Favors v. State , 296 Ga. 842 ( 2015 )

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 27, 2015
S14A1797. FAVORS v. THE STATE.
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
Appellant Michael Favors was convicted of murder, burglary, aggravated
assault on a peace officer, and other related offenses in connection with the
December 2003 shooting death of Theodore Barber. Favors now appeals,
contending the trial court erred in admitting certain witness testimony and in
sentencing him on certain counts, and claiming that his trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance. Though we find no error in the verdicts
and no ineffective assistance on the part of trial counsel, we do find error with
respect to the trial court’s merger of some offenses, and we therefore must
vacate and remand to the trial court for proper merger and resentencing.1
1
Favors and co-indictee Thomas Jerome McCoy were indicted by a Fulton
County grand jury in February 2004. Both were indicted on one count of malice
murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated assault, one count of
burglary, one count of theft by receiving, and two counts of firearm possession during
the commission of a felony; Favors was also indicted on one count of aggravated
assault on a peace officer. Favors and McCoy were jointly tried and convicted in
October 2005, but in October 2009 the trial court, citing evidentiary error, granted
On December 2, 2003, police officer Heather Davis responded to a 911
call reporting a burglary in progress at a Fulton County apartment complex.
Officer Davis arrived in her marked patrol vehicle with emergency lights
activated and, after parking and exiting the car, she heard the squeal of tires and
saw a burgundy Ford Expedition back out of a parking space, then drive towards
her. Driving the SUV was a young male with an afro and gold teeth, who was
ultimately identified as Appellant Michael Favors. Officer Davis, in full
uniform with her service weapon drawn, yelled at Favors to stop, but he did not,
and she was forced to jump out of the way of his oncoming vehicle. Officer
Davis and Officer Vernal Sutherland, who had also responded to the burglary
call, pursued the vehicle as it sped away and wrecked a short time later. Favors
their motions for new trial. The pair were re-tried in April 2012 and convicted on all
counts. Favors was sentenced to life imprisonment for malice murder, a five-year
concurrent term for theft by receiving, a consecutive five-year term for one of the two
firearm possession counts, a concurrent five-year term for the second firearm
possession count, and a concurrent five-year term for aggravated assault on a peace
officer. The trial court purported to “merge” the remaining counts for sentencing
purposes. Favors filed a timely motion for new trial on May 25, 2012 and amended
the motion on May 31, 2013. On September 18, 2013, the trial court granted the
motion on the theft by receiving count, finding a lack of evidence to support the
conviction, but denied the motion as to all other counts. Favors filed his notice of
appeal on October 13, 2013. His appeal was docketed to the September 2014 term
of this Court and thereafter was submitted for decision on the briefs.
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fled on foot into a wooded area, where Officer Sutherland found him hiding and
placed him under arrest.
Officer Davis returned to the apartment from which the 911 call had
originated to find the door kicked in and a male victim lying on the floor
bleeding from a fatal gunshot to the neck. Near the victim’s body lay an unused
16-gauge shotgun. Also found at the scene were a .40 caliber shell casing and
an unfired .40 caliber bullet. There was a shoe print on the broken door; the
print resembled the tread pattern on shoes belonging to Favors.
The burgundy Expedition was determined to have been stolen at gunpoint
from its owner a few days prior to the murder. A search of the vehicle
uncovered fingerprints matched to Favors as well as a candy wrapper, which
bore a fingerprint that was ultimately matched to McCoy.
Witness Taja Glenn, McCoy’s girlfriend at the time of the crimes, testified
at trial that on the day of the crimes, she and her friend Lakeesha Reese rode
with Favors and McCoy in a burgundy Expedition, which McCoy told Glenn
they had stolen. The foursome went to a nearby hotel, where they watched
television and played video games and prepared to spend the night. Both men
had guns with them. Glenn overheard Favors and McCoy talking about a plan
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to “hit a lick” – street slang for robbing someone – and the fact that the person
they intended to rob was not supposed to be at home. At some point, Favors and
McCoy left the hotel room, telling Glenn and Reese that if they were not back
by a certain time, Glenn and Reese should pack up their belongings and leave
the hotel. By the following morning, the men had not returned. In a later
telephone conversation, McCoy told Glenn that “the lick went bad,” and that the
victim had been at home with a gun and was shot.
The medical examiner testified that the victim had died from a gunshot
wound to the chest.
1. Though Favors has not enumerated the general grounds, we have
concluded that the evidence as summarized above was sufficient to enable a
rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Favors was
guilty of all the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Favors contends the trial court erred in permitting Glenn to testify
about (a) overhearing Favors and McCoy discussing their plan to “hit a lick”
and (b) McCoy’s subsequent statement to her that “the lick went bad” and the
victim was shot. Favors contends that both his conversation with McCoy and
4
McCoy’s later statement were inadmissible hearsay and that, in combination,
they violated Favors’ rights under the Confrontation Clause, see Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (88 SCt 1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968), because they
were statements by a non-testifying co-defendant implicating Favors in the
“lick.”
As an initial matter, the statements in question were both properly
admitted under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. See former
OCGA § 24-3-52 (once a conspiracy is shown, statements by one co-conspirator
during the pendency of the criminal project are admissible against all). The
evidence independent of these statements was sufficient to make “a prima facie
showing . . . of the existence of a corrupt agreement” between Favors and
McCoy. Brown v. State, 262 Ga. 223, 225 (2) (c) (416 SE2d 508) (1992).
Specifically, on the night of the crimes, the pair, both armed with guns, left the
hotel room together – having forewarned their female companions they might
not return – in the vehicle in which Favors subsequently attempted to flee the
crime scene. Given this prima facie evidence of a conspiracy between the co-
2
The co-conspirator hearsay exception is now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 (d)
(2) (E), effective for proceedings on and after January 1, 2013.
5
defendants, any statements made by McCoy “during the pendency of the
criminal project,” former OCGA § 24-3-5, were admissible against Favors. The
conversation between Favors and McCoy took place during the planning phase
of the crimes, clearly during the pendency of the conspiracy. McCoy’s
subsequent statement to Glenn was made in the post-crime concealment phase
of the conspiracy. See Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14 (2) (635 SE2d 723) (2006).
Contrary to Favors’ contention, the fact that Favors had been arrested by the
time McCoy made the second statement to Glenn does not render the conspiracy
at an end, because the effort to conceal McCoy’s identity as a participant in the
crimes was still ongoing. See id. at 727 (post-arrest statements made by co-
conspirators to third parties were properly admitted under the co-conspirator
hearsay exception); accord Perera v. State, 295 Ga. 880 (5) (763 SE2d 687)
(2014).
As to the Confrontation Clause issue, “[a] defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to be confronted by the witnesses against him is violated under Bruton
‘when co-defendants are tried jointly and the testimonial statement of a co-
defendant who does not testify at trial is used to implicate the other co-defendant
in the crime.’” Ardis v. State, 290 Ga. 58, 60 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 526) (2011).
6
Bruton thus applies only to out-of-court statements by non-testifying co-
defendants that are “testimonial” in nature. Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99 (4)
(745 SE2d 583) (2013). A statement is testimonial if its “primary purpose . . .
was to establish evidence that could be used in a future prosecution.” Pitts v.
State, 280 Ga. 288, 289 (627 SEd 17) (2006). Here, neither of the statements
in question were testimonial in nature; the first was a conversation in
furtherance of the criminal conspiracy, the second a statement made by a co-
conspirator to his girlfriend, and neither was made under circumstances
indicating the declarant’s intent to provide evidence for a future prosecution.
Indeed, “statements by a coconspirator made during and in furtherance of the
conspiracy are not considered ‘testimonial’ and therefore do not require any
constitutional scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause.” Paul S. Milich, Ga.
Rules of Evidence, § 18.11, p.717 (2014-2015 ed.). Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in admitting these statements.
3. Favors next contends that the trial court erred in admitting Officer
Davis’ testimony, in recounting her brush with the SUV in the apartment
parking lot, that she made eye contact with the vehicle’s driver and that “I know
he saw me.” Favors claims this statement was improper speculation that went
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to the heart of the offense of aggravated assault on a peace officer, which
requires knowledge of the victim’s identity as a police officer. See OCGA § 16-
5-21 (d); Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180 (2) (274 SE2d 455) (1981). We
disagree. “A witness who personally observed the event to which she is
testifying may state her impressions drawn from, and opinions based upon, the
facts and circumstances observed by her.” Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428, 430 (3)
(721 SE2d 892) (2012). See also Dunn v. State, 291 Ga. 551 (3) (732 SE2d
524) (2012) (lay witness is permitted to offer her opinion as to a defendant’s
behavior so long as it is based on personal observation and the witness states the
facts on which the opinion is based). Here, Officer Davis’ opinion that Favors
saw her was based on her personal observation of the driver of the SUV, with
whom, she testified, she made eye contact. Her testimony in this regard thus
was properly admitted, and this enumeration lacks merit.
4. Favors also contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his
trial counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that but for such
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (104
8
SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355 (3) (689 SE2d
280) (2010). To prove deficient performance, one must show that his attorney
“performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the
circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Romer v.
State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3) (745 SE2d 637) (2013). Courts reviewing
ineffectiveness claims must apply a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
fell within the wide range of reasonable professional performance. Id. Thus,
decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an
ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no
competent attorney would have followed such a course. Id. If the defendant
fails to satisfy either the “deficient performance” or the “prejudice” prong of the
Strickland test, this Court is not required to examine the other. See Green v.
State, 291 Ga. 579 (2) (731 SE2d 359) (2012).
(a) Favors first claims that counsel performed deficiently in effectively
conceding, during closing argument, Favors’ guilt on the theft by receiving and
aggravated assault on a peace officer counts. At the new trial hearing, trial
counsel testified that, after discussing possible defenses with Favors, he decided
as a matter of trial strategy to concede guilt on these two counts. As to the theft
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by receiving count, there was clearly no prejudice in this strategy, given that
Favors’ conviction on this count was ultimately vacated. As to the aggravated
assault on a peace officer, Favors cannot establish deficient performance, given
Officer Davis’ unequivocal and undisputed testimony recounting how Favors
drove the SUV at her after she exited her patrol car in the apartment complex
parking lot. In the face of such evidence, it was not objectively unreasonable to
concede guilt on this offense in an effort to avoid a conviction on the more
serious murder charges. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 395 (2) (b)
(696 SE2d 686) (2010) (in light of quantum of evidence presented on lesser
charge as opposed to more serious one, it was reasonable trial strategy to
concede guilt on lesser charge).
(b) Favors also contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
object to two specific statements the prosecutor made during closing argument.
Specifically, Favors asserts error in the prosecutor’s invitation to jurors to
“imagine what would be going through their minds, Mr. Barber’s mind, the
defendants’ minds” as they faced one another after the co-defendants broke
through Barber’s door. Favors claims this statement constitutes a prohibited
“golden rule” argument. See Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 494 (5) (651 SE2d 702)
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(2007) (explaining that a “golden rule” argument “‘either directly or by
implication, tells the jurors . . . that they should put themselves in the injured
person’s place and render such a verdict as they would wish to receive were they
in the (injured person’s) position’”). In addition, Favors takes issue with the
prosecutor’s statement to the effect that a juror’s job is “to seek the truth. It’s
not to look for doubt.” Favors claims this argument misstated the quantum of
proof required to convict and served to lessen jurors’ sense of responsibility.
Pretermitting whether either of these statements would have given rise to a valid
objection at trial, we find, given the isolated nature of each of these remarks and
the wide latitude afforded counsel in closing argument, that trial counsel did not
perform in an objectively unreasonable manner in failing to object thereto, nor
did Favors’ defense suffer prejudice therefrom. See Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 599
(2) (a) (669 SE2d 98) (2008) (counsel’s failure to object to “handful of
comments” by prosecutor during closing was neither objectively unreasonable
nor prejudicial to defense).
5. Favors asserts that the trial court erroneously sentenced him on the two
firearm possession counts. Though we disagree with Favors’ contention, we
have noted an error with regard to the merger of certain counts for judgment and
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sentencing. See Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49 (2) (766 SE2d 1) (2014) (merger
error, even if it is not raised by the parties, may be addressed by appellate court
sua sponte). As noted in footnote 1, supra, the trial court imposed a life
sentence for malice murder; two five-year terms for firearm possession, to run
concurrent with one another but consecutive with the life sentence; and a
concurrent five-year term for aggravated assault on a peace officer. The court
purported to “merge” the two felony murder verdicts, as well as the verdicts for
aggravated assault and burglary, into the malice murder verdict.
As to the two felony murder counts, the trial court merely used incorrect
nomenclature, as these verdicts did not “merge” into the malice murder verdict
but rather were vacated by operation of law. See Hulett, 296 Ga. at 53 (when
valid guilty verdict is returned on both malice murder and felony murder of the
same victim, defendant should be sentenced for malice murder, and alternative
felony murder verdicts stand vacated by operation of law). With the felony
murder verdicts vacated, the aggravated assault and burglary counts on which
the felony murder counts were predicated must be evaluated to determine
whether either of these verdicts merged as a matter of fact into the malice
murder. See id.
12
To determine whether one crime is included in another, and therefore
merges as a matter of fact, the court must assess “whether conviction for one of
the offenses is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the other crime.” Grissom v. State, No. S14A1431, 2015 WL
240477, at *3 (1) (decided Jan. 20, 2015). Both the malice murder and the
aggravated assault counts, as indicted, were premised on the act of shooting
Barber with a firearm. Because there is no evidence to suggest the occurrence
of “an aggravated assault independent of the act which caused the victim’s
death,” see Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 295 (3) (687 SE2d 427) (2009), we
conclude that the verdict on the aggravated assault alleged in Count 4 of the
indictment merges as a matter of fact with the malice murder verdict for
sentencing purposes. The burglary count, on the other hand, does not merge
with malice murder as a matter of law, because each crime by definition requires
proof of an element that the other does not. Compare OCGA § 16-5-1 (defining
malice murder), with OCGA § 16-7-1 (defining burglary).
Regarding the firearm possession counts, these counts were predicated,
respectively, on aggravated assault and burglary. We have held that OCGA §
16-11-106 permits one firearm possession conviction as to each victim in a
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criminal transaction under subsection (b) (1) as well as an additional conviction
for firearm possession during the commission of the crimes enumerated in
subsections (b) (2) through (b) (5). State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. 383 (2) (c) (589
SE2d 69) (2003). Because the crime of burglary falls within subsection (b) (2)
of OCGA § 16-11-106, it was thus proper for the trial court to impose separate
sentences on each of the two firearm possession counts.
Accordingly, we vacate the sentencing order insofar as it purported to
“merge” the two felony murder verdicts into the malice murder verdict; these
verdicts, rather, stand vacated by operation of law. We also vacate the
sentencing order insofar as it merged the burglary verdict into the malice murder
verdict, and we direct the trial court to enter judgment and impose a sentence
thereon.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part and case remanded for
resentencing. All the Justices concur.
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