Spriggs v. State ( 2015 )


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  • 296 Ga. 542
    FINAL COPY
    S14A1524. SPRIGGS v. THE STATE.
    BLACKWELL, Justice.
    Following his entry of a plea of guilty but mentally ill,1 Robert Timothy
    Spriggs, Jr., was convicted in October 2012 of murder and several other crimes
    and sentenced. About seven months later, Spriggs filed a motion to withdraw his
    plea, but the trial court dismissed his motion as untimely. After the time passed
    in which Spriggs might have appealed as of right from the dismissal of his
    motion to withdraw, Spriggs filed another motion, this one seeking leave to take
    an out-of-time appeal from the dismissal of the motion to withdraw. The trial
    court, however, denied that motion. Spriggs now appeals from the denial of his
    motion for leave to take an out-of-time appeal from the dismissal of his motion
    to withdraw. We affirm.
    We have recognized the right of a defendant to appeal from the refusal of
    a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, see Caine v. State, 
    266 Ga. 421
    , 421-422
    (467 SE2d 570) (1996), and we likewise have recognized that, when the right
    to appeal from such a refusal is frustrated by a denial of effective assistance of
    1
    See OCGA § 17-7-131 (g).
    counsel to which the defendant is constitutionally entitled, an out-of-time appeal
    is the appropriate remedy. See Carter v. Johnson, 
    278 Ga. 202
    , 205 (2) (599
    SE2d 170) (2004). See also Cobb v. State, 
    284 Ga. 74
    , 74 (663 SE2d 262)
    (2008). The problem is, a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty must be filed in
    the term of court in which the defendant is sentenced, and after the expiration
    of that term, “the trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of the
    plea.” Dupree v. State, 
    279 Ga. 613
    , 614 (619 SE2d 608) (2005) (citation
    omitted). Spriggs did not file his motion to withdraw until several terms of court
    after the conclusion of the term in which he was sentenced. See OCGA § 15-6-3
    (33) (terms of court for Rome Judicial Circuit). As such, his motion to withdraw
    was an untimely one over which the trial court lacked jurisdiction, see Dupree,
    
    279 Ga. at 614
    , and Spriggs was not entitled to the assistance of counsel in
    connection with such an untimely motion. See Barnes v. State, 
    293 Ga. 365
    , 366
    (744 SE2d 795) (2013). And in any event, Spriggs cannot show that he was
    prejudiced in any way by the allegedly ineffective assistance of his counsel as
    to an appeal from the dismissal of his motion to withdraw precisely because the
    trial court clearly did not err when it dismissed that untimely motion, see
    Dupree, 
    279 Ga. at 614
    , and if Spriggs had taken a timely appeal from the
    2
    dismissal, the dismissal would have been affirmed. Consequently, the trial court
    did not err when it denied Spriggs an out-of-time appeal from the dismissal of
    his untimely motion to withdraw his plea.
    Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
    Decided February 16, 2015.
    Murder. Floyd Superior Court. Before Judge Matthews.
    Robert T. Spriggs, Jr., pro se.
    Leigh E. Patterson, District Attorney, John F. McClellan, Jr., Assistant
    District Attorney, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway
    Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S14A1524

Filed Date: 2/16/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/17/2015