Jackson v. Sanders , 299 Ga. 332 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • In the Supreme Court of Georgia
    Decided: July 5, 2016
    S15G1896. JACKSON v. SANDERS.
    HUNSTEIN, Justice.
    We granted certiorari in this child support modification action to consider
    the construction of a particular provision of our child support statute, OCGA §
    19-6-15 (f) (4) (B), and its application in the context of the facts presented
    below. This provision is addressed to modification proceedings in which a
    parent “fails to produce reliable evidence of income,” thus impeding the trial
    court’s ability to fairly and reasonably calculate and allocate the parties’
    respective child support obligations. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
    it was within the trial court’s discretion to apply OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B) but
    that doing so required the court to utilize the increment prescribed thereunder
    – an “increase . . . of at least 10 percent per year of [the obligor’s] gross income”
    – in calculating the modified support obligation. Accordingly, we affirm the
    judgment of the Court of Appeals.
    In November 2001, Appellant Doug Jackson (“Father”) and Appellee Lisa
    Sanders (“Mother”) divorced in Florida. The final judgment and decree of
    divorce required Father to pay Mother $1,005 per month for the support of their
    infant son, based on Father’s then-current annual salary of $250,000.
    Subsequently, both parties relocated to the Atlanta area, and a decree was
    entered in Cobb Superior Court in 2007, incorporating the same child support
    requirement.
    Subsequently, Father moved for modification of custody and child
    support, and Mother counterclaimed, seeking an upward modification of child
    support. The trial court held a bench trial in March 2014 and thereafter entered
    a final order granting Mother’s motion for directed verdict on the custody
    modification and granting Mother’s request for an upward modification of child
    support. Regarding child support, the trial court found that Father “was not
    forthcoming with proof of his gross income and did not provide sufficient
    information to determine his gross income.” Specifically, the trial court found
    that the evidence Father presented was by turns incomplete, inconsistent,
    inaccurate, and not credible. Accordingly, the court determined that it was
    proper to apply OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B), which provides:
    2
    When cases with established orders are reviewed for modification
    and a parent fails to produce reliable evidence of income, such as
    tax returns for prior years, check stubs, or other information for
    determining current ability to pay child support or ability to pay
    child support in prior years, and the court or jury has no other
    reliable evidence of such parent’s income or income potential, the
    court or jury may increase the child support of the parent failing or
    refusing to produce evidence of income by an increment of at least
    10 percent per year of such parent’s gross income for each year
    since the final child support order was entered or last modified and
    shall calculate the basic child support obligation using the increased
    amount as such parent’s gross income.
    Having found that Father had failed to produce reliable evidence of his income,
    the court looked to the undisputed evidence that Father’s annual income at the
    time of the original 2001 child support order was $250,000 and imputed an
    increase of 4% per year for each of the 13 years since then, to arrive at a current
    imputed annual income of $380,000. Using this number, together with the
    undisputed evidence of Mother’s annual income and certain other undisputed
    amounts from the child support worksheet, the trial court calculated Father’s
    child support obligation at $3,994 per month.
    On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a divided whole court opinion,
    3
    vacated and remanded on this issue.1 The Court of Appeals’ three-judge
    plurality – joined by one additional judge, who concurred in judgment only –
    concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Father
    had failed to produce reliable evidence of his gross income and in thus resorting
    to OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B). Jackson v. Sanders, 
    333 Ga. App. 544
     (2) (773
    SE2d 835) (2015). The plurality also held, however, that “once the trial court
    exercised its discretion and chose to apply OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B), it failed
    to calculate [Father’s] income as mandated by that statute.” Id. at 553.
    Specifically, it held,
    the trial court erred by only applying a four percent incremental
    increase to calculate [Father’s] child-support obligation. Suffice it
    to say, the application of OCGA § 19–6–15(f) (4) (B) undoubtedly
    results in an extremely harsh penalty for parents who fail to produce
    reliable evidence of their incomes. But when the language of a
    statute is “plain and susceptible to only one natural and reasonable
    construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.” And
    OCGA § 19–6–15 (f) (4) (B) plainly provides that when a parent
    fails to produce reliable evidence of his or her gross income, the
    trial court has the discretion to determine whether such a Draconian
    penalty is warranted.
    Id. at 553-554. The appellate court therefore vacated the child support award
    1
    The Court of Appeals also reversed or vacated various other portions of the
    trial court’s order, none of which are at issue on certiorari.
    4
    and remanded for the trial court “to consider whether the application of OCGA
    § 19–6–15 (f) (4) (B) is still warranted, and if so, to recalculate [Father’s]
    child-support obligation using the formula set forth in that statute.” Id. at 554.
    The dissent, on the other hand, opined that, because Father had adduced some
    reliable evidence of his income, OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B) was inapplicable,
    and the trial court should simply have used its enlightened judgment to calculate
    Father’s gross income based on the evidence that was before it. Id. at 565-566.
    We granted certiorari to address the proper construction and application
    of OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B). We consider questions of statutory construction
    under a de novo standard of review. Hankla v. Postell, 
    293 Ga. 692
    , 693 (749
    SE2d 726) (2013). Once we have construed the statute, however, we must, in
    determining its proper application, defer to the trial court’s credibility
    determinations and uphold its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
    Autrey v. Autrey, 
    288 Ga. 283
     (2) (702 SE2d 878) (2010).
    Under our well-established rules of statutory construction, we
    presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said
    what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its
    plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the
    context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in
    its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the
    5
    English language would.
    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 
    294 Ga. 170
    , 172-173
    (751 SE2d 337) (2013). In our interpretation of statutes, we thus look to the text
    of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework,
    to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it. See id.; OCGA § 1-3-1 (a),
    (b).
    The first clause of OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B) makes clear that it applies
    only in child support modification actions. The text goes on to create two
    conditions precedent to the applicability of the provision: (1) a parent’s failure
    to produce “reliable evidence of income” and (2) the absence of any other
    “reliable evidence of such parent’s income or income potential.” Id. The text
    provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of evidence that might
    serve the purpose of establishing the parent’s income – tax returns and check
    stubs – and specifies that what is sought is information regarding the parent’s
    current or past ability to pay child support. Id. If these two conditions
    precedent are met, the text provides, the trier of fact “may” resort to the remedy
    of “increas[ing] the child support of th[at] parent . . . by an increment of at least
    10 percent per year of such parent’s gross income for each year” since the last
    6
    child support order was entered and “shall” calculate the modified support
    amount utilizing this increment. Id.
    We first address the question of whether application of the prescribed
    increment – “at least 10 percent per year of such parent’s gross income” – is
    required or merely authorized once the conditions precedent have been met. In
    isolation, the provision itself is less than clear on this point, because it first states
    that the trier of fact “may” utilize the prescribed increment but goes on to
    provide that the trier “shall” calculate the modified child support obligation
    using this amount. Notable in this regard is the phrasing of the subsection
    immediately preceding OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B), which addresses the
    absence of reliable evidence of income in an initial child support proceeding:
    in this situation, “gross income for the current year shall be determined by
    imputing gross income based on a 40 hour workweek at minimum wage.”
    (Emphasis added.) OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (A). Unlike with subparagraph (B),
    there is no question about the application of the designated formula in this
    subparagraph (A).
    This contrast indicates that OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B) was intended to
    be permissive rather than mandatory in nature. That is, if the two conditions
    7
    precedent are satisfied, the trier of fact has the discretion to utilize the prescribed
    formula as a proxy for the missing evidence. If the trier chooses to resort to this
    proxy, however, it is required to utilize the prescribed increment – “at least ten
    percent” – and is not at liberty to select a lower increment, as the trial court did
    here. This construction not only gives effect to the distinction in phrasing
    between subparagraph (A) and subparagraph (B), but is also the only cogent
    way to give meaning both to the permissive phrase “the court or jury may
    increase the child support” and to the subsequent phrase “and shall calculate the
    basic child support obligation using the increased amount.” (Emphasis added.)
    Id.2
    The remaining question is the proper construction of the conditions
    precedent, which both hinge on the meaning of the phrase “reliable evidence of
    income.” We begin by noting that OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B) is situated
    within the subsection of the child support statute that defines “gross income,”
    It also makes sense that the formula prescribed for use in initial child support
    2
    actions would be mandatory, given that if the trier had no reliable evidence of a
    parent’s income in making its initial child support determination, it would be
    compelled to make use of some proxy therefor. By contrast, in a modification
    proceeding, there will always be some modicum of evidence of the parent’s past
    income – from which the then-current child support obligation had previously been
    determined – and thus at least some baseline number from which to proceed.
    8
    the starting point for the child support calculation. See OCGA § 19-6-15 (b) (1).
    Thus, clearly, the “income” referred to in subsection (f) (4) (B) is gross income.
    “Gross income” is defined as “all income from any source . . . whether earned
    or unearned.” Id. at (f) (1) (A). “Reliable evidence” of such “income” must,
    then, consist of credible evidence from which a trier can determine a parent’s
    total income from all sources.
    Appellant’s suggestion that documentation of some indeterminate portion
    of a parent’s total income suffices to insulate the parent from the reach of
    subsection (f) (4) (B) is untenable. The clear intent of the subsection is to
    provide for a proxy – which is also in the nature of a penalty – for situations in
    which the parent’s failure to cooperate impedes the court’s ability to determine
    how appropriately to modify child support. Subsection (f) (4) (B) thus serves
    not only a functional purpose – in establishing a formula for fixing the parent’s
    gross income – but also a potentially disciplinary purpose – in mandating the use
    of a significant increment, potentially resulting in a substantial increase in the
    parent’s obligation. Its utility as a tool for trial courts and as a deterrent to non-
    cooperation by parents would be severely undercut if it were possible to avoid
    its application by producing documentation establishing only a fraction of the
    9
    parent’s total income.
    Accordingly, we hold that the trier of fact may utilize OCGA § 19-6-15
    (f) (4) (B) where it determines that (1) the parent has failed to produce, and (2)
    there is not otherwise available, credible evidence establishing a significant
    portion of the parent’s total gross income as defined in the statute. If the trier
    of fact determines that these conditions precedent have been satisfied, it will
    have the discretion to utilize the prescribed increment in determining the
    modified child support amount. If it elects not to do so, then it may turn to the
    methods it ordinarily employs in determining a parent’s gross income from
    incomplete information. See, e.g., Brogdon v. Brogdon, 
    290 Ga. 618
     (2) (723
    SE2d 421) (2012) (trial court properly determined father’s gross income by
    reference to evidence of his expenses, cash withdrawals, and personal use of his
    business account); Harris v. Snelgrove, 
    290 Ga. 181
     (3) (718 SE2d 300) (2011)
    (trial court properly determined mother’s gross income by extrapolating from
    information about her assets, her earning capacity given her specialized skills,
    her expenses, and other “relevant circumstances”); Banciu v. Banciu, 
    282 Ga. 616
     (1) (652 SE2d 552) (2007) (having concluded that father’s income on
    financial affidavit was understated, trial court properly considered father’s
    10
    earning capacity as gleaned from his ongoing business and history of expenses
    and lifestyle).
    Having thus construed OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B), and having reviewed
    the evidence of record, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
    did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Father had failed to present
    reliable evidence of his gross income, and we affirm its disposition vacating and
    remanding for the trial court to reassess whether to exercise its discretion to
    apply subsection (f) (4) (B) as we have herein construed it.
    Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S15G1896

Citation Numbers: 299 Ga. 332, 788 S.E.2d 387, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 449

Judges: Hunstein

Filed Date: 7/5/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/7/2024