (a) (548 SE2d 278) (2001) (upholding trial
court’s admission of juvenile statement where there was no evidence
that the interrogations were abusive or overly long).
There is no evidence in the record that Daniels had ever
previously refused to voluntarily give a statement to the police or
that he ever repudiated the statements he made to the police in this
case. See Love, 309 Ga. at 838 (2). Daniels asserts on appeal that
entering a plea of not guilty constituted a repudiation of his
statements, but we reject that assertion. See Norris, 282 Ga. at 432
(2) (noting that defendant, who pled not guilty, did not recant
confession until trial).
Daniels also asserts that the police officers made promises to
him in exchange for his statements. First, as to the statement
allegedly made by one of the officers that Daniels would be allowed
to “come home” if he cooperated with the police, Daniels’s mother
testified that an officer, whom she could not identify, said this to her
during Daniels’s arrest while Daniels was standing a few feet away.
But it is not clear that Daniels heard or understood this comment,
33
as it was directed to his mother, not him. Although the trial court
made no explicit finding on this point, it was authorized to
determine that the statement, if made, was not heard by Daniels.
Moreover, in his testimony, Detective Carden denied that he ever
promised Daniels that he could go home. The trial court could thus
determine that Daniels was never promised that he would be
allowed to go home if he cooperated. See Murphy v. State, 267 Ga.
100, 102 (7) (475 SE2d 590) (1996) (“The trial court was entitled to
determine the credibility of the witnesses and to believe the
officers[.]”).
We turn next to statements made to Daniels during his
interviews at the police station. Detective Carden made several
statements to Daniels about being “exceptionally cleared” if Daniels
told the truth about “property” crimes Daniels had been involved in.
Detective Carden also told Daniels that he would help Daniels with
the charges Daniels faced if Daniels told the truth. It was after these
statements by Detective Carden that Daniels made inculpatory
statements to Investigators Harralson and Austin regarding the
34
thefts of the Tacoma, Acura, and Buick and the shootout at
Belvedere Park. According to the police, those statements helped to
link Daniels to the burglary and shooting at Moore’s house, his role
in which he confessed to Detective Odom later in the day.
While Detective Carden’s statements suggested to Daniels that
his cooperation and truthfulness regarding the uncharged
“property” crimes he had been involved in would result in Daniels
being charged with fewer crimes, and thus may have constituted a
“hope of benefit” under Georgia law, see OCGA § 24-8-824, these
assurances by Carden were not determinative as to the “methods of
interrogation” factor or the Riley test as a whole.19 See Oubre, 301
19 We note that Daniels never challenged the admission of his custodial
statements under OCGA § 24-8-824, the Georgia statute which provides that
“[t]o make a confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily,
without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest
fear of injury.” Instead, Daniels repeatedly argued only that his statements
should have been excluded as being in violation of the requirements Miranda
established under the United States Constitution using the Riley test
applicable to juvenile defendants.
We have suggested that the statute and the Riley test are intertwined
such that a violation of the statute weighs strongly toward exclusion of the
statements under Riley. See Oubre, 301 Ga. at 306-307 (2) (a). However,
although Oubre indicated that the use of aggressive interrogation methods,
including providing a hope of benefit, may be the “most significant[]” factor in
35
the Riley analysis, Oubre, 301 Ga. at 306, it did so while considering the Riley
factors in the context of a federal due process analysis, rather than whether
the juvenile defendant had voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda,
which is at issue in this appeal.
Moreover, with regard to whether a defendant’s inculpatory statement
(rather than his waiver of his right against self-incrimination) was made
voluntarily, OCGA § 24-8-824 and the Riley test actually provide separate
paths for suppressing the statement. We have noted this distinction in the
context of interrogations of adult suspects. See Matthews v. State, 311 Ga. 531,
542 (3) (b) (858 SE2d 718) (2021) (contrasting constitutional question of
whether a confession is inadmissible as a violation of due process because it
was not voluntary under the totality of the circumstances with OCGA § 24-8-
824, which “involves ‘a narrowly focused test that presents ‘a single question’
targeted at ‘the reliability – the truth or falsity – of [the defendant’s]
confession[.]’” (quoting State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 779 (3) (b) (770 SE2d
808) (2015)). As we discussed in Chulpayev, with regard to adult confessions,
“our decisions have sometimes conflated the analysis of whether a confession
is voluntary under the statutory standard with the analysis of whether the
confession is voluntary under the constitutional due process standard.” 296 Ga.
at 779 (3) (b). We noted that “[t]his imprecision may stem from the fact that
proof that a defendant’s incriminatory statement was induced by a hope of
benefit or fear of injury in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824 is generally significant
proof that his constitutional [due process] rights were also violated.” Id. When
a defendant challenges the admission of his statement under OCGA § 24-8-
824, the statement must be excluded by the trial court if the statement was
induced by a hope of benefit. See Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 777 (3) (b) (“There is
no doubt that the statutory text mandates the exclusion from evidence of
incriminatory statements obtained in violation of the statute at trial[.]”).Of
course, admission of a defendant’s statement under OCGA § 24-8-824 is also
subject to harmless-error review. See Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 328-329
(2) (d) (830 SE2d 195) (2019). Moreover, “a violation of OCGA § 24-8-824 is not
automatically a federal [due process] violation too, because the tests for
determining the voluntariness of a confession under the statute and under the
Constitution are not the same.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 779 (3) (b); see
also United States v. Lall, 607 F3d 1277, 1285 (3) (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that
“a per se rule that would render a confession involuntary [as a matter of due
process] if it was preceded by ‘any direct or implied promises, however slight,’
has been rejected by the Supreme Court.” (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U. S. 279, 284-285 (111 SCt 1246, 113 LE2d 302) (1991)).
36
Ga. at 306 (“[O]ffering a hope of benefit is a method of interrogation,
a factor to be considered in evaluating the totality of the
circumstances under Riley.”).
We note in this regard that Detective Carden’s discussion of
the “exceptionally cleared” concept was clearly limited to uncharged
“property” crimes such as vehicle break-ins and thefts, not serious
felonies like home burglary, aggravated assault, or murder.
Moreover, in contrast to Detective Carden’s statements suggesting
that Daniels would receive fewer charges if he cooperated, Detective
Carden’s comments about Daniels helping himself by telling the
truth and recommending leniency to the prosecutor are not
considered a hope of benefit under OCGA § 24-8-824. See Dawson,
308 Ga. at 621 (3) (determining that statements by interviewing
A similar distinction applies in the context of determining whether a
juvenile defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under
Miranda and Riley. Where, as Daniels did in this appeal, a juvenile defendant
argues only that a custodial statement should be excluded under the federal
constitutional requirements of Miranda and Riley, the court can consider
whether the police provided a hope of benefit that induced his confession.
Whether the police used aggressive interrogation methods, including providing
a hope of benefit, is only one of the many factors that the courts consider under
Riley. And as we have stated, no one factor is necessarily determinative in the
Riley analysis.
37
officer imploring suspect to “tell the truth” and “help himself” do not
violate OCGA § 24-8-824 and that “it is permissible for a detective
to tell the accused that the detective will inform the district attorney
or trial court about the accused’s truthfulness and cooperation, so
long as the detective does not promise a hope of benefit.”). Daniels
has pointed to nothing in the record showing that the officers who
interviewed Daniels after Detective Carden and elicited his
admissions as to the crimes charged in this case — including
Detective Odom, who spoke to Daniels after a roughly two-hour
break — made any statements that constitute a hope of benefit
under the statute. 20 Compare Oubre, 301 Ga. at 306 (focusing on the
interviewing officers’ offer of reduced charges for the shooting for
which the juvenile was later indicted).
Thus, although some factors weigh against the trial court’s
ultimate determination that Daniels’s statements were admissible
20 During his trial testimony, Detective Odom was asked by Daniels’s
counsel if he explained the term “exceptionally cleared” to Daniels during his
interview. Detective Odom replied that he did not because he “wasn’t
exceptionally clearing anything.”
38
under Riley, we cannot say that the trial court erred. Daniels, who
the record shows was nearly 15 years old and could read and write,
was clearly advised of his rights two times and appeared to
understand them. And although his interviews were fairly lengthy,
there is nothing in the record to suggest that he was coerced,
intimidated, threatened, or held incommunicado by the police. He
was permitted to speak with his mother and was given food and
drink at the police station. He never asked to speak with a lawyer
or anyone else. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the
trial court erred in concluding that, under the totality of the
circumstances, Daniels made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his
Miranda rights under the Riley factors. See Bedford, 311 Ga. at 334
(3) (no trial court error in admitting incriminating statements
where, despite defendant’s age and low level of education, he was
informed of charges against him and his Miranda rights, was not
held incommunicado or for a very long time, was not prohibited from
consulting with relatives or an attorney, and was not abused or
oppressed during questioning). Compare State v. Lee, 298 Ga. 388,
39
389 (782 SE2d 249) (2016) (trial court properly concluded based on
the totality of the circumstances that 15-year-old defendant did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his rights where video recording
showed that defendant, who was at the police station for ten hours
and extremely distraught, never signed the waiver form, never
expressed an understanding of his rights, and appeared to have
minimal capacity to understand what little the investigators
attempted to communicate regarding his rights).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Nahmias,
C.J., Boggs, P.J., and Warren, J., who concur specially as to Division
2 (b).
40
S21A1268. DANIELS v. THE STATE.
NAHMIAS, Chief Justice, concurring specially in part.
I join Divisions 1 and 2 (a) of the Court’s opinion in full. As for
Division 2 (b), in which the Court upholds the trial court’s ruling
that Daniels voluntarily waived his Miranda rights under the
special Miranda-waiver test for juvenile defendants set forth in this
Court’s Riley decision, I have doubts about how a trial court is to
make, and an appellate court is to review, a ruling based on a nine-
factor, totality-of-the-circumstances test.21 Applying that test as best
21 See, e.g., David Kwok, Is Vagueness Choking the White-Collar Statute?,
53 GA. L. REV. 495, 523 (2019) (“Multifactor balancing tests incorporate a
number of discrete elements, and the relationship between the elements is not
transparent. An element might overlap significantly with another element,
and it may be unclear how much weight any particular element carries. This
indeterminate relationship can create uncertainty. Multipart balancing tests
may be useful [for] post-hoc explanation or justification of a decision, but they
are less useful in providing future guidance.” (footnotes omitted)); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182 (1989)
(“[A]t the point where an appellate judge says that the . . . issue must be
decided on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, or by a balancing of
all the factors involved, he begins to resemble a finder of fact more than a
determiner of law. . . . And to reiterate the unfortunate practical consequences
of reaching such a pass when there still remains a good deal of judgment to be
applied: equality of treatment is difficult to demonstrate and, in a multi-tiered
judicial system, impossible to achieve; predictability is destroyed; judicial
arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage is impaired.”).
41
I can, I think the question is closer than the Court’s opinion
indicates. But I cannot say that the Court reaches the wrong result,
particularly given the way Daniels’ case has been litigated.
As discussed in footnote 19 of the Court’s opinion, Daniels has
challenged the admissibility of his statements based on a claim
regarding the voluntariness of his waiver of Miranda rights, rather
than a claim regarding the voluntariness of his actual statements
under the Constitution (like the claim made in Oubre) or, even more
conspicuously, under Georgia’s statute rendering inadmissible
confessions that are “induced by . . . the slightest hope of benefit,”
OCGA § 24-8-824. In addition, footnote 15 of the Court’s opinion
indicates that evidence of Daniels’ limited intellectual capacity,
which is relevant to the Riley test, was available but was not
mentioned during the suppression hearings at trial and was not
actually offered into evidence during the motion for new trial
hearing. Moreover, as outlined in the Court’s opinion and mentioned
in its footnote 4, the evidence presented to the jury regarding
Daniels’ interviews was replete with discussion of criminal acts of
42
which he was accused by the police but not charged in this case, yet
no challenge to that evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) was made
at trial or on appeal. All of these issues could affect the admissibility
of some or all of Daniels’s statements to the police. Why his trial
counsel and appellate counsel litigated the case as they did, I do not
know. But this Court must decide his appeal based on the claims he
has raised and the evidence he has offered to support them. And for
that reason, I join the Court’s result as to Division 2 (b).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Boggs and
Justice Warren join in this special concurrence.
43