Bowman v. State ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 21, 2023
S22G0303. BOWMAN v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
In February 2014, a Paulding County grand jury indicted
Logan Adam Bowman for crimes against his daughter. At the next
term of court, Bowman properly invoked his right to a speedy trial
pursuant to the applicable speedy trial statute, OCGA § 17-7-170.
More than five years later, the State still had not brought him to
trial before 12 citizens sworn by the court or the court clerk to “well
and truly try the issue formed upon this bill of indictment . . . and a
true verdict give according to the evidence,” OCGA § 15-12-139, so
Bowman filed a motion for discharge and acquittal on speedy trial
grounds, which the trial court granted. The State appealed, and in
State v. Bowman, 361 Ga. App. 465 (863 SE2d 180) (2021), the Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that a “trial” by an unsworn group of
citizens satisfies the requirements of OCGA § 17-7-170. We granted
Bowman’s petition for certiorari and now reverse the Court of
Appeals’ judgment. 1
1. On August 30, 2013, the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office
arrested Bowman on suspicion of child molestation and incest.
Almost six months later, on February 17, 2014 – during the January
2014 term of the Paulding County Superior Court – the grand jury
indicted Bowman on one count of aggravated child molestation, six
1 The trial court granted Bowman’s motion for discharge and acquittal
on both statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds. See OCGA § 17-7-
170 (b) (“If the defendant is not tried when the demand for speedy trial is made
or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided that at both
court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant, the
defendant shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged
in the indictment or accusation. . . .”); U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial, by an
impartial jury . . . .”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a) (“In criminal
cases, the defendant shall have a . . . speedy trial by an impartial jury; and the
jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts.”). The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s order granting the motion, rejecting both Bowman’s
statutory and constitutional claims. In light of our conclusion that the trial
court correctly granted Bowman’s motion under the applicable speedy trial
statute, we need not separately address the Court of Appeals’ treatment of
Bowman’s constitutional claims. See State v. Bell, 274 Ga. 719, 720 (559 SE2d
477) (2002) (concluding that the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim
was moot once this Court held that he was entitled to discharge and acquittal
under the applicable speedy trial statute).
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counts of child molestation, and two counts of incest. On September
18, during the July 2014 term, Bowman filed a Demand for Speedy
Trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 and an Assertion of
Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial. 2
Later during the July 2014 term, starting on December 1, the
trial court held a proceeding at which the parties selected 12 citizens
from among those summoned for jury service to try Bowman’s case.
However, neither the court nor the court clerk administered the jury
oath required by OCGA § 15-12-139, which says:
In all criminal cases, the following oath shall be
administered to the trial jury: “You shall well and truly
try the issue formed upon this bill of indictment (or
accusation) between the State of Georgia and (name of
accused), who is charged with (here state the crime or
offense), and a true verdict give according to the evidence.
So help you God.” The judge or clerk shall administer the
oath to the jurors.
Instead, on the morning of December 2, the court gave preliminary
instructions, the parties made opening statements, and the State
2 The Paulding County Superior Court has two regular terms of court
each year, one starting the second Monday in January, and the other starting
the second Monday in July. See OCGA § 15-6-3 (31.1).
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called its first witness. On December 3, the State rested, and
Bowman called the first of two witnesses. Bowman himself did not
testify. On December 4, the parties made closing arguments, the
court gave a jury charge, and before noon, the 12 citizens retired to
deliberate.
On December 5, after deliberating for more than a day, the
unsworn group of 12 citizens purported to return verdicts acquitting
Bowman on seven of the nine counts of the indictment and finding
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of one count each of child
molestation and incest. On December 30, the court held a sentencing
hearing and sentenced Bowman to a total term of 50 years in prison
with the first 15 years to be served in confinement and the
remainder to be served on probation. Bowman filed a timely motion
for new trial.
More than four years later, at a status conference on March 7,
2019, Bowman requested the appointment of conflict counsel, and
the court granted his request. Conflict counsel filed an amended
motion for new trial arguing, among other things, that the complete
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failure to administer the jury oath was a structural error that
required setting aside the verdicts, Bowman’s judgment of
conviction, and his sentence. At a hearing, the State informed the
court that it had investigated the matter and determined that the
jury oath was never administered to the 12 citizens who purported
to decide Bowman’s case. The court entered a consent order setting
aside the verdicts, Bowman’s judgment of conviction, and his
sentence and reinstating his case to active status on the court’s trial
calendar.
On November 27, 2019, through new counsel, Bowman filed a
motion for discharge and acquittal on statutory and constitutional
speedy trial grounds. On the same day, the State filed a motion
seeking a declaratory order that the December 2014 proceeding
“constitute[d] a trial” for the purpose of satisfying Bowman’s
Demand for Speedy Trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 and the
speedy trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. The court held an
evidentiary hearing at which Bowman presented evidence that
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juries were impaneled and qualified to hear cases at the July 2014
term of court, the January 2015 term of court, and the nine
succeeding terms of court since then. On March 30, 2020, the court
entered an order granting Bowman’s motion for discharge and
acquittal, relying on this Court’s decisions in Slaughter v. State, 100
Ga. 323 (28 SE 159) (1897), and Spencer v. State, 281 Ga. 533 (640
SE2d 267) (2007). Two days later, the court ordered Bowman’s
immediate release after more than six-and-a-half years in custody.
The State appealed, and on October 5, 2021, the Court of
Appeals issued an opinion reversing the trial court’s order granting
Bowman’s motion for discharge and acquittal. The Court of Appeals
acknowledged that Bowman properly invoked his right under OCGA
§ 17-7-170 to be tried no later than the January 2015 term of court.
See Bowman, 361 Ga. App. at 466. However, citing dictionary
definitions of the word “trial,” the Court of Appeals held that
“Bowman was ‘tried’ or placed on ‘trial’ within the plain meaning” of
OCGA § 17-7-170 at the December 2014 proceeding. Id. at 472. The
Court of Appeals also rejected Bowman’s speedy trial claim based on
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the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
Georgia Constitution. See id. at 473-475.
We granted Bowman’s petition for certiorari and posed the
following question:
Was [Bowman] deprived of his statutory or constitutional
right to a speedy trial where the trial he received was held
before a jury that had not sworn the oath required by
OCGA § 15-12-139?
The case was orally argued in this Court on September 20, 2022.
2. The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of the
words “trial” and “tried” in OCGA § 17-7-170. Subsection (a) of
OCGA § 17-7-170 says:
Any defendant against whom a true bill of indictment or
an accusation is filed with the clerk for an offense not
affecting the defendant’s life may enter a demand for
speedy trial at the court term at which the indictment or
accusation is filed or at the next succeeding regular court
term thereafter . . . .
Subsection (b) then says:
If the defendant is not tried when the demand for speedy
trial is made or at the next succeeding regular court term
thereafter, provided that at both court terms there were
juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant, the
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defendant shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of
the offense charged in the indictment . . . . 3
In interpreting statutes, we “presume that the General
Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v.
Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
[A]nd so, we must read the statutory text in its most
natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the
English language would. The common and customary
usages of the words are important, but so is their context.
For context, we may look to other provisions of the same
statute, the structure and history of the whole statute,
and the other law – constitutional, statutory, and common
law alike – that forms the legal background of the
statutory provision in question.
Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (774 SE2d 688) (2015)
(citations and punctuation omitted). Thus, “[w]e construe statutes
in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of
a general and uniform system of jurisprudence.” In the Interest of
3The remaining subsections of the statute specify when a demand for
speedy trial expires, how the statute applies when a jury returns a verdict but
the judgment is reversed on appeal, how the statute applies when a case ends
in a mistrial, and how the statute applies when the defendant files a special
plea of incompetency to stand trial or the court conducts a trial on the
competency of the defendant. See OCGA § 17-7-170 (c) - (f).
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M. D. H., 300 Ga. 46, 53 (793 SE2d 49) (2016) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
Here, the Court of Appeals erred in failing to give proper
weight to the constitutional background of the applicable speedy
trial statute and this Court’s precedents. The “speedy trial” that
criminal defendants charged with noncapital crimes have the right
to demand under OCGA § 17-7-170 (a) is the same “speedy trial” that
is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI
(guaranteeing “right to a speedy . . . trial, by an impartial jury,” in
all criminal prosecutions); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI
(a) (guaranteeing that “[i]n criminal cases, the defendant shall have
a . . . speedy trial by an impartial jury”). See Durham v. State, 9 Ga.
306, 309 (1851) (stating that statutory predecessor to OCGA § 17-7-
170 “was wisely and humanely framed to carry into effect that
provision of the Constitution which declares, that ‘in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial’”). OCGA § 17-7-170 provides a mechanism that criminal
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defendants may employ to ensure that their constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy trial is not violated. See Denny v. State,
6 Ga. 491, 493 (1849) (“This law puts it in the power of the accused
to compel a trial, as early as the second term of the Court after the
bill is found, in cases not capital . . . .”).
More than 125 years ago, this Court held that administration
of the jury oath now codified at OCGA § 15-12-139 is an
indispensable prerequisite to a legally valid jury trial. See Slaughter
v. State, 100 Ga. 323, 324 (28 SE 159) (1897) (“It is essential to the
legality of any criminal trial that there should be a lawfully
constituted tribunal; and where such tribunal is composed in part of
a jury . . . how can the tribunal be considered as lawfully constituted
unless the jurors actually take this oath, either literally or in
substance?”). We held in Slaughter that because no attempt had
been made to comply with the jury oath statute, “there was no trial
at all, because there was no lawful jury. It was, in effect, no more
than a trial by a mob . . . .” Id. at 324-325. We further explained that
“[w]here . . . the requirements of the statute as to administering an
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oath to a jury trying a criminal case have been utterly ignored,”
there is a jurisdictional defect in the proceedings, because “there
must be a lawful tribunal; and where the trial is by jury, it must be
legally constituted, or it will be without authority to pass upon the
issues submitted.” Id. at 326.
Put differently, the administration of the jury oath is what
turns the 12 citizens selected to hear a criminal case into a jury
invested with the authority to decide whether the accused is guilty
of a crime. Without the oath, there is no jury; and without the jury,
there is no trial. See id. at 329 (“‘A jury is a body of [citizens]
summoned and sworn to decide upon the facts in issue at the trial.
Hence, [citizens] summoned as jurors must also be sworn before they
constitute an organized and competent tribunal to which the issues
in a cause can be submitted for trial.’” (citation omitted)). See also
Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 839-840 (134 SCt 2070, 188 LE2d
1112) (2014) (“Jeopardy attaches when a defendant is ‘put to trial,’
and in a jury trial, that is when a jury is empaneled and sworn.”
(citation and some punctuation omitted; emphasis added). A
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proceeding conducted before 12 citizens who have not taken the jury
oath is nothing more than an “attempted trial,” Spencer v. State, 281
Ga. 533, 535 (640 SE2d 267) (2007), which does not satisfy the
requirements of OCGA § 17-7-170.
The Court of Appeals’ holding that the December 2014
proceeding constituted a “trial” at which Bowman was “tried” for
purposes of OCGA § 17-7-170 cannot be squared with this Court’s
decisions in Slaughter and Spencer. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Pinson, J.,
disqualified.
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